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ABSTRACT
The argument of this thesis is that 'underclass' is a discourse of cultural and economic
division with both a genealogy and a geography. 'Underclass' is more than a cultural and
political construct of particular kinds of poor people and poor spaces at times of socio¬
economic crisis and change. The spaces of 'underclass' are not only those which are made
visible in hegemonic representations, revealed as the concrete spaces of named cities and
estates. They are also spaces of knowledge. These spaces are both symbolic and material
because their production is embodied and their effects are lived.
Following a critical discussion of the theories of knowledge developed by Michel Foucault,
Bruno Latour and Nancy Fraser, this thesis shows the spaces of 'underclass' to be produced
by the workings of power/knowledge, practiced by socially embedded individuals and
situated within networks of relations. They are shown to be connected by relations of
power/knowledge in a process of contestation over contemporary notions of welfare.
The delineation of new relationships between gender and economy, and between the
'independent' and the 'dependent' (primarily 'non-working' parents, children and long term
benefit recipients) is argued to be central to 'underclass' discourse. This thesis shows how
the discourse has partly developed through the work of the mainstream political Left on
notions of 'Stakeholding' and 'Welfare to Work', and partly through prominent feminist
commentaries on poor, working class masculinities and the 'needs' and 'wants' of single
mothers. These hegemonic knowledges are problematised specifically in terms of their class
location and contested through both my own and two filmic narratives of working class
poverty. In this thesis these narratives are presented as subjugated knowledges of the
discourse of 'underclass' which refuse and accuse traditional theories and practices of
authoritative knowledge. They are argued to challenge the power-laden binaries of fact and
affect, of work and care, of public and private, of the professional and the unqualified; and
to suggest a need for the strategic engagement of a socialist feminist politics that is attuned
to the classed and gendered complexities of 'underclass' discourse.
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PREFACE
During the 1990s the idea of a British 'underclass' emerged through a dominant motif of decay and
dereliction in the social fabric. A central part of its production can be located in the realms of press
and broadcasting media, often in relation to other authoritative cultural representations in politics
and in academia. These productions partly exist as a visual regime of meaning, as particular ways
of seeing people and places cast as 'other'. Visions of 'underclass' have become part of personal,
public and political imaginations in 1990s Britain. They are presented as entertainment in populist
crime based television programmes where police-camera raids are commonplace and where closed
circuit televisions supply additional 'evidence'. They are provided as the backdrop for
announcements of new policy initiatives, and as illustrations for social affairs programming. The
visions are both 'real' and artistic, ordinary and dramatic. In order to convey a sense of the tenor of
the themes and meanings which characterise these images I am presenting a number of newspaper
representations as a preface to the thesis. The kind of visibilities they construct are based upon
reductive characterisations whose hallmark is a stamp of class difference as division from the rest
of 'us', but also as warning of what 'we' may become. This is a discourse of familial disorder and
dysfunction; of dangerous masculinities and dependent femininities; of anti-social behaviour; and
of moral and ecological decay. The photographs are accompanied by different parts of a wider
media narrative of 'underclass' whose story is ongoing.
This thesis aims to establish different ways of seeing and knowing the people and places of
'underclass' by looking at some of the practices through which 'underclass' is produced. My
choice has been to mainly look at the practices and people involved in representing (both
politically and culturally) the people and places of 'underclass'. These practices and people are not
located within any one professional realm or political allegiance. A central part of the discourse
analysis that I undertake involves the people and practices of politically Left-wing arenas.
To begin with I looked to the political Left with high expectations: my own politics are most at
home there and would be central to the analyses I intended. Some prominent ideas and debates on
the political Left therefore became part of the subject of my research as 'the thing to be
problematised', and a source of different hopes. As a simultaneously critical and hopeful
engagement with political discourse this thesis has been difficult to think and write about in both
personal and political terms. Completing the writing through a period of time that I had waited a
long time for - namely the election of the first Labour government for 18 years - I found myself
continually hoping that politically things would change, and that I would have to change some of
my estimations and arguments. Apparently Left-wing ideas for a citizenship based on 'rights and
responsibilities' and the desirability of certain kinds of 'social inclusion' were being produced
apace, directly and indirectly referring to the behaviour of the poor and the idea that they should
do more to help themselves and society. The warning signs of such developments were obviously
there for the reading before the election, as Labour's flirtation with 'Communitarianism'
overlapped with the Conservative's call to go 'Back to Basics'. Indeed I had read them as part of
my original research proposal, albeit with a kind of wilful optimism that they would develop in
another direction. In many ways this thesis is about tracing the development of these ideas, as they
have been variously translated and combined with others, through the workings of 'underclass'
discourse. In this tracing process I have not been able to completely shed the wilful optimism that I
first started with. It continues in my readings of other signs. Ongoing and growing criticisms of the
direction of recent welfare reform as a failure of political imagination and understanding are part
of a political process (within and outside of the Labour party) that remains hopefully unsettled.
This thesis is part of that resistance, as a resistance of ideas expressed in terms of a socialist
feminist geography.
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Source: The Observer 19.11.95 p9
'Britain's moral economy was born in the North, and its death has been felt there first...
Gun fights in Manchester's Moss Side, ram-raiding in Newcastle, the murder of James Bulger
on Merseyside, the Liverpool school at the bottom of John Patten's league table, the media-
hyped home alone children of Leeds, the three young children murdered in a house fire at
Peterlee... Both states, industrial and welfare have passed to the wind. The plants and mills
are derelict, the pits closed, the yards grass-grown ... In their place heritage centres,
hypermarkets, high-technology companies, venture capital, private health insurance, the
'lean state'. So great a change cannot be without its moral reverberations... Are Hillsborough
and Bulger - or, rather their petty but far more numerous and significant analogues -
grim after-shocks of the collapse of a peculiarly English moral economy?'
('The World We Have Lost' The Independent 27.3.94 p21)
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Source: The Observer 3.11.96 p26
'Institutions such as family, school and community which once gave children, regardless
of background, a sense of discipline and moral compass, have declined in their ability to
impart those values. Where all three have deteriorated, the result is the social anarchy
and squalor of today's 'sink' estates, inhabited by a largely white underclass which
has come to resemble in crime, violence, illegitimacy, welfare dependency and general
hopelessness, the black ghettos of urban America.'
('The Brutality of Britain' The Sunday Times 21.2.93 Section 2 p3)
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Source: The Observer 3.11.96 p27
'The underclass is not a degree of poverty; it does not refer to the poorest of the poor.
It is a type of poverty: it covers those who no longer share the norms and aspirations
of the rest of society, who have never known the traditional two parent family, who are
prone to abuse drugs and alcohol at the earliest opportunity, who do poorly at school
and who are quick to resort to disorderly behaviour and crime.'
(The poor may be richer but the underclass is growing' The Sunday Times 28.5.95 p3)
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Source: The Observer 14.5.95 p25
'Instead of saying 'you're on the margins of society, we're going to criticise you as a
scrounger', which is what the previous government did, we're saying, 'we know you want to
work, you want to be better off for your sake and for your children's sake and we're going to
help you.'
(Harriet Harnian, Minister for Social Security, BBC Panorama 29.9.97)
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Source: The Observer 27.10.96 pl6
'One fascinating insight into possible reasons why these children commit serious crimes comes
from Valerie Sinason, a consultant child psychotherapist at London's Tavistock Institute.
She is concerned about the damaging effect caused by incestuous relationships between single
mothers and their sons: 'I've seen a growth in violent behaviour by boys who were brought up
with no male figure. They feel close, dangerously close to their mothers and are frightened of
it. The mother unconsciously sees the male child as the person who should be in her bed to
make up for the missing man. The boy recognises there is something unconsciously incestuous.
They start bullying women and girls.'




GENEALOGY AND GEOGRAPHY: TRACING AND SPACING THE
CONTEMPORARY DISCOURSE OF 'UNDERCLASS'
This chapter introduces the idea of 'underclass' as a production of power/knowledge.
It starts by tracing the idea as a way of knowing groups of poor people and the places
in which they live. Poor people and places have long been the object of knowledge in
social scientific templates of research and continue to be so in the contemporary period
through the discourse of 'underclass'. In this chapter, the process of knowledge
production around 'underclass' is argued to be symbolic and material: it is through
symbolic and material practices that discourse works and is productive. Moreover, that
productivity can be conceived in terms of power: power is practiced throughout the
social space in networks of relations. The terms and concepts through which this
theorisation of discourse proceeds are derived from Foucauldian and feminist theories
of knowledge, and are used to construct an image of social space as discourse.
Foucault's theory of genealogy in combination with Haraway's theory of situated
knowledge, are outlined as the epistemological and methodological framework for the
chapters that follow. Their normative perspective is outlined with reference to Fraser's
non-reductive socialist feminist politics of welfare.
In the 1990s a dominant notion of 'underclass' as an excrescence of British culture
and society has become a central interest of government, academia and the media. It has
become the subject, indeed the common denominator of major political and cultural debates
in relation to welfare, work, crime and the family. As a way of crystallising a number of
social, economic and cultural issues into one, 'underclass' is primarily about the problematic
nature of particular poor groups in relation to the rest of society. Definitions and
explanations for the nature of 'underclass' are extensive. They are contradictory and often
ambiguous but predominantly they are of a reformative kind: whatever its genesis and
whoever is to blame, 'underclass' is a problem about which something has to be done. This
thesis enters a debate on 'underclass' which has tended to produce oppositions: those for or
against the idea and those for or against the existence of the people of 'underclass'. In many
ways the debate can be seen as a play of questions about the relationship between ideas and
realities of poverty. My starting position is that 'underclass' exists at the level of ideas and
in material practice and that it has come into being through discourse.
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The 'underclass' debate has developed along populist and academic lines which
intersect at particular points in such a way that distinctions between the two are difficult to
maintain. Nevertheless it is possible to identify the development of the idea within British
sociology over the last 20 years via some prominent texts: the work of Anthony Giddens in
the 1970s on types of chronic unemployment that have a primarily cultural genesis
introduced the idea into mainstream sociology; the work of John Rex in the 1980s developed
the idea in a specifically racial context in relation to Black and White areas of Birmingham;
and in the 1990s the work of Lydia Morris and William Runciman have both sought to
dispose of the idea on the grounds that it is empirically unsustainable.1 These writings have
all sought to locate 'underclass' in structural approaches to the study of society by focusing
on its placement within classificatory systems and class formations.
The more populist variants of the debate have focused on 'underclass' as a social
phenomenon that relates to the contemporary state of society rather than as a class grouping
per se. The work of Charles Murray is most well known amongst these commentators for his
linking of criminality, illegitimacy and unemployment to the over generosity of welfare
provisions. 'Welfare' is presented as having promoted moral depravity by making it rational
for people to avoid work and marriage.2 In a more liberal vein the commentaries of Ralf
Dahrendorf have proffered the idea of 'underclass' as decay within the wider social fabric
induced by government under action on unemployment.3
Academic detractors of the idea of 'underclass' rather than its structural integrity as
a residual class location have deployed analyses of moral panic, backlash and ideological
construct. The problems of the terminology are in this respect well rehearsed.4 The concept
of 'underclass' that I am using in this thesis fits none of those approaches but does require
its referent to be identified. 'Underclass' is generally held to refer to particular social groups
at the base of the working class whose characteristics are those of long term unemployment/
highly irregular employment, single parenthood and criminality where some or all of those
characteristics are tendentially if not causally related.3 Within these groups the order of the
1 Giddens.A (1973) The Class Structure of The Advanced Societies London: Hutchinson; Rex.J (1983)
Race Relations in Sociological Theory London: Routledge; Morris.L (1993) Is there a British
Underclass? p404-413 Journal of Urban and Regional Research vol. 17; Runciman.W.G (1990) How
many classes are there in contemporary British Society? p377-396 Sociology 24
2
Murray.C (1990) The Emerging British Underclass London: IEA
3 Dahrendorf.R (1992) Footnotes To The Discussion p55-58 Smith.D.J (ed.) Understanding The
Underclass London: PSI
4 See for example Gans.H (1993) 'From 'underclass' to 'undercaste': some observations about the
future of the post-industrial economy and its major victims' p327-35 International Journal of Urban
and Regional Research 17; Bagguley.P and Mann.K (1992) Idle Thieving Bastards: Scholarly
Representations of the Underclass pi 13-126 Work, Employment and Society 6(1)
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According to the Chief Research Officer at the Economic and Social Research Council's Research
Centre on Micro-Social Change this group made up about 10% of the population at the beginning of
3
two parent family, the work ethic and respect for private property is seen to be undermined.
More than an effect of their economic position, 'underclass' behaviours are deemed to be
cultural and motivational. Importantly this means that emphasis is given to 'the problem of
underclass' rather than the problems of particular social groups. Following this
understanding, solutions to 'the problem' include imposing censure, stricture, and
compulsions upon the behaviour of particular groups to force them to change or to make
particular lifestyles unsustainable in practical and financial terms. Primary among these
'solutions' are changes to welfare provisions and procedures in areas of Social Security and
youth crime management. The particular focus of my thesis is therefore those welfare
related parts of 'underclass' discourse that encompass issues of work, family, community
and contemporary class and gender relations. In this respect the term 'underclass' itself is
not of primary concern. A critique of the terminology of 'underclass' - its etymology,
nuances in its use, and arguments against its use - is not entered into. My interest is rather
the different kinds of spaces through which 'underclass' is constituted as a changing regime
of ideas, policies and practices. This conception of 'underclass' as discourse is developed as
much more than an analysis of terminology. Indeed in some of the spaces that I am
analysing the term itself is not used frequently or directly. Of more importance are those
contemporary ideas, debates and practices which embed contemporary knowledges about
the 'non-working' poor as 'underclass' widely and deeply in different kinds of social space.
'Underclass' is a highly mutable term: it is everywhere and nowhere, and its
production is historically contingent. In historically shifting discourses around 'the
vagabond', 'the undeserving poor', 'the scrounger', 'the welfare dependant', and 'the
socially excluded' there are marked continuities in the kind of issues that constitute modern
knowledges and practices around 'non-working' others. However, historically situated
incarnations of the 'non-working' poor are also importantly differentiated in ways that
necessitate time-space specific discourse analyses. In this thesis use of the term 'underclass'
marks common points of settlement in a range of disparate contemporary debates,
representations and practices. Their interconnections are presented as points of stability and
coherence which are variously related to some dominant policy formulations. These points
of settlement do not necessarily have the same genesis and are often arrived at via different
motivations, routes and power-vested relations. Their configuration produces 'underclass' as
a complex and multiply sourced discourse with coherences, contradictions and conflicts. It
is not however a formless, arbitrary production without consequence. Some points of
settlement are more dominant in the discourse than others, and they are more readily related
the 1990s, having doubled from 5% in 1979. See Buck.N (1992) Labour Market Inactivity and
Polarisation p9-21 Smith.D.J (ed.) Understanding the Underclass London: PSI
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to particular policy trajectories. This thesis identifies significant points of settlement
specifically around welfare-related debates, practices and policies in 1990s Britain.
It is important to note at this early point that I am not dealing with the racialised
nature of this discourse. This is partly because the dominant discourse in Britain (as opposed
to in America) has not constructed 'underclass' in racial terms. Although many of those
identified as 'underclass' are black, or from ethnic minorities, it is specifically the class and
gender identity of poor, long term benefit claimants living on council estates that is most
strongly figured in dominant cultural and political representations. The work of Charles
Murray has made a point of specifying the British problem of 'underclass' as one of
predominantly white, working class cultures which he terms the 'New Rabble'. He asserts
that 'underclass' is not 'mainly a black problem', because increasing illegitimacy rates as
the primary 'underclass' characteristic are overwhelmingly accounted for by whites. 6 In his
politically well connected writings on 'underclass', Frank Field MP, has also been keen to
emphasise that 'there is no racial bias to Britain's underclass'.7 The two central figures of
'underclass' discourse are held to be the 'benefit dependent' single mother and the
unemployed, often 'criminal' young man of British council estates. Their positioning in
relation to each other and as possessing a number of problematic social characteristics,
produces them as the embodiment of 'underclass', the primary targets of policies for social
change. The nature of that change is a mix of oppressive, progressive and contradictory
elements whose configuration is the subject of the chapters that follow.
My framework of analysis is partly derived from elements of Michel Foucault's
work and partly from the work of contemporary feminist writers Nancy Fraser and Donna
Haraway. In common with Foucault, Haraway and Fraser are interested in foregrounding
issues about how, why and by whom knowledge is produced, with regard to the role of
knowledge in the subjectification of the individual and the production of society. My
approach to 'underclass' is therefore through questions and arguments about the production
of knowledge itself. In this respect it is part of wider debates in post-structuralist theory
about what constitutes 'authoritative' knowledge. Within geography the use of post-
structural theories in relation to issues of welfare marks a point of departure from more
traditional approaches. I intend to use these theories to question a number of prevalent ideas
about how 'welfare' can be researched, theorised and indeed practiced in the 'real world'.
6
Murray .C (1996) 'The Emerging British Underclass' p23-53 Charles Murray and the Underclass:
The Developing Debate London: Institute of Economic Affairs, Choice in Welfare No. 33 p29
7 Field.F (1996) 'Britain's Underclass': Countering the Growth' p57-65 Charles Murray and the
Underclass: The Developing the Debate London: Institute of Economic Affairs, Choice in Welfare
No. 33 p57
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The structure of this introductory chapter has four main parts. The first locates
'underclass' within a welfare discourse that has developed as part of the genealogical
project of modernity. The second regards that development as part of a dominant
epistemology through which 'underclass' continues to be known, and it presents a critique of
that way of knowing through the work of Foucault and Haraway. The third part develops
those philosophical critiques as the methodology on which the thesis is based - namely a
discourse analysis of 'underclass'. The final part returns to questions about the relation
between modernity and welfare in order to clarify the political animus of the thesis and the
way that I intend to write it.
1: GENEALOGY
Modernity and Welfare
The provenance of the terminology of 'underclass' is historical, commonly associated
with ideas about the 'dangerous classes' of nineteenth century industrial England, and in
Marxist history with the lumpen proletariat.8 Its contemporary use is a continuous part of
that history, not as an expression of determined class structures and crises in capitalist
accumulation but in terms of certain patterned continuities in social, economic and cultural
relations in which particular groups can be classed in such a way that they are cast as
outside of 'normal society'. The identification of such patterns does not amount to a thesis
that 'it's all happening again' according to an ideological template of capitalism's cyclical
nature or a populist 'fin de siecle' historicism. Rather I am arguing that the nature of
discourse is found in the specific historical and spatial details of its production. In this thesis
'underclass' discourse is specified and situated in the 'historically present' spaces of 1990s
Britain.
My starting point aims to historically locate the mutual constitution of modernity
and welfare via an engagement with the work of Michel Foucault. It is through the
meanings, practices and politics of those two concepts that the contemporary discourse of
'underclass' can be situated in time and space.
The beginning of this inquiry is therefore not an historical past but an historical
present that is about welfare as a centrally constitutive part of modern society. Welfare and
modernity are linked through the historical period in which they emerged and which they
partly created, and as part of a set of philosophical ideas about that period as the 'Age of
Enlightenment'. This historical-philosophical link is explicated in Foucault's middle work
as he traces the origins of social practices surrounding delinquency, madness and sexuality
8 See Stedman-Jones.G (1984) Outcast London London: Penguin
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as the basis of an emergent, enlightened modern society.9 In those social practices he
discerns the processes of subjectification through which modern society could be created.
Such practices were legitimated via an Enlightenment language of Reason, Science and
Truth, a language that came to be seen as the guarantor of order.
Foucault's Discipline and Punish is my primary source for constructing a
genealogical approach to the study of 'underclass' discourse. The approach is principally
concerned to understand the role of power/knowledge in the constitution of modern society
and the modem subject. The formative nature of that constitutive process - traced in
Discipline and Punish via penal practices - can be identified as a way of knowing and
ordering 'the social' which became instituted in a plethora of modern social practices.
Foucault traces these practices to an historical period in which burgeoning and shifting
populations were brought under administrative and professional control through
management practices based on the application of scientific knowledges. He argues that
from the late eighteenth century onwards these knowledges were developed in human
sciences - such as psychology, psychiatry, demography and criminology - which could be
practiced on individuals and groups of 'disordered' people. In this way the role of
knowledge became central to the emergence of modem society as disciplinary society.
Indeed knowledge is so intrinsic to the workings of this society that it can be seen as the
very arm of power so that power/knowledge becomes the modus operandi of governance in
modem, disciplinary society. However it is not a seamlessly successful 'delivery system':
the social practices of modem society aim to be disciplinary but their effects are in no way
guaranteed, the social is not necessarily disciplined. Moreover, the workings of
power/knowledge are productive rather than being purely repressive. Power/knowledge is an
apparatus through which modern subjects as the building blocks of modem society are
partly made, but the nature of that making is ultimately undetermined. The nature of social
being is contingent, outcomes are more or less likely according to specific circumstances
rather than being pre-determined effects of power as 'negative force':
'We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it
'excludes', it 'represses', it 'censors', it 'abstracts', it 'masks', it 'conceals'. In fact,
power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of
tmth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this
production'.10
The 'individual' as the constitutive subject of modem society becomes the site of
power, produced through the workings of power. Part of the role of knowledge in those
9 Foucault.M (1978) The History ofSexuality vol. 1 London: Penguin; (1973) The Birth of the Clinic:
An Archaeology ofMedical Perception London: Routledge; (1977) Discipline and Punish: The Birth
of the Prison London: Penguin
10
Foucault, Discipline and Punish pi94
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workings is to produce the subject as an object of knowledge who can then be classified and
ordered - literally 'subjected' - through knowledge based social practices. Thus towards the
end of his writing career Foucault claims that his oeuvre has been the development of a
theory of the subject:
'My objective... has been to create a history of the different modes by which in our
culture, human beings are made subjects... Thus it is not power, but the subject,
which is the general theme ofmy research'.11
What can such a theory say about the subject of 'underclass'? First of all it sees the
individual subject of 'underclass' as a production, not as something that has come into being
by virtue of essential natures and internal drives. Second, it sees that subject specifically as a
production of power/knowledge through which s/he is objectified. This is clearly about
much more than a negative representation imposed on an already constituted subject, it is
about a process of individual and social becoming. Foucault identifies three 'modes of
objectification' as central to the production of the modern subject. The first is 'those modes
of inquiry which try to give themselves the status of sciences'.12 These are the human
sciences which position the subject as an object of study and intervention. The second is the
mode of 'dividing practices' through which the subject is positioned together with or apart
from others like him/her, not like him/her according to binary constructions such as
mad/sane, dangerous/harmless, abnormal/normal.13 In the third mode it is by seeing
him/herself as an object that the human being becomes a subject as the other two modes fold
into his/her subjectivity. Such modes of subjectification can be seen as central to the
production of the subject of 'underclass' as a subject who is researched as an object of
knowledge in whom various characteristics combine; a subject who is differentiated from
others in society - the 'working', the married, the reproductively and behaviourally normal;
and a subject who is at least partly recognised by him/herself and others in the descriptions
that proliferate around him/her. We can conceptualise 'underclass' as the product of a
power/knowledge regime in which modem practices of welfare are partly constitutive of the
subject of 'underclass' and of society in the contemporary period.
In Discipline and Punish Foucault provides a substantive history of the dual
constitution of modem society and the 'carceral network' in which embryonic welfare
practices are part of the carceral skein. His elaboration of the emergence of a disciplinary
society from the middle of the eighteenth century via a new political form of power
developed to replace the sovereign mle of the king, is more than a matter of historical
11
Foucault.M (1982) The Subject and Power p208-209 in Dreyfus.H.L and Rabinow.P (eds.) Michel
Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics Sussex: Harvester Press
12
Foucault, The Subject and Power p208
13
Foucault, Discipline and Punish pi99
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interest. Through that historical narrative Foucault develops a conception of modern power
whose nature remains fundamental to modern Western governance. During this period of
emergent nation-statehood and of capitalism the problematic of the State was the
introduction of economy and order throughout the social body. Indeed the project was to
create 'society' and in Foucault's telling it proceeded via practices of discipline and
punishment. From having been an act against the sovereign, 'crime' was produced as an act
against 'society' through the disorder that it introduced. It would be punished by the will of
the general citizenship instituted in Law. However the constitution of 'society' was about
more than just penal power although that was part of its originary moment. As the first State
led attempt to regulate 'Life' for the good of society its principles and practices would be
replicated throughout the social body in a whole new mode of Western governance.
Sociological literatures have detailed a great deal of what that entailed in the genesis
of modern welfare institutions and practices - with an emphasis on the historical
development of oppressive welfare practices.14 In this respect they engage less with
Foucault's conception of power as productive than with its specifically oppressive nature. In
turn they tend to elide much of the contradictory nature of welfare as partly constituted
through a progressive political struggle for resources between unequal social groups. The
latter is not a subject that Foucault deals with either, but which is clearly part of another
history of the class relations of welfare's development.15 It is those two productive and
political elements of power relations working in the contemporary discourse of 'underclass'
that I intend to bring out in my analysis.
The emergence of particular kinds of power/knowledge formations with society as
their project has a strong conceptual purchase on the contemporary discourse of
'underclass'. It allows an understanding of the productive nature of discourse as a more
complex notion of 'underclass' than allowed in a traditional sociologies of moral panic and
social control. Moreover, the originary modern processes of knowledge production and
social management traced in Discipline and Punish have a substantive bearing on the way
problems of 'social disorder' have been defined and institutionalised. 'Underclass' is
currently pitched as a problem incumbent on society that requires management to ensure
general social, economic, political and cultural well-being. A central part of that
management is a requirement for knowledge about 'underclass': who are they? where do
14 Cohen.S (1985) Visions ofSocial Control: Crime, Punishment and Classification Cambridge: Polity
Press; Donzelot.J (1980) The Policing ofFamilies London: Hutchinson; Garland.D (1985)
Punishment and Welfare: A History ofPenal Strategies Aldershot: Gower; Squires.P (1990) Anti-
Social Policy: Welfare, Ideology and the Disciplinary State London: Harvester Wheatsheaf; Dean.H
(1991) Social Security and Social Control London: Routledge; Fox Piven.F and Cloward.R.A (1971)
Regulating The Poor: The Functions ofPublic Welfare London: Tavistock Publications
15 See Brenner.J and Ramas.M (1984) 'Rethinking Women's Oppression' p33-71 New Left Review
144 especially p63-68
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they live? what are they like? The quest for a particular kind of knowledge becomes the
quest for a particular kind of social order.
In Discipline and Punish the modem quest for social order is traced through the
mutually productive relationship between social science and modem society. Punishment as
a means of social ordering and one particular technology of power, worked through
knowledge, and knowledge was produced through scientific practices of observation,
examination, measurement and classification. The 'scientific' axiom justified and facilitated
the governance of human society as the rational management of populations for the good of
the whole. Although the social scientific rhetoric of 'society' came to stand for the social
body as a whole, in practice social management was the management of those groups of
people constituted as the 'problems' of society, as the objects of social scientific discourses.
'The social' was therefore constituted as a particular sort of space: highly constructed by
powerful discourses of human science and differentiated by social group.
In Discipline and Punish the nature of that social space is expressed
paradigmatically in the form of the Panopticon. In the domed inward facing architecture of
the Panopticon (originally conceived by Jeremy Bentham as a model for the ideal prison),
surveillance of the many could be facilitated by the central strategic location of the few. The
Panopticon can be seen as a metaphor for a social space in which problems of society are
temporally fixed on particular groups, and power is institutionalised in that stability:
'In appearance, it is merely the solution of a technical problem; but, through it, a
whole type of society emerges.'16
The type of society that emerged from this constmction of social space was a modern
disciplinary society, later cast as a modem welfare society whose representation is no longer
based on the threat of punishment but on the promise of general well being. Of course in
modem social practice those two elements are of a piece, with welfare and penal
representations and procedures working in relation to each other. Welfare practices of
modem society survey the social space to spotlight and intervene in the life of problematic
subjects as those who need help of one kind or another.
Of central importance to the workings of the Panopticon is that all those within its
space are subject to a particular positioning which means that the relation between
differently positioned subjects is mutually constitutive. That mutuality is the imperative of
its working. Moreover the workings of power within this social space do not rely on any
particular person deploying power:
'Power has its principle... in an arrangement whose internal mechanisms produce
the relation in which individuals are caught up.'17
16
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In this formation the subjects of the Panopticon do not have to be worked upon directly
because awareness of generalised surveillance ensures the automatic functioning of power,
thus:
'...the inmates [are] caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the
bearers.'18
So in the wider social body the effect of punishing (or helping) the few is to discipline the
many in the virtues of self-policing and self-help.
The modern drive to rationalise life in all its aspects took as its model the mode of
governance already instituted in the management of 'criminal' populations. Scientifically
informed policy construction, professional and bureaucratic administration, statutory
intervention and therapeutic management of particular 'cases' would become a formulaic
process whose product would be a self-regulating modern individual. In their originary
period these processes did not distinguish between 'problems' of the poor and of the
criminal. Problems of 'vagabondage' defined through a mix of newly emergent physical and
moral classifications around disease, immorality, crime and indigence emerged as problems
in relation to increasing 'property crimes'.19 The social transformations of the late
eighteenth century brought about through the development of capitalism instituted great
increases in wealth and a new status and legal protection for property. They also effected the
displacement of large numbers of peasants, rendered as shifting populations who roamed the
countryside. Intrinsic to the new discourse of property was the discourse of 'vagabondage':
the threat of the vagabond necessitating a 'new severity' towards the poor in general:
'...stricter methods of surveillance, a tighter partitioning of the population, more
efficient techniques of locating and obtaining information.'20
Although the vagabond is the initial and most visible target of these new practices, closely
followed by poor populations in general, their still wider target is the mindset of all. The
opportunities for disorder of multiple kinds are so multiplied by the proliferation of
commodity forms and other material expressions of wealth that discipline has to be installed
psychologically throughout the population rather than policed individually. Power must
work ubiquitously in capillaries of networks deeply embedded in the individual and social
body:
'...the point of application of this power... is the mind or rather a play of
representations and signs circulating discreetly but necessarily and evidently in the
minds of all.'21
18
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'The gentle way in punishment' comes to rest on a technology of representation whose
desired object is the non-criminal, healthy and willing worker: 'the citizen'.22 The criminal
is remade as the citizen via a pedagogy of work, installed in the psyche of the modern
subject:
'This useful pedagogy would revive for the lazy individual a liking for work, force
him back into a system of interests in which labour would be more advantageous
than laziness, form around him a small, miniature, simplified, coercive society in
which the maxim, 'he who wants to live must work', would be clearly revealed.'23
The modern individual, the building block of modern society, would be produced through
'work' as defined by a universal pedagogy. Those outside of such work would be cast as
being outside of modern society, lacking what it took to be 'modern'. The 'vagabond' was
one such figure, outside of 'society' at the point of its inception, an excrescence of massive
social change in the late eighteenth century. Through the definitions, processes and practices
of law, economy, politics and the human sciences, the 'vagabond' was produced as the
originary non-working and dangerous outsider of modern society. The historical production
of the non-working individual is therefore part of the production of modern society.
Fundamental to both modern subject and modern society are the dualistic constructions of
Enlightenment rationality through which both emerged. Modernity and welfare are a product
of this dualistic rationality, positioning and adjudicating between the individual and society,
the good and the bad, the law abiding and the delinquent, the healthy and the sick, the
working and the non-working. Poverty and criminality are instituted as part of the bad and
relatedly so through a lack of 'work' as the means of subsistence. However, the poor and the
criminal are amenable to reform through the application of particular kinds of knowledge
and management to themselves as individuals, to particular groups and to society as a whole.
Many elements of these practices of knowledge production and social management are
historically continuous in the contemporary period in cultural and institutional ways of
seeing, knowing and dealing with 'problematic' social groups. Moreover, the philosophical
worldview through which they emerged continues as the Western episteme, a meta-theory of
knowledge that is foundational to the pedagogic practices, institutions and dominant values
of modern society.
Discipline and Punish works as a critique of the Western episteme and the modern
social practices that are its modus operandi. However it is not explicitly normative, there are
no judgements about the 'good' and 'bad' of modernity. The critique raises a difficult
question about welfare's 'modern' nature and the extent to which it fulfils any of the
positive, partly 'emancipatory' potential of modernity. These are questions that Foucault
22
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leaves unaddressed through an implicitly oppositional regard for modernity. In contrast, the
analysis of 'underclass' that I am proposing is explicit in the politics of its epistemology and
in its regard for 'welfare'. It does not represent a wholesale rejection of either the ideas or
the practices of modern society. Indeed a wholesale de(con)struction of the ideas and
practices of 'welfare' as part of that society is perhaps my primary reason for not choosing
that approach. However, part of my approach is to reject many of the ways in which
'welfare' has been historically, and is currently practiced.24 In this respect some post¬
modern ideas centrally inform my methodological approach as a rejection of dominant
historical and geographical ways ofknowing the social problems, people and places
associated with 'underclass'.
2: EPISTEMOLOGY
Modern Ways of Knowing 'Underclass'
From the mid-nineteenth century, a social group of people identified as the 'urban
poor' emerged as a problem that dominated the social commentary of bourgeois society. The
industrial slums that had developed in the transition to capitalism from the end of the
eighteenth century onwards became the focus of burgeoning practices of social science.
Those ideas which had been emergent in the mid to late eighteenth century as 'science' were
harnessed to the construction of the 'human sciences'. From the mid-nineteenth century they
were given a direct social application onto the populations and environments of urban
London. The social documentations of Henry Mayhew ((1861) London Labour and the
London Poor), Andrew Mearns ((1883) The Bitter Cry ofOutcast London), Charles Booth
((1902) Life and Labour of the People ofLondon) and William 'General' Booth ((1890) In
Darkest England) are the best known accounts of an urban poor whose nature had
previously been 'unknown' to bourgeois society.25 The terms in which these researches
were conducted were often those of exploration, discovery and enlightenment and in this
respect they paralleled the colonial journeys to the 'dark continent' of Africa. To different
degrees they appealed to a government concerned with issues of social management and a
public audience for popular 'travel' literature. The parallel journeys represented a joint
241 am using practice in the broadest sense here to include practices of representation, research, policy
making and administration.
25 It should be noted that these writings are not of a piece: their languages, motivations and imagined
audiences varied. Some are more recognisable as 'travel literature' (In Darkest England)-, others have
a more empirical style of mapping, grading and systematic tabulation (Life and Labour of the People
ofLondon)', while others are more ethnographic, based on direct 'contacts' and the subjects' own
words (London Labour and the London Poor).
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quest for knowledge of and power over those deemed to be uncivilised, disordered,
dangerous and generally a burden upon the Western, bourgeois forward march of Progress.
Through the social documentations of the mid-nineteenth century those previously
referred to as 'the lower orders' emerged as the 'working classes'.26 In socially authoritative
accounts they were divided into two separate classes using the dichotomy of the respectable
and the non-respectable. Such distinctions could be made via scientific methods to ascertain
the precise nature of the relation between behaviour and environment:
'First, the observer noted the behaviour of the observed and then asked the question
'Is the behaviour true or false?', or to put it in another way 'Are environmental
factors altering the behaviour in such a way that the behaviour is not truly
representative of the person's type?'27
If a bad environment was merely obscuring the nature of an otherwise good type of person
then that person was respectable, deserving, redeemable. In contrast, the character of the
non-respectable was not obscured by a bad environment but revealed by it. They chose their
way of living and that choice was the product of their nature. Thus the respectable poor
could be observed as - literally seen to be - clean, industrious, sober, evenly tempered,
disciplined, civilised while the non-respectable were seen to be dirty, slovenly, loud¬
mouthed, undisciplined, bestial.
Discourses of nature which fixed a scientific language onto the social world were
fundamental to the social sciences as they developed from the late nineteenth century into
the twentieth century. Ecological and pathological explanations for the behaviour and living
conditions of the poor became embedded in the social scientific mode of inquiry. The
'scientific method' valorised as the most authoritative route to knowledge ensures the
continuing status of these explanations. Although scientific languages of nature are now
rarely used explicitly in social explanation, the scientific method remains the authoritatively
modern way of knowing the social world, continuing the spirit of its originary moment. Thus
the scientifically trained observer as a conduit of reality, relays the tmth not as he sees it but
as it is. Scientifically trained vision - empirical and objective - is cast as the primary
qualification for the production of knowledge about the social world. I shall turn to the
extensive critique of these dominant theories and practices of knowledge below, but first
shall briefly review some modern ways in which 'underclass' has been rendered in academic
research in the late twentieth century according to a traditional social scientific template.
The main part of that literature remains in the fold of 'objective', empirical inquiry
and a substantial part of it is made up of geographical writings in which 'the city' as the
26 Finch.L (1993) 'Two Working Classes' p32-49 The Classing Gaze St Leonards, Australia: Allen
and Unwin
27
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place of the urban poor has prominence through ideas of social ecology.28 Most prominent
here is the Chicago School's paradigm of urban sociology characterised by a particular motif
of discovery, a direction of research towards socially problematic groups and a focus on
issues of spatial organisation.29 Those orientations remain strong in quantitative and policy
directed research on social problems in urban environments. The contemporary writing that
is closest to the Chicago School's urban ecology, and commonly referred to in British
literatures on 'underclass' is that of Professor William Julius Wilson who in the American
context talks about the 'concentration' and 'isolation effects' of the urban ghetto and of
'ghetto specific culture'.30 Within that notion of localised cultures of poverty is the idea that
the 'underclass' is reproduced through cycles of deprivation. The idea of 'cultures of
poverty' and relatedly 'cycles of deprivation' - both as locally and internally generated or at
least locally and internally sustained - seemed to have passed in the 1960s and 1970s after
being discredited politically and sociologically.31 Yet it is through the language of inter-
generational, cultural and estate-based disorder that the contemporary discourse of
'underclass' has emerged. This emergence is multiply sourced: the academic, mainstream
political, popular cultural and popular scientific are all part of the discourse and not separate
realms of knowledge. Moreover, the terminology of pathology and ecology is not confined
to historical social scientific discourses through which it gained status. It is part of a wider
regime ofmeaning where connections proliferate across time and space. Psychometric
psychology, race scientism, the genetics of criminal and anti-social behaviour, popular
Darwinism and social genetics are all subject to extensive media interest in the
contemporary period and often have their source in popular academic writings.32 While such
writings have been most concerned to make links between pathology and criminality there
are attendant links with ecological forms of explanation. The terminology of contagion, and
28 Within recent geographical writings this link has been traced as part of an environmental and moral
discourse in the nineteenth century. See Driver.F (1987) 'Moral Geographies: Social Science and the
Urban Environment in Mid-Nineteenth Century England' p275-287 Transactions of the Institute of
British Geography 13
29 See Jackson.P (1983) 'Social Disorganisation and Moral Order in the City' pl68-180 Transactions
of the Institute ofBritish Geography 9
30 Wilson.W.J (1987) The Truly Disadvantaged Chicago: University of Chicago Press
31 The 'culture of poverty' terminology was introduced into social science by the American
anthropologist Oscar Lewis ((1968) The Culture of Poverty in Moynihan.D.P (ed.) Understanding
Poverty New York: Basil Blackwell), and had some currency in British sociology. In the 1970s the
Social Science Research Council devoted a major research programme into inter-generational
transmission of deprivation under the direct instruction of Sir Keith Joseph , the Conservative Minister
for Social Security. He insisted on linking unemployment to cycles of deprivation through which bad
child rearing and unstable families were perpetuated and commissioned research in an attempt to
substantiate his claims. See Rutter.M and Madge.N (1977) Cycles ofDisadvantage: A Review of
Research London: Heineman
32 See for example Jessel.D and Moir.A (1997) A Mind To Crime London: Signet; Wilson.J.Q (1995)
The Moral Sense London: Free Press; Wiley.J (1996) The Genetics ofCriminal and Anti-Social
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epidemics of teenage pregnancy in particular areas is common to popular journalism on
'underclass', where council estates are figured as breeding grounds for criminal and
reproductive deviance.33 A focus on the 'inner city' and 'peripheral estates' as the places
where 'underclass' happens, have given particular areas and estates paradigmatic status
within the discourse - Kingsmead in Hackney, Penywaun in South Wales, Ryelands in
Lancaster, St. Pauls in Bristol, Ragworth in Cleveland, the Manor in Sheffield, Moss Side
in Manchester, the Scotswood, Benwell and Meadow Well estates in Newcastle. Within
academia Professor Julius Wilson's work is most prominently cited as linking 'the ghetto' of
North American deindustrialising cities with a partly behavioural 'underclass', and has also
been used to question the nature of the 'ghetto' in the British context.34 Charles Murray has
named lists of British cities in which 'indicators' of 'underclass' most strongly combine, and
where a 'contamination' of values occurs at a neighbourhood level from which individuals
cannot 'isolate' themselves.35 In the work of Professor Peter Hall, making the case for better
planning in 'ghettoised' cities of Britain and America, an argument is put that problems of
'social pathology' cannot be separated from a discussion of design solutions if 'the city of
the permanent underclass' is to be prevailed against.36 More quantitative approaches to the
problem of 'underclass' have been adopted elsewhere as a focus on geographical
distributions of single parenthood and as comparative criminology at a variety of
geographical scales.37 In these accounts spatial perspectives concur with a broadly
positivistic conception of space. Space is understood to exist as a variety of different
geographical scales and is observed as spatial patterns, distributions and manifestations.
Such a perspective suggests there is an objectively conceived spatial phenomenon under
study. This approach most commonly shows itself as a continuing obsession with the
question - 'is there or isn't there an underclass?' - necessitating an evidential quest in the
direction of 'the underclass' to find out. Thus interest in where and whether 'underclass'
fits into existing classificatory systems and the common suggestion from 'progressive'
Behaviour Chichester, West Sussex: CIBA Foundation; Brand.C (1996) The g Factor London: John
Wiley; Murray.C and Herrnstein.R.J (1994) The Bell Curve London: Free Press
331 have been able to gauge the nature of some dominant journalistic representations of 'underclass'
through a comprehensive survey of broadsheet newspapers which have, in different ways, produced
and sustained the debate (The Independent, The Independent on Sunday, The Guardian, The Observer,
The Times and The Sunday Times 1992-1996 inclusive)
34 See Peach.C (1996) 'Does Britain Have Ghettos?' p216-235 Transactions of the Institute ofBritish
Geography 21
35
Murray.C (1989) The Emerging British Underclass London: Institute of Economic Affairs p4
36 Hall.P (1996) 'The City of the Permanent Underclass' p362-400 Cities Of Tomorrow Oxford:
Blackwell p395
37 Harris.F and Breugel.I (1995) Teenage Parenthood: The Local Dimension Paper given at the British
Sociological Association Conference Leicester University, April 1995; Fyfe.N.R (1995) Crime, Space
and Society: Key Research Themes, Findings and Questions in the 1990s pi82-195 Scottish
Geographical Magazine volume 111: no. 3
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social scientists that use of the term be located in research of a particular type - namely
structural perspectives of labour market change.38
The academic evidential quest rests on an appeal to the authority of positivistic
social explanation - if there is an 'underclass' we will be able to find it, describe it, account
for it, and possibly change it. It ignores the extent to which 'underclass' is already 'out
there' as a regime of meaning that is materially produced by a range of practices and people
and materially productive of spaces and subjectivities. What then becomes necessary and
interesting to ask is: what are the terms, spaces, powers and forms of that production. Other
kinds of geographical work have moved towards a more discursive engagement with issues
of social marginalisation and space. The work of David Sibley on Geographies ofExclusion
talks about the social production of marginalised identities and spaces in relation to each
other. He presents the production of different kinds of spaces as a way of fencing off social
groups identified as 'unsavoury' at particular times. The emphasis is on the socially and
psychoanalytically constructed nature of identity and space.39 There also exists a more
positive (and partly historical) literature on how socio-spatial marginalisation normally
conceived in terms of social problems contains elements of transgression, subversion and
resistance to dominant socio-spatial orders. In the exemplary work of Richard Sennett and of
Elizabeth Wilson these are celebrated as geographies of urban disorder.40 With particular
regard to ethnographic research issues post-structuralist modes of inquiry have sought to
open up to scrutiny the knowledge producing processes through which 'other' people and
places come to be represented.41 However, these approaches are not without their own
problems. In particular, the common rendition of 'the represented' as the 'other' of powerful
representational elites in media, politics and academia also serves to reify the concept. The
use of 'other' should therefore only be regarded as a heuristic device that describes the
rendition of difference and how that partly comes to constitute a material relation of
difference and/or inequality. Thus my focus is on processes ofbecoming known, and does
not assume the integrity and coherence of categories of 'same' and 'other'. Such an
emphasis on process and relations rather than stable entities allows for relations between
3R See Morris.L (1993) Is There A British Underclass? p404-413 Journal of Urban and Regional
Research; Robinson.F and Gregson.N (1992) The 'Underclass': A Class Apart? p38-51 Critical
Social Policy 34
39
Sibley.D (1995) Geographies ofExclusion: Society and Difference in the West London: Routledge.
It is perhaps worth noting why I am choosing not to follow Sibley's approach to some similar issues.
Sibley's ideas are largely premised on psychoanalytic theories of projection and othering which though
clearly relevant are also problematic to the extent that they tend to reify the category of 'other'. My
own emphasis is the social practice of discourse rather than its psychoanalytic dynamics.
40 Sennett.R (1970) The Uses OfDisorder London: W.W Norton; Wilson.E (1991) The Sphinx in the
City London: Virago
41 See for example Clifford.J and Marcus.S (1986) Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of
Ethnography Berkeley: University of California Press
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different people and places to be seen as actively produced and therefore actively
changeable. It also allows for a complex relation of refusal and recognition with regard to
labels and categories through which people and places are known. It is within these kinds of
understandings that my approach to the figures, spaces, processes and relations involved in
the discourse of 'underclass' is located.
A Feminist and Foucauldian Way of Knowing
Critical theories of knowledge and its production developed by philosophically
engaged feminist writers have been central to the problematisation of the category of 'other'
as the object of research. Perhaps the defining theme of feminist epistemologies as
particular ways of engaging with the world that seek to transcend the subject-object divide
between researcher and researched, is that of 'situated knowledge'. Seminally developed by
Donna Haraway, the concept gives priority to recognising that knowledge comes from
someone, somewhere at sometime and so the knowledges of both researcher and researched
should be understood and accountable on those terms, and the knowledge hierarchy between
them thereby partly displaced.42 Rhetorics which seek to disguise that situatedness with
recourse to the language of science, objectivity and truth are effectively attempts to disguise
the power laden nature of knowledge and its production and to shore up powerful
hierarchies of knowledge. In many feminist epistemologies recognition of location and
therefore of difference in the way that knowledge is produced is part of a specifically
political project. Part of its purpose is to identify and change the inequalities which
characterise some of the most powerful and oppressive realms in which knowledge is
produced and applied. Feminist politics and epistemologies are therefore allied in
recognition that what is at stake in practices of knowledge is power. Thus Haraway:
'Some differences are playful; some are poles of world historical systems of
domination. Epistemology is about knowing the difference'.43
The need for reflexivity by those involved in the production of knowledge stems
from the call to make the location of knowledge and its production explicit via questions
like: who speaks, why, to whom, to what effect? However it should be noted that a
sensitivity to such questions does not guarantee answers that can necessarily reveal often
intimate, oblique and shifting connections between the subject and the knowledge she has of
herself and her social world, nor between the subject and those involved in representing her
42
Haraway.D (1991) Situated Knowledges: the science question in feminism and the privilege of
partial perspective pi 83-203 Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention ofNature London: Free
Association Books
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'situated knowledge'. Neither the subject nor researcher is self-identical, able to open up or
be opened up to reveal truths of 'the self. In other words, situated knowledges should not
claim to represent subjective truths as truths of the subject or the social, but should be seen
as a 'tactic' in a play of power, a way of disrupting mimetic representations of 'the truth'.44
It follows that whilst feminist epistemologies target scientific epistemologies that
claim powers of truth telling, they do not posit the existence of alternative truths, ready to
assume the same power position. Rather, situated truths are about a permanently critical
positioning that is achieved, not given, through practising reflexivity as a specifically partial
and disruptive feminist objectivity. In this conception 'subjugated knowledges' have more
value than those which have been (and remain) historically dominant. Subjugated
knowledges are those of the less powerful, valuable not simply because they are subjugated,
but because they allow the knowledges of the powerful to be seen for what they are: a 'god-
trick' that is situated 'nowhere' whilst claiming to see comprehensively.45 Haraway makes a
point of emphasizing that subjugation per se is not 'grounds for an ontology', but rather the
potential for political and ethical struggles to be foregrounded in contestation of what counts
as 'rational knowledge'.46 This understanding does not represent a call to relativise
knowledge, rather Haraway's argument for subjugated knowledges is for a better because
more objective kind of knowledge:
'The subjugated have a decent chance to be on to the god-trick and all its dazzling -
and, therefore, blinding - illuminations. 'Subjugated' standpoints are preferred
because they seem to promise more adequate, sustained, objective, transforming
accounts of the world.'47
Feminist critiques of dominant modes of knowledge are rooted in a critique of the
Western episteme as constituted by gendered knowledge hierarchies and languages. In the
dualistic constructions of male and female, mind and body, reason and affect, subject and
object, same and other, there are constructions of value in which the lesser half of the
dualism is coded as feminine. The implications of refusing those dualistic ways of thinking
as the supports of a power apparatus that seeks to devalue that which is feminised, are vast.
Indeed the possibility of refusing them may be only available as a tactic given their
centrality to the constitution of modern social practices and subjectivities. Nevertheless, by
maintaining a principled and strategic refusal of that symbolic and material order, feminist
epistemologies have been able to bring about considerable ruptures in the way that academic
44
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knowledge is theorised and produced. They have opened up a range of methodological
possibilities that diverge from traditional empirical epistemologies.
Foucault's genealogical approach is one such possibility.48 As an approach that is
highly attuned to the connections between knowledge, power and space it is of particular
value to a geographical understanding of the way the discourse of 'underclass' works. The
practice of genealogy repositions the direction of the research gaze from an empirically
knowable, pristine space in the 'real world' to the practices that produce spaces of
knowledge. Both genealogical theories of knowledge and feminist theories of situated
knowledge can be seen in terms of a spatial ontology. These theories reconfigure the
research space as a space of possibility, as a space where neither the voice of the author nor
the voice of the researched is self-identical and definitive, the space is interpretative and
partial. The researcher is herself part of the research space, speaking from a particular
position, seeing others in relation to herself, and seeing all the relations within the research
space as relations of power. The reason for her attention to power is to position dominant
speakers in relation to the subjugated, and to displace dominant knowledges with subjugated
ones. Haraway specifically conceives of this displacement as a changed view on the world, a
way of seeing that is partial and accountable (it is also necessarily embodied, a point to
which I turn later). The knowledges that come from this way of seeing, symbolise a feminist
reclamation of vision abused by the tmth telling of the master view 'promising Vision from
everywhere and nowhere, equally and fully.'49 They are produced as:
'...partial, locatable, critical knowledges sustaining the possibility of webs of
connections called solidarity in politics and shared conversations in epistemology.'50
Feminist epistemologies do not inevitably produce''feminist knowledge' as a particularform
or substantive kind of knowledge. They are rather a way of knowing in which the power
dimensions of the knowledge producing process are problematised, prioritised and
politicised by a visual register:
'How to see? Where to see from? What limits to vision? What to see for? Whom to
see with? Who gets to have more than one point of view? Who gets blinkered? Who
wears blinkers? Who gets to interpret the visual field?'51
48
It is important to note that the relation between feminist theory and Foucault's work is prolifically
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In this concern with the power of vision feminist epistemologies are strongly allied to
Foucault's epistemology.
Foucault's genealogical project works to trace the effects of power, to analyse what
kinds of subjects, knowledges/truths and social practices are produced by the workings of
power at any given time. By tracing the production of dominant truths the genealogical
approach also seeks to unfold those 'lesser' truths that dominant types of knowledge want to
disqualify. These are the subjugated knowledges that are denied by more powerful
discourses rooted in scientific ways of knowing the world. In this respect genealogies are
anti-sciences, not against the form of scientific knowledge per se but its power effects:
'...it is really against the effects of the power of a discourse that is considered to be
scientific that the genealogy must wage its struggle.'52
The questions which genealogies need to be asked of those powerful discourses are these:
'What types of knowledge do you want to disqualify in the very instant of your
demand 'Is it a science?' Which speaking, discoursing subjects - which subjects of
experience and knowledge - do you then want to diminish... Which theoretical-
political avant garde do you want to enthrone in order to isolate it from all the
discontinuous forms of knowledge that circulate about it?'53
In Foucault's genealogies tracing the workings of power involves tracing the spaces
through which power is practiced and spaces which in turn are produced by power,
including the research space. Thus Foucault's well-cited quote that 'an analysis of power
would be an analysis of spaces'.54 The sense of this idea is that power relations produce
space. Rather than being a given medium in which power has manifest causality, in which
social practices take place, space is itself a product of those power relations and practices. It
is through this basic understanding that complex connections between power, knowledge
and space can be made. Foucault is not simply saying that through power the production of
knowledge takes place and the production of space also takes place (or that knowledge is
already in a space or place) but that the two are related. Power's production is of different
kinds of spaces and knowledges in relation to each other: particular kinds of knowledge and
particular kinds of space are constituted through each other. This means that different kinds
of spaces (embodied spaces, symbolic spaces, social spaces of every kind) to those
traditionally seen as the legitimate focus of geographical inquiry become the focus of an
approach whose aim is to show how different kinds of subject positions, spaces and social
practices are produced through the workings of power/knowledge.
52 Foucault.M (1980) Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977






Genealogy can be seen as both a philosophical approach and a mode of inquiry. In
its philosophical capacity it is a set of ideas about how individual subjects and society are
produced, about their process ofbecoming. Central to this process of production/becoming
is the role of power/knowledge in establishing knowledges as truths about individuals, social
groups and societies. As a mode of inquiry genealogies trace those processes of
production/becoming through the kinds of dominant truths that are circulating and being
practiced at any particular time. Thus in the History ofSexuality vol. 1, Foucault traces the
social production of differently sexed subjects and of a sexualised society through practices
of social regulation around sex. These practices were based on oppositions between ideas of
normality and deviance, established as new, scientific knowledges/truths about sex. Through
these distinctions the management of particular groups - perverts, homosexuals, prostitutes -
as problem populations could be brought about. This understanding is central to my
analysis, it means that it is possible to trace the process of truth-making/knowledge
production by analysing discourse because it is through discourse that power/knowledge
works, indeed 'it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together'.55
An analysis of discourse that is based on Foucault's genealogical approach is
therefore much more than an analysis of language. It is the analysis of power, of knowledge,
of social practice, of space, and of their parts in the production of individual subjects and a
wider social body at a particular time. It is through such a conception of discourse that my
analysis of 'underclass' in the contemporary period proceeds.
3: METHODOLOGY
Discourse Analysis: Practice, Space, Power, Networks
The discourse analysis of this thesis is constructed around two central concepts:
practices and networks. A theorisation of how these concepts are linked is presented as a
theory of how 'the social' works. It provides the background to my methodological approach
by suggesting that particular methods of inquiry will be best able to explicate the workings
of the social.
~Practice~
The social practices which make discourse materially effective do so by producing
particular kinds of space: discourse is a spatial production. In my conception, the nature of
this spatial production has three constitutive parts. First, it is the production of those spaces
in which representations are made, whether that is a book, or a news conference: both are
55
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seen as particular kinds of spaces of representation. One may be seen as fictional and
insignificant in the scheme of things, the other as globally consequential. Those judgements
have consequences for the status of different kinds of knowledges contained within
different representational spaces. Second, it is the production of spaces of representation in
which other people and places are identified, located, and given meaning. For example 'the
stock exchange' and 'the estate' are represented as particular kinds of spaces which are
occupied by particular kinds of people. Those representations partly come to represent 'the
truth' about different groups of people and different kinds of spaces. Third, it is the
production of spaces through the material effects of representation, for example through
policy directed at particular places or as people act towards others according to prevailing
meanings about those others. The latter can be regarded as a production of lived spaces
where different possibilities of being are made more or less likely. The separation of those
three elements is heuristic, there is no progressive or determined causality about the way
they work together.36
By thinking about discourse in these spatial ways, the analysis of discourse can
utilise three kinds of questions:
How are different kinds of spaces of representation mapped themselves'?
What kinds ofspaces does that allow them to authoritatively map?
What is the material nature of those mapping processes'?
Those are questions that relate spaces of representation to power: who has the power to
represent? what kind of representations are powerful? what is the basis of their authority?
how is that authority constructed through different kinds of spaces? how does the power of
representation relate to other kinds of social power? The initial three questions lead
discourse analysis in a particular direction. If discourse works through different kinds of
spaces and through social practices then the focus of analysis is those spaces and practices.
Before detailing the social practices and spaces of representation that are the subject of my
discourse analysis of 'underclass', it is necessary to further develop an argument about the
relation between discourse and 'the social'.
~Social Space~
As well as seeing discourse as social practice, 'the social' should be seen as
discursively produced. Moreover, after Foucault's argument that discourse is where power
56 It should be noted here that I am not drawing on Lefebvre's theorisation of the production of space
(Lefebvre.H (1991) The Production ofSpace Oxford: Blackwell). He talks about relations between
three kinds of space (abstract, concrete, representational) as a way of conceiving of modern
capitalism's spatiality. I find the links between his spatial concepts too abstract and oblique to be of
much use. My own conceptualisation of three kinds of space working in relation to each other is
specifically concerned to explicate the nature of discourse as a spatial production.
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and knowledge come together, the social can be seen as a production of power/knowledge.
This is how discourses of sexuality produce sexualised societies, and discourses of
delinquency produce disciplinary societies. Power-ful discourses work through
representation, through social practices, through space, to produce 'the social' according to
particular truths. However, 'the social' does not exist as one kind of space, internally
coherent and structured. The concept of discourse allows the social to be seen as constituted
by different kinds of spaces, spaces that are materially and symbolically differentiated, and
which are therefore also generically diverse. Here, the study of 'social space' can have many
different starting points because there is no social or spatial blueprint of 'the way things
work' and no right method through which the blueprint can be understood.
Critiques of programmatic conceptions of 'the social' are many and among the
alternative conceptualisations available, the work of Bruno Latour on networks has the
strongest bearing on my approach to social space.57 In We Have Never Been Modern Latour
forwards a critique of the modem view of 'the social' as composed of stmctured polarities
and bound divisions: primarily that instituted as a divide between Politics and Science, and
conceived as a division between Representation and Truth.58 Latour contends that this
modem view - rooted in Enlightenment thought, and instituted through modem social
practices emergent in the seventeenth century - is the basis of hegemonic understandings of
the social as composed of structure, hierarchy and polarity. His argument is that such
features do not exist as natural divisions but only as reified constructions. Moreover, those
constructions act as the main building blocks of dominant theoretical blueprints of the way
the social works. Their fixity means that the nature of social space can be known by
knowing how the blueprint works. Indeed that knowledge and the reality on which it is
supposed to be based is determined by the blueprint. Latour's critique of this Enlightenment
template of the social, its polarised constmctions and the theories of social and spatial
determination that it facilitates, seeks a different image of social space. It is not an
alternative blueprint but a boundless, moving image of the way that social space is
practiced. The image is of social space as network, a network of relations produced through
the practices of socially situated individuals (classed, racialised, and gendered for example).
These practices are productive of different kinds of space and constitutively of a wider
social space at any given time.
571 have not the space to present an extensive critique of Latour's work, but will briefly outline where
his ideas can be most productively engaged with the broadly Foucauldian concept of discourse that I
am using. This brief introduction is extended in the theoretical background to the second chapter of the
thesis where some of Latour's ideas about networks are used directly
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It is Latour's emphasis on practice that is most useful to my focus on the production
of 'underclass'. It means that knowledge and its production can be specified according to the
practices, people and spaces involved in its production. These kind of specificities are
answers to the how questions which are raised by a focus on practice: how is knowledge
produced? how is space produced? how does discourse work? Such questions relate back
to both Foucault's conceptualisation of genealogy as a richly detailed tracing of
power/knowledge regimes through modern social practices and Haraway's situated
knowledges as the localised products of somebody somewhere.
-Bodies and Power-
Both Haraway's and Foucault's epistemologies require that the production of
knowledge is seen to be the work of practices that are both full of power and full of bodies.
Discourse is infused with power and thick with bodies. Moreover the two are of a piece:
power works through practices, practices are embodied. The cases that make up Discipline
and Punish show how discourse is fleshy: at the extreme bodies are literally shaped through
practices that beat, brand and torture them, while in the everyday, discourse subjectifies
individual bodies through practices of social regulation and discipline. In both, the body is
the very site of power as the target of practices of subjectification. But the body of discourse
is not just acted on, it is a constitutive part of its own subjectification, it shapes and resists
particular kinds of subjectification . Equally it is not just oppressed bodies that are the site
of power. Those bodies which deploy power authoritatively over others are subjectified in
the process: particular bodies beat and torture others and particular bodies produce
knowledge about others. Bodies are therefore produced in relation to each other as
particular kinds of bodies, produced and differentiated in material and symbolic relation to
each other. For example in Foucault's genealogies bodies are relationally majestic,
dissolute, adorned, shackled, sexualised, diseased, condemned and ripped apart. Similarly,
the bodies of contemporary 'underclass' discourse are those produced through the physical
and mental stresses of illness, anxiety, hunger, exhaustion, depression, violence; they are the
bodies that are represented, surveilled and marked with meanings that seek to reduce
identity to physicality in terms of pathology, contagion and out of control reproductive and
criminal urges; but they are also the bodies of suited professionals, famous bodies, bodies
that are differently classed and gendered.
For my purposes looking at the embodied aspects of the production of knowledge
makes it possible to see bodies as differently embroiled in power relations: which bodies
speak? where are they positioned? what are they like? which bodies are materially burdened
with the meanings of others? The issue is one of located embodiment and the power
dimensions of location.59
At this point my intention is to provide a loose framework of connections between
materiality and discourse which will be developed later through substantive case studies.
The analysis of discourse that I intend works on the basis of an axis of understanding about
relations between bodies, social practice and discourse. It has three mutually related
elements: the body as the ultimate marker of location; social practices as embodied
practices; the bodily materiality of discourse. In sum, embodied analyses are a necessary
part of taking seriously Haraway's conceptualisation of situated knowledge where bodies
are literally the site of situatedness, the view from somewhere:
'I would like to insist on the embodied nature of all vision, and so reclaim the
sensory system that has been used to signify a leap out of the marked body and into
a conquering gaze from nowhere...'60
'...objectivity turns out to be about particular and specific embodiment and
definitely not about the false vision promising transcendence of all limits and
responsibility.'61
The principal reason for this thesis partly focusing on bodies is to trace and locate the
workings of power through practice.
~Networks~
The notion of power working through different kinds of practices, relations and
spaces, is facilitated in the idea of network. Here Foucault's and Latour's image of power
and space connect. Power is not held in blocks, in situ, shared out or kept back. It is
configured in networks of relations through which it travels, generates and is generated by
social practices. This figurative image of the social as constituted by power laden networks
is fundamental to the way that I am conceptualising the social workings of discourse. In
these networks power does not exist in a fixed distribution, although it is often temporally
fixed in institutions; it is differently configured at different times, in different places and
within those places. However there is not total flux within the networks, they are material as
well as fluid, there are continuities and patterns in their configurations. They are networks
of historical change and continuity. The network image complicates hierarchy and structure
59 This is necessarily a cursory mention of one possible set of links between bodies and power as a
subject which has been widely theorised from a variety of philosophical perspectives, especially in
feminist literatures (See Butler.J (1993) Bodies That Matter: the discursive limits ofsex London:
Routledge; Grosz.E (1994) Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism Bloomington and
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press). There is a longer theoretical engagement with some of these
ideas in Chapter Two where I focus on particular bodies involved in the practices of 'underclass'
discourse.
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with complexity and contingency and it necessitates attention to temporal and spatial
conjuncture and specificity. Ideas of social space as network, of networks that are practiced
and embodied, and of practices that are the workings of power/knowledge, facilitate a
different way of seeing and thinking about the study of social space. If social space itself is
discursively produced and discourse is produced spatially then it is possible to ask - what is
the spatiality of any given discourse? The importance of the answer is that it can locate
knowledge, and thereby locate power in practices that are not beyond critical reach. It
makes knowledge and power more accessible, more open to change. So, what are the spaces
of 'underclass' that are the subject of this thesis and how are they situated within the
networks of power/knowledge that produce them?
The Discourse of 'Underclass': Sites and Spaces
The spaces of 'underclass' discourse that I am analysing are multiple and
generically diverse. In common they can all be seen as nodes in a temporally connected
network of power relations. Their nature as spaces of identity and place, among other things,
is the subject of the chapters that follow. The spaces of 'underclass' that I will be analysing
are seen as constitutive parts of different sites, where each site is an area of knowledge
production within 'underclass' discourse. The sites are a policy conference, DSS waiting
rooms, interviews, books, television documentary, newspaper articles, policy documents,
newsletters, pamphlets, films, and song lyrics. The particular sites have been chosen in order
to bring different spaces and knowledges into the same analytic frame (they are normally
kept apart, often poles apart) and to see them as related to each other through relations of
power. I will not be mapping these sites as subjugated or dominant in relation to each other:
the network of power/knowledge relations in which they are situated is more complex than
that. The different sites do not oppose or dominate each other so much as internalise each
other. The large number of events, institutions, people and practices that relate to
'underclass' produce a configuration whose meaning and power is situated within the whole,
where relations between sites also intersect sites, and where the meanings and powers of
each site are produced in relation to each other. Importantly this means that some sites may
be internally contested and have shifting boundaries while others may be coherent and have
enduring boundaries. In the network of sites, spaces and relations that make up the
contemporary discourse of 'underclass' it is therefore not possible to describe a modelled
configuration of relations between groups like 'the single mother', 'the State', 'the media',
'the political Left', 'the pressure group', 'the feminist commentator'. Nothing less than a
tracing of discourse through its spatial and temporal configuration can show the nature of
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relations between and within the sites and spaces that make the contemporary discourse of
'underclass' as it is.
Each of the three chapters that follow will focus on different sites within the
discourse of 'underclass'. Each site represents an area of knowledge production and
representation within the discourse but is constituted by different kinds of space rather than
being internally homogenous. The sites of Chapter Two are sites in an area of knowledge
production of 'underclass' that can be termed welfare knowledges, in particular knowledges
about Social Security. In these sites welfare knowledge includes policy debate on Social
Security and the future of welfare, and the everyday knowledge of relating to the
government agencies of Social Security administration. The chapter presents a comparative
ethnography of an international policy conference on 'Stakeholding' and a number of local
DSS waiting rooms in the South of England. These sites produce particular kinds of spaces
within the discourse of 'underclass': spaces of power laden social practice, spaces of
professional and claimant identity, of authoritative and subjugated knowledges of 'work'
and 'dependence'. The sites of Chapter Three are located under the rubric of feminist
knowledges of 'underclass'. Feminist knowledges are expressed in political and cultural
debates on community and crime, the state of the family and gender relations, parenting and
child care, single motherhood and 'welfare dependency'. The chapter is based on in-depth
interview based discussions with six prominent spokeswomen in fields of media, academia
and policy related campaigning. The sites on which I focus are the discussions and other
texts through which the women's personal and professional identities are produced. The
spaces they partly constitute are the spaces of identity of the people and places of
'underclass': the 'benefit dependent' single mother, the young unemployed, often 'criminal'
male, 'the council estate', 'the street', 'the home', 'the community', 'the workplace'. The
sites of Chapter Four can be positioned under the rubric of popular discursive knowledges
of 'underclass'. The chapter presents a cultural cartography of two contemporary films
which represent experiential knowledges of 'benefit dependent' single motherhood and
working class 'criminal' masculinities. The sites of my analysis are the films, the spaces
they constitute are those of experiential narrative: of identity, home, street and estate, all
presented as spaces of social and cultural resonance, conflict and struggle.
My reasons for choosing these particular sites represent a fusion of personal
motivation with academic theory on how dominant ways of knowing - their hierarchies,
processes and forms - come to produce dominant modes of social action. My idea was to
make that connection explicit and to analyse it through sites which represent some of the
most prominent forms of knowledge production around 'underclass'. I identified those sites
as being in areas of policy representation (conference), policy administration (DSS waiting
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room); academic, media, lobbying/campaign-based representations (feminist speaking
positions) and popular culture (films). The selection of particular sites was in many ways
suggested by the cultural profile of those sites, gauged by reading the dominant visibilities
of 'underclass' discourse. This was of course an interpretative reading of the social space. It
happened to include motivations that were quite personal in nature.62 There was a dominant
discourse of 'underclass' emerging through the 1990s and I had a personal relation to it
because of my family and class background. As a student I also started to have an academic
relation to it because the issues it was dealing with partly related to my chosen studies. A
shared part of my personal and academic identity was an interest in Left-wing politics and
feminism, as interests that spilled over into a lot of what I thought about and enjoyed doing.
I could therefore present the selection of sites as a selection of things that I was already
involved in doing and thinking about at the time: going to political conferences, sitting in
DSS waiting rooms with my mum, talking about feminism and the state of society, and
watching films! However I am not presenting these selections and connections as fortuitous
or pleasure driven, preferring Elspeth Probyn's description of such socially embedded
research as 'writing the social through the self' to produce 'points of view that allow insight
into the construction of particular conjunctural social moments'.61 In Probyn's argument
such personal-social connections are not so much coincidental as derived from the nature of
the social self.
The presentation of the sites as case studies is loosely related to the case study as
research method literature.64 The case study approach is particularly well-suited to the idea
of an accumulative and compound discursive phenomenon such as 'underclass', without
evoking a uni-directional or teleological motor of development. The case study approach can
accommodate ideas of contradiction and diversity through different case analyses without
detracting from the analytic whole. My case studies are generically diverse and each chapter
employs a different research method that is elaborated in each chapter as part of its
analysis. They are all traditional qualitative methods - of participant observation, interactive
and semi-structured interview based discussions, and textual analysis - employed in order to
arrive at interpretative, argued conclusions rather than correct answers. However, the
methodology is primarily based on a genealogical approach to discourse. Foucault's post-
structural philosophy, genealogical method and substantive focus are inextricably
intertwined in a way that refuses the need for a separate elaboration of methodology.
621 will expand on this originary motivation of my research in the last section of this chapter
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The chapters that follow are inspired by that integrated approach as a way of
writing. The relation between the chapters, like the relation between the sites and spaces of
the discourse is conceptual and complex rather than causal or hierarchical. In the discourse
of 'underclass' particular events, people or texts are not the effect of a greater causality but
are constituted by processes which are often complex and equivocal. The case studies I am
presenting are therefore not merely tools or small scale effects of the greater causal power of
welfare restructuring. Nevertheless, in particular parts of the networks of 'underclass'
discourse there is a coalescence and stability of knowledges which whilst they may not
represent a monolithic convergence of intention and result do frame the issues involved in
ways that make different visibilities and ways of being, more or less likely. These relations
are not those of cause and effect but of constitutive processes. Such processes are much
more difficult to trace - indeed may often be untraceable - in comparison to the hard
certainties of cause and effect. It is therefore not possible or even desirable to set up direct
links between the sites in a way that suggests that the workings of discourse can be fully
mapped and accounted for. Their constitutive spaces complexly internalise each other in a
variety of ways, some of which may not be empirically knowable. The links that I am
making between the sites are therefore largely of my own making, they are possibilities
among many others. I am choosing a particular ordering of the case studies to make an
argument about ways of seeing and knowing 'underclass'. Although it may be possible to
read and analyse all the sites as being as complex and contested as each other, my own
interpretation of them is as sites that are differentiated from each other in important ways,
and some sites make the reading of complexity and contestation within 'underclass'
discourse more available than others.
For the purposes of this argument the ordering of chapters represents an ordering of
increasing complexity, heterogeneity and depth in ways of seeing and knowing 'underclass'.
The movement is broadly from reductive to expansive ways of seeing, from authoritative
fact and evidence to poetic, affective and sometimes ambivalent ways of knowing. The
movement can also be spatialised in a way that recognises differences between the sites as
differences in the kinds of understandings that they promote. It is broadly a movement from
the enduring patterns and closures of the welfare knowledges of the policy conference and
DSS waiting rooms, to the temporal fractures and disjunctures of the interview based
feminist knowledges, to the fluidity and openness of the popular cultural knowledges of the
films. These figurative spatialities are a way of recognising difference between the sites,
with preferences implied. However they do not necessarily suggest why openness is better




Modernity and Welfare: 'an infernal couple?'
I started this chapter with a brief introduction to the ways in which modernity and
welfare are constituted in relation to each other, using the genealogical-philosophical
critique of Foucault's Discipline and Punish. I have shown how this aspect of Foucault's
work overlaps with a particular feminist epistemology of situated and subjugated knowledge
through their shared critique of the dualistic nature of Enlightenment thought and its
constitution of the Western episteme. Where they differ is in the normative content of their
critiques and the degree of importance they attach to its explicit inclusion. Where Foucault
eschews an explicitly political normativity, preferring instead an 'ethics of permanent
resistance',65 feminists concerned to bring about particular kinds of social and political
change have insisted on the way that knowledge is always political, should be stated as such
and seen in its political capacity to effect change. This thesis adheres to that kind of
normative approach, following Nancy Fraser's advocacy of a politics of epistemology,
where the politics are those of socialist feminism.66
An illustration of the irreducibly political nature of Foucault's own knowledge
production around welfare is provided in an interview on contemporary Social Security
practice.67 Fiis comments on the subject of the 'perverse' and generally undesirable effects
of the Social Security system on the subject's dependency, point to an absolute necessity for
the modern subject of Foucault's work to be classed and gendered. His reference is to the
'infernal couple' security-dependence:
'One notes the following fact which is inherent in the functional mechanisms of the
machinery: on the one hand more security is being given to people and, on the other,
they are being made increasingly dependent. But what one ought to be able to
expect from security is that it gives each individual autonomy in relation to the
dangers and situations likely to lower his status or subject him.'68
It is not insignificant that the subject of this comment is a 'he'. The substitution of a female
subject into the autonomy 'versus' dependence opposition forces consideration of the nature
of 'independent' female citizenship especially in relation to State support for parenthood.
65 Foucault.M (1984) On the Genealogy of Ethics: an Overview of Work in Progress p340-373
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The construction of notions of autonomy and independence in strongly masculinist terms
has long been disputed by feminists.69 It is also a classed construction that is central to the
dominant discourse of 'underclass' which reiterates a divide between benefit claiming and
independence, equating independence with paid work in the official economy. A normative
position on issues of 'dependence' and 'independence' in relation to Social Security and
'work' is absolutely central to the political animus of the discourse analysis that I intend. It
is also integral to the epistemological approach of that analysis: the refusal of dualisms of
science and politics, fact and affect, representation and truth is also a refusal of those
modern constructions of dependence and independence, public and private, work and care.
The political position on which that refusal is partly based is socialist feminist and its focus
in this thesis is the contemporary state of welfare, in particular benefit provision for the
'non-working' poor. In the kind of socialist feminism that informs my discourse analysis of
'underclass', politics and epistemology are two related parts of that position. Fraser's
politics ofneeds interpretation brings those two parts together.
Fraser's politics of knowledge production around 'welfare' provide the theoretical
inspiration to combine modern political sensibilities of social justice - in particular an
argued necessity for a strong welfare state - with a post-structural epistemology. In the
concept of a politics of needs interpretation is a means of making explicit the classed,
gendered and politicised production of welfare in an approach that is politically normative
and partly engages at the level of policy analysis. In Unruly Practices Fraser's concern with
everyday practice and politics is marked as a particular criticism of French deconstructionist
philosophers:
'In general, they wanted 'the political' without 'politics' so they spared themselves
the effort of trying to connect their theoretical reflections with the struggles and
wishes of the age'.70
In Foucault's work she identifies a 'total critique of modernity' which does not fit with
positions of policy advocacy and this she finds problematic:
'...it is essential to be able to distinguish better from worse sets of practices and
forms of constraints.'71
In her own work a Foucauldian analysis of power/knowledge in relation to welfare is made
from a particular democratic socialist feminist standpoint - a 'standpoint of the exigencies of
political practice'.72 In Unruly Practices this translates into a focus on the 'problem' of
expertise that prevails in social welfare discourses about subsistence level benefits. The
69 See Fraser.N and Gordon.L (1994) A Genealogy of 'Dependency': Tracing a Keyword of the U.S
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approach requires a substantive engagement with the processes and content of welfare
policy making in any given period. In this respect her own focus on the social welfare
programmes instituted in the United States in the 1970s (particularly Aid For Families With
Dependent Children) does not have a direct bearing on contemporary British welfare policy,
nor indeed on contemporary welfare in America. In particular her analysis of welfare
policy's construction of woman as mother-in-the-home via the idea of separate spheres of
public and private, male and female, belongs very much to that period. I will be arguing this
point through in Chapter Two with regard to the way that the Job Seeker's Allowance has
systemised the previously two tier system of National Insurance based Unemployment
Benefit and Social Security based Income Support which was widely seen as a gendered
tiering.71 Crucially 'underclass' discourse involves powerful attempts to construct the roles,
needs and interests of a welfare citizenry according to a dichotomy of 'claimant' or 'worker'
where the claimant is 'the jobseeker' regardless of gender. Nevertheless the basic premise of
her approach remains apposite: it is to explore how the politics of need interpretation are
constitutive of welfare. Her approach to this task concurs with both Foucault's and Latour's
focus on practice as constitutive of the social (in Fraser these are called micro-practices).
Thus:
'...the analysis and critique of such practices take priority over the analysis and
critique of ideology.'74
Similarly, power is seen as productive and ubiquitous, investing the very substance of those
practices. The practices identified as the most productive elements of dominant welfare
discourses are those concerned with framing the issues, deciding the themes, establishing
the vocabularies, facilitating and orientating the discussions. Fraser calls these the socio-
cultural means of interpretation and communication (MIC), they are the means of producing
and disseminating dominant welfare knowledges. Through these means particular modes of
welfare governance are established, as attempts to establish particular power effects. This is
neither a monolithic nor straightforwardly successful project, but neither is it plurally
negotiated. Power relations turn, twist, break and shape that pluralism in ways that are
productive of patterns of inequality.
Fraser's attention to processes of power as productive of social inequality is more
than a caveat to an otherwise pluralist melange. It has analytic centrality to political
approaches that are concerned with inequality and the patterned nature of social outcomes,
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especially with regard to resource distribution. It does not work as a total vision of the social
and will be less meaningful or useful to those kinds of social analyses that are interested in
the nuances of personal identity for example. Of most importance to my analysis is its
terminology of inequality, distribution, social justice as words selected for meanings and
histories that are aligned to a broadly socialist politics. Indeed the feelings, values and
beliefs of those politics are the animus of inquiry. As I will go on to show in the chapters
that follow, those feelings, values and beliefs do not require an all-encompassing vision of
an hierarchical, structured and stratified social whole in order to have socialist integrity.
Fraser's work is therefore important for the way it exemplifies a fit between a Foucauldian
discourse analytic epistemology, an explicitly socialist feminist approach to the politics of
welfare practice and an engagement with the substance of contemporary welfare policy. The
link is made by seeing politics as a constitutive part of discourse which needs to be
accountable, and politics as a constitutive part of the analysis of that discourse which needs
to be openly articulated.
Articulating a political self
This thesis does not intend to present an analysis of the history or contemporary
state of socialist feminist thought or of the relevance of class or gender as bases of social
and political identity. However, within those debates are issues that are highly pertinent to
my analysis of the discourse of 'underclass' and the contemporary politics of welfare. I will
be using the terminology of 'class', 'socialist feminism' and the 'welfare state' which all
carry a large baggage of meanings differently understood according to who is writing and
reading them. I therefore need to briefly outline my own position on each as a way of
clarifying their meaning in the analysis that follows.
~Socialist Feminism~
'Political objectives are in an important sense constituted on the basis ofvalues and
principles... they cannot be grounded in scientific analysis but spring from
aspirations rather than proof. '75
I am broadly defining my political position as socialist feminist to mark a partisan
alignment to particular priorities and principles in political theory and practice. There is no
determined relation between the socialist and feminist elements of that position and I do not
have an uncritical identification with what has become associated with their political claims
in various hegemonic discourses. Indeed part of my approach is to question how what counts
75 Barrett.M (1992) Destabilising Theory: Contemporary Feminist Debates Cambridge: Polity Press
p217
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as socialist feminist is defined. It is therefore within a broad spectrum of socialist feminist
beliefs that my own beliefs are most at home, whilst the issue of how these beliefs are
rendered in academic and politically mainstream understandings remains critical to my
imagination of other kinds of socialist feminism. I would argue that within British academia
a hegemonic idea of socialist feminism has focused attention on women's material
subordination primarily in terms of a sexual division of labour that has been instituted by
capitalism and that creates inequalities between men and women, workplace and household,
public and private. Within this focus the goal of gender equal participation in a well
regulated labour market, bolstered by extensive childcare provision assumes priority.76 This
labour market focus on gendered divisions of labour is extended to problematisations of 'the
family' along the same lines, casting the domestic space of the 'traditional' family as a
social and economic construct of gender inequality.77 Apart from (or perhaps as a
consequence of) their substantive orientation these kinds of writings have tended to elide a
more value-orientated, affective and experiential language of socialist feminism. This is not
to claim that there has been no contestation over the nature of 'socialist feminism'. Indeed
critiques of, and debates around, those politics in theory and practice are multiple and
emotionally invested.78 Nevertheless their way of writing socialist feminism has tended not
to be inclusive of positive discourses on domestic space. An important caveat to this broad
perception is that in the American context a number of black socialist feminist writers have
written passionately about the positive politics and experiences of family and domestic
space.791 find these latter kinds of writings more personally resonant.
Ideas about what constitutes a socialist feminist position were most prolific between
the early 1970s and mid 1980s. Their currency within academic discourse is associated with
76 See Breugel.I and Kean.H (1995) The Moment ofMunicipal Feminism: Gender and Class in 1980s
Local Government p 147-169 Critical Social Policy 44-5. The labour market focus of socialist
feminism is exemplified in Phillips.A (1983) Hidden Hands London: Pluto; Cavendish.R (1982)
Women on the Line London: Routledge and Kegan Paul; Pollert.A (1981) Girls, Wives, Factory Lives
London: Macmillan
77 See Segal.L (ed.) (1983) What Is To Be Done About The Family? London: Harmondsworth
Penguin/The Socialist Society; Whitelegg.E et al (eds.) (1982) The Changing Experience of Women
Oxford: Martin Robertson/Open University
78 See Hamilton.R and Barrett.M (eds.) (1986) The Politics ofDiversity London: Verso; Wilson.E with
Weir.A (1986) Hidden Agendas: Theory, Politics and Experience in the Women's Movement London:
Tavistock Publications; Phillips.A (1987) Divided Loyalties: Dilemmas ofSex and Class London:
Virago
79
In particular I am thinking of Patricia Hill Collins (1994) Shifting The Centre: Race, Class and
Feminist Theorising p45-67 Glenn.E, Chang.G and Forcey.L (eds.) Mothering: Ideology, Experience,
Agency London: Routledge; Bray.R (1994) 'Growing Up On Welfare' The Observer Magazine 2.1.94
p35-38; Taylor.D (1994) My Children, My Gold London: Virago; hooks.b (1984) Feminist Theory:
From Margin to Center Boston, Mass: South End Press, as Black socialist writings which do not
follow the more essentialist and mythologised versions of motherhood such as Rich.A (1976) Of
Woman Born New York: W.W.Norton, Ruddick.S (1980) Maternal Thinking p342-367 Feminist
Studies vol. 6 no 2; Gilligan.C (1982) In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's
Development Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press
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the assertion ofMarxist theories within the social sciences and the extension of Marxist
analyses of the capitalist economy to the specific position of 'women in the home', most
prominently in the 'domestic labour debate'.80 The move away from the Marxist
reductionism of casting the informal space of the household in terms of the formal space of
the economy, was spearheaded by Michele Barrett's Women's Oppression Today which
recognised the necessity for a more sophisticated elaboration of relations between women,
men and the State with regard to the family, work, welfare and biological reproduction.81
However, the intention to configure a socialist feminist position from that argument was
apparently not met, the dynamic of oppression rather than a complex and sometimes
contradictory constitution came to the fore.82 There remains no agreed version of socialist
feminism, or consensus on the need for such agreement. Its constitutive parts - of socialism
and feminism - are equally contested, and only the (shifting) parameters of various
arguments are discernibly socialist feminist. Nevertheless within those parameters there
remains a shared regard for a multiplicity of oppressive relations which are not all reducible
to economic status; a shared regard for the heterogeneity of powerfully oppressive
discourses and for the specificity of historical and cultural forms and relations. In academic
feminist theory, the anti-dualistic politics of Donna Haraway, Nancy Fraser and Iris Marion
Young are exemplary of this approach.83 My preferred position is to maintain an idea of
socialist feminisms outside of their public and academically authorised versions,
representing knowledges and beliefs that have been leamt the hard way - and passed on -
through historical and everyday political struggles. These socialist feminisms may exist in
different kinds of knowledges, languages and practices in different spaces, at different times.
In terms of actual political practice the analytical and practical target of much
socialist feminism remains those configurations of inequality that are traditionally
associated with poverty, welfare and labour market exploitation.84 Without suggesting the
causal or originary pre-eminence of a particular oppression, socialist feminism has
traditionally focused on circumstances of material deprivation and the various mediations of
class oppression. This is a matter of political prioritisation rather than a claim that nothing
else matters.
80 See Malos.E (ed.) (1980) The Politics ofHousework London: Allison and Busby for early feminist
writings on domestic labour
81 Barrett.M (1980) Women's Oppression Today London: NBL
82 This apparent failure of intention is outlined in Brenner.J and Ramas.M (1984) Rethinking Women's
Oppression p33-71 New Left Review 144
83
Haraway, A Cyborg Manifesto; Fraser, Justice lnterruptus; Marion Young.I.M (1990) Justice and
the Politics of Difference Chichester, West Sussex: Princeton University Press
84
In particular I am thinking of the Socialist Campaign Group within the British Labour Party
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-Class-
Fundamentally I am conceiving of socialist feminism as a praxis for social and
political change, enunciated in terms of social justice, with material inequality as its target.
That this materiality is both highly differentiated according to other social constructions and
inequalities, and constituted by symbolic and affective elements of social being is the
invaluable contribution of post-modem theories of the subject and the social. In relation to
the dominant discourse of 'underclass' and the contemporary configurations of inequality
that are part of its material and symbolic productions, the socialist feminism politics of this
thesis argues for the prioritisation of a class based approach. This approach recognises that
the class relations of the contemporary period are constituted through other social
inequalities of gender, race, age and disability, and that class is a subject position that is
multiply constructed and experienced. However with regard to the discourse of 'underclass'
class subjectivity specifically is central to the animus of the discourse and needs to be
central to its analysis.85
Class subjectivities are not just the 'target' of 'underclass' discourse but are part of
its production. In line with a discursive conception of 'underclass', I am regarding class as a
social category that signifies material conditions of existence, in which that signification is
productive of material effects.86 The significations of class that are part of the discourse of
'underclass' therefore produce different meanings and material circumstances for differently
classed individuals. The understanding that class is produced discursively in processes of
social becoming that involve cultural practice, self-definition, and social classification is
crucial to a non-reductive socialist feminism. There is no dilution of political purpose with
this understanding, indeed with an increased awareness of the way the subject and the social
are classed differently at particular times, there should be an increased openness to the
possibilities of social and political change.
-The Welfare State-
Within the Welfare State as a wide ranging set of principles, practices and
provisions, the dominant discourse of 'underclass' centrally focuses on the subsistence
level benefits of Social Security provision. Those provisions are also the focus of my
analysis of the discourse. References to 'welfare' are therefore primarily meant in the
85 Issues raised by this argument including the potential problems of meeting 'like with like' - that is
responding to a form of class homogenisation with class solidarity - are addressed in Chapter Four and
the Conclusion of the thesis
86
For an historical elaboration of the production of 'working-classness' compare Stedman-Jones.G
(1983) Languages of Class Cambridge: Cambridge University Press ; Riley.D (1988) Am I That
Name: Feminism and the Category of Woman in History London: Macmillan
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narrow sense of that word: as Social Security benefits for the 'non-working' poor, unless
otherwise specified. Moreover, these benefits are increasingly the referent of 'burgeoning
welfare spending' in everyday media and political parlance. The configuration of welfare
provision in what is at least nominally still the British Welfare State suggests that in the
contemporary period, class is the structuring instant of inequality. This observation is not a
mark of class determinism or an abstraction of capitalist class oppression managed by the
State. It is read from the contemporary configuration of transfer payments in the tax and
benefit system between the State and particular social groups.87 The socialist aspect of the
politics that inform my analyses is therefore not expressed as a theory of the State but
through personal knowledges, feelings and beliefs about those configurations of inequality.
Their expression resonates with those values of social justice historically espoused in
socialist thought, in particular a defence of the principle of a strong Welfare State. This
principle adheres to an ethics of wealth distribution from richer to poorer that is conditional
upon need and represented in terms of basic social and economic rights.88
The Welfare State has had an ambiguous status within socialist feminist writings as
neither a monument to socialist principle and gender equality, nor a unified functionalist
instrument of capitalist appeasement and control.89 Its development is characterised by
periods of political conflict and of consensus which have shaped it as a non-unitary and
temporal set of principles and practices. The extent to which it can be considered beneficent
to the working class poor is highly dependent on the cultural and political-economic
circumstances of provision. It remains a site of struggle for representation and resources. In
the contemporary period the discourse of 'underclass' is such a struggle. I have identified it
as a struggle in which questions of who is speaking, where from and what for, are of primary
consideration to an analysis of the power and productivity of welfare discourses. Having
signposted the normative motivation of my analyses, I finally turn to the nature of the
discourse that is my writing.
87 The classed nature of these transfer payments is outlined in Sinfield.A (1989) Social Security and Its
Social Division Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press; for a discussion of how recent developments
within labour market have brought about a non-alignment of gender interests, see McDowell.L (1991)
Life Without Father and Ford p400-419 Transactions of the Institute ofBritish Geographers 16. This
subject is elaborated in Chapter Three.
88 There is much debate over the terminology of welfare needs and rights, what they imply and how
they might be established (see Wetherly.P (1986) Basic Needs and Social Policies p45-65 Critical
Social Policy 46). I have not the space to engage with these debates and at this point am choosing to
flag 'basic welfare needs and rights' as principles which intuitively and intellectually appeal to me. In
the conclusion to the thesis I elaborate on what these needs and rights might look like.
89 See the debate between Brenner.J and Ramas.M (1984) 'Rethinking Women's Oppression' p33-71




Renalto Rosaldo identifies the 'vices of subjectivity' as those of 'passionate
concern, prior knowledge and ethical engagement' ,90 These qualities are antithetical to
claims of scientific objectivity. All of those qualities are written into my work as part of a
personal, political and epistemological project whose intention is to disrupt the hierarchies
of knowledge that make up the dominant discourse of 'underclass'. I want the writing style
of this thesis to be read as purposeful: as an interweaving of different kinds of knowledges,
languages and voices that creates a feeling for the texture of discourse. It is not meant to
reproduce the texture of the dominant discourse of 'underclass' but to analyse it and in so
doing produce a different kind of discourse in which the personal, affective and ethical are
equally placed with the political, cognitive and analytical and can contest each other on
equal terms.
Having already outlined the political and epistemological underpinnings of this
discourse, I will make a final note of its personal dimensions. A central part of my
motivation to focus on 'underclass' discourse was a personal anger about particular kinds of
cultural commentaries and government policies that have surrounded the working class poor
for as long as I can remember. Through the 1990s commentaries proliferated and policies
towards this group became more prescriptive. The nature of this escalation started to
provoke questions in my mind because it was not confined to particular ranks of the
Conservative press and politicians and it could not be easily dismissed in terms of moral
panic or scapegoating. It seemed much bigger and more important than that. There were
issues of social and cultural change worth discussing in the morass of commentary around
'underclass' and parts of the political Left were prominent in enunciating them. These were
reasons to engage with the discourse rather than to dismiss it in anger. Moreover, I felt that I
had a personal stake in engaging because the discourse was partly about who I was, where I
was from and the welfare benefits on which my family had always depended. We were
certainly categorisable as part of the long term benefit claiming poor after twenty nine years
of living on subsistence level benefits, on council estates, as a large single parent family.
The knowledges, feelings and politics that are part and parcel of these experiences are now
part of the writing of this thesis. Some of them are interspersed in the writing as particular
'moments of knowing'91 and as a way of locating my analysis in a different kind of
authority. These moments are intended to displace distinctions about what counts as
90 Rosaldo.R (1994) Subjectivity in Social Analysis p 171-183 Seidman.S (ed.) The Postmodern Turn:
New Perspectives on Social Theory Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
91 This phrase is taken from Probyn's idea of 'writing the social through the self'. Probyn, Sexing The
SW/pl07
knowledge, they are imagined as tactics whose effects may go no further than the text of my
writing. However they are not meant to be read as a relativising move to expand what counts
as knowledge or to set up experience as just another reading of a reality that is subject to
infinite meanings. They are deployed specifically to valorise experience over alternative
accounts at particular analytic points. My representation of that experience is not claimed
as a conduit of a 'pure' reality, rather experience is regarded as a constructed, mediated and
changing domain of meaning. Its value lies within an epistemological valorisation of
subjugated knowledge as earlier outlined.
Most of the time my personal feelings, knowledges and experiences are not
signposted or named, and are not the main subject of analysis. Nevertheless they remain
present in the substance of what is said and in the texture of its meaning. This writing is
part of my self that feels imbricated in the discourse of 'underclass'. Of course I am also
partially imbricated in academic discourses of knowledge production, a positioning that is
evident in the structure and language of my writing. The combination of these two
positionings is something that I am presenting positively as the very reason for this work .
The value of writing that combination lies in the way that it accords with the nature of the
social as a configuration of mutually constitutive elements rather than elements in dualistic
opposition. This kind of writing allows me to articulate a speaking position beyond the
'same' of 'us' and the 'other' of 'underclass', and beyond the 'inside'/'outside' alternative
of social inclusion and social exclusion that the dominant discourse seeks to establish. It
allows recognition of the inextricable nature of those relations and contestation of those
dominant knowledges and practices that insist on their division.
CHAPTER TWO
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'UNDERCLASS' DISCOURSE AS THE PRACTICE OF NETWORKED
RELATIONS: THE SITES OF THE STAKEHOLDER POLICY CONFERENCE
AND DSS WAITING ROOM
This chapter is about the politics of knowledge production around 'underclass', in
relation to contemporary welfare practices of 'Social Security'. It addresses the nature
of that production by presenting a comparative ethnography of a policy conference on
'Stakeholder Capitalism' and a number of DSS waiting rooms in the South of England.
The starting premise of my analysis is that the policy conference and DSS waiting
room sites need to be read and understood in relation to each other, through the
practices which constitute them in relation to each other, and through the networks
that situate them in relation to each other. This joint reading is structured around four
themes which express the nature of their relational production as represented spaces,
as embodied spaces, as spaces of knowledge and as worked spaces. Each of these themes
is presented as constitutive of 'underclass' discourse as a discourse that is produced
through different kinds of practices of representation, embodiment, knowledge and
work. In this chapter those practices are shown to be the very substance of networked
power relations. The nature of those relations produces different spatialities for the
policy conference and DSS waiting room sites, and ensures an exclusionary and
oppressive policy making trajectory for the claimant subject of 'underclass' discourse.
Introduction: Another Summer of Hate
At the end of the summer of 1996 the discourse of 'underclass' took a particular
turn through some key events that provide an appropriate starting point for this chapter.
Primary among them was the introduction of the Job Seeker's Allowance (JSA) which
dramatically affected large numbers of benefit claiming people throughout the country. It
also personally affected me through my family. The JSA is centrally related to my research
on the DSS waiting room as a particular kind of social space in the discourse of
'underclass'. It is a space that is personally and politically meaningful. This merging of the
personal and political is not a coincidence. I chose to focus on DSS waiting rooms as part of
my research because having been brought up through all the changes in subsistence level
benefit legislation and administration over 25 years, I knew that these places were central to
the lives of poor people trying to sort out enough money to live on from the Department of
Social Security.
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The space of the DSS waiting room is a significant part of the discourse of
'underclass' for a number of reasons. I will be talking about it in relation to another social
space - that of the policy conference, in particular a conference on 'Stakeholder Capitalism'
that I attended in March 1996. 'Stakeholding' is a concept that has been promoted as a new
Big Idea for the political Left by a number of academics and social commentators. I started
with a number of questions about how the conference and waiting room spaces were
connected and why that connection was important both in terms of social and critical theory
and the wider politics of the 'underclass' debate. At the most basic level that debate and the
relation between the policy conference and the DSS waiting room are about the politics of
welfare change. The meanings of welfare change are produced in a number of key social
spaces from Parliament to think-tanks and job centres: the policy conference and DSS
waiting room are two such spaces. The events of summer 1996 brought some of those
meanings into perspective.
At home in Portsmouth, an event in our local Social Security waiting room made the
headlines - 'Mother's Fury Over Gun Scare.'1 The police were defending a decision to allow
claimants to continue to go into the DSS waiting room despite the fact that there was a
suspected gunman inside and the police, in bullet proof jackets, had taken up a low profile
surround of the building whilst working out the safest way to disarm him. While the staff
had evacuated the building, the gunman, who seemed to be impassive, sat in one of the
interview booths and the claimants waited for an hour before the police moved in and the
situation was defused . As it turned out the gun was an imitation Glock handgun, but the
waiting claimants were nevertheless angry, feeling that they had effectively been abandoned.
The incident brought the issue of DSS staff safety to the fore of local media, and it was
somehow not surprising that the claimants were the last to know anything - just waiting as
usual, for inordinate lengths of time for an uncertain outcome. It coincided with national
news events surrounding the immanent introduction of the Job Seeker's Allowance - the
new benefit to replace Income Support and Unemployment Benefit as part of the most
fundamental reform of benefit for unemployed people in 50 years. More than 60 benefit
offices were closed in a two day strike by staff protesting about new working practices
associated with the JSA which would endanger their safety. Members of the Public Service,
Tax and Commerce Union and the Civil and Public Services Association were asking for
protective screens to be installed in Benefit Agency (DSS) offices, fearing for the safety of
their members from attacks by 'jobseekers' when the JSA was introduced. The PTC Union
announced that assaults on staff had risen and expectations were worsening. The PTC
branch chairman in Wandsworth said:
''Mother's Fury Over Gun Scare' Portsmouth Evening News 13.8.96 pi
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'There is a rising tide of violence within the Social Security system. Only yesterday
a security guard was threatened with a knife. Our view is that the JSA will lead to
even more violent incidents.'2
It was unsurprising to me that the issue of protection for welfare administrators
should arise with regard to new welfare legislation, and that this was an issue about erecting
barriers between administrators and claimants. People who use DSS waiting rooms know
that for a long time they have been a site of conflict to a greater or lesser degree, as the site
where decisions are made and presented as to whether the State will meet the particular
needs of those without enough money to get by. Benefit policy is therefore central to the
way that DSS waiting rooms are administered and experienced.
Currently there is a more or less consensual party political line on the need to
implement 'Welfare to Work' strategies. It was a key proposal of the Social Justice
Commission set up by Labour to inform their social policy into the next millennium.3 In
November 1996 the Conservative government announced that 100,000 long term
unemployed people in Hull and Medway would be made to do thirteen weeks full time
'community service' with private, voluntary charitable organisations for an extra £10 on top
of their benefits. Called 'Project Work' this was recognised as a US-style workfare scheme,
a £100 million drive to move the long term unemployed off the register.4 Attending this
policy change was a national advertising campaign by the government for a newly set up
'benefit cheat hotline', replacing the free Social Security information line for claimants and
public information on available benefits which received 3.25 million calls a year.5 Posters
on buses, billboards and bus stops carried messages to the public to 'beat the cheats' of
benefit fraud with lines such as:
'Know of a benefit rip-off ? Give us a telephone tip off
In the same period in which these new policies were unfolding, I read a piece in The
Guardian by Labour MP Roy Hattersley, a figure of the 'Old Left' who in other places has
criticised the way New Labour has regarded the poor. But here his attention was focused on
the poor themselves:
'The curse of the British working class is their willingness to settle for so little.
They are disciples not of the politics of envy but the politics of complacency. That
is why they are so regularly ignored when the demands of the middle classes (who
2 'Strike Closes Benefit Offices' The Guardian 2.8.96 p3
3 The Report of The Commission on Social Justice (1994) Social Justice: Strategies ForNational
Renewal London: Vintage
4 'Tories put faith in workfare: pledge on job scheme' The Guardian 24.2.97 pi
5 Child Poverty Action Group (1997) 'Benefits Agency Change Programme' p 13-15 Poverty Spring
1997pl3
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suffer from no such inhibition) increasingly dominate the policy agenda of both
major parties.'6
This commentary struck me as exemplary of something else that directly relates to the work
of this chapter. Namely the distance between those who speak about welfare and those
whose welfare interests are spoken for, even when there is an expressed political affinity. It
is the distance between the DSS waiting room and the policy conference; the difference
between knowing something because you inhabit that space, and claiming to know
something because you inhabit the designated, qualified space of the 'knowledgeable' and
the 'representative'. This is not to say that all the authoritative speakers on welfare - who are
themselves a diverse group occupying different sites - dwell in rarefied climes but that the
relations between different sites of knowledge and experience within the discourse of
'underclass' are productive of particular, situated understandings within those sites. This
situatedness can be conceived of in terms of sites of power in an extensive network of
relations.
It is the aim of this chapter to make connections between the two particular sites of
the Stakeholder policy conference and the DSS waiting room as a way of explicating the
discourse of 'underclass' as something that is practiced, processual and productive. That is
to say, discourse does not 'emerge' from political-economic conditions but is processually
constitutive of them. These conditions are constructed through discourse in the practices of
embodied subjects and these practices are materially constitutive of people's lives at
particular times. Clearly this understanding is drawn from a particular conception of how
'the social' works, the nature of things and the relations between them. In this chapter I am
conceiving of a network of power relations (symbolic and material) in which the DSS
waiting room and Stakeholder policy conference are two sites. Following my three-fold
conceptualisation of the 'spaces' of discourse in Chapter One, both sites are conceived as
'spaces of representation', that is they are represented as particular kinds of spaces,
occupied by particular kinds of people. Both are also spaces produced through the material
effects of representation and in this respect they are also lived spaces. In addition, the
conference is regarded as a representational space where power-ful representations of
others (including DSS claimants) are made. As such it is part of a policy process through
which the lives of those 'others' are materially effected. Although I am conceiving of the
conference and waiting room sites in terms of a relational spatiality, the space of the
6
'Nobody Preaches, No-one Cares' The Guardian 28.10.96 pi4. This quote from Hattersley expresses
a particular kind of paternalistic view of the poor, echoing the Labour Party Fabianism of the 1930s. A
'what's to be done with the poor' attitude is elsewhere elaborated by Hattersley in starker terms:
'Society must decide whether or not the pathologically unemployable are to be permanently
condemned to lives of grinding poverty' ('Things Can Only Get Better' The Observer 28.9.97 pi 8)
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conference is more closely analysed. This bearing is part of the politics of my discourse
analysis, intended to 'turn the tables' on prominent analysers and experts, to problematise
their knowledge and its production in relation to more commonly conceived spaces of
'underclass'.
In the discourse shaping the relational spatiality of conference and waiting room
'underclass' meets welfare policy. Together they constitute a contested discourse where
different groups, sites, ways of talking about and experiencing economic 'imperatives',
'needs' and 'interests', are played out. Questions of welfare provision are central to
'underclass' discourse. Views about the nature of particular groups of benefit claimants, all
in some way relate to the question of whether the government will undertake to satisfy the
basic needs of this given constituency, if so then to what degree, and on what conditions. In
order that the specifics of the relations between the policy conference and DSS waiting
room can be explored, it is first necessary to briefly locate the idea of their 'networked
relations' theoretically.
Discursive Networks
Chapter One has outlined the philosophical and methodological frame of this whole
research project. It is premised upon the idea of discourse/practice from a broadly
Foucauldian position, conceiving of discourse as something that is material-symbolic in
nature, and practiced, processual and productive in the way that it works. In We Have Never
Been Modern the emphasis that Bruno Latour gives to those characteristics in his conception
of the social as a network of relations, makes his work particularly useful: this chapter is
most concerned with the practical workings of the discourse of 'underclass' and in
particular a relational analysis of the policy conference and DSS waiting room sites.7
Latour's substantive focus in We Have Never Been Modern is Science, in particular
how an idea of Science has been constructed as and has brought about a 'dominion': a realm
of belief and practice. His epistemological approach to this subject is widely applicable to
other substantive, organisational themes of society - from 'Welfare' to 'Technology' -
through a vision of how the social works. Basically this vision is of a network of relations
explicable by focusing on the way they are practiced, and in this it is closely allied to the
Foucauldian conception of discourse. It is most relevant to my work in pointing to the way
that discourse operates through a wide range of heterogeneous materials, rather than for
example just language. These materials - from texts to buildings to bodies - combine in
power formations and relations that make up 'the social'. By looking at these materials, how
they are practiced and how they combine with other materials, a more nuanced and
7
Latour, We Have Never Been Modern
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potentially empowering understanding of how the social works is possible. The clearest
illustration of why that may be so is found in Latour's comment:
'Take some small business owner hesitatingly going after a few modest shares, some
conqueror trembling with fever, some poor scientist tinkering in his lab, a lowly
engineer piecing together a few more or less favourable relationships or forces,
some strutting and fearful politician: turn the critics loose on them, and what do you
get? Capitalism, imperialism, science, technology, domination - all equally absolute,
systematic, totalitarian. In the first scenario, the actors were trembling, in the second
they are not. The actors in the first scenario could be defeated; in the second they no
longer can.'8
The methodology of this approach expresses a commitment to showing the material
character of the social, where formations and relations are the effects of practice rather than
inviolable 'entities' and 'orders'. Latour finds in the quality of a network a notion that is:
'...more simple than the notion of a system, more historical than the notion of
structure, more empirical than the notion of complexity.'9
His application of the idea represents a rejection of three ways of thinking about nature,
society and discourse that have characterised social science, namely: the naturalisation of
'facts', the socialisation of 'power', and the deconstruction of 'truth effects'. It is an
approach which, in asking 'Is it our fault if the networks are simultaneously real like nature,
narrated like discourse and collective like society',10 seeks to combine all three elements.
This is not an entirely new idea. It equates in many ways with the discourse/practice premise
of Foucault's genealogies and a social science literature that since the 1970s has made the
philosophical and epistemological case for rejecting traditional conceptions of the social that
are overburdened with monoliths, dualisms, essences, structures and separate spheres.
Donna Haraway's feminist collectives, hybrids and cyborgs are one inspirational example of
how such terms have been gutted and remade.11 For me the value of Latour is therefore one
of emphasis and conciseness. In this one book he provides the methodological wherewithal
to localise the study of the 'building blocks' of society, including Welfare. The connection
with Science is not incidental:
'The myth of the soulless, agentless bureaucracy, like that of the pure and perfect
market place, offers the mirror image of the myth of Universal Scientific Laws.'12
Latour's emphasis on practice means that how questions are foremost and these are
necessarily the meat of 'ethnographies of practice' which engage at the level of the local,
detailed, substantive and meaningful. The terminology Latour uses to convey the difference
8
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this focus on practice makes is one of process and movement, ideally suited to the sorts of
connections that I am making between the policy conference and DSS waiting room.
Hybridisation, association, translation and mediation are relations that convey fusion more
than purity, simultaneity rather than linearity. They disallow the tidy convenience of boxes
and multiply possible ways of seeing relations between things - perhaps as constellations
shedding more light than single stars. It is the state of being 'in relation' to other things that
gives substance and meaning to the things we look at: the relation becomes the thing and
vice versa. Neither thing has 'causality' in a conventional sense 'as sources' because each is
a generated effect of the relation with the other.
These understandings are implicated in my approach to 'underclass' and welfare in
two ways. First, with regard to the nature of the dynamic of 'underclass' discourse. The
expected 'objects' of study - 'poor people', 'criminals', 'welfare dependants' - are too
narrated to be facts', 'Welfare' and 'Politics' are too fractured, practical and embodied to be
reduced to a power/interest bloc; and the discourse of 'underclass' is too real and too social
to boil down to meaning effects. Simultaneous relations generate discourse as all these
things. Second, Latour's network analogy is implicated in my approach through the
centrality it gives to a relational way of thinking, to relations between things as constitutive
of the things themselves: 'In the middle, where nothing is supposed to be happening, there is
almost everything.'13 The relations between the policy conference and DSS waiting rooms,
the mediation or translation of policy related practices and benefit claiming practices,
becomes what is most important and interesting about the sites.
The fundamental quality of these mediating relations is that they are all power
relations. Latour's 'actor-network' theory is necessarily a theory of power where 'agency' is
not driven by power but generative of it.14 This means that power does not emanate from a
particular source and diffuse outwards but is generated in the effects of chains of agents
working together in 'associations': 'power as a consequence and not as a cause of collective
action.'15 It is in the originary work of Foucault that the notion of power as produced and
productive has fullest expression. Disparaging the idea of causal power monoliths Foucault
is interested in the workings of what he calls micro-powers in their specific local effects,
and also conceives of this work in terms of a network of relations where:
'...none of its localised episodes may be inscribed in history except by the effects it
induces on the entire network in which it is caught up.'16
13
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Sociology Of Knowledge Sociological Review Monograph 32, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
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Latour's actor-network approach to studying the social is therefore congruent with a
Foucauldian methodological account of discourse/practice as outlined in Chapter One.
Together they can be used to argue for the importance, indeed necessity, of considering the
discourse of 'underclass' in terms of a network that is constituted by power-knowledge
relations, and in my writing, infused with political stakes. Primarily this is an issue about the
politics of knowledge and representation, that is the democracy of conceived networks.
Locating (and Limiting) Networks
This section briefly locates and limits the networks on which I will focus. The idea
of networked social relations means that every part of the social is potentially so connected
to other parts, across time and space, that network research could be limitless. It is therefore
necessary to construct boundaries at some point, and to specify as closely as possible the
time-space lineaments of the networks being focused on. The nature of these networks is to
shift and tracing them can be difficult given that mutability. Yet, the importance of tracing
connections remains: it is to better know 'how we got here', which might also suggest
something of where we are going. 'Here' in the contemporary period is a dominant
discourse of welfare change that is opposed to the idea of increasing subsistence level
welfare provisions on an unconditional basis, and in support of the idea of tying welfare
improvements to labour market participation. This has become an orthodoxy that transcends
party political lines. It means that the Stakeholder conference, organised by politically Left-
wing figures to launch their vision for a new Labour politics, can host a Conservative MP as
a guest speaker:
'Stakeholder capitalism is closely related to Welfare... I hope this concept of the
Stakeholder can successfully develop the role of individual welfare responsibility
since there will be unavoidable collective obligations that derive from Britain's
unenviable record of divorce and single parenthood... It cannot be the materialist
concept of a welfare bran tub with more winners than losers.'
(John Biffen MP)17
The way current circumstances are held to require a transcending of old divides of
Right/Left, Old/New, Modern/Postmodern is presented as an apparent consensus. It unites
(though not univocally or unproblematically) academic and political convictions that the age
of Ideology and Universals has passed.18 The policy conference on 'Stakeholder
Capitalism' was set up to debate how certain 'new realities' effect the British economy and
17 Biffen.J (1996) Stakeholder Capitalism: Blind Alley or Best Hope? Conference Proceedings
Sheffield: Political Economy Research Centre
18 Giddens.A (1994) Beyond Left and Right Cambridge: Polity Press; Blair.T (1996) New Britain: my
vision ofa young country London: Fourth Estate; Bauman.Z (1993) Postmodern Ethics Oxford:
Blackwell; Hutton.W (1995) The State We're In London: Vintage
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British society still loosely described as a Welfare State.19 The main figures associated with
this analysis identify themselves as politically Left, and seek to combine some of the
traditions of that movement with the imperatives of 'new realities' as values to be
implemented in a new manner. So for example, the core of the liberal economics of Keynes
and Beveridge is out, equality is still in but may have to be detached from its past
associations and expectations. Meanings are being remade. Indeed the Welfare State is
positioned at the centre of how Left/Right can be reconceptualised in a new politics of
'positive welfare' and 'life politics' (Giddens), and 'proactive welfare' (Hutton) rather than
the class politics that prevailed at the inception of the British Welfare State. Crucially these
analyses focus on ending the now politically ubiquitous idea of 'welfare dependency', as a
central goal of a new Good Society.20 In these formulations Welfare is predominantly
something that the working class poor become dependent on, the route to the DSS waiting
room office.
The aspects of 'underclass' discourse that I address in this chapter are practices
within and about the contemporary Social Security system, namely: means-tested benefit
claiming and the vision of change for them expressed in the notion of the 'Stakeholder
society'. The DSS waiting room and the policy conference are two key sites where those
practices of welfare are located. I have chosen these sites for what they can show about the
politics of knowledge production around 'underclass'. The conference provides an
opportunity to analyse some of the 'analysers' in action, to study the power relations of
'underclass' discourse by studying some of its powerful players, to see how they perform,
how they organise and are organised, how they are involved in establishing regulatory views
and actions over the people of 'underclass', and how they are themselves regulated or
produced as powerful subjects. The DSS waiting room gives me the opportunity to express
different kinds of knowledge about Welfare and Social Security: practical knowledges about
being a benefit claimant and about administrative practice; and personal and experiential
knowledges about having a 'place' within the Social Security system. In other words, the
choice of these sites reflects an epistemological premise that knowledges about
contemporary Welfare exist in different kinds of spaces, and that their value is primarily
dependent on the power relations between them.
19 This idea of 'Stakeholding' as a way of ushering in a new politics and society is expressed
throughout the conference's promotional literature, from the original flyer to the post-conference book.
See Kelly.G, Kelly.D and Gamble.A (eds.) (1997) Stakeholder Capitalism London: Macmillan/
Political Economy Research Centre
20 The work of J.K Galbraith on the 'Good Society' (Galbraith.J.K (1996) The Good Society: The
Humane Agenda London: Sinclair-Stevenson) is central to Hutton's own vision of social change as
outlined in The State We're In (1995)', see also Hutton.W (1996) 'New Hope For The Good Society'
The Guardian 3.1.96 pi3. Galbraith gave the inaugural lecture at the opening of the Political Economy
Research Centre (PERC) in 1993. PERC are the conference organisers.
To allow me to talk about the power relations of the policy conference-DSS waiting
room and the dichotomous meanings that can be associated with that pairing
(professional/worker, thinker/doer, taxpayer/claimant, giver/taker among others) I am going
to talk about what is in-between those apparent divides: the realm of the relational. I have
identified four themes through which I can talk about the relational spatiality of the two
sites. They will be used to mediate the two sites, to show them as differentially constituted
in relation to each other. They allow the sites to be discussed in the same terms with the
same questions in mind. The intermediary themes are: Representation, Embodiment,
Knowledge, and Work. My idea is to present the sites as intrinsically related spaces by
virtue of key practices (of representation, embodiment, knowledge, and work) that constitute
each site, and constitute them in relation to each other. The significance of these particular
areas of practice, the nature of the spaces they constitute and the relations that bind them are
explicated in the following four sections.
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1: REPRESENTED SPACES
Writing Between Sites: The Represented Space of the Policy Conference and the DSS
Waiting Room
My research path took me between a policy conference and various DSS waiting
rooms not as a first time participant in either, but in a different capacity as participant-
researcher. My own position in the research process as a might-be academic and part of a
working class family on Social Security, is integral to the way that I will represent those two
spaces. The importance of articulating the difference that my position makes to this
'research knowledge' should be clear. The sites are researched through my position in them,
they are partly my sites of production. Therefore what counts as significant, and how that is
expressed in my writing is rooted in my perspective and my chosen notations. In this respect
my work is located in a specifically feminist objectivity and research ethic.
The policy conference and DSS waiting room are sites that I am presenting as
'analytic' spaces rather than as straightforwardly 'empirical' spaces. In other words, they are
spaces constructed for the purpose of conveying particular social understandings through
myself. The dimensions of this sort of analytic space are quite different to those claimed for
empirical, objective space as space that is 'mimetic' of one material reality. They enable the
articulation of a different sort of project, indeed different sorts of geography:
'We need an analytic space which can articulate boundaries, distinctions and
disjuncture instead of erasing them, a space which can acknowledge exclusion as
intrinsic to the process of inclusion... a space of contradictions... a pleated and
folded space... which can make space for alterity.'21
The use of the term analytic space is not meant to suggest that the policy conference and
DSS waiting room are purely ideational spaces. Rather, the idea of space as a product of
different kinds of practices, including analytic practices, is meant to transcend the division
between the empirically real and personally intuitive, and the cerebral and the lived. In my
telling, analytic space is both the lived research space and the represented space of the page.
An idea of the research space as lived and representational encapsulates a
'relational' way of thinking. It allows the research space to be figured in terms other than
those of authority, objectivity, purity, centrality. It allows positions of 'marginality' and
'alterity' to be seen as constitutive of relations between different groups of people and
different spaces, in relation to each other. This idea is powerfully expressed in the writings
21
Rose.G (1995) 'Geographical Traditions: Rethinking the History of Geography' p414-416
Transactions of the Institute ofBritish Geography 20 1995 p416
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of bell hooks with regard to the identity relations between 'margins' and 'centres'. The first
line of her preface to From Margin To Centre states: 'To be in the margin is to be part of the
whole but outside the main body.'22 From this position hooks constructs for herself a social
positionality and a view that is capable of particular kinds of social insight into relations
between different kinds of people and places. For her these are the relations between people
and places on different sides of the track:
'Living as we did - on the edge - we developed a particular way of seeing reality.
We looked both from the outside in and from the inside out. We focused our
attention on the centre as well as on the margin. We understood both. This mode of
seeing reminded us of the existence of a whole universe, a main body made up of
both margin and center. Our survival depended on an ongoing public awareness of
the separation between margin and center and an ongoing private acknowledgement
that we were a necessary, vital part of that whole...This sense of wholeness,
impressed upon our consciousness by the structure of our daily lives, provided us an
oppositional world view - a mode of seeing unknown to most of our oppressors, that
sustained us, aided us in our struggle to transcend poverty and despair, strengthened
our sense of self and solidarity.'
The awareness of connections between margins and centres is critical to the sort of
research relation I am setting up between the policy conference and DSS waiting room
through my own positionality. My position in both sites is an intervention of sorts. In some
respects I should not be in either because children from 'cultures of welfare dependency' do
not end up going to policy conferences and 'academics' do not sit in DSS waiting rooms as a
matter of course. But someone from a 'culture of welfare dependency' doing academic
research may well do both and not feel totally out of place (or in place) in either. The
importance of this hybrid identification is that it creates a new area ofmeaning, the
possibility of a different kind of representation.
Part of that new area of meaning is about seeing relations between different sorts of
people and places as less fixed, and less distant than is often made to seem the case. One
particular hope is to see how an apparently 'consensual bloc could be disarticulated.'23 For
me this is the contemporary consensus of 'underclass welfare dependency' partly
represented in the Stakeholder policy conference. The substance of the policy conference-
DSS waiting room relation, through which I position myself, is a class relation. The research
and writing process has to a large extent been about travelling and writing between classes
and concomitantly between different powers and different knowledges. The academic and
'welfare dependency' parts of me are already part of my subjectivity and can be strategically
deployed between the two sites to provide insight in my analysis of the welfare practices
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that partly constitute 'underclass'. Welfare practices are here conceived in the broadest
sense, as a realm of knowledge production, policy administration and subsistence living.
Such a thinking and writing process is necessarily self-reflexive, engaged and
committed, and it gives priority to the affective and to the material experienced as 'real'. It
is the hallmark of much feminist, black and post-colonial writings within academia, but
interestingly has not had the same productivity in writings that foreground being working
class.24 This is a telling absence, possibly related to the prominence given to class as an
economic category in much political and social theorising of the 1960s and 1970s from
which gender, race and cultural specification emerged. The fact remains that British working
class subjectivities have not been the terrain of the 'cultural turn' in social sciences, and it is
very much this aspect of the classed nature of the policy conference-DSS waiting room
relation and ofmy own subjectivity as a working class researcher writing between those
sites that I want to foreground. Classed relations are primary to the construction of this part
of the discourse of 'underclass'; they are also primary to my own feelings of class
subjectivity at the moment. The period of underclass/scrounger/benefit cheat/low-life
politics has been a long one that has stretched through most ofmy childhood, teenage and
adult years and looks set to condition the party political agenda for some time. It is therefore
perhaps a formative and visceral working class knowledge and identification, rather than the
newly academic-researcher part of me that will sound the loudest in this strategic
articulation of hybridity. In this respect my hybridity is not about migration, displacement,
aspiration or moving on. This is not to deny those experiences of class that are more
ambivalent about where they are from and at. My class and gender identity has developed
without domestic or community based oppression by working class men, and I hold class as
a primary allegiance in the particular context of addressing the politics of 'underclass'
discourse. Class is written in /into what follows not as a monolithic determining category
but simply as a voice.
Being There
Being at the policy conference and being in the DSS waiting rooms for the sort of
research purposes I had, required a particular mindset. If observed I would not have been
doing anything very different to other people except for occasionally writing. I was mostly
occupied with thinking and I tried to think about two things. First, what were the
connections between 'all this' at the conference and 'all that' of the waiting rooms and vice
versa. I let my imagination roam. Second, how these spaces were full - constituted through
24
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language, bodies, history, symbolic meaning, subjective experiences, performances. I had a
great deal to think about, mainly what I would count as significant. From my research
scribblings, some tape recordings, memories and later reflections I would somehow order
into words these copious social spaces.25
But the research moment itself was made up of just 'being there', forcing myself to
remember research objectives, and trying not to slip into habitual motions. I do not want to
portray the quality of my research experience as arbitrary or inept in an attempt to distance
myself from the traditional research motif of the 'expert in the field'. Neither do I want to
suggest that because I am making an issue of the 'represented' nature of these spaces - my
productivity as it were - that there was nothing significant there to shape or that any old
story about the conference or waiting room experience will do.
My initial selection of these particular spaces was perhaps the most important
element of doing this part of the research. This selection, as part of the whole research
project has its genesis in personal history and current biography and I am claiming it as a
positive strength that can only add to the sort of analyses of power, knowledge and
experience that I am making. I am choosing to combine the impressionistic and emotional
with the evidenced and analytic as a writing strategy, not as weaknesses to be bracketed off
but strengths made to work - to both situate my own partiality and to make sense of some
dominant discursive partialities which are equally emotional and impressionistic (even if
couched in different sorts of rhetorics). It was these understandings that brought me back to
the DSS.
Departure Points: A Remembered Space
Through the summer months of 1996 I spent the waiting time to see a DSS officer
(between 30 minutes and one and a half hours) in a number of waiting rooms in the South
East of England. They are officially called Benefit Agency offices, but for the people who
use them they are called 'the social' or 'DSS'. I had chosen the South East because it is an
area with which I am familiar and at ease, and where my accent means I could make
enquiries and talk unobtrusively. I followed through the waiting period in offices in
Fareham, Portsmouth, Southampton, Havant, Cosham, Brighton and in London - Euston,
Kennington, Finsbury Park and Stoke Newington. In these waiting rooms commonalities are
more striking than differences. People come to them because they haven't got enough
money to live on, usually due to a problem with a first claim; the need for a 'special
25 Research note content was a mix of jotted running description of activities and people; things heard
and overheard; parts of conversations with people; mental notes as passing ideas; with fuller and more
reflective notes compiled at the days end. This was a version of a general schema taken from Lofland.J
and Lofland.L.H (eds.) (1995) Analysing Social Settings: A Guide to Qualitative Observation and
Analysis University of California: Davis Wadsworth p94
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circumstance' Social Fund grant or loan (due to death, moving house, domestic violence); to
notify a change in domestic or financial circumstances; for stamped evidence of claimant
status for other agencies; or to sort out administrative delays and mistakes in benefit
payments. I made enquiries about getting removal cost help from the Social Fund, initially
as a genuine enquiry.
In these rooms the materiality of poverty is palpable. As a child I remember my
local DSS waiting room as somewhere where there was often open conflict between the staff
and people in immediate need. It was a sort of nerve centre, somewhere where things usually
hidden on shopping streets, like people not able to cope, living in an almost constant state of
crisis and anxiety, came to the surface. The police would sometimes be called but most often
shouting, swearing and trouble of some sort just passed. People smoked, sometimes talked
to each other, tried to keep their children 'well-behaved'or let them run around. People often
knew each other from where they lived or were just 'back again'. Everyone seemed to be
experiencing variations on a theme because the general conclusion was either 'Bastards' or
half victorious relief at having sorted some problem or money out from those behind the
desks. Sometimes there would be laughter, humour at the expense of those behind the desks
or about each other and shared treatment, experience. But it was generally a depressing
place, especially as a child with nothing to do, where the waiting sometimes for hours is
most memorable. I spent a lot of time in our local waiting room with my mum, sisters and
brother and remember particular incidents quite well, usually because of the anger and upset
they caused us. The feeling of such experiences remains with me mainly as anger but also as
a feature of my childhood that generally affected how I felt about myself and our poverty in
relation to other 'middle class' people and those who had the power to relieve it - in the DSS
office and in the government. On one occasion my mum's benefit payment book had not
arrived at the Post Office from the DSS for our weekly payment so we all had to run across
town to try and get it from the DSS office before it shut. Just as we arrived the door was
being locked by one of the staff and my mum had to put her foot in the door to stop the
woman from shutting it on us. The officer said we could not come in because it was too late
and tried to push the door shut against my mum's wedged foot. But my mum did not move
and said that they had to see us because they should have sent the benefit book, it was
Friday and she only had 50p left in her purse for the whole weekend. She shouted because
this was serious, not just about money for food but because the electricity and gas in the
house were run on coin meters. The woman was furious but curtly told us to wait there while
she got someone else. My mum did not trust her and insisted that we all went in there and
then, and we did. In the end we left with the book and ran back across town to the Post
Office before that shut. We accepted and even expected this sort of thing to happen in a
normality that consisted of a day to day, week to week getting by and it was in spite of the
DSS rather than thanks to them, because nothing was ever made easy or stress free. They
made us feel as if we were always trying to get something that was not really ours - from
rent rebates to tribunals for money for paint to decorate with because the council would not
do it. And the whole time there was a fear that the money could be reduced or taken away.
Or that we could be taken from our mum and put into care, especially when she was ill. This
nearly happened a few times and we knew other people that it had happened to. The feelings
I had about these places as a child and teenager have largely stayed with me, in memory but
also because my mum is still claiming benefit and still has problems with the DSS. They are
now part of my research perspective.
DSS waiting rooms were overhauled in the late 1980s as part of the government's
'customer service' ideology. Their appearances, functions and processes have largely
changed to make them more efficient and more pleasant. But somehow they aren't and it's
nothing to do with the decor. It is more to do with the relation between them and other
places, better places, cleverer places, more important places, places like the policy
conference. Through the policy conference on Stakeholding I am exploring that relation as
problematic both personally and politically.
Holding a personal knowledge about DSS waiting rooms, I set off to the conference
at Sheffield University in which a number of distinguished figures from business, academic,
media, political and social policy fields would come together to discuss 'Stakeholding' as
the new Big Idea, for a new Britain. Arriving at London's St. Pancras rail station where the
11.30 train would depart for Sheffield I found myself amongst a crowd of other conference
goers - holding recognisable conference bumf, some with copies of The Guardian and the
bible of 'Stakeholding'- Will Hutton's The State We're In. It all seemed quite amusing
really, there were nods and smiles of mutual recognition as we got on the train, people made
jokes about it, sat down, and some introduced themselves while others clearly knew each
other already. And not only was I among them, but I was smiling and joking too. Anger was
not really appropriate among these people, everything was so pleasant. This clearly was not
the world of the DSS waiting room, it was the world of the policy conference.
In this themed section I have suggested that the policy conference and DSS waiting
room are partly constituted through my reading and writing of them and in the case of the
DSS waiting room long held feelings and knowledges about them. This is to some extent a
preamble to what follows, a personal take on a power relation between two different sites. In
the next three themed sections I present this relation as an ethnography of two social spaces,
unequally positioned in power laden networked relations of embodiment, knowledge and
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work. The first section turns to the relation between the DSS waiting room and policy
conference where the policy imperatives of 'welfare change' meet the imperatives of
survival. The different evaluation of those imperatives in dominant discourses of
'underclass', rests on a division between different kinds of classes/knowledges/spaces.
Knowledge as 'intellect' is held as the preserve of the middle class and the spaces they
inhabit. Its correlative is that the working class do not dwell in the mind and other spaces of
the intellect but dwell in the bodily and emotional. Consequently, debates about the needs
and interests of poor bodies should be produced from the minds of the qualified middle class
- at exactly the sort of national, discursive intellectual event that the Stakeholder conference
set itself up as. One way of breaking the premise of this divide is to look at the embodied
nature of the conference, to break the idea of its space as a rarefied clime of the intellect.
The idea of the conference space as intellectual and disembodied, the waiting room as earthy
and embodied is central to the classed power relation that constitutes each in relation to the
other and that maintains the knowledges of the latter in analytic silence.
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2: PERFORMED AND EMBODIED SPACES
Bodies 'On' Welfare: The Policy Conference and DSS Waiting Room as Performed
and Embodied Space
'...materiality... power's most productive effect' Judith Butler26
'Social Security spending... has ballooned as poverty drives millions through the
drab waiting rooms of the ramp welfare state' Will Hutton27
'The marks of all this violence upon individual bodies are not hard to read'
David Harvey28
The contemporary discourse of 'underclass' is embodied. It is about bodies that are
criminal, over-fecund, needy, unsightly and unsavoury, abusive, emotional, delinquent, out
of control. It is also about bodies that are hungry, exhausted, cold, ill. Bodies that are
surveilled and tagged, taken into custody and into 'care', classed and gendered.
The term 'underclass' evokes a repertoire of bodily images that fix upon excess and
lack, active ill-discipline and passive dependence. The body of 'underclass' is at the centre
of converging knowledges of criminology, economy, demography, biology, and sociology,
which are held to be factual, informed, cerebral. The minds of various experts are thus put to
work on the nature and predicament of individual and grouped bodies that are deemed
problematic in a variety of ways, according to the expert's discipline.
The discourse of 'underclass' is also embodied as a production, that is, the whole
range of ideas about 'underclass' are not free-floating, empirically self-evident but are
generated in particular sorts of spaces by specific men and women whose own classed and
gendered embodiment is elided as they name and claim as public property the bodies of
'underclass'.
The discourse of 'underclass' is also constitutive of actual bodies: it partly brings
about that which it names. This is Foucault's seminal contribution to the way discourse
should be conceived of as a material production, conveyed here by Elizabeth Grosz:
'For Foucault, power deploys discourses, particularly knowledges, on and over
bodies establishing knowledge as the representatives of the truth of those bodies and
26
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their pleasures. Discourses made possible and exploited by power, intermesh with
bodies, with the lives and behaviour of individuals, to constitute them as particular
bodies.'29
In this section I want to explore the productive nature of this discourse through the
bodies of the Stakeholder policy conference and the DSS waiting room. The purpose of the
exploration is to extend my argument about the material nature of this discourse as
something that is practiced and constitutive: here performative and embodied, and about the
situated nature of its knowledge: specifically its class and its gender.
The policy conference and DSS waiting room share these characteristics of
materiality, performativity, and the situatedness of their knowledge. They are different in
terms of the meanings attached to them. Those meanings are produced in relation to each
other and constitute a power relation. To talk about those relations by talking about bodies
however, involves some conceptual acrobatics. Is it worth it? I will attempt to show that it is
and that moreover it is necessary, by presenting the DSS waiting room and policy
conference as heterogeneous, performed and embodied spaces. But I shall briefly preface
this with two questions: why bodies? and how can the conference and waiting room bodies
be rendered/talked about?
Why Bodies?
In the following themed sections my attention to practice in the discourse of
'underclass' talks about the ways in which the subjectivities, spaces and knowledges of
delegate and claimant, conference and waiting room, are intertwined with each other -
creating a power-ful domain of meaning and practice. In order to do this and to answer the
question 'what sort of space is this?' in both the policy conference and DSS waiting room I
listened, looked, talked, interacted with and thought about where I was. This process was
very much a bodily one: experiences, interpretations, feelings and thoughts were all
intrinsically part of my bodily space as I related to the DSS waiting room and policy
conference spaces. My body was literally the site of all this, as a 'sensory and sentient'
bundle of relations. The 'things' I moved among and reflected upon were both human and
non-human. Many of the practices I observed were an irreducible mix of both and as such
were all embodied. By thinking about both my embodiment and that of the delegates and
claimants I tried to achieve a closer understanding of the way the spaces were constituted
through practices (both my own and those of others). It was through those practices that I
produced an understanding and reading of the spaces of conference and waiting room. My
reason for talking about bodies therefore marks a move to specify practice. In many respects
29
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it is a strategic specification which turns attention to those who assume the mantle of
'disembodied facticity' and it therefore refuses the lived/embodied versus textual/cerebral
distinction.
Specification of practice is my aim, with three main areas of interest with regard to
the bodies of policy conference and waiting room. First, an interest in the materiality of
discourse as practice; second, an interest in performative aspects of these sites, in their
complexities and contingencies as social situations; third, an interest in the embedded nature
of the knowledges that are produced in those spaces in relation to the situated positions of
delegates and claimants. The sort of specification that would allow an exploration of the
subjectivities and corporealities of particular delegates and claimants is not covered here
because I think that level of engagement would require interviews with individuals and it
has not been my intention to provide such an in-depth ethnographic interpretation of the
sites. However, this should not detract from an understanding of the irreducible relation
between the behavioural, situated, subjective, and corporeal nature of discourse as embodied
practice. It is rather a question of emphasis and here embodiment will be presented in terms
of materiality, performative sociality, and embedded positionalities. Those terms have large
theoretical literatures of their own which I do not intend to review here. Instead, below is a
brief summary of my understanding of those terms as they inform my 'bodily
representations' of the policy conference and waiting room spaces.
Materiality
Bodies have a fleshy immanence that is irrefutable. 'The body' stands at the
opposite of what is held to be the conceptual, the abstract. It can be made to act both as the
'test' and grounding of theory, and as the lesser half of a dualism that has pathologised
women, black people, homosexuals and poor people as inferior beings controlled by
irrational, uncivilised, out of control, bodily impulses. In recoiling from both these
constructions of reductive empiricism and pathologising discourse, Social Science has
developed ideas about how the physical is mediated and constructed by the cultural and
social. Bodies have largely been dissociated from this process (the project of
constructionism as it were) and so abstracted from the development of social theory. But
through the work of a number of prominent feminists who have developed Foucault's
approach to power as productive and therefore materially constitutive, 'the body' has been
reclaimed from both pathologising and overly constructionist discourse.30
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Judith Butler's concept of 'materialisation' explains how power does not act on
bodies but through them, so matter is not a surface but:
'...a process of materialisation that stabilises over time to produce the effect of
boundary, fixity and surface we call matter.'31
It is this understanding of materiality that I carry into the policy conference and waiting
room spaces. Power relations of class and gender are marked on delegate and claimant
bodies but that marking is not an inscription on passive matter. It is a relational process in
which those bodies are active. It means that I am thinking about delegates and claimants as
classed and gendered bodies, and working class and female bodies, without either
suggesting a one way notion of socially constructed bodies or an essentialist notion of class
or gender. My approach seeks to accommodate ideas about 'the visceral' and 'the regulated'.
Performative Sociality
Butler uses the concept of 'performativity' to describe the way that bodies are
infused with power relations that partly make up what they are, how they seem, how they
act, think and feel. It is an alternative account to 'agency' in which the emphasis is on the
on-going process of 'becoming' who we are through the practices of power relations. Thus:
'...there is no power that acts, but only a reiterated acting that is power in its
persistence and instability.'32
In this conceptualisation, social situations, bodies and identities are contingently produced,
processual and relational. I am adopting this notion of the performative in my representation
of the policy conference and waiting room spaces in order to escape the associations of
'conduct' and 'behaviour' which are overly rooted in the notion of a fully cognisant and
bound individual subject/actor. Instead delegate and claimant bodies are seen as caught up
in (as the threshold of) the symbolic and material power relations that converge in the policy
conference and in the DSS waiting room and are performative within the specific relations
of those social spaces.
This does not mean that these bodies are not ontologically grounded because
confusion would result from being caught up in continuously happening processes and
relations. The social spaces of policy conference and waiting room are lived and
experienced as if they were real, solid, actual, even predictable. Claimants and delegates are
ontologically grounded but their experience is not an ontological given. I am not therefore
trying to oppose an idea of the authentic experience of claimants or delegates to an idea of
pre-determined socialisation or ideological delusion, but am conceiving of experience as
31
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something that is social and processual. To talk about the performative nature of the waiting
room and conference is therefore a way of emphasising their processual and relational
nature. And the body is the site where processes and relations converge in practices. By
talking about it, emphasis is given to the situatedness of the whole productive process of
discourse. The body is self-evidently located as somebody in time and space. It is a site of
specificity: of class, gender, race, time, space, and a site of embedded knowledges.
The Embedded
An embodied location is productive of embodied understandings. The body is
therefore a site for the production of a particular kind of knowledge. As already said, that
knowledge is not an authentic realm of understanding, it is rather a situated knowledge that
is partly constituted by bodily experience. A politically strategic approach that seeks to
valorise such knowledge will recognise the formative role of experience. This understanding
does not only apply to subjugated groups, it is also meant to reveal the situated partiality of
dominant knowledges: 'Every body is marked by the history and specificity of its
existence.'33 Different markings are a touchstone of specific bundles of power relations. For
example, in the discourse of 'underclass' it is possible to say that the body of the
'underclass' as a target of disciplinary power-knowledge relations is classed more violently
than the body of middle class professionals who deploy that regime from a bodily position
of material ease. It is the nature of that marking that necessarily produces in the benefit
claiming poor a visceral knowledge of the discourse. The consequences of entrenched
inequalities for the poor can be partly explicated in terms of embodiment. Body-talk can be
put to use to draw attention to the bodily consequences of discourses that claim
'disembodied facticity'. The problem is how to speak this composition of materiality,
performativity and embeddedness, which is partly the problem of how to speak the body.
Body Talk?
In many ways bodies are the inception, the process and the end point of social
practice - a nexus of simultaneous relations. To translate that understanding into a research
method makes an enormous assumption that it is possible to convey 'everything and
simultaneously so' by interacting with bodies (as a self-reflexive body myself) and then
writing about them. The impossibility of 'writing' embodiment is evident, it is unavoidably
reductive because the complex substance of 'embodiment' cannot be translatable to words.
It is amorphous, unavailable to the world of logic/logos/linguistics.34 This is not a matter of
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my not having got delegates and claimants to talk about their embodiment, of not probing
deep enough. Empirical investigations of embodiment are always an articulation of
embodiment that cannot access (by whatever means) that which may be uncapturable,
unknowable to those in different bodies. Instead I have been talking about the implications
of using embodiment as a concept (its materiality, performativity, embeddedness) rather
than trying to evidentially render up a bodily truth. Nor would I want to attempt this because
such a persistent 'will to knowledge' does not fit with the politics of my research concerned
as it is with the discursive rendition of differently classed and gendered bodies. I am reading
the bodies of policy conference and DSS waiting room as performative, material and
embedded without claiming to know the 'truth' of them. I am thinking about the capillary
form of power in the talk and movements of claimants and delegates; I am relating my own
experiences - past and present - to that thought process; and I am using my imagination to
recreate those spaces on the page.
Bringing it all together
An afternoon plenary session, a morning workshop and an evening social: three
different spaces at three different times that partly make up the Stakeholder conference
space. They have enough in common to feel 'of a piece' and are enough apart to wonder
about the different spatialities of the conference. In other words, differences are there but
they do fit together as a sense of place - 'the conference'. This is what I felt.
Do / feel part of this, do I look as if I should be here ?
I can join in lunchtime banter; I know what is appropriate (and not) to say; I clap and laugh
at things that I genuinely find funny; I follow directions and instructions that mean the
conference can run smoothly and on time. I won't persist with my question once the time is
up and I won't shout out swear words to register my angry disagreement, even though I'm
thinking them. I seem to fit, does that mean I do fit? My dissenting thoughts, my reason for
being here, my personal history, my class, are somehow all held within: nobody can tell by
looking at me and do any of those things matter here, if I don't make them matter by making
them visible and audible, by being a spoke in the works. But such a performance would
make me the centre of attention and I want them to be the focus, my focus, the thing I was
looking at and forming opinions about. I could justify my joining in as subterfuge, I'm not
really part of it. Perhaps other people were doing the same, and even more convincingly by
joining in more than me, perhaps this space is full of hidden agendas and strategic
manoeuvrings. Perhaps we are all hoping that there are hidden agendas and that once in
power, in government, even these ideas will be different to how they seem now. These ideas
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will turn out to be the cover for something really radical. And perhaps not, perhaps what you
see is what you get and this really is as radical as it's going to get. Is it subversive not to
wear my name badge? Maybe I'm not radical enough, perhaps that's me just trying to be
different when I'm not at all because I'm just like them going along with it, playing the part,
becoming the part. But no, I maintain my difference and perhaps it is not that well hidden
after all. Perhaps it is there for all to see because after all there are no other women of my
age here for a start. They are overwhelmingly middle-aged men, or older women. I laugh
and clap at some things but not others. I leave the social event early, I'm not with a group
and don't seem to know anyone. I ask the camera man lots of questions. My clothes are too
trendy. I can't help looking angry and incredulous, sighing in disbelief at different points.
Yes I'm obviously a bit of an anomaly, but not a trouble causer. I am easily accommodated
as I sit with the rest of them under the flags of nationhood and academe which regale the
hall.
Can I, and therefore possibly the rest of these people be both 'conformist detractors' and
'subversive functionaries'?
I must look for the signs, for the give-aways, for the slips and cracks. But there is so much
cover to wade through, can it all be cover? Am I willing the slips to make it all more
interesting, and hopeful? I wonder.
The Men in the Suits Take the Stage
The afternoon plenary that launches the conference is made up of a row of soberly
suited middle-aged and older men. Smart male bodies, shaven and clean, with a certain
stature, who speak with confidence as second nature. Their speech is a mixture of self-
positioning and truth claim: a self-justifying ambition of Ideas. These are voices of
authority: sonorous, measured, self-assured. The impression is that they know what they are
talking about. They are talking about Big Things: Global, Economic and Business, with
words that are technical, a professional language. The impression is that these are the 'right'
words, spoken in the right way. They demand, expect and receive our attention. Their
knowledge is imparted and listened to. Whether it is agreed with, modified or rejected in the
minds of the delegates I cannot know, but it is taken on board. Symbolically it is accepted
within the stage-audience relation in which it is deployed.
For 20 minutes at the end of two hours that relation is apparently reversed, given
over to the 'floor': people stand from their seats, a microphone is brought to them, a
comment made or question asked, some short and nervous, others lengthy and at ease. They
are all partly critical, challenging the 'newness' of the Stakeholding idea, the closeness of its
accommodation with the interests of capital, its overly regulative, authoritarian potential.
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They are like shots, quick and disarming, some hit their target more effectively than others,
some scrape, others wound. But the session has been cleverly managed so that the target
remains in tact: the questions and comments follow from each other while replies are saved
up for an extended answer to everything at the end which is not further disputed. It has not
really been a debate but has made a gesture to debate which we are assured can continue
apace in the following sessions. Disagreement is thus contained in this particular space, the
final word is theirs as if in resolution of the problems raised. It would seem that we listened,
queried, had problems dealt with. The short burst of dissent has therefore served a purpose:
their authority questioned and restored, the stronger for it, having proved itself. Delegates
knowing that has been the case, recognising the set up as it were, does not matter a great
deal. The speakers' authority is affirmed, even if agreement does not attend it. The plenary
session is as much about authoritative symbolism and self-presentation as it is the idea of
Stakeholding, so the session has worked insofar as authority remains in tact at the end. Their
convictions have not shifted, the process of persuasion has begun and proved itself resilient
at the first hurdle. Furthermore this situation seems to be an organisational rather than
democratic deficit because we are assured that it's about keeping on a timed schedule and
discussion can continue elsewhere. The nature of this 'elsewhere' is important because it is
somehow less public, divided into smaller spaces, more informal - less of a threat to the
dramaturgy of power in the main arena. Out of sight it is marginalised, contained, unlikely
to achieve a large scale momentum that could derail the event before it had properly begun.
Above all the symbolism of authority delivered by men of stature, in possession of
professional knowledges and a technical language, is maintained. So a distance and
detachment, a mystique of sorts is produced. The squabbling can go on elsewhere, it is not
'in place' in this grand hall. Having 'mastered' dissent, they have conveyed a sense of
competence, the symbolic affirmation of authority is part of authority itself. Like theatre
goers, the audience files out, talking quietly among themselves, perhaps not enamoured with
the content of the piece but somehow unavoidably impressed by the spectacle.
Strangers in the Night
The evening social is a launch reception for the New Political Economy journal, an
opportunity for publication promotion and networking. I stand at the back near the table of
filled wine glasses, a young male suit approaches:
"Is this a safe place to stand away from the throng, or are you desperate to be near
the drinks?"
"Both I think, what about you?"
"I don't know what the point of all this is"
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"Networking and a drunken subscription probably"
"Who are you then?"
"I'm Chris and I'm doing a PhD at Edinburgh" (mock serious)
"Oh right, I'm David from Birmingham's Industrial Strategy Centre" (serious)
"Are you a supporter of this Stakeholding idea then?"
"Well interested really, what did you think of this afternoon's session?"
Another suit approaches:
"Are you two guarding the drinks or are we allowed another one?"
He looks at our badges and we repeat a version of our first conversation.
This is the stuff of stranger interaction at conferences: looking for reasons to start
talking often made easier by the presence of food and drink; introductions according to what
you 'do'/what's your interest in this; jokey irreverence about the event; references and
questions about the last/next session/conference and what you thought about that
idea/person, possibly developing into a discussion about a particular idea; questions about
what you've been doing/ what's your next move/project, interrupted at points by other
approaching participants incorporated by 'we were just saying about...' sort of joiners.
There is of course variation within this, but it is nevertheless quite a standard,
practised and recognised way of going on. It is half playing-at-being-at-a-conference
knowing this is what we're supposed to do. It is a style of interaction that marks post-event
reception rooms as particular sorts of spaces: not as formal as the main events, not as
informal as the bar. They are social situations which require skilled practices and an habitual
way of going on. Conventions and rules that are adhered to, constitute the event as a fairly
predictable sort of social space in which people become 'conference delegates'. There is
recognition of mutual self-interest in such conformity or rather a mutual performativity that
is highly intersubjective, produced in relation to others. Its modus operandi is 'we do this/
this is the way we do it/ we're like each other/ this is what we're like/ we are professional
people/ this is what we do'. Of course it is entirely normal, 'natural' behaviour for those
whose identities are partly made up by it, not a conscious thinking process that smacks of
paranoid insecurity, of desperately wanting to be like everybody else. It is not a
'performance' that is separate from the person, it partly constitutes that person, albeit
temporarily within the conference space. This constitutive process is seen in the conference
delegates in terms of their shared speech codes, expressions, gestures, postures, all
performed intersubjectively through scanning others, interacting with others, being
themselves in relation to others. This intersubjectivity is a basic dynamic of sociality in
shared social spaces whose specification will depend on the nature of the
subjectivities/relations that converge there. In the Stakeholder conference reception rooms, a
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scanning, recognition, interaction or withdrawal process is highly visible. It is intrinsic to
the process of 'networking' and seen most clearly in the way name/organisation badges are
so often the first port of call for the delegate on the move among strangers - this is
socialising for a purpose. People are talked to until a better option becomes available, or just
until someone preferable appears. The feel of such a space is a subjective matter, although it
is possible to visually distinguish delegates at ease from those who are awkward and
otherwise 'out of place', those who are not practised, good at or willing to practice such
modes of behaviour. There is however the potential for diverse performances within this
social space once other commonalities have been established: a shared sense of humour,
interest in football, drinking, or flirting can take conversations in very different directions.
With another Ph.D student, such diversionary tactics were identified, as we all stood around
drinking wine:
"Shall we see if we can edge into Will Hutton's group and see what he's going on
about?"
"No because we might have to say something intelligent or pretend we know what
Stakeholding actually means."
"Mmm and I could suddenly get carried away and ask for a job at The Observer."
"Giz a job, I can do that"
"Let's just imagine what he's saying. Do you think it's about 'Eastenders'... shall I
ask him if he watches it ?"
"No you're pissed, think about your future career."
(Both laugh)
Such interactions do not indicate that sociality is about totally improvised
performances or 'radical' possibilities! It is still very much grounded in power relations and
is in many respects a scripted business that is predictable even in its difference. This is why
the conference space, although constituted by a variety of different interactions and spaces,
still left a dominant impression of order and predictability. Things are generally conducted
pleasantly, politely, observing rules of middle class professional protocol with due regard
for the opinion of others. Being civil to people that you may well hate, or at least hate what
you think they stand for, is part of that performativity. It means that Conservative MP David
Willets is engaged with by delegates, without recourse to violence, and he has attended in
the knowledge that that will be the case. It's a practised form of the expression 'We're all
adults here'. That quality of pleasantness and civility is not a mark of character but a luxury
that is afforded particular social groups in particular social spaces. For example it is not
abundantly available as a choice in DSS waiting rooms in the interactions between staff and
claimants. It is afforded by a position of material ease where the stakes of debate are not
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personally high. Conference debate is not a matter of being able to feed your children or
visit a dying relative. DSS waiting room argumentation is about a struggle for survival and
dignity against the odds where losing the debate can mean losing your children to Social
Services, and there is a certain violence in that relation. Clearly there are conference
delegates who know about this, most academically or as a political position. The translation
of that knowledge into a mode of behaviour and attitude does not follow for most of them.
But no such translation is necessary for the claimant who is living the violence of power-
knowledge relations, and for whom violence often does not present itself as 'choice'. The
materiality of such relations, is not felt here, it is seen only in its opposite as material well-
being, healthy complexions, expensive attire, and in the sound of muted conviviality. But on
two occasions the translation was made in purposeful attacks on polite conference consensus
- the slips I'd hoped for. Significantly both attacks referred to things bodily. The reaction to
both revealed a deep seated antipathy and inability to cope with displays of emotional
intelligence that have the material position of those in poverty as their focus. The conference
space struggled to recuperate them but could not. They simply didn't fit.
Speaking 'Out of Place'
The first incident was during the workshop at which Conservative MP David
Willets was a panel speaker. The session was about the constitutional implications of a
Stakeholder State but the questioner concerned was not bound by that official heading:
"As a community worker who goes to the homes of people with nothing, I'd like to
ask David Willets if he knows what the smell of poverty is , 'cos I don't think he'd
like it."
The comment was not exactly shouted, but the tone was angry and accusatory. It threw the
workshop. An embarrassed silence followed and then David Willets uneasily looked to the
workshop Chair to be extricated from the awkwardness of his position. Significantly the
Chair went on to ask if there were any more comments or questions from the audience. This
decision following professional decorum, served to relieve Willet's discomfort and so
position the questioner as the one who had acted out of place and out of order. In many
respects the question could have no satisfactory answer from Willets, it so evoked the
material, bodily nature of poverty, it could not be met with the sort of objective,
disembodied language that had so far characterised the conference exchanges. Willet's
reaction, the all-round embarrassed silence and the Chair's decision all marked a retreat. But
this did not imply any sort of gain for the questioner who was automatically delegitimised as
'professional', or for those of whom the questioner spoke. It did, however, highlight the
extent to which the conference's stated allegiance with the 'best interests' of the poor was
abstracted from the material, emotional and embedded meanings of poverty. Its inability to
talk a language and register an understanding of those meanings represented the nature of
the distance between the conference and the DSS waiting room - a distance policed by a
different language and understanding. This distance is why claimants were not here to
speak: the nature of the discourse of 'underclass', in which the conference is one site, means
that claimants could not be here to speak, and that is not about invitations but fundamentally
who claimants are.
The conference's way of speaking and understanding are part of a power-knowledge
relation that works to produce differences as inequalities between these social groups.
Different languages and understandings then become the 'reasons why' claimants can't
participate in policy forums of debate. 'Voice' becomes the prerogative of those who can
speak an a priori language and who have a priori understandings. Claimants, excluded from
this discursive coterie, are reduced to bodily needs and interests, and spoken about. In this
authoritative realm of language and understanding, 'voice' is about controlling what is
heard. The refusal of 'emotional talk' and positionality are related parts of that mission to
control: it means that 'voice' doesn't come from embodied, sentient beings; it is 'objective'
and it does not have to account for itself.
This imperative was revealed by the second 'slip' in the conference's cover of
consensual unity. In the last five minutes of the final plenary session, shared by Labour MP
David Blunkett and Conservative MP John Biffen, in which Blunkett had started his speech
with the words 'I've a lot of respect for John', a delegate from the floor stood up to say:
"All this consensus at political level makes me nervous, those living in poverty
don't have a feeling of consensus but of anger and division. I just want to say all this
pleasantness makes me sick."
A few of us clapped and heads turned to see who had spoken such a blasphemy against the
consensual ethos of Stakeholding. The fact that there could be people unconvinced of the
Stakeholding message in this final assembly, did not sit easily with the tenor of the event -
the sense of membership and mission that the organisers had offered and had done so much
to instil. The suggestion of a divide existing not between Stakeholding advocates and the as
yet 'unenlightened', but between those adherents of a consensus politics and the poor and
unemployed, was for me the most obvious and damning quality of the conference. It seemed
to be a hopeful sign that this had been recognised by others who were equally angry. The
fact that it was spoken in the conference's final moments, even if it did not represent the
majority view, had a symbolically empowering meaning: letting the organisers know that not
only were some of us leaving unconvinced of their idea, but that we were angry about its
implications. Significantly the delegate was not answered through an engagement with the
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substance of his comment on the appropriateness of consensus politics at a time of
entrenched class divisions, but by the suggestion of John Biffen MP that such a notion was
the product of an over-emotional, wnthinking state of mind:
"Stakeholding has to be calm, calculated and developed - the rhetoric of passion
gets us nowhere."35
This seemed to convey the essence of the sort of consensus politics that Stakeholding was
about: a dominant discourse of ideas; talk of economic capital over social capital; the
working taxpayer over the welfare dependent claimant; the instalment of 'better experts' and
'better capitalists' in government and the enlightenment of other governing elites; new
careers for a new world order; the abnegation of class and the subordination of
democratically participatory policy debate. Despite contestation of parts of that view within
the conference space, there was still a dominant power relation within it able to act as if
there was a conformity of view, a unity of purpose as 'we' are sent forth:
"We need to carry these changes with us, we must believe we can change the
world... that is why this conference has been so important."36
It struck me how good some groups are at covering up conflict, having the
wherewithal to stage manage and relocate dissent, strategically generating the appearance of
consensus among networked groups, whilst reproducing divides between differently, less
powerfully networked groups: the deserving and undeserving, the responsible and the
irresponsible, the Jobseeker and the welfare dependant, the working citizen and the non-
working outsider.
We All Sit Together
People in the DSS waiting room are a transient community, they have a common
relation to the DSS in the sense of 'being in it together', in the same boat. And yet there is
difference everywhere. Children's bodies, black bodies, old bodies, pregnant bodies, middle-
aged female and male bodies, old white bodies, young black bodies and different
combinations of bodies in different waiting rooms. Different combinations of Poor Bodies.
That is the reason they are all here, in circumstances of need, needing resolution. Quiet and
desperate; desperate and joking; threatening, desperate and vulnerable. Never just one thing
but always poor.
15 John Biffen MP,' Stakeholder Capitalism: Blind Alley or Best Hope?' Conference, Final Plenary,
Sheffield University, March 1996
36 Pamela Gordon, Chief Executive of Sheffield City Council, 'Stakeholder Capitalism: Blind Alley or
Best Hope?' Conference, Final Plenary summing up, Sheffield University, March 1996
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Can you read desperation? Could this be an airport lounge? Some of the bodies are
even sun-tanned, it's the summer after all. Some have decent trainers and leather jackets.
Can they really be poor?
As I sat in the waiting rooms I didn't doubt that they were about poverty, whatever it
looked like. My own family always had a suntan in the summer, from lying in the garden or
on the local beach: 'Oooh, aren't you all looking well, is that a new T-shirt Debbie?'
Explain yourself. You must never look better than them, those who've been working in the
office all week in tights and skirts, all pale. We're good at making the best of ourselves,
that's what you're supposed to do isn't it? Perhaps the trainers are hooky, the lipstick
nicked, the coat not yet paid for, a jumble sale find, a cast off from a trendy friend. Who
knows. They definitely don't.
So I don't really expect the people in the DSS waiting room to look like anything in
particular, people on benefits don't display their poverty for public recognition. People who
are poor don't tend to want to look poor, in fact the opposite. But many of the people in DSS
waiting rooms do look poor. Clothes that don't quite go together, hair that hasn't been cut
for a while, shoes low on the heel, washed out T-shirts, fashions from a few years ago,
drawn and ill-looking faces, people trying to look smart. Poverty is material but that doesn't
mean it always looks the same, or means exactly the same thing for different people. And it
doesn't always exist 'evidentially' in a self-revealing way.
I haven't come to the DSS waiting room for the material evidence of poverty
especially not of the bodily kind. The poor are already materially over-represented; their
bodies surveilled and targeted in policy; DSS administrative questions pry into living
arrangements and sexual partners. But discourse is material, real bodies are part of the
underclass discourse, materiality is power's most productive effect. This understanding
requires a different sort of body-talk where to talk of bodies in the DSS waiting room is not
to reduce them to a category: 'the claimant body'. It is to present something more
heterogeneous and complex about these spaces; it is to talk of practices that are necessarily
embodied and embedded; it is to present discourse as material. Power relations are
productive so where there is objectification and subjugation wrought through the body there
is also resistance or rather resilient ways of dealing with subjugation that are practiced
through the body, through speech, actions, looks and gestures. The aim of my representation
of the DSS waiting room as embodied discourse is therefore to make claimants visible in
different ways, not through the sort of prurient or disciplinary over exposure that usually
renders invisible the complexity of real bodies.
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Euston DSS 1.30p.m August 6th 1996
"How long have you been in here?"
"Since quarter past ten"
These two people seem to know each other, they share a packet of crisps. It's now 1.30.
Three young children in shorts and T-shirts are clambering over a row of chairs and running
around the queuing partition. It's the school holidays. An older man smiles with amusement
at their mother. A woman opposite me is polishing her nails with what looks like a conker.
I'm just looking around. There's about thirty of us in here, all vaguely looking at each other.
A mother leaves with her two sons, one of them asks her something as they leave. "Just wait
'til we get outside, I'll tell you when we get outside". Outside is the real world, of shops and
streets where no-one can really tell if you're a DSS claimant. In here we all recognise each
other. Sitting and waiting and looking. Most people aren't having big conversations, but
occasionally chatting and making the odd remark. You catch snatches of conversations,
unless people are right next to you. Two black women diagonally opposite me are speaking
French in quiet voices, they're relaxed with their legs up on the seats, bright colours among
the drabness.
'Neighbours' has just finished, people occasionally look over at the television on the wall
but they're not watching it. It's just a distraction. It's often not even as eventful as what goes
on in here.
"Paula Mattas come back to booth six, there's a form for you to fill in". The voicecom tells
us all. No-one moves, she must have gone. A few minutes later: "167 to booth six please". A
middle aged man gets up and wonders over.
Opposite me there's a man wearing tracksuit bottoms under cotton trousers, trainers and no
socks, reading The Sun. Next to him two young people are leaning on each other asleep. And
on the other side is an older man wearing a thin suit; the creases in the trouser legs have
been ironed too hard, they jut out at severe angles. He looks strange and poor, not like a
respectable man in a suit. Next to him there's a young black man quietly arguing with a
young white woman with a baby, she moves to leave and he takes the baby, holding her
closely.
2.10p.m It's all quiet just now except for two young children playing and screaming round
the Coke machine, and the too loud voicecom: "Last call for ticket 194 to booth four". The
black security guard leans against the window sill casually chatting to a couple of young
men wearing long T-shirts and baseball caps, they look relaxed and friendly. Later on he
moves over to a middle aged Rasta man who's put his legs up across a few seats and is
sleeping. The guard shakes him by the shoulder and gestures for him to leave. "Alright,
man", but he doesn't move. He's taken up by the arm and led towards the door. I'm looking
at him and as he passes he winks at me, I half smile. He shrugs the guard off and goes
quietly.
There must be a hostel for young women nearby because there's a few in here who seem to
know each other from the same place:
"I'm in B6 I was going to come down to see you, where are you?"
"
B13, it's alright isn't it"
"I've got loads to tell you, have you seen Carol about?"
It's mainly women in here, they tend to be with somebody else or with children. They chat
more than the men. Two behind me are talking about how long they breast fed for, they
agreed that the longer you did it for the better it was for the baby, that's why their two
hadn't been ill, and how could they do that if they were working.
An Irish accent suddenly sounds out: "Youse Fucking bastards youse", and a young women
leaves the far booth and the waiting room, angry looking, and tears. A young man quickly
gets up and follows: "Josie..."
"The thing is I can't keep on giving her money - she's my friend but she can't control her
spending". A young woman is explaining something to a young man who's just walked in. A
younger girl follows him: "I was going to get you some fags with it" she says to the other
girl. "Just give me the fiver and we'll forget it". The girl hands her a fiver and walks off. She
puts it in her purse then turns to the bloke: "And you can piss off if you're all skagged up".
One of the black women leaves - "Tout a l'heure", and there's a big call out for booth nine
that looks like a giro hand out. A list of names are called: "McGraff, Kendal, Pointer,
O'Brien..." A group of people walk over, two younger lads start jokingly singing 'we're in
the money' as they go.
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"He wanted sex all the time, that was enough exercise for me... but I had to ran away to me
mum's in the end." Two girls laugh loudly and a couple of us smile because we've heard
too.
There are no smoking signs everywhere but an older man starts to smoke a roll up. Everyone
ignores him, I don't think the security guard is even looking. He finishes it in peace.
My ticket number comes up on the digital screen "213", "213 - booth two". I wander over, "I
need the form to apply for help with removal expenses, and can you tell me how I can get it
as a grant not a loan?" The officer turns round to speak to another officer about something
else I think, then turns back: "Sorry, can you start again ?" In the booth next to mine there's
raised voices: "Well I don't know do I, isn't that your bloody job?" The tone is a mix of
anger and frustration. He's still arguing when I leave with my form.
Outside the building a few people are smoking, an old man's sleeping on the pavement. He
looks as if he might be with some others drinking cans of Special Brew. It's 3.20.
Southampton DSS l.OOp.m August 19th 1996
'Welcome to St. Cross House. Thankyou for your co-operation.' A flashing notice board.
It's full, it's a bad time to come if you want to get out quicker: Monday and lunchtime.
People are standing round the walls. This queuing system means we have to wait on our feet
for ages before seeing anyone. It's always more lively when there's this many people, so
somehow it doesn't seem so bad.
A woman behind me is having a joke about there being six women and fifty kids in here
"Where do they all come from ?" It starts people off, everyone's standing close to each other
because it's a wrap around queuing barrier. "It looks better than it used to though", "Yeah
it's nice to know they care". A few of us laugh. A youngish man with bright red hair and a
beard to match, pipes up in a jokey way: "So who'll join me in a bricklaying gang to
Germany ?" He sounds a bit pissed. The woman behind me laughs - "Well I would if it
wasn't for the kids."
Stoke Newington DSS, Hackney District 3.30p.m July 22nd 1996
A scruffy looking young lad leaves one of the booths and shakes a giro victoriously at those
waiting on the seats: "Don't take no for an answer" he shouts to us as he leaves.
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In the booth next to me a woman is talking loudly to the officer: "Well I know it's not your
fault love but I want it sorted now, I'm here now and I'm not going til it's done." She sounds
angry. I lean against a spare booth counter to fill in my form, and about ten minutes later the
woman gets up to go, saying to the clerk as she leaves: "Thanks ever so much, thanks".
Outside as I leave a white young man is handing out flyers for a club 'Jungle Dawn - The
Inner City Shake Down.' He passes one to me - "Cheers", "Cheers".
Kennington DSS, Wandsworth ll.OOa.m July 24th 1996
"Can I just borrow your pen a minute, love ?"
I'd just finished scribbling down a few notes on a form and was looking around, pen on lap.
The woman was holding one of the huge forms that's more like a booklet it's so thick. She
was smiling, frizzy hair and a bit of lipstick, about my mum's age.
"Yeah sure, it's a bit leaky though"
"Falling to bits like the rest of us eh ?"
We both laugh.
She opens the form: "You can't fart in here without filling in a form can you ? ...Still keeps
us busy... this one's a days work..."
She muses distractedly as she starts to fill in the form: "...yeah , nothing better to do... life of
leisure..."
"It's nice to know we're keeping them in work though isn't it" , I carry on jokingly, nodding
in the direction of the officers in the booths.
"Yeah and we get no thanks for it do we!" We both laugh again.
Brighton DSS 3.00p.m August 9th 1996
"Have you been in here since 12 o'clock?"
A young man approaches a group of people sitting together next to me. There's two young
girls, two babies and another younger lad. The girls in leggings and cropped tops, the blokes
in tracksuit bottoms and T-shirts.
"Alright Jase." He shakes hands with the other bloke and they push each other about
jokingly. The talk between the girls is about baby milk and other essentials:
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"They've told me I can have 40 quid in Safeway vouchers for two weeks, it's no good is it? -
I'm just waiting now", one of the girls explains. A couple of minutes later : "Would Miss
Jackson come to booth four."
"Here we go she wanders over to the booth.
The other girl starts baby-talking to the babies and the blokes chat about a friend who
sounds like he's dealing: "...not living on anything at the moment, just what's going through
his hands."
When the girl comes back, she's holding the vouchers and looking annoyed. The other girl
takes them off her: "Right what you've got to do is buy a load of stuff that's not food - like a
few big items, then take them back and get a refund in cash. They have to do that."
"I don't know, I haven't got the guts to do that."
"Wankers they are", says the girl with the vouchers, and they leave together, the blokes
pushing the babies, the girls walking ahead still talking about what they can do with the
vouchers.
These are all moments in people's lives. An hour or more spent in the DSS waiting
room, hoping for a good result. Their subjective meaning is situated within whole lives:
what claimants have already been through, what they can expect of the future, what's going
on in the rest of their lives. Part of this meaning will be personal history and psychology,
part well-circulated and shared interpretations of particular experiences and knowledges.
The multiply possible meanings of all this are not directly accessible by looking at bodies
and listening to voices. My reasons for telling some moments and not others are also
personal to me: / think these moments are all significant on their own as part of the
embodied texture of the DSS waiting room space and together as part of a wider picture of
claimant lives. They are also part of a network of power-knowledge relations that includes
the policy conference site. I have tried to avoid the sort of 'contextualisation' that attempts
to harness all possible meanings in one interpretative frame. My presentation is therefore not
a 'polished knowledge' of what all these moments are about. These are complex pieces of
people's lives presented as interpretative possibilities. They are not complete. They are
something of what was articulated and enacted in these spaces at particular times, and they
include nothing of the claimants' passing thoughts, feelings and imaginations - that whole
realm of possibility that is the unreadable. It may be that my presentation of these moments
on the page produces very different understandings to my own. My personal recognition and
understanding of them is hard to convey in words, it is a domain of feeling and gut level
knowledge.
The moments also present a rich seam of possibilities to understand the
performative, material and embedded nature of 'underclass' discourse. They show a whole
range of performative behaviours that go with material poverty: postures, deference,
humour, angry talk. The polite getting-by side - the nodding and bobbing - as a mix of
appearance as strategy is partly about being seen to be willing, part of the habitual practice
of a power relation of subjugation. These are demeanours produced by subjugation. But
there is also noise, and refusal, when things are not even apparently compliant: the swearing,
shouting and insults bespeak some kind of resistance in the face of those who wield decision
making power who can maintain calm, quiet, rationality. The noise is momentary, the
product of an inability to choke back feeling, a spontaneous gauge of feeling that can also be
a collective speaking of people's minds in one phrase - "wankers they are". Much of this is
an attempt to retain autonomy and some sort of dignity, a symbolic victory in the face of
material loss, the final word. It shows how a power-knowledge relation is productive of
different knowledges. The claimants know about their position in this waiting room and in
the Social Security system as an embedded knowledge located within their material
condition and felt as indignity, anger, fear, resilience, humour. It is to the Stakeholder policy
conference and DSS waiting room as 'spaces of knowledge' that I now turn.
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3: SPACES OF KNOWLEDGE
Interpreters and Claimants: Knowing 'The Social' as a Space for Making 'Claims'
Knowledgeable Claims
For media commentators, politicians and academics 'the social' is the realm in
which their expertise is authorised and deployed. It is something they actively create as they
talk about the state of society and make policy interventions. To create the 'good society' is
what the economy and politics are for.
For benefit claimants 'the social' is where you go to sort out money to live on. It is
what you call the Social Security waiting room of your local Benefits Agency office. It is
also something you actively create as you talk about and try to negotiate your benefit
entitlement. 'The social' administers the financial means by which you participate in society
at a particular level.
These two definitions represent two forms of knowledge about 'the social' and they
are linked. The spaces where those different knowledges are produced and performed are
multiple. I am looking at two in particular - the Stakeholder policy conference and the DSS
waiting room - as two different spaces of knowledge that pertain to 'underclass'. For
heuristic purposes I am calling these knowledges 'Stakeholder knowledge' and 'Social
Security knowledge'.
Within academic Geography, interest in the nature of knowledge and the sites of its
production has developed as a mainly historical interest in scientific knowledges and
historical-geographies of the discipline itself.37 Beyond Geography, 'intellectual production'
has been studied sociologically as a particular kind of cultural activity which has developed
historically, and which can be located socially and spatially.38
This themed section is interested in the classed nature of Knowledge where the
production of the working class is held to be one of physical labour rather than of intellect.
The idea that people who are denied an equality of access or outcome in formal education,
have knowledges and expertise about their own and wider social conditions among other
things, has gained status within academic writings associated with the 'postmodern turn'.
37 For example Thrift.N, Driver.F, Livingstone.D (1995)'The Geography of Truth' pl-3 Society and
Space vol. 13; Livingstone.D (1995) 'The Spaces of Knowledge: contributions towards an historical
geography of science' p5-34 Society and Space vol. 13; Driver.F and Rose.G (1992) Nature and
Science: Essays in the History ofGeographical Knowledge Historical Geography Research Series No.
28
38 The most prominent examples are Bauman.Z (1987) Legislators and Interpreters Cambridge: Polity
Press and Bourdieu.P (1988) Homo Academicus Cambridge: Polity Press
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Feminist work in particular has spearheaded this development by creating a language around
speaking the marginal, subjugated, hidden knowledges of 'the other', as opposed to always
speaking knowledges about 'them'.39 Such ideas are central to my understanding of the
hierarchies of authoritative sites and knowledges that constitute 'underclass' discourse.
They suggest that it is possible to map differently valorised sorts of knowledges to particular
sorts of spaces within this discourse.
The relation between knowledge and space is very much part of an historical
relation between power and space, illustrated in Foucault's most 'geographical' of quotes:
'the history of powers would at one and the same time amount to a history written of
spaces.'40 The Stakeholder policy conference and DSS waiting room sites are such power
produced spaces. My analysis of them, is based on the following questions: what is the
nature of their knowledge and how is it mapped/represented? What is its spatiality in a
network of relations? What is the nature of its power? By asking the same questions of
both sites the nature of their relational production can be shown.
My representation of the policy conference and DSS waiting room as spaces of
knowledge, is concerned with a particular sort of knowledge. The knowledge that I am
talking about is that which is formally presented and accessible as the 'substance' of the
sites, or literally what they are for. It exists as information, a dominant presentation of
knowledge, the 'prevailing' knowledge at each site. A more personal or experiential
knowledge would perhaps be the subject of an interview based ethnography of those people
at the sites. The knowledges discussed here are those of 'Stakeholder Capitalism' and
'Social Security' as the knowledges through which each site is formally
located/represented/known.
Stakeholder Knowledge
The Stakeholder conference was part of a drive to set a new cultural and intellectual
agenda for both the political Left and the country at large. The terms of this agenda have
been defined by a small group of well established cultural and academic figures, chief
among them Will Hutton who is editor of the broadsheet Sunday newspaper The Observer
and author of The State We're In, the best selling exposition of Stakeholding as a new
political Big Idea. The conference key speakers did not shrink from this agenda setting
ambition or their role within it. A keynote speaker, Harold Perkins (a History Professor)
made this role explicit:
39
Haraway, Situated Knowledges pi 85-101; hooks.b (1991) Yearning: race, gender and cultural
politics London: Turnaround
40 Foucault.M (1980) 'The eye of power', interview in Gordon.C (ed.) Power/Knowledge: selected
interviews and other writings 1972-77 Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Press pi49
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'...the modern world is the world of the professional expert. It is a product of the
Third Revolution, the revolution of the professionals.'41
The identification of a shared group mission to effect a political and cultural sea change was
a prominent part of the plenary speeches. It included thinking through and making explicit
the links between knowledge and policy, expressed as:
'...the need for both cognitive consensus and policy consensus. One is inclined to
attach particular weight to what is said by practitioners of such eminence, who are
also intellectuals...There cannot usefully be any firm doctrines, but there could be a
shared, continuing and developing awareness of available knowledge and of the
policy options to which it might relate.'
(Sir Arthur Knight)42
This particular speaker made prominent use of the term 'straddler' to describe those who
cross professional/disciplinary boundaries in academic, policy, media and business fields
and have a strong role to play in requisite changes:
'...straddler communities... might be expected to play a part in the dissemination of
knowledge which bears upon thinking and action related to public policy making'
(Sir Arthur Knight)43
The introductory theme of the need to establish a working consensus across party
political and professional lines, focused on the importance of a successful economy.
Stakeholding, first and foremost is an economic conception, an idea about a new kind of
capitalism. The desired end of the 'good society' (as a 'proximate purpose rather than a
fixed model') is deemed to require a particular economic base:
'...material well being requires high performance which is possible only if there is
high productivity.'
(Sir Arthur Knight)44
Significantly this is not an anti-capitalist vision, but one that unashamedly makes a better
job of the way capitalism works. A contract between all, for the good of all because
everyone has a 'stake' in the country. It requires bringing business on board to the cause and
making the market work in such a way that business interests are in the country's interest.
To this end is brought the importance of welfare reform and the need for 'proactive benefits'
in which 'work' not welfare is the way out of poverty. The present system is deemed to be
41 Perkins.H (1996) 'Are Capitalisms Converging?' Stakeholder Capitalism: Blind Alley Or Best
Hope? Conference Proceedings Sheffield: PERC
42
Knight.A (1996) 'An Agenda For Consideration' Stakeholder Capitalism: Blind Alley Or Best
Hope? Conference Proceedings Sheffield: PERC
43
Knight, An Agenda For Consideration
44
Knight, An Agenda For Consideration
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both 'expensive' and 'inefficient in terms of incentives',45 meaning that claimants do not
perceive it to be in their interests to make the transition from benefits to work. This work-
centred, economic, 'for the interests of us all' view of welfare reform, expanded on in The
State We're In, is the primary way in which the conference speaks about Welfare:
'Nor can insiders look at their plight with equanimity. The impact of inequality and
insecurity is pervasive, affecting everything from the vitality of the housing market
to the growth of Social Security spending and ultimately the growth prospects of
the entire economy.'46
(my emphasis)
The position of 'outsiders' is the well rehearsed position of 'underclass'. Although here
Hutton does not use that term directly, his social diagnosis is resoundingly familiar:
'The widely noticed decline in the number of marriageable men who can support a
family, which means that the task of child rearing and family building has fallen to
single women is not an act of God; it is because men can expect little but to work for
very low wages or to live off Income Support and the black economy.' 47
(my emphasis)
The solution to this particular aspect of social decline is seen to lie in the second of seven
principles of Stakeholding: 'We must all be included in the workings of the economy and
society.'48 The work ethic is paramount to this social vision:
'[work is] a means of acting and interacting with the world that fulfils an
individual's humanity.'49
'Above all, work offers a sense of place in a hierarchy of social relations, both
within the organisation and beyond it, and men and women are after all, social
beings. Inevitably some work is demeaning and poorly paid, but the same need is
there. Those who work belong; those who do not are excluded.'50
'To work is to be.'51
The argument is that the division between 'us' in work and 'them' out of work can and
should be closed through policy change. However, there is a kind of moral obligation on the
part of the claimant to comply with the help and the vision that is 'offered':
'The good society is therefore founded on the right and associated obligation of
individuals to be part of that society in which they live.'52
45 Will Hutton, 'Stakeholder Capitalism: Blind Alley or Best Hope? Conference, introductory plenary
speech, Sheffield University, March 1996
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13.10.96 p26
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It is underlain by the threat of withdrawing help, when social division becomes a matter of
self-induced hardship, a lack of responsibility or obligation on the part of the claimant:
'But those who opt out of the right to work - secured by guaranteeing access to
training and work even if in a different part of the country after a clearly defined
period - have no strong claims on the rest of us. The claim to benefit must be
53conditional on acceptance of those obligations.'
(my emphasis)
The distinction between insiders and outsiders translates into the conference stream on
'social inclusion and exclusion' which specifically addresses the implications of
Stakeholding for Welfare. Here the link is made with the Commission on Social Justice set
up in 1992 to direct Labour's policy thinking on Welfare into the 21st century.54 The
terminology of social inclusion and exclusion is theirs: inclusion means membership in the
mainstream economy, society and politics. Crucially it confers both 'rights and
responsibilities' on members. For welfare claimants that means benefits are conditional
upon certain obligations. Labour market exclusion, pitched as the problem of both claimant
and the economy is amenable to change via an accommodation of economy and welfare:
'high productivity' and 'reciprocal balance.'55 The two main elements of such balance are
conceived of as adjustments to benefit allocations that will 'reduce disincentives' to work,
and 'welfare to work' schemes for single parents and the jobless.56 The clearest statement of
how such a Social Security policy formulated around compulsory work and training schemes
would work is provided in Labour MP Frank Field's Making Welfare Work: Reconstituting
Welfare For The Millennium,57 Field makes the case for a 'flexible earnings related system
of income security' and pre-dating Hutton's conference speech, makes the case for a
'proactive benefits agency'. In Field's prescription this consists of welfare to work policies,
a 'case management' approach to claimants, and the application of benefit sanctions. In his
book Stakeholder Welfare - published seven months after the conference - Field identifies
his use of Stakeholding terminology as being inspired by Hutton himself:
'The use of stakeholding in welfare is simply the result of listening to Will Hutton
talk about economic stakeholding during sessions of the Dahrendorf Commission
and thinking that this phrase could be the leitmotif of a whole government
programme, and particularly as it related to welfare reform.'5S
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Hutton has endorsed Field's vision of a new Welfare State which ties the principles and
workings of welfare policy to the 'imperatives' of the labour market and economy.59
Significantly these needs unlike those of the welfare claimant's should not be policed. Thus
the fourth principle of the seven principles of Stakeholding applies to business:
'The good economy is one where you do the right thing without being policed... the
rules of the economic game we seek to introduce are much better operated by people
and firms themselves than by elaborate rule books.'60
This is how a 'consensus' is reached: Stakeholding expresses the notion that the best
interests of the Economy coincide with the best interests of Welfare, the best interests of the
Market and of Society. Under the logic of Stakeholding, each of those things can work as a
united group of interests, a collective contract. So for example, the idea is that if companies
act as good employers (here companies like British Telecom and Sainsbury's are held as
exemplary), and workers make themselves employable, then the best interests of both can be
realised. The logic is that of 'rights and responsibilities': if all parties meet their
responsibilities, they are entitled to the security of knowing that all will be well for them and
everybody else.
Politically the notion is an argument for a type of consensus politics that represents
an accommodation between capitalist and socialist positions, the market and the community,
the profit motive and the common good. It is located as part of the project of the 'New Left'
for a 'third way' which started in the 1970s and developed through the 1980s as a coming to
terms with the apparent success of Thatcherism. The magazine Marxism Today played a key
role in promoting the notion of this third way politics through a series of articles by cultural,
academic, and political commentators. Among these was David Marquand who supported
the Social Democrat Party split from Labour, and is now director of Sheffield University's
Political Economy Research Centre, the conference organisers.
Labour Party leader Tony Blair has identified the 'New Labour' party with such
third way politics, as the mainstay of Labour's political programme:
'But there is a big idea left in politics. It goes under a variety of names -
stakeholding, one nation, inclusion, community - but it is quite simple. It is that no
society can ever prosper economically or socially unless all its people prosper...
unless we live up to the ambition to create a society where the community works for
the good of every individual, and every individual works for the good of
community.'61
59 Hutton.W (1996)'Raising The Stakes' The Guardian Tabloid 17.10.96 p2
60 Hutton and Kay, Only Working Together Will Save The Economy p26
61 Blair.T (1996) New Britain: my vision ofa young country London: Fourth Estate. Preface: x
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'That is not to say... there do not remain substantial differences between Left and
Right... but they fit within a larger body of consensus and sometimes they cross
Left/Right lines.'62
The first media-covered political use of the term 'Stakeholding', seen as its launch,
was by Tony Blair to a group of business men in Singapore in January 1996, the same year
in which it was given centre-stage party political status in Blair's statement of political
purpose for a 'New Britain.'63 The way 'Stakeholding' was taken up by New Labour is
important to note because it points to the rationale that would inform a policy field of
application post the 1997 General Election. Labour have not made any commitment to
scrapping the JSA and indeed amended the first draft of their 'Welfare to Work' policy
document in order to distance themselves from the possibility.64 Besides which the JSA does
represent a particular manifestation of the 'rights and responsibilities' talk that New Labour
have developed as the hallmark of their social policy statements. A rights-obligations
relationship between the individual and society is represented by the 'stake' in a mutual
social contract:
'If people feel they have no stake in a society, they feel little responsibility towards
it and little inclination to work for its success.'65
The symptom of such a situation seen by Tony Blair to have developed in the contemporary
period is an 'underclass':
'The development of an underclass of people, cut off from society's mainstream,
living often in poverty, the black economy, crime and family instability is a moral
and economic evil... It is wrong, and unnecessary, and, incidentally, very costly.'66
The remedy is a 'Stakeholder welfare system' founded on a 'modern notion of social justice
- something for something':
'We accept our duty as a society to give each person a stake in its future. And in
return each person accepts responsibility to respond, to work to improve
themselves.'67
The primary importance and dignity of 'work' is the centre of this vision. The working
condition is the primary state and a duty of being part of society:
'The most meaningful stake anyone can have in society is the ability to earn a living
and support a family.'68
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This particular definition of social inclusion is fundamentally economic and labour market
based, and it presumes a consensus of interests:
'The purpose is simple - to ensure that the country works for the good of everybody,
and everybody works for the good of the country.'69
The claimed rationale of this political argument is an accurate 'knowledge' of 'the
way things are'. This knowledge base allows a rhetoric of imperatives and realism to be
spoken with authority. It positions those who articulate it as interpreters of 'the way the
world is' and 'the way the world works', according to particular economic, global, market
dictates that can be interpreted and managed. This construction of ideas does two things
politically. First it allows the notion of consensus politics - if there are certain imperatives
that make the world the way it is, then an accurate knowledge of what those imperatives are
is a basis on which politicians can agree and by which good, 'rational' (as opposed to Left
or Right-wing) judgement can proceed. Thus the possibility of being able to conceive of
things as in the best interests of economy/country/society/welfare, as if that were an
indisputable notion. Second it means that the power that particular groups have to change
'the way things are' can be understated, so in the face of global capital movements or the
ineluctable development of markets, suggestions of alternative ways of talking and thinking
are erroneous, irrational or unrealistic. In the conference's final plenary session that note
was resounding. Tory MP John Biffen's address carried a summation of Stakeholding as
offering up 'possibilities for Left and Right' and concluded that 'Labour would be unwise to
take the radical course'. Labour MP David Blunkett talked about a 'breakdown in traditional
sources of power' leading to a 'fragmenting society' as evidenced in one school in Sheffield
where 'there's not a single child living with their natural father' and in the emergence of
'underclass': 'there are now underworlds in the neighbourhoods some of us where brought
up in'. He then answered his question 'can real alternatives be offered by politicians' with a
call for realism: 'let's not delude ourselves or our voters'; all they could promise was 'to
make a difference'.70
The so-called imperatives of the real world that so constrict political action are
presented as those of technological and informational change, viewed through the language
of the new (Times/Britain/Left/Labour), the post (modern/industrial/Ford/market) and the
third (way/politics/revolution/age).71 The knowledge that is articulated and produced within
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this mode of analysis has multiple sources - indeed that is its main characteristic and its
prevalence as a discourse. It is applied widely across different spheres from Welfare (the re¬
structuring imperative) to Business (the re-engineering imperative).72 The notion and
rhetoric of Stakeholding thus merges political knowledge with contemporary business
knowledges of the 'third age'. Indeed the book that pairs Hutton's society-wide notion of
Stakeholding with economic management theory is written by the business economist John
Kay.73 Together their ideas are sometimes expressed as 'the Hutton-Kay' prescription'.74
The part-formulation of Stakeholding as a management theory is evident in the political
rhetoric of Stakeholding in terms of 'leadership', 'trust', 'flexibility' and 'the team'. Tony
Blair has personally endorsed Kay's writings:
'Business leaders recognise that what New Labour is saying fits exactly with current
thinking in industry... business advisers like John Kay and Charles Handy say that
competitiveness and success comes from a Stakeholder approach.'75
Of significance here is the extrapolation of these business writings directly into a political
rationale for the way society should work. New Labour's belief in the benefits of reforming
welfare by infusing policy thinking with business knowledges was clearly demonstrated in
the 1997 post-election period with the Treasury's commissioning of Martin Taylor, chief
executive of Barclays Bank. His brief was to work with senior civil servants, on ways to
'reduce poverty and welfare dependency'.76 In Blair's New Britain the rhetoric and rationale
of economic and business management abounds:
'We need to build a relationship of trust not just within a firm but within a society.
By trust, I mean the recognition of a mutual purpose for which we work together
and in which we all benefit. It is a Stakeholder economy...'77
'The old means of achieving that on the Left was through redistribution in the tax
and benefit regime. But in a global economy the old ways won't do.'78
'The Stakeholder economy has a Stakeholder welfare system... today's demands and
changed lifestyles require a more active conception of welfare.'79
all-consuming imperatives and global ineluctables, the latter opens up different possibilities to speak
for previously non-articulated differences
72 See for example George.V and Miller.S (1994) Social Policy Towards 2000: Squaring The Welfare
Circle London: Routledge; Hammer.M and Stanton.S (1995) The Re-engineering Revolution London:
Harper Collins
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'Working as a team is an effective way of working or playing a sport, or running an
organisation. My point is that a successful country must be run the same way. That
cannot work unless everyone feels part of the team, trusts it, and has a stake in its
success and future.'80
'This is where a new economics of the centre and left of centre must go: towards an
open economy working with the grain ofglobal change.'8'
(all my emphasis)
The representation of the Stakeholding project at the conference developed themes
pertaining to the 'underclass' through particular rhetorics. The non-working as 'outsider';
reality as global change with economic imperatives of 'flexibility'; solutions as consensual
'best interests'. In combination these rhetorics belie a particular middle class, economistic
and masculinist ethic. That ethic is crystallised in the argument for the centrality of paid
work to both economic production and socialisation. It is the primary means of economic
and social management; the primary generator of national wealth and social identity.
In order that this argument could be convincingly constructed, both the role of the
conference speakers as key interpreters, and the space in which their knowledge was
presented, needed to be strongly defined as authoritative and necessary to the process of
changing the condition of 'others' which so affects 'us all' in the problem ridden space of
the social. Their role and their knowledge is therefore indispensable to the problem they
construct. Zygmunt Bauman has talked about this process as part of an historically
developed 'ideology of intellectuals' in which the pictures of society they paint are self-
portraits - visions of likeness to themselves:
'...the 'good society' of which the heroes are believed to be agents, is a projection of
the intellectual mode upon the society as a whole.'82
The right knowledge is the qualification of the right to tell others - the not yet enlightened
assembly and the un/disqualified elsewhere - of the interpreter's own indispensability. That
knowledge is legitimated as authoritative by its nature and the method of its production -
conditions of authority which are met in the professional identity and presentation of
intellectual labour. Through the deployment of such identities and practices a power-
knowledge relation is constituted in which the professional interpreters of the conference
have more in common with each other, regardless of stated political allegiance, than they
have with the DSS claimant. In this way, the conference space as a space of social proximity
based on shared identities and professional practices, expresses a unity (however internally
80
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differentiated) in relation to the shared identities and practices of benefit claiming. Indeed
the policy conference site is firmly located within a network of relations that requires the
subjugation of 'other' knowledges for its own meaning, status and legitimacy. In order that
the 'good society' can take form in the terms prescribed, those 'others' have to be told what
is good for them, according to the imperatives of 'reality', known through the possession of
objective knowledge, and instituted by knowledgeable practitioners. The promise of their
vision of change/improvement/emancipation, is premised on the silence, subjugation and
exclusion of others, from these authoritative spaces of knowledge production. The dynamic
of 'inclusion' set up by the conference in their discourse of 'underclass' is therefore as
follows: encouraged/coerced inclusion into particular sectors of the labour market (primarily
low-skilled labour), effective exclusion from realms of policy debate and influence
('intellectual labour'). This is primarily a class-based division: the authoritative as cerebral
is set against the unqualified as bodily as the historical substance of constructions of middle
class/working class 'difference'.
The policy conference and DSS waiting room are spaces in which that difference is
practically and symbolically reiterated. It is the difference between one space mapped as
authoritative, knowledge producing and another as a domain of application for policy
knowledge; the difference between knowing minds and unknowing bodies. The apparent
necessity of reiterating the status of the conference within an intellectual domain had clearly
been identified by the organisers. The self-presentation of why this conference is important
and in what ways, was shot through the advertising and organisational literature, the
conference address and summation. Such a proclamatory self-presentation, is a central part
of the substantive business of Stakeholding as a new realm of ideas that requires the work of
dissemination by the right people. Thus much of the pre-conference literature was concerned
with setting out the relation between the conference and its academic location, under the
aegis of the Political Economy Research Centre (PERC) at Sheffield University. In the
manner of many large business organisations, PERC has a mission statement:
'...established to address the new problems of policy and theory raised by the world¬
wide economic and political transformations of the past decade. As the new
millennium approaches, the old debates of state versus market and individualism
versus collectivism have become obsolete, while traditional boundaries between
academic disciplines have become barriers to understanding. New problems demand
new solutions and these can be discovered only through dialogue between
disciplines and between the worlds of the academy and of policy making.'
The first personally addressed contact letters sent out from PERC 'to invite you to a major
international conference' set up a dynamic of inclusion that encouraged the idea of a natural
constituency of participants, 'one of us' who should be part of the process of change:
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'Do not miss this chance to help set the agenda of economic and political debate'
'We are very excited by its potential'
'A forum for debate as a stimulus to new policy thinking'
The impetus of the conference was large scale change in political economies, world orders,
nations, regions, institutions, all subject to transformation and requiring an equally Big Idea
in order that its analysis and management do not defeat 'us'. 'Stakeholder Capitalism' is
thus positioned to take on the mantle of change, with help from its well connected friends, in
which 'the invited' are flatteringly numbered.
The location of the conference within PERC as a springboard for debate and policy
inspiration across academic, business and political realms signifies an approach to political
change through making connections with other already powerful social domains. That aim
has been explicitly theorised in terms of 'connexity' by the think tank Demos, centrally
positioned in the networks of New Labour's policy making.83 'Connexity' expresses the
nature of social relations as networks, identifying the political need to think and act through
networks, and to create new ones in the process. With regard to Stakeholding its logic is to
move upwards and outwards, embedding professional knowledge in authoritative spaces in a
network of relations. Hutton has taken his Stakeholding message to the business leaders,
politicians and audiences who are already knowledgeable as specialists in some capacity -
capacities that he deems valuable to his cause. Hutton's chosen practices of disseminating
Stakeholder knowledge seem to be based on an idea of intellectual trickle down:
encouraging enlightened self-interest amongst social and economic elites which will work
towards making things better for society as a whole. The approach certainly does not
concern itself with trying to access 'other' already knowledgeable domains, whose
specialisms and spaces are less well connected.
Social Security Knowledge
The Social Security knowledge that I am talking about in relation to the DSS
waiting room is a knowledge about subsistence level benefit administration. As with the
conference, in this section my focus is the nature of this formal knowledge, how it is
presented and the sort of space that it constitutes in the process of its practice and
production.
The DSS waiting room is set up as a domain of application for Social Security
policy. Through it claimants know about contemporary discourses of welfare and welfare
change, as a practical knowledge about a culture of benefit administration. The Jobseeker's
83 See Mulgan.G (1997) How To Live In A Connected World London: Chatto Windus
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Act (1995) wrought enormous changes in that culture, represented as changes from a passive
culture of welfare dependency to an active culture of Jobseeking. The Act has tried to
institute a new knowledge regime, a whole framework of understanding about what being a
benefit claimant is within the Government, Civil Service, DSS administrative staff, the
wider public and claimants themselves. What does being a 'Jobseeker' mean? what does it
involve in practice? what is expected of 'Jobseekers'? and what they can expect? The
legislative frame sets up a regime which is then 'worked' by a number of groups including
claimants. They may circumvent parts of it, develop different sorts of knowledges from it
and have individual interpretations of what the 'official' regime of knowledge and practice
means. A number of possibilities exist to partly shape individual claimant knowledges, but
the position of the claimant in the Social Security system is nevertheless set up as a domain
of policy application and regulation.
As the last major change to the Social Security system of a 17 year Conservative
government, the JSA represents a concerted attempt to further regulate the lives of benefit
recipients through a number of conditions, strictures and sanctions.84 The Benefits Agency
and Employment Service that administer the JSA are two of the six executive agencies of
the Department of Social Security. Social Security administration within Benefit Agency
offices is itself subject to a huge cost cutting reorganisation aiming to reduce administrative
costs by 25% by 1999 and involving the sale of headquarters, management centres and
prime high street sites to raise £750 million.85 Part of this cost cutting exercise will involve
greater use of technology, part will shift more of the onus to prove legitimacy of entitlement
onto the claimant.85 The JSA has already taken the conditions of benefit receipt in that
direction. It has replaced a system of two differently rated benefits - Unemployment Benefit
(UB) and Income Support (IS) - with a single unified benefit with the same rates of payment,
administered either through the Job Centre for National Insurance contributions based
benefit or the Benefits Agency for means-tested benefit. This change is meant to take away
84 Since the election of a new Labour government (1997) the JSA has been supplemented with a
welfare programme called the 'New Deal' for 18-24 year olds who have been unemployed for more
than 6 months, starting nationally in June 1998. It is being established in the same framework of
compulsion that characterises the JSA, making available four options of work (private sector,
voluntary sector, environment taskforce, full-time education or training) but no 'fifth' option of
remaining on benefits. Department of Education and Employment (1997) Design of the New Dealfor
18-24 year olds London: DfEE
85 Child Poverty Action Group (1997) 'Benefits Agency Change Programme' Poverty vol. 96 London:
CPAG p 13-15; 'Billion dollar man vies for DSS offices' The Guardian 24.7.96 pi
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the distinction between contributory versus means-tested benefits, to group the 'jobless'
together and make the overall reduction in benefits dependency the 'real issue.'87
The JSA is part of a long line of changes within Social Security administration and
legislation that has been developing in the direction of increased coercion and surveillance,
evident in the tightening of 'availability for work' rules in which the claimant must produce
more and more evidence that they are 'actively' seeking work and in the levels of personal
accountability that are required as conditions for the receipt of benefit. For example the
withdrawal of benefits for non-compliance with different aspects of the JSA regime will not
be covered by hardship payments before claimants have clearly demonstrated that they are
suffering hardship. This means that claimants can be left without any income whatsoever for
weeks at a time. The Conservative government justified the introduction of this measure in
the following terms:
'[the government] strongly believes that a claimant who makes a wrong choice in
these circumstances must be personally accountable.'88
In this respect the benefit systems that preceded the JSA, were not distinctly different from
the JSA in their intentions to make benefit claiming difficult, demanding and demoralising,
especially if means-tested. Rather the JSA represents an extension of already coercive and
surveillant characteristics.89 The knowledge that the claimant has of this system is highly
attuned to the demands that it makes: what staff can and cannot make you do or do to your
benefit; what you have to say and do to get round the most demanding aspects of
'availability for work' rules or to get priority status when only emergency payments are
available from the Social Fund; the different interactions that are required between signing
on and fortnightly interviews, the 13 week 'advisory' interviews, the 6 monthly Restart
interviews, the 12,18 and 24 month schemes. The claimant can be called in for an advisory
interview at any time if the Employment Service thinks that there is a question over whether
they are fulfilling the availability for work conditions. Employment Officers can decide to
give individual 'help and attention' known as being 'caseloaded' for the long term
unemployed who can be challenged about the things that seem to be preventing them from
finding a job.90
At the centre of the JSA administration and rationale is the 'Jobseeker's Agreement'
which is set up as a contract between the claimant and government. In it the claimant must
specify the number of times they will write to, phone and visit potential employers and
87 The Jobseeker's Bill (1995) London: HMSO
88 Government quote in 'Squeezing Claimants' Red Pepper June 1996 no. 25 p26
89 The intensification of such developments through the 1980s is traced in detail in Dean.H (1991)
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90
Poynter.R (1996) Jobseeker's Allowance Handbook London: CPAG p25
91
employment agencies on a weekly basis. The contract stipulates what the claimant's
minimum terms and conditions for taking work will be. On a fortnightly basis the condition
of 'actively seeking work' is tested by 'active signing' in which the officer uses a computer
questionnaire based on the contracted agreement, to produce a 'score' to indicate whether
the claimant is active enough. If the claimant under-scores the officer is mandatorily obliged
to suspend benefit for two weeks.
Failure to agree to properly participate in, or attend, the interview regime or the
schemes that are set up (for example 'job club' - four and a half days a week for 5-6 months
making speculative approaches to employers) are met by two week minimum benefit
sanctions.91 Sanctions for non-compliance with specific schemes are part of a wider sanction
regime which covers: directives telling you to take specific action to help you find a job,
such as a requirement to apply for a specific vacancy or to improve your appearance or
behaviour in order to be more presentable to potential employers; and misconduct rulings
following dismissal from employment or training schemes. There is a benefit sanction of
non-payment from one week to six months depending on the seriousness of the misconduct,
qualified by strictly defined criteria distinguishing 'good causes' from 'just causes', the
latter being most arguable because the adjudication officer reaches the decision by:
'...balancing the claimant's interests against those of all the other contributors to
national insurance. The claimant must show that they acted reasonably in leaving
and that the circumstances of his case are such that the community should support
them.'92
Decisions by the adjudication officer to stop benefit, restrict or disallow other
payments, can be taken up with the Social Security Appeal Tribunal System (SSAT). It is
independent of the DSS and works through hearings in which a panel chaired by a lawyer
will adjudicate on a claimant's case. However most claimants will not experience the
tribunal system, and the DSS waiting room booth will be where irregularities, grievances
and disputes are dealt with on an everyday basis.
The DSS waiting room is a central part of the highly structured knowledge regime
that makes up this part of the Social Security system. Indeed it is the front-line between two
different knowledges of that system where a legislative and administrative knowledge meets
the meaning of benefit claiming as practical knowledge. The sort of space that meeting
constitutes is of a hybrid nature. The DSS waiting room is a distinctly regulatory space that
fits with coercive benefit legislation; it is also a space that tries to present a facade of
customer service, pleasantness and co-operation; it can be a space of immanent or occurrent
disorder and conflict, or compliance and orderly ticking over. The space is contradictory.
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Perspex barriers between staff and claimants do not fit with the smiling faces of
multicultural claimants on the wall posters. The presentation of a consumer ideology of
choice and the lie of that choice within the same space does not fit either. Claimant
knowledge is of the compulsory contract that is the JSA. It is knowledge of the meaning of
welfare reform in practice. It is knowledge of the power relation between Social Security
officials, the wider 'tax paying' society and government, and claimants. It is also a
knowledge of the way the DSS authorities want to present policy, practice and your
condition of existence through their waiting rooms. It is a deep and complex knowledge of
the contradictions of 'Social Security', 'Rights and Responsibilities' and the 'Jobseeker's
Agreement'.
This is all in contrast with the informational or presentational knowledge of the
DSS. The DSS waiting room presents a particular knowledge of what Social Security is
about as it supplies information in numerous posters, leaflets, and signs about itself. This is
'charter knowledge': the presentation of empowerment, rights, service, targets. The
literature of this knowledge production is the leaflet and the poster.
Customer Charters set out to fulfil the 'rights' end of your 'contract' with the DSS.
Individual offices display their service standards:
'You have a right to expect from us a service which is professional, efficient and
courteous, which actively seeks and responds to your views and takes them into
account.'
The standard statement makes clear the contractual nature of these 'rights':
'Our aim is for your payments to be right every time. You can help us to achieve
these aims by giving the information we need to deal with your claims and
enquiries. It is important that you keep us informed of all changes to your
circumstances and that when contacting us you quote your National Insurance
number... We cannot achieve our aims and targets without your assistance.'
Here the double-edged nature of assistance is made clear. Co-operation is framed as being
mutually advantageous but on the part of the claimant it is compulsory, it demands self-
policing and compliance in order that the security of your claim is not jeopardised.
Significantly, whereas the responsibilities of the claimant are to comply with the directives
which are stringent, coercive and set up for her, those of the DSS are platitudinous and self-
defined. The 'Jobseeker's Charter' set out on the back of the 'Jobseeker contract' (ES3) lays
out 'Our Commitment To You':
What you can expect from us: You can expect us to -
• wear a name badge and give our name when we answer the phone or write
• be polite, considerate, open and honest
• respect your privacy. In most cases we can provide a private room for sensitive
interviews
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• apologise if we get things wrong, explain what happened and put things right
promptly
The rhetoric of this form of self-presentation co-exists with other sorts of presentation in the
DSS waiting room that construct an altogether different knowledge about what sort of space
the authorities believe it to be: burdenous, dangerous, threatening, unpredictable. Thus signs
telling you not to smoke or drink; to inform you of the CCTV operating and to tell you that
the police will be called after one warning about abusive behaviour. Leaflets advise on
appropriate behaviour. The 'Help us to help you' leaflet advises:
'Don't abuse the office staff, they will listen to you and will always try to help'
'You may be angry, upset or confused at the time of the interview but please try to
be patient and polite'
The co-existence of these contradictory approaches to the claimant - 'client-customer-poor
person-anarchist' - mirrors the contradictory relation between the claimant and Welfare
more generally. Benefits are the means by which your survival is made possible and also the
means by which you are made to suffer indignity. You are tied up in a system that tries to
subsume your identity into the role of the 'Jobseeker' in appearance, manner and
occupation, and even tries to control what emotional responses to distress you are allowed in
the DSS waiting room. The dynamic represents itself in terms of offering help and
independence, whilst working to impose coercion and poverty. The relation is analogous to
that constructed in the Stakeholding policy conference: a discourse of welfare change set up
as being in the 'best interests' of claimants, effectively coerces them into realising interests
that have been decided for them. Fundamentally this is a power-knowledge relation between
the policy conference and DSS waiting room which means that difference, conflict and
alternative knowledges can be subsumed and spoken for by authoritative commentators.
Although I have been mainly talking about the DSS waiting room as a site of
subjugation, it is therefore also a site of knowledge about that subjugation. I do not intend
to try to reveal the nitty-gritty of particular claimant knowledges but to briefly suggest how
the nature of this knowledge relates to that of the conference in general terms.93
The conference knowledge is part of a one-off 'event'. Authoritative figures
converge in a space represented as the domain of the intellect, invitees come to partake of
the superior knowledge of others and leave with more knowledge in their possession.
Claimant knowledge is part of an ongoing relation with the Social Security system. The DSS
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waiting room is a space that is about systemising non-working people - a sort of staging post
for problematic bodies. Claimants are dealt with then discharged. Their knowledge of the
system is routine and ordinary, textured and affective, a way of life, learnt the hard way. The
meanings attached to those differences are both worlds apart, and totally related as a power-
knowledge relation. Claimants experience that relation as a burden of meaning in which they
are supposed to forget knowledge, conflict, and self-definition, and present themselves as
worthy and accountable 'Jobseekers'. Their knowledge of the Social Security system, as a
knowledge of class, subjugation, and survival, is currently deemed to require changes in
benefit administration which would cut out the part played by the DSS waiting room as
much as possible. The waiting room as a public and often conflictual space is to be
increasingly displaced by the 'home visit'. As Minister for Welfare Reform, Frank Field MP
has expressed the importance of establishing new local administrative regimes in which
local benefit officers are empowered with organisational control. Officers he talked to on a
'fact-finding' excursion to Exeter expressed a preference for home visits:
'At office interviews, those claimants who should not be claiming have come well
versed in how wrongly to claim benefit... there is no substitute for visiting claimants
in their own homes.'94
In the contemporary discourse of 'underclass', circumventive claimant knowledges are a
target of control, while claimant knowledge of whatever kind, does not have much currency
in the sorts of spaces that 'matter' enough to influence and effect policy change. It has a
different spatiality to that of the conference which has the 'right' connections in a network
of power relations.
Having Connections, or it's not what you know
The conference space, its participants, and its knowledges, are well-connected,
already part of a network of relations which gives them an elite status. The Stakeholding
conference was organised so as to embed and extend those connections in a way that would
generate a network of interest and consensus in favour of Stakeholding. In this process of
knowledge production and dissemination knowledge travels through time and space, is
moulded and changed whilst simultaneously moulding and changing the things it meets, uses
and crosses: people, policy, events, ideas. That is the nature of discourse. The process works
through a network of relations, partly traceable through patterned effects.
The discourse of 'underclass', mediated in the policy conference through the ideas
of Stakeholding, is given a particular impetus at the conference site. An already current idea
of 'underclass' is given further shape, here specifically in relation to Stakeholding, as it is
94 Field.F (1997) 'Give Them The Tools' The Guardian 12.8.97 p 13
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passed among a diverse group of participants spanning fields of media, business, politics,
social policy and academia. 'Underclass' is produced as a symptomatic condition of 'the
state we're in'.
As a new intellectual initiative the concept of Stakeholding intended to generate a
momentum by launching a series of ideas and analyses that would be analogous to the sort
of agenda setting and cultural agitation that attended Thatcherism. The start of this project
was the launch of Hutton's book The State We're In, prefaced with his aim:
'My greatest hope is that the book will offer a way forward that is neither a return to
the bastardised Keynesian corporatism of the 1960s and 1970s, nor the forced march
towards a wholly deregulated market.'95
Its afterword makes the connection between these ideas and an incoming Labour
government:
'The next election will be a unique moment. For the first time for over thirty years
there is a real possibility of a majority non-Conservative government aiming to
move the country decisively in a new and democratic direction. Many now think this
is vitally necessary, and I hope that this book can contribute to that shift.'96
After being on the hardback best-seller list for more than six months, the book was released
as a paperback in 1995 and in two years sold about 250,000 copies.97 This success
guaranteed media and political attention from all parties: Tony Blair's advocacy has already
been detailed, on the Right the accusation was of a renewed ideology of corporatism/ or the
theft of Thatcher's popular capitalism. Intellectuals on the Left tried to generate greater
expectations:
'[Hutton's] influence on the next fifty years may yet prove to be as seminal as that
of Keynes and Beveridge on the last fifty.'98
'The state we've been in for 50 years and how a book could change it.'99
'Hutton's book is the most important produced on the Left since Tony Crosland's
'Future of Socialism' more than 30 years ago.'100
'The reality is that Stakeholding had become an important idea, developed by the
most coherent and purposeful group of left-of-centre reformers now on the scene.'101
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Total alignment with the ideas of Stakeholding was not a feature of all these commentaries
but a sense of its importance, its landmark proportions and potential political impact was.
The figure of Will Hutton has been pivotal in sustaining the movement of the
Stakeholding train in this direction. His position as the originator of the idea was already
well-connected as economics editor of The Guardian newspaper, having been economics
correspondent for BBC2's Newsnight for 5 years, as a member of the governing council of
the Policy Studies Institute, the Institute for Political Economy and Charter '88, and a
governor of the London School of Economics. In many respects Stakeholding has come
across as Hutton's personal project. His style of mission-like zeal to persuade people of his
message is in ample evidence in the 'False Economy' programmes broadcast by Channel
Four in the summer of 1996 which trace him touring business groups, new City employees
and top company directors. He has also been able to use his editor positions in two sister
broadsheet newspapers that are politically Left of centre, to publish both his own articles
and commission others that engage with the Stakeholding idea.102 Clearly Hutton has been
able to draw on his considerable communicative resources which are part of the privileges of
his social position, in order to construct an audience for his ideas. The broadly successful
'response' to them must be located within an understanding of the extent of those resources
as a power to disseminate knowledge. That power is not just about a personal position but
its meaning as a juncture of relations. Those relations are personal, social and historical.
Personal in terms of friendships, intermarriages, relations with colleagues and
acquaintances. Social in terms of links with associations, organisations and institutes,
research bodies and think-tanks which set and react to each other's agendas. Those which
have been closely associated with the Hutton/Stakeholding project are the Policy Studies
Institute (PSI), the Social Market Foundation (SMF), the Institute for Public Policy Research
(IPPR), Demos, and Nexus.103
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The historical relations that mean Stakeholder knowledge can be so widely and
influentially disseminated are relations of ideas about political change. Since the 1970s
these have developed in a particular direction on the Left, that could be generally described
as a move away from statism towards a politics of civil society. Stakeholding is very much
a successor idea of developments associated with that move, and as such is part of a wide
network of people and ideas from different arenas that see themselves as broadly politically
aligned. They act through networks of support, attend the same conferences and events,
subscribe to the same journals and magazines, and have a shared political vocabulary that
has developed to articulate the meanings around mixed economies of public and private,
social markets, market socialism.104 In common these different groupings have addressed the
Labour party's modernisation project in relation to themselves and have been engaged with
in turn by the Labour party leadership. Indeed there has been an eagerness to sustain an
'ideas culture' with a philosophy that is neither ideologically Right or Left. From the late
1980s the source of such ideas for political renewal shifted through the generation of a
think-tank culture - initiated by Margaret Thatcher's use of the Institute of Economic Affairs
(IEA) and the Adam Smith Institute as mainsprings for her policy ideas. The think-tank
rationale is that by not having to follow a party political line, ideas can be provocative,
radical and above all new. It is one that is ideally suited to the Stakeholding project, and
relatedly to the discourses of citizenship, communitarianism, empowerment, community,
rights and responsibilities. It has been called a new political approach to Ideas, by those who
are part of it:
'Think-tanks, policy forums, networks of pro-Labour academics: an unprecedented
campaign is being waged by Tony Blair and his lieutenants to win the battle of
ideas. The Blair rationale is simple. Margaret Thatcher triumphed because she
changed the climate of opinion, had a programme to implement and carried the
electorate. Labour must do the same.'105
A number of academics are associated with this trend, most notably professor Anthony
Giddens at the London School of Economics.106 Giddens is said to have regular contact with
Tony Blair after being invited to discuss his understanding of 'the way problems such as the
concept of Stakeholder Welfare. Demos was founded in 1993, by Marxism Today editor Martin
Jacques and Geoff Mulgan; Director GeoffMulgan has been a commentator on Stakeholding and is
now a key figure in the Labour's 'Number 10 policy unit' with a 3 day-a week brief to re-think
Welfare ('Blair tries to end vicious circle' The Guardian 9.12.97 p8). Nexus was set up in 1996 to
provide an intellectual forum (mainly via the Internet) for New Labour; its Parliamentary Co-ordinator
is Tony Wright MP, co-editor of Political Quarterly, the conference sponsors.
104 These definitional developments around a new sort of politics on the Left are traced in Wright.T
(1996) Socialisms: Old and New London: Routledge
105 Adonis.A (1997) 'Blair and the Brains' The Observer 12.1.97 p 16
106
Adonis, Blair and the Brains p 16
98
family, the underclass and the Welfare State have leapt up the political agenda.'107 He has
been part of a small group of thinkers on Welfare selected by Tony Blair to attend two high
prestige meetings named 'Chequers One' (December 1997) and 'Chequers Two' (February
1998).108 These lengthy 'think-ins' have been promoted as a way for Centre-Left
governments to learn from a transatlantic exchange of ideas on domestic issues such as
crime, welfare and the family, commonly seen as the preserve of the Right and forged by the
Thatcher-Reagan relationship. The translation of American ideas about Welfare into the
British context, is a key part of 'underclass' discourse.109 It is most evident in the kind of
terminology that is shared (underclass, welfare dependency, workfare/welfare to work,
tough love/hard choices) and the turn towards behavioural accounts of poverty. For
example, in Beyond Left and Right: the future of radical politics Giddens identifies Charles
Murray's criticisms of the Welfare State as having some merit;110 and the Treasury's most
recent idea of putting 'welfare' into the pay packets of poor working families via tax
credits, rather than giving welfare benefits to poor, non-working families, is directly taken
from the idea of the American Earned Income Tax Credit.11'
The dense network quality of associations within the realm of cultural and political
commentary around 'underclass' does not necessarily amount to a consensus. Rather the
network is characterised by shifting alliances over relatively short time periods, and often
contradictory positions when different figures articulate their ideas in different spaces.
While networked sites cannot be regarded as a unified group in terms of interests, they still
remain networked even when they are partially in conflict. This is a central characteristic of
the way 'underclass' discourse primarily works as a classed power-knowledge relation, in
which the working class poor are produced as 'the excluded' even by those who claim to
represent their interests. It is well illustrated in the way that Stakeholder knowledge draws
on the Report of the Social Justice Commission to develop its concept of Stakeholder
Welfare. The propositions of the report for 'welfare to work' proposals, derived from its
basic definition of social inequality and citizenship in terms of inclusion and exclusion from
the labour market, are adopted by Stakeholding discourse. The welfare policy stream of the
conference is presented by Ruth Lister, who together with David Marquand was a member
of the Social Justice Commission. The Commission's report does give emphasis to the idea
107 Giddens quoted in 'Blair's backroom boffins make strange bed fellows' The Sunday Times 8.1.95
p8
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109 The subject of American-British links with regard to 'underclass' discourse requires a much longer
account than I have room to cover here. Rather it is my intention to note these links as a significant
part of extensive networks which are almost limitless in terms of their proliferating connections but
need to be bound at some point when they are written about
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of giving voice to the objects of welfare policy, its 'Outreach' section deals specifically with
political exclusion. Yet the conference space is clearly exclusionary to these people. That
contradiction was even voiced in the session that Lister chaired at the Stakeholder
conference, and was recognised, but not addressed in terms of the productivity of
'underclass' discourse itself. The identification of a problem 'them' - 'the excluded'-
continued in the conference session as the necessary half of the project of 'inclusion',
excluded by definition and practice, that is through discourse. The 'in common-ness' of the
conference delegates is their proximity, the inclusivity of their shared spaces: in print, on the
television, where they live and socialise, and at conferences such as this.
The conference represented a concerted attempt to network ideas, people and
institutions. The networking roles performed are explicit, practiced as mutually
advantageous power relations between publishing interests, delegates and the conference
organisers. This is the deal of attendance. Active promotion of 'the network' is central to the
conference's work, the network being recognised as the condition of Stakeholding's success
as an idea and as a practical, political strategy. A Stakeholder society works by 'networks of
co-operative, working relationships cemented by trust'112 and it requires networks of the
right sorts of people, with the right sorts of knowledge, in the right sorts of spaces to bring
that about. The conference unites all three, and anticipates the nature of social networks
beyond this site, where the work of individual Stakeholder advocates will be generative of
success. In the words of one speaker, and as Latour himself might have said:
'...there is no 'capitalism' to fight battles; there are academics, practitioners and
straddlers, acting as individuals, or in the context of institutions with which they are
associated.'113
This networked space is a space where understandings are shared: delegates know
what 'all this' is about, it is part of who they are. The fact that there are ambivalent and
contradictory relations between this group does not detract from a shared elite status whose
power is to make its presence felt (in multiple ways) at a distance, in spaces such as the DSS
waiting room. It does however mean that their networks can be potentially de/re-routed, that
they are not monoliths.
The conference power networks make possible very different kinds of connections
to those which produce the knowledges, identities and spaces of claimant cultures. The DSS
waiting room is one site in a network of relations through which knowledges of 'Social
Security' are produced, presented and changed. Just as Stakeholder knowledge is produced
112 Hutton and Kay, Only working together will save the economy p26
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in relation to other spaces such as think-tanks, so Social Security knowledges are linked to
other spaces in a process of knowledge production. In this section I have mainly been
interested in looking at the front-line space of the DSS waiting room as a primary site of
application for dominant welfare knowledges; however I think it is also important to at least
note that the DSS waiting room also exists in social networks of its own, which include
other spaces of knowledge production, if not spaces specifically set up for that purpose.
These may be neighbourhood or social activity based shops, playgroups, pubs, community
centres, credit unions, food co-ops, Lets schemes (local exchange and trading networks),
tenant groups and CBEDs (community based economic development schemes)."4 Indeed
some of these are part of highly developed community based social networks in which
claimant status is more than tangential. It is the part of people's identities that is the very
reason for social activities that are about everyday existence and survival in poverty. It is not
my intention here to 'ethnograph-ise' these networks or the knowledges which partly
constitute them, that kind of knowledge is the subject of Chapter Four and I want to present
it as part of a different kind of space to that of more formal 'social networks'. This is not to
say that such networks are not important in the role they play. It is not only the conference
that is embedded in networks of representational spaces: it is worth briefly signposting what
the equivalent networks of the DSS waiting room may be.
In terms of the daily, weekly, fortnightly and the less regular practices that being a
benefit claimant involves, there are a whole range of different places which claimants move
between - from the Job Centre, to local council offices, estate management offices, medical
benefits agencies, unemployment offices, and Social Services - that make up their
geographies of everyday life. The meanings and practices that characterise these sites are
partly productive of claimant identities and knowledges - often based on straggles for basic
needs provision and some autonomy in that process. These sites are often linked to the
subject of formal welfare advocacy/representation. So for example there are links
maintained with these sites by DSS management staff who also hold liaison meetings with
social and probation services, Citizen's Advice Bureaux (CAB), Welfare Rights
organisations and organisations campaigning around poverty such as the Child Poverty
Action Group and its Citizen's Rights Office. Primarily these links have been used to
establish complaint and equality of opportunity procedures within those different sites. The
provision of help and advice for claimants to pursue their welfare interests with statutory
agencies, is made by CAB, local law centres and Social Services who often have advocates
to speak with or for the claimant to strategically negotiate the system of benefit entitlement
and related needs provision. Through such representations links between particular needs
114 See Ronnby.A (1996) Mobilising Local Communities London: Avebury Press
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and formal rights are made - where advocate knowledge of the system and its wider legal
framework is the basis of the relationship to the claimant. It is another power-knowledge
relation. It either speaks by proxy or facilitates the claimant to speak specifically about her
needs/entitlement. It is not there to dispute the terms or level of that entitlement or to
promote endogenous welfare knowledges of the claimant.
Sites of claimant knowledge networks that are about speaking more politically
orientated discourse that perhaps engages at a polemical level are few. Those which work at
a grass-roots level in positions of self-advocacy are the clearest forum for the sorts of
claimant knowledges that are produced in relation to the DSS waiting room. They include
claimants unions which made up a strong network in the 1960s and 70s (now less prolific),
unemployed worker's centres set up in the late 1970s and 80s under independent control,
and locally based anti-poverty alliances.115 The widespread dissemination of experiences
and knowledges from such groupings is dependent on channels to speak to local or national
media publics for example, being provided for them. As far as this power relation with the
media is concerned, what claimants can say, how, when and where they say it is not within
their sphere of influence. Their practices are often more about self and collective support,
and maintaining self worth and dignity, than they are arguing their positions in the media.
However, increasingly those practices intersect as the links between media and political
representation are recognised as being fundamental to psychological and material
experiences of poverty. The Single Parent Action Network (SPAN) is a grass roots national
organisation of single parent groups - such as the Brixton Young Single Mothers Group and
Glasgow's Allsorts Young Parents Group - which has networking and media influence as a
core aim. Members are advised on the benefits of networking in terms of :
'...information exchange; developing relationships of solidarity; developing a sense
of common purpose on the basis of shared values and identity; negotiating and
articulating a collective view on issues which are relevant to participating
members.'116
Such network relations are also conceived of as outward reaching into other advocacy
organisations and the media, but in practice are trammelled by both a lack of material
resources, by a lack of time (the work of those involved must fit in with the time consuming
115 The National Welfare Rights Movement in America is often referred to as representing the apex of
such grass roots strategic organisation around welfare identity. At its height in 1969 the organisation
had approximately 25,000 members, the vast majority of whom where African-American women with
children who claimed benefits and demanded benefit increases as rights of citizenship, motherhood,
and consumption. See Kornbluh.F (1997) 'To Fulfil Their "Rightly Needs": Consumerism and the
National Welfare Rights Movement' p76-113 Radical History Review 69. Significantly, much welfare
rights organising at this time took place in the waiting rooms of local welfare centres, where claimants
had come to 'negotiate grievances', see Fox Piven.F and Cloward.R.A (1971) Regulating The Poor
London: Tavistock Public p327
116 'What Is Networking?' p7 SPAN Newsletter 10 July 1997 Bristol: SPAN
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nature of parenting in poverty) and by the limited status of the knowledges they convey. The
expert-advocate remains a preferred media source, connecting more efficaciously with the
languages, practices and technologies of those parts of the network that produce the
dominant discourse of 'underclass'.
It is nevertheless important to note that there is marked differentiation within
institutional sites of media, politics and academia whose internal dynamics can produce
unpredictable and contradictory lines of connection to claimant knowledges. The Campaign
to Defend the Welfare State within the parliamentary Labour Party is at odds with the party
leadership line on public spending commitments, and together with other prominent
detractors of the current direction of welfare reform can be seen as an internal coalition of
dissent.117 There are a number of academics who are fierce critics of their own intellectual
traditions and practices with regard to 'poverty research' and the direction of government
policy."8 Such examples may be limited but they have also generated considerable noise
within and beyond their own spaces of authority. They show that the network of relations
that generates 'underclass' discourse is not about relations between unified sites but that
those sites are often internally differentiated and their allegiances shift over time.
Those indeterminacies mean that only a close and ongoing analysis of the network -
its constitutive practices and relations - can reveal the nature of power workings within it. In
this section I have shown how the power-knowledge networks of the Stakeholder policy
conference and DSS waiting room are qualitatively different. Stakeholder knowledge spans
elite spaces, has figureheads and high media profiles, its means of producing and
exchanging related knowledges are extensive, its academic knowledges merge with business
and government knowledges (even in conflict), its language is inter-disciplinary and
international, it can act as if the world is its own to traverse. The social policy academic
Peter Beresford has noted that whereas many other subjugated groups have found forums to
develop their own debates and knowledges - notably feminist, black and gay groups - the
poor have not:
'Poverty is the one issue...where this hasn't happened, so far. It is a last bastion of
people's exclusion from discussions of which they are the subjects.'"9
One important reason that this should be so is that the specific meanings through which poor
people are 'known' disqualify them from participating in the discourse of elite spaces,
117 The Campaign To Defend The Welfare State organise through events like lobbies and rallies on the
eve of Budgets and through small conferences of their own on the future of Welfare. The emergent
opposition to New Labour's Welfare reform within the Labour party is traced in Wintour.P (1997)
'The Resurgence of the Left' The Observer 5.10.97 p24
118 For example Beresford.P and Croft.S (1995) 'It's our problem too! Challenging the exclusion of
poor people from poverty discourse' p75-93 Critical Social Policy Issue 44/5
119 Beresford and Croft, It's our problem too! p77
including those which formally represent them. This network of power-knowledge relations
- of classed understandings about 'them' produced by 'us' - was evident in the conference's
shared plenaries, in the acknowledgement of mutual 'respect' between political opponents
('despite our differences'), in the conference networking, and in the consensus around the
use of the term 'welfare dependency' and the 'imperative' of ending it. The next section
turns to the ways in which these power-knowledge relations are constituted through different
kinds of social spaces, through practices of work. Working practices are part of the modus
operandi of power, that produce the conference and waiting room spaces as unequally
significant sites of welfare discourse in relation to each other.
4: WORKED SPACES
104
Holding Power in Place: The Worked Space of the Stakeholder Policy Conference and
DSS Waiting Room
'Things do not hold because they are true, they are true because they hold' - Bruno
Latour120
'I want to thank all those who have made this conference possible - the sponsors, the
chairs, the audio-visual department, the porters, catering department and marshals...
and you for acting on this important chance to shape ideas' - Stakeholder
Conference Organiser
'Security Cameras are permanently recording in this area. Thank you for your co¬
operation' - DSS waiting room sign
Why 'Work'?
The conference on Stakeholding worked. It ran smoothly according to plan and was
thus able to do what it set out to. Primarily this was to provide a forum in which the ideas of
a number of 'opinion formers' could be exchanged and shaped with regard to the Big Idea
espoused by the conference organisers. For this to be achieved and the conference named a
success, systemised, practical organisation was required. That work involved a number of
people holding particular practical skills - from cleaners to camera men - and a whole array
of physical resources - from buildings to fax machines. The conference, an apparently
ideational event, was therefore also an immensely practical achievement. As far as its
presentation and its functioning were concerned, it held together, it was credible, it rose to
the occasion of a political launch.
DSS waiting rooms also work. They facilitate the management of some of the most
problematic, confrontational aspects of the Social Security system in every large town and
city in Britain. In order that this is achieved with minimal levels of controversy, containable
levels of claimant dissatisfaction and maximum levels of administrative efficiency, a
complex machinery of human and non-human resources are needed. Perspex fronted booths,
claimant record systems, CCTV cameras, digital queue systems and security guards, all
allow DSS waiting rooms to work from 9 'til 4.30 in a more or less uniform manner across
the country. The achievement of government efficiency targets, the processing of claimants'
financial crises, the general ticking over of the Social Security system's most dysfunctional
and awkward outcomes, is therefore no small achievement. And yet much like the
120
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conference, the appearance of the benefit office at work is one of relative ease and the
experience for those who attend and know how these places work, one of habitual normality.
The theme of 'worked space' which is addressed here is about the elaborate process
of work which sustains such appearances. It is not making a case for either the DSS or
conference having an entirely mechanistic, consensually achieved or unified effect as far as
participation in those processes is concerned but is about the organisational efficiency of
these places and this is not simply a matter of operational interest. It ensures the
instrumentality of particular power relations. It is the bricks and mortar, or the fax and form
of particular welfare practices. At a conceptual level this is about how the workings of
power are practically produced and sustained. As is suggested by Latour's opening quote, it
is about the way things 'hold together', how they work, and come to have the appearance of
normality, order, truth, as if naturally occurrent - 'the way things are'.
The mechanics, the practical achievement of the way things are, is a particular
aspect of power working within this part of the discourse of 'underclass'. To study those
mechanics, is therefore to study part of the nature of this power. First of all I will look at the
most 'solid' parts of the conference and waiting room sites, their physicality as it were. I
will then shift to the sites as organisational spaces that are systemised, bureaucratised,
technologised - this is the primary 'work' and achievement of both sites.
The Building Blocks of Power
I have been talking about 'the policy conference' and 'the DSS waiting room' as if
they might be generic entities. This is because I have been to a good few conferences both
academic and political since being a student and sat in many DSS waiting rooms and there is
a generic quality about both sorts of spaces. The sameness of the feeling of being in both
derives from an indivisible mix of physical, social and symbolic relations. The look of each
is notable for being a particular sort of building - universities (red brick, 1960s/70s
modernism, or a mix of both), and council buildings (modem office blocks or old town hall
architecture). Their interior areas are distinguishable in details of style rather than purpose.
The conference site has reception areas, theatres with stacked seating, halls with rowed
seating, furniture dominated seminar rooms, canteen areas. The waiting room site has rows
of open windowed booths, rows of small cubicles with doors, geometrically laid out seating
areas, queue divides and barriers. The layouts of both conferences and waiting rooms are
about accommodating, organising and moving groups of people for a particular purpose
around public buildings.
The physical differences between the two sites are considerable: they are very
different kinds of public buildings with access for different kinds of publics. The association
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of particular 'publics' with particular buildings is a social-symbolic relation. Buildings
which are readily associated with particular people may be used by them but it is the
powerful nature of the visibility and knowledge about this use that gives it meaning. That
meaning is tied up in the activities and status of the people themselves as they represent
themselves and are represented to each other and the wider world. The Stakeholding
conference and DSS waiting room sites are produced as meaning-ful and power-ful spaces
through such a physical-social-symbolic relation.
The main venue and focus of the policy conference was Firth Hall which is the
central chamber of Firth Court, Sheffield University's central administration building. Firth
Court is an impressive, church-like red brick building set back from the main road by a short
driveway, you approach it. Wide steps take you up to a tall arched doorway and through to
an entrance hall of archways and high ceilings which face straight onto a grand central
stairway. Walking up the stairs I definitely felt as if I had 'arrived', dwarfed by architectural
grandeur and suddenly by the possible magnitude of the event itself. The main area in which
we were all convened once up the stairway, was a huge wood panelled hall lined with large
portraits of University and Civic notaries from the past, all men. Rows of chairs stretched
across the floor separated by a wide central aisle, cross cut half-way by another. At the front
of the hall a raised stage served as the rostrum from which the speakers and panel members
would talk. It was adorned with palms and other greenery, and above it two large flags
draped from a horizontal length of pole in an ornately structured wooden arc - one Union
Jack and one bearing a golden, Latinate University insignia. Two of these University flags
also draped from the back of the hall. On the rostrum was a large rectangular table from
which the speakers rose to address the audience, at a lectern situated pulpit-like at its side.
And there we sat, apparently united beneath symbols of nation and academe, as
distinguished speakers delivered their take on Stakeholding. Other parts of the conference
were held in standard lecture theatre workshops and smaller modern reception rooms but
Firth Hall was the main event - the place to which we arrived and departed from,
enlightened as to what Stakeholding might mean to our political futures.
The DSS waiting room can appear like an airport lounge or the sort of large
communal waiting rooms you used to have at bus stations. Usually it is a mixture of both: a
bus station with pot plants and a telly. I am going to describe the waiting room that is
Euston's district DSS office - probably one of the bigger waiting rooms and most busy, it is
also the one I spent most time in.
Euston DSS is part of a large grey stone old building on the main road, a short walk
to the right as you come out of the railway station. The standard orange and blue 'Social
Security' sign is fixed next to one of the building doorways which you enter to the 'initial
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reception' in an ante-room of the main waiting room. As soon as you enter the building there
are signs warning about behaviour that will mean you will not get seen at all. These signs
proliferate and repeat themselves in different ways on the walls, doors and cubicle fronts:
ANYONE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL OR DRUGS WILL NOT BE SEEN.
VIDEO CAMERAS ARE PERMANENTLY RECORDING IN THIS AREA, THANKYOU
FOR YOUR CO-OPERATION.
CCTV CONSTANTLY MONITORS THIS AREA.
RECEPTIONISTS WILL REFUSE TO SEE ANYONE WHO USES ABUSIVE OR
THREATENING BEHAVIOUR.
PLEASE NOTE STAFF WILL REFUSE TO SEE ANYONE WHO IS UNDER THE
INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL. ONE WARNING WILL BE GIVEN AND THEN THE
POLICEWILL BE CALLED.
In the Euston office there is also a tatty old sticker on the waiting room door: 'Think you're
a bit of an anarchist? Organise for class struggle.'
The layout of Euston waiting room is like other offices in terms of where things are
in relation to each other. Rows of metal chairs are joined together and fixed to the floor, as
are the seats at each booth window. There's a Coke machine and wall mounted TV in the
corner opposite a CCTV monitor. The grey stone floor is strewn with small bits of litter.
Two toilets which lead straight off the waiting room are locked so you have to ask a security
guard if you want to use them, most people don't. Under a sign that reads 'DSS serving the
community' there is a notice board full of DSS information posters showing smiling
multicultural claimants. A digital strip notice board flicks on continuous play:
'ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH THE SERVICE? HELP US TO HELP YOU, USE
CUSTOMER SERVICES. NO FOOD OR DRINK ALLOWED IN THE OFFICE'
Another digital strip flashes up the last ticket number that was called so you know where
you are in the queue. A voicecom announcement tells you when your ticket is up. Euston
DSS is a dingy, depressing place and it does get to you. It is the sort of place that you would
want to avoid and want to get out of as quickly as possible. But it's a busy office and there's
nothing you can do about it. You sit with your ticket and you wait.
In describing both conference and waiting room, the impossibility of separating the
physical nature of the sites from the practices that go on there and the meanings that imbue
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them, is clear. Indeed it is these practices which make these sites what they are, rather than
their walls and ceilings per se. The meanings which attend these practices are a constituent
part of the power relations that position the conference and waiting room in relation to each
other as different sorts of social spaces. The main conference hall is a room that speaks of
tradition, authority and power, while the waiting room speaks of the power of subjugation.
You experience those qualities as feelings that are somehow part of the buildings
themselves.
The nature of both sites is therefore an indivisible relation of meaning and practice.
At the Stakeholder conference site the signs and symbols of academic authority combine
with organisational practices of policy debate to produce a site of manifest power in which
particular identities and knowledges can be produced as authoritative. There is a
coincidence of practice, meaning and physical design - authority figures present important
knowledge within a commanding architecture. Everything seems to fit.
In 1988 many DSS waiting rooms were refurbished by refitting them with new logos
and fixtures. Some of their functions were relocated to information centres, contactable by
freephone only, so face-to-face interaction between staff and claimants was stopped for
particular kinds of problems. These changes were intended to institute a different kind of
claimant practice and regime of meaning as part of a new consumer ideology promoted by
the government in all welfare sectors and conveyed in the Benefits Agency promotional
slogan 'benefits are our business, customers our concern'. The idea was to re-position the
claimant as the client-customer-consumer, and through environmental and organisational
changes in waiting rooms induce different kinds of claimant behaviour and attitude. The
result is that in some waiting rooms pleasant appearances belie the meaning of
organisational practices. Because Euston DSS has not been done up, the meaning of those
practices is more visible. But in the pleasant appearance of some DSS waiting rooms, there
is a deep incongruity that feels like a cover-up. However it is also a cover which quite often
slips because the organisational practices so contradict the facade of pleasantness. Conflict
is inherent in the staff-claimant relation because of those practices. In this regard pleasant
surroundings are often a further cause of aggravation because of the incongruity they
express. It is to those organisational practices that I now turn as the substance of the power
relation which makes the sites what they are in relation to each other. They are both
organised, systemised, technologised, surveilled spaces, but not in the same way.
Systems and Technologies of Power
This is obviously not a comparison of like with like: the DSS is not a forum for the
presentation and debate of claimant knowledges, conferences are different to waiting rooms
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because of differences in purpose. However I am not talking about equivalence of function.
The connection is that they are united and divided by a power relation. It is the productive
power relation of policy debate-benefit claiming that constitutes the sites as different sorts
of spaces. The nature of this power relation can partly be revealed by looking at the
constitutive practices of the conference and waiting room sites.
The workings of both sites are carefully systemised. Both systems are made up of
technological and bureaucratic sorts of practices. They produce and sustain particular sorts
of social relations.
When you arrive at the DSS waiting room you are already part of the Social
Security system, your life is already conditioned by regulatory requirements and waiting
room practices are an expression and extension of those processes. If there is an initial
reception in the waiting room, a DSS officer asks about your inquiry and if it is short or
general may deal with you there. Alternatively you may be directed to the freephones in the
main waiting room which deal with some Social Fund, National Insurance contribution and
Child Support inquiries through management centres in Glasgow, Newcastle and Belfast.
Otherwise you are given a numbered ticket which you take into the main waiting room
where you sit until your number is called out. At that point you take up the next vacant
booth. That is the system at Euston DSS. The waiting systems vary slightly between
different area offices - tickets can be dispensed from a machine when you go in, or you have
to stand in a queue from when you arrive and wait anything up to an hour on your feet
before seeing anyone. This includes old and ill people and mothers with young children or
women who might be pregnant. Waiting is the thing most people complain about in the
standing queues and on the seats.
Once installed at a booth window there is an interview of sorts through which your
problem is entered into the Social Security system for appropriate action. It is highly based
on the claimant giving personal information. Form filling is integral to the process. Each
form is known by a number and has an explanatory leaflet to go with it: the Social Fund
application is SF33, the Appeal Form NI246, the Jobseeker's Agreement ES3. The system
works according to a process of disclosure, questioning, further disclosure, assessment and
action/instruction. Much of the officer's work and skill centres on extracting, soliciting,
demanding information from the claimant. 'Making yourself accountable' and responding
appropriately to interventions is the expected condition of benefit claiming. Help, on their
terms, depends on the claimant's information. It is the 'confession' of poverty and it
positions the officer as the source of 'delivery'.
Within the DSS waiting room that basic procedural system is shored up by a whole
range of technologies from the time ordering mechanisms of the staff; internal and external
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distribution systems; freephones to central information management centres; televisions for
waiting claimants to watch; digital display systems; microphones behind dividing Perspex
barriers. These are not only 'props' to the system, they are part of its lifeblood that make the
system what it is. They all serve a purpose which in such a well thought out and budgeted
environment, is never superfluous. Primarily that purpose is to ensure order and to remove
from the claimant both the opportunity and the inclination for conflict. The Social Security
computer system and the CCTV monitors are two of the main technologies in that service.
In September 1997 the Social Security computer databank held records of 77 million
names each one identified by a unique code of three letters and six digits - called the NINO
or national insurance number.121 This information is not just kept about benefit claimants but
it is used by the DSS as their main identification tag. It is the NINO that carries the details
of each claim, how much it is and when it should be paid. The security of that number is an
essential part of the security of the system because it means that people cannot work
(officially) and claim subsistence benefits at the same time. The policing of that distinction
between worker and claimant is what Social Security administration is about at its core. The
principle of that distinction is at the heart of the system of the JSA. It is therefore the first
piece of information that is required in claimant dealings with the DSS.
The statement of your NINO is one part of a computer systemised process of claim
management. This systemisation is set up by the Department of Social Security at Whitehall.
It is they who systemise the libraries of statutes and legislature produced by the
Parliamentary system, into Benefits Agency administrative procedure. A lynch-pin of the
system's practicability is the computer. It regularises administration as something that is
'system generated' and to an extent ensures a broad parity of treatment between similar
'cases'. The claimant interview is therefore often a three way interaction between computer,
DSS officer and claimant, and in this respect is part of a technologised power relation. Its
practice involves Whitehall prescription, computerised procedure and record, officer
assessment, claimant disclosure. Sitting there, the claimant has no access to the information
kept about her on the computer and cannot negotiate giving what information she may or
may not feel is relevant to her case without jeopardising it. Public 'informants' on the other
hand can proffer information which they think may effect the legitimacy of a claim via free
telephone hotlines. In the first three months of its operation - August to November 1996 -
the National Benefit Fraud Hotline received over 100,000 calls.122
Means-tested claimants who are in receipt of the JSA are subject to other
technologised procedures at the Job Centre where they sign on. The administration and
121 From 'The System' a BBC2 documentary on Britain's Social Security system 19.9.97
122 'DSS Calls to Fraud Hotline Top 100,000' DSS News Release 96/238 6.10.96
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payment of JSA is heavily computerised with details of claimants and jobs being kept on a
large database called the 'Labour Market System'. This is a new £70 million system which
matches details of the claimant's case and the types of jobs they have said they're looking
for, with the jobs that are available in the area. The system is seen as integral to the new
regime:
'The LMS will provide a direct way for testing the requirement for clients to be
available for and actively seeking work.'123
The Social Security system's design to regulate the claimant will not necessarily be
achieved as a blueprint of Whitehall's intentions and if it is then that regulation is not
always or necessarily oppressive. Nevertheless, the technology is in the exclusive service of
a group of people with intentions to discipline claimants' behaviour for particular ends and
it makes some outcomes more likely than others. The issue of control over personal
information that is extracted from claimants relates to the Social Security Administration
Fraud Bill (1996). This bill sets out plans for the pooling of information by government
departments to crack down on benefit fraud. As well as permitting the transfer of
information from other departments such as Immigration and Inland Revenue, the DSS is
permitted to pass information to local council administration of housing and council tax
benefit. In this way, an individual's claimant status is writ large and monitored across a
range of government departments through a 'data matching' process specifically designed to
discipline, catch-out and if necessary criminalise the claimant.124
The other main technologised power relation deployed in the DSS waiting room to
regulate claimant behaviour, works through the eye of the CCTV monitor. The closed circuit
television is now an ubiquitous part of everyday public life for a lot of people. Its place in
the DSS waiting room can be seen both as an extension of that widespread surveillance into
previously unwatched areas of public life and a development of the specifically classed
nature of that gaze.125 In the DSS waiting room the camera has an exclusive focus on poor
welfare claimants, set apart from the crowds. Here in the waiting room the claimants
represent a kind of concentrated deviancy, with a potential for threatening behaviour by
virtue of who they are or rather what they as claimants represent. The notices that are all
over the waiting rooms prohibiting particular sorts of claimant behaviour make it clear that
CCTVs are not there to stop claimants from fighting or being abusive to each other. They
are there as a 'disincentive' to threatening behaviour against staff, to induce compliant
123 The Annual Report of the Department of Education and Employment (March 1996) quoted in Red
Pepper June 1996 no 25 plO
124
Daniel.C (1997) 'Not Citizen's But Data Subjects' New Statesman 13.6.97 p23-25
125 It is particular sorts of groups, activities and areas that are the target of these cameras: namely
working class young men in shopping areas, and council estates. See Norris.C (1997) The
Unforgiving Eye Hull University: Centre For Criminology and Criminal Justice
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behaviour and in order to provide evidence should trouble arise. Similarly the security
guards that patrol the waiting rooms, and the Perspex screens which front the booths are
there to police the claimants and protect the staff.
In the DSS waiting room the CCTV can be seen as a disciplinary technology
working as a continuous, anonymous gaze that seeks to produce self-regulating individuals.
Sitting in the waiting room you tend to forget that it is there but you have usually registered
it and know that it is. There are signs to remind you of its operation in case you do forget. Its
qualitative effect on the space of the waiting room cannot be measured, but is disciplinary in
the sense that it sets up a visual regime in which it is clear who is watching who and why. Its
power is therefore partly symbolic: it states that disciplinary power is being deployed. It is
an attempt to establish a spatial ordering based on self-surveillance. This does not mean that
the space is necessarily disciplined, only that a particular power relation is manifest. In this
respect the DSS waiting room CCTV is not about a solution to a technical problem: like the
Panopticon it is a political technology and in the waiting room it bespeaks the disciplinary
power of 'Social Security'. It also expresses the need and desire for vigilance over particular
groups who in some capacity, however limited, pose a threat of disorder to the system. The
power relation that the mounted wall camera makes visible, is therefore not one way. Its
presence is deemed necessary because the ongoing social relation between the claimant and
the system as it presently works, means that tension and violence may not be far from the
surface. The DSS authorities know that in the same way that they know to the penny how
low a subsistence level benefit can go and still ensure survival. It is a knowledge of what the
system is about at a fundamental level, because they have set it up. The cameras are
therefore installed on the basis of a calculation and the calculation is right: the DSS waiting
room is not a space that is always under control, it is sometimes on the brink of being
seriously out of control. The CCTV is a check on that potential for disorder which arises
because of the social relations of benefit claiming and because there is little consensus or
respect for those social relations among claimants. The CCTV does not administer control,
its very point is to avoid the expense, effort and illegitimacy of physical discipline in this
context. It 'works' in as much as it influences behaviour in the direction of discipline, it
holds things in place albeit fragilely. It does this through the deployment of a visual regime
that is a power relation wherein the claimant's recognition of that regime is enough for it to
be disciplinary. DSS waiting room surveillance is efficient to the extent that it holds, thus
Latour's opening quote that things do not have to be 'true' to hold: 'they are true because
they hold'.
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The systems, technologies and bureaucracies of the policy conference work to
produce the conference as a particular sort of space. Like the waiting room it is a regulatory
space but one whose practices are carried out for different purposes.
The choice to attend this conference is not made freely: like the claimant the
conference participant is already part of a network of social relations. Participation is made
available by an invitation process in which personally addressed letters were sent out to a
whole range of people in local and central government, voluntary and charitable
organisations, trade unions, political parties, business, lobbying groups and academic
institutions. Names and addresses were obtained from journal and magazine subscription
listings, open membership listings of professional institutions such as the Social Policy
Association's and through speculative approaches to organisations. Advertisements were
also carried in academic and political journals and magazines as invitations to a specific
readership. The participant listing shows 363 people attended. From this list the participant
profile was: 45% academic; 16% business; 11% social organisations/charities/trade unions;
10% policy related/politicians; 4% media; 15% non-affiliated. Of these 23% were women;
and from my observations the vast majority were aged over 40.126
For those who attended, the conference offered the chance to become authoritatively
informed about an emergent political idea that seemed likely to have a substantial impact on
the policies of an incoming Labour government and thereby on the sort of work with which
the invitees were involved. The necessity to be conversant with such potentially influential
policy ideas is part of professional work in particular fields from social policy research to
business development. In this respect the choice of attendance is one that is strongly located
in the 'demands' of employment and career interests that are part of the normalising
regulation of professional life. Membership of work related organisations, and journal and
magazine subscription listings have a role to play as part of an apparatus in which
professional identities are produced and sustained. Invitation to this conference is 'normal'
by virtue of who the participants are: they are the sort of people who go to conferences.
Conference participants are partly produced as subjects by the practices of their professional
identities in much the same way claimants are produced by theirs through the normal-ising
practices of benefit claiming. Moreover these identities are produced in relation to each
other through a dominant discourse of 'welfare reform' of which 'underclass' is a central
part. The discourse divides those who are talked about as objects of policy and those who do
the talking as professionally interested individuals. The systemised practices of the
Stakeholding conference - from the invitation process to the schedules of participation - are
part of the process through which identity, meaning, and power are produced. The practices
126
Delegate listing, Stakeholder Capitalism conference March 1996, Sheffield: PERC
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that make up the work of defining and debating Stakeholding over two days are as much
about securing the power relation between professional identity and its 'others' as they are
debating the concept of Stakeholding - they are one in the same thing. Yet seemingly this
conference is not about 'us' the conference delegates or organisers, in terms of securing jobs
and futures, rather it is for 'them' and primary among them are the unemployed welfare
claimants as the biggest casualties of 'the state we're in'. The conference is apparently about
securing their jobs and futures. This abstraction of 'self by the conference
organisers/speakers is partly achieved through the systems, bureaucracies and technologies
that allow the conference to be set up as a particular kind of space, organised well, in a
manner befitting an event of this standing. Primarily this is as a space of consequential
ideas: professional, ordered, rational, authoritative. To this end, schedules direct delegates
purposively towards specific activities on which 'we' as invited participants have a
professional bearing; we are badged and identified by our institutional affiliations; we are
colour-streamed according to areas of interest and/or knowledge that mean we will attend
some sessions and not others. We are issued with promotional literature to locate the
importance of the conference, to inform our substantive ideas on Stakeholding and to
confirm our reasons for being here. We are encouraged to become 'familiar' with
Stakeholding as a group by making formal and informal contacts with each other and taking
out subscriptions to related journals and other publications. We are socialised at particular
times and places. Wine is provided at the launch of a journal called New Political Economy :
'very pleased you're all here... new world order... new journal... enjoy your drinks'. Shared
eating and drinking ensures conviviality and enjoyment of the event, we should feel good
about Stakeholding. Our time is structured into morning, afternoon and evening activities;
and further structured into plenary sessions, question opportunities, and workshops, to
facilitate a logical, cumulative, progressive knowledge of the subject of Stakeholding. We
are spatially ordered via plans for seating and standing and allocations to particular rooms
and venues which facilitate certain sorts of interaction. Seated in rows we listen to those
who impart knowledge from the raised foreground of the rostrum; seated around a table in a
seminar we discuss with a small group of equal others; standing, we can mingle in open
spaces which allow freedom of movement between individuals and the temporary possibility
of transcending knowledge hierarchies - the chance to approach Will Hutton himself if you
dare and some do.
The event flows as our activities are organised and we go along with it, it is what we
are here for. This process does not produce predictable 'effects' such as the manufacture of
committed advocates of Stakeholding, but it offers the participants authoritative subject
positions in relation to Stakeholding knowledge and particular groups of 'others'. Indeed in
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the conference promotional leaflet the offer is of power in the policy process itself: 'Do not
miss this chance to help set the agenda of economic and political debate'. The practices,
regulations and normalising techniques of the conference are therefore not entirely set up to
regulate participants who may otherwise be inclined to behave in ways that threaten the
conference's purposes. They are also practices, regulations and techniques that produce and
sustain a social relation of professional authority over 'others'. They are practices,
regulations and techniques that amplify the authoritative power of the participants, as they
are subjectified. This two-fold power process is clearest in the particular surveillant
technology that marks the conference site, and so distinguishes it from the CCTV of the
DSS waiting room.
Among the enormous array of artefacts that shape the conference practices - from
flipboards to clocks, microphones, word processors and lecterns - there are those
technologies which seem to bear a greater significance because of their capacity to extend
across large parts of a network of relations. This significance was conveyed at the
conference start when we were informed by the chair that we were going to be filmed,
recorded and published.
Television cameras filmed the audience and the speakers from the side of the
rostrum at the plenary addresses. They also moved among us at the two social receptions
after an evening buffet and at the journal launch. All the plenary speeches, followed by
question and answer sessions, and the workshop papers and discussions, were tape recorded
by technical assistants. The proceedings were transcribed for an official conference report
Stakeholder Capitalism - Blind Alley Or Best Hope? published by Sheffield University's
Political Economy Research Centre. A year later, a book including particular conference
papers as chapters was published by Macmillan in association with PERC.127
The television cameras were part of a Channel Four documentary outfit covering the
event and the idea of Stakeholding through Will Hutton's presentation of it to different
audiences throughout the country. Footage from the conference would be used to illustrate a
national process of enlightenment to 'Stakeholding', the cameras fixed on Hutton
gesticulating vociferously as the Main Man. The television programmes concerned were part
of a series called 'False Economy' transmitted by Channel Four in June 1996. Their
direction conveyed a mood of political urgency, speed and immanence as they traced
Hutton's movements among political and business groupings. Will Hutton on trains, in
meetings, on a mission: 'Will this man's ideas change Britain for good?' the voice-over
asked. The programmes opened Channel Four's 'Broke' season as a series of documentaries
covering the state of poor people in contemporary Britain. They were preceded by another
127
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introductory documentary 'on the society we've become' presented by Will Hutton, set up
to frame the political and policy context in which the subsequent excursions into poverty
could be placed. The 'Broke' season included the broadcasting of the work of Channel
Four's Commission on Poverty, especially set up for the series ('The Great, the Good, and
the Dispossessed' Channel Four 12.10.96). Chaired by the Social Policy Professor Peter
Townsend , the Commission's task was a mission to define, explain and evaluate
contemporary British poverty and policies for its alleviation. Commencing 'in search of
Britain's poor', the format was one of mission, exploration, and discovery of the poor, for
the edification of the television audience. Experts, victims, and self-helpers were presented
as the staple ingredients of poverty discourse. Hutton featured as a potent mix of saviour-
expert.
The significance of the cameras at the policy conference was more than the
provision of illustrative and contextualising footage. The cameras are part of a technologised
power relation in which the activities and ideas of those located in authoritative sites of
knowledge can be shown to be important, can be disseminated way beyond the physical
bounds of the site itself, can be given spatial reach. Like the other conference practices
working to amplify the power of participants as they regulate their behaviour and activities,
the televisual 'surveillance' of the conference participants sets out to amplify the conference
as a site of authority, then used to frame and contextualise/give particular meaning to
experiences of poverty. This process also works on the participants, confirming their
professional importance, as the importance of the event is further demonstrated to them.
The camera technology of policy conference and DSS waiting room plays a part in
regulating the behaviour and activities of two different sorts of assembled groups, but the
meaning of that relation derives from the power relation between the groups themselves.
Their 'relations of looking' are not the same. The DSS waiting room is a watched and bound
space where the CCTV is a visual technology installed for purposes of order and control
within the site. The message is that this space needs to be contained: ordered within and
limited in importance. The policy conference is a watched but expansive space where the
TV camera is a visual technology installed to communicate and disseminate outwards and so
expand the space of the conference. The message is that this expanded space is an important,
authoritative space. Similarly the work of publication generated by the conference is the
work of dispersion beyond immediate sites and selves to other sites and other people who
are less authoritative, less qualified on this subject of 'the state we're in'. The conference
site has access to televisual and publishing technologies because it exists as a nexus of
power-ful social relations spreading tendril-like into other sites of authoritative power which
include media sites. The meaning of those technologies (the purpose for which they exist,
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their ownership, their specific use) is derived from those power relations. The sorts of
knowledges, identities and spaces produced in the policy conference and DSS waiting room,
are part of those same power relations working through value-laden oppositions:
















The conference and waiting room sites are partly produced through such relational
meanings, practices and technologies. But as a power relation that 'mutuality' is quite
differently constituted. The waiting room is about reductive control, the conference
amplified authority. In the former, subjects are named, managed and silent, in the latter
subjects have authorship, copyright and voice. The relation needs both parts. Conference
work is the work of career, the necessity to become conversant with important developments
in your field. Waiting room work is the work of survival, benefit claiming as a means of
survival. The question 'who needs who?' may not be the most useful way of imagining how
this relation could or should be changed: yes, thinkers on policy need 'subjects' to focus on;
yes, claimants need debates about change in welfare policy. The problem is that the practice
of those much needed debates is such that the power relations which produce poverty in the
first place are further entrenched, further empowered. The place in which the Stakeholder
conference was held; the systems, practices and technologies it used; the signs, symbols and
meanings that it relied upon; all produced it as exactly the sort of space that militates against
significant political change in the discourse of 'underclass' as a discourse of 'dependency'.
It strengthened the power relation through which the policy process works to keep the DSS
waiting room as a marshalled and discounted space.
The 'work' of the Stakeholder policy conference was the work of power relations.
That work enabled the presentation of the conference as a particular sort of professional
event: exclusionary, authoritative, separate from the object of its discourse. In this themed
section I have argued that the way of doing things does matter. I have looked at the
Stakeholder conference and DSS waiting room sites as 'worked' spaces which demanded
and relied upon concerted practical and technological organisation. That work could have
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been deployed in different ways to produce the conference and waiting room as different
sorts of spaces. As it is, the practices of those two sites close off alternative ways of thinking
about and practicing Welfare that could otherwise bring together the two in a dialogical and
democratic power relation. This would necessarily be a changed power-knowledge relation.
Conclusion: Democratising Networks
Much of the argument of this chapter has been that the embedded knowledges of the
DSS waiting room and policy conference are primarily classed and gendered knowledges.
This means that the discourse of 'underclass' is often about patterned and scripted relations
and performances. One of the most striking aspects of the embodied nature of the policy
conference and waiting room was the way the conference space was so dominated by
middle aged, white, middle class men and the waiting room space by young black and white
working class women with children. These women simply did not feature in the Stakeholder
conference space, they were subsumed in the category of 'the unemployed', 'out of work',
in need of 'work' and nurseries for their children. Their 'inclusion' into society would be via
the economy of paid work. The hard work of these benefit claiming mothers was entirely
dismissed and so devalued, as their claimant status as 'welfare dependants' was deemed to
position their needs and interests as coincident with 'mainstream' society. The consideration
of the sort of work these women would be doing once included in society and its
comparative value to mothering work was not an issue in the middle class masculinist vision
of a Stakeholding society. 'Work' was not differentiated in class or gender terms; 'people on
benefits' were an ungendered amorphous mass. Did these women want to be included in this
vision, did they have any say at all? Could a different 'culture of welfare' to that produced
in the DSS waiting room and policy conference be imagined, in which the dualistic
opposition of 'dependence' and 'independence' could be deconstructed to reveal different
sorts of dependencies across classes and across genders? This is the subject of the next
chapter. The argument of this chapter has suggested that such change might only be possible
through a democratisation of the network of power-knowledge relations (of which the
conference space is part) which produces the claimant as 'the excluded'. That is necessarily
an argument about a reconfiguration of power networks which would produce the power for
claimants to speak and be heard in their own spaces rather than having to be included in
those of others, and which would also produce new 'hybrid' spaces in which different kinds
of expertise could be expressed in relation to each other. Such a reconfiguration would also
facilitate claims for economic resources to address the inequalities which mean some people
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are always already 'stakeholders'. In other words their monopoly of the network and of
economic resources has to be addressed in order to see the nature of power relations
between their responsibilities and the 'responsibilities' of claimants, between their material
ease and already entrenched inequalities.
This chapter has shown the discourse of 'underclass' to be something that is
practical, material and embodied as well as being an arena of signification. It has argued that
practices are constitutive of power-knowledge relations within and between different social
groups and social spaces. With regard to the discourse of 'underclass' as practiced in the
spaces of the DSS waiting room and Stakeholder policy conference those power-knowledge
relations produce both patterned inequalities and contingent indeterminacies. In the
contemporary configuration of that network of relations, the domination of particular
classed knowledges by others is ensuring that an exclusionary and oppressive policy
trajectory is being generated with regard to 'underclass'. The possible question: 'is this
happening as part of an 'agenda' or as 'unintended consequence'?' needs to be displaced by
a notion of discourse that goes beyond notions of powerful agents such as Stakeholder
notaries having 'effects', intended or otherwise. The discourse of 'underclass' cannot be
mapped or traced in those terms, less simplistic notions of how the social is produced are
needed. Networks of practice, knowledge and power often work in indeterminable ways so
that ideas which start off being well-intended, or seemingly insignificant or marginally
related to the mainframe of debate, come to assume a different form or significance within a
wider network, in the hands of others, in different spaces, at different times. This multiply
constituted, often contradictory and even dishevelled discursive process is the subject of the
next chapter, with regard to feminist directions in the discourse of 'underclass'.
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CHAPTER THREE
FEMINIST DISCOURSE ON 'UNDERCLASS': FAULTLINES OF CLASS AND
GENDER
In the discourse of 'underclass', contemporary debates about family-work relations,
parenting, community and crime are related to processes of welfare reform and
employment restructuring. These debates are shaped by the language and ideas of
certain kinds of feminism, embodied in the speaking positions of prominent
journalists, academics, policy thinkers, politicians and lobbyists. This chapter makes
links between the discourse of 'underclass' and particular feminist speaking positions
through interview based discussions with prominent women from key commentary
fields. It examines this feminist discourse by looking at three kinds of spaces which are
produced in relation to each other: the spaces of representation through which their
voices on 'underclass' are heard and read; the spaces those voices seek to represent -
primarily the 'estate', the 'home' and the space of 'work'; and the spaces of
production which are the situated speaking positions of the women themselves. Their
knowledge is analysed as a power laden production which constitutes 'underclass' as a
classed and gendered discourse. The implication of feminist discourse in the reform of
benefit dependent ways of being, is problematised via some socialist feminist
understandings about the contemporary period of 'underclass'. The chapter is divided
into two parts: feminist speaking positions on 'underclass' masculinities, and feminist
speaking positions on 'underclass' femininities. The divide is one of presentation
rather than substance: the chapter will argue that those masculinities and femininities
are produced in relation to each other, in material-symbolic spaces.
Introduction: A New Social Contract
On the 8th May 1996 The Guardian newspaper carried a front page headline: 'The
End Of The Welfare State.' The article marked announcements from the Labour and
Conservative parties on their visions of welfare into the next millennium as 'a decisive and
irreversible shift in the role of the Welfare State.'1 Both political parties had delivered
speeches on their vision of government's role as 'enabling' citizens to provide for their own
security rather than the State being a sole provider. Chris Smith MP, then Shadow Secretary
' 'The End Of The Welfare State - Tories and Labour define a loose compact between people and
government' The Guardian 8.5.96 pi
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of State for Social Security, announced in a keynote lecture to the Institute of Public Policy
Research that the rationale of this change was:
'...to take account of modern family structures, job flexibility and insecurity and the
rise of the working woman.'2
In policy terms a main plank of the new welfare strategy would be a restructuring of the
comprehensive State run social insurance model so that individual workers would own their
own 'welfare capital'.
Another article in that day's newspaper by Labour MP Tessa Jowell, then Shadow
Minister for Women, called on the government to act with regard to new working patterns
for women because the family was presently in crisis.3 The increased numbers of working
women was marking a redistribution of work from men to women: 71% of women were
working making up 44% of all people of working age in employment (Labour Force Survey
1995). Jowell described the development as beneficial to both women and the economy:
'It is clear that the labour market cannot do without women and that the economic
freedom that this has given women and their families is a good thing.'4
According to Jowell the trend was problematic because men and fathers had not adapted to
these changes in terms of parental involvement and because of a moral panic about the
welfare of children. It required government to establish a policy framework that would
produce 'a new paradigm for the working family.' Part of that would involve extensive
childcare provision and a change of attitude towards childrearing from certain quarters. To
illustrate the problem Jowell highlighted a news story that had been covered a few weeks
earlier in which a headmistress had suggested that it was inadvisable for two year olds to be
put in nurseries for 8 hours a day. She sought to locate the headmistress's objection in 'the
fundamentalist Right' amongst whom:
'...there is still evident unease about the desirability of women going out to work
before their children are of school age.'
Both newspaper articles are part of a process in which the meaning of 'welfare' is being
reconstituted in relation to social and economic changes in the labour market, especially the
growth of female employment. Those changes are held to be the reason why the old model
of full-time male employment and the family wage on which Beveridge's Welfare State
rested has become an anachronism, no longer suited to the modern workplace or modern
family. The argument is that a new welfare or social contract implies a new gender contract
between men, women and the government.
2 'The End Of The Welfare State' The Guardian 8.5.96 pi
3 Jowell.T (1996) 'Family Fortunes' The Guardian Tabloid 8.5.96 p 13
4
Jowell, Family Fortunes pi3
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At the end of March 1996 a debate in the pages of the British Journal ofSociology
spilled over into the pages of the national press:
'An unprecedented war of words has erupted among a group of feminist academics
about whether the majority of women prefer to stay at home and look after children
rather than go to work.'5
The coverage arose from an article entitled 'Five Feminist Myths About Women's
Employment' published in the British Journal ofSociology by Dr. Catherine Hakim, a
senior research fellow at the London School of Economics. The article challenges what
Hakim sees as a long standing feminist assumption that given a gender level playing field
most women would opt to work.6 Her research suggests that an acceptance of differentiated
sex roles underlies fundamental differences between the work orientations, labour market
behaviour and life goals of men and women. The research is based on an analysis of part-
time work which she says is used to justify feminist discourses about rising female
employment as the prime indicator of social and economic change. From a sociological
perspective she argues that women who work part-time mainly do so by choice and that they
should be grouped with housewives rather than wage workers because:
'...the research evidence shows that part time work does not change a woman's
primary self-identity as a housewife, does not change her bargaining power and
weight in decision-making, and does not change her role in the household.'7
In reaction to her article the journal published a rebuttal and critique of her research signed
by eleven eminent academics working in the area of gender and employment. Hakim
claimed that this response was exemplary of the powerful but largely unrepresentative group
of women who speak about the sexual division of labour. They were a group of highly
educated, highly motivated career women with dominant speaking positions who made up a
'vociferous minority that gets its voice heard' but could not be held as representative of
majority views amongst women.8 The debate that followed in the journal and letters pages of
the national press illustrated the contentious nature of the often highly personal and emotive
issues involved. It also highlighted the way that certain myths, caricatures and orthodoxies
are riven into a diverse feminist discourse about employment and mothering.9 In one
response to Hakim's research the reasons why 'women chose to learn to prefer mothering'
5 'Feminists Fall Out Over Chores' The Guardian 29.3.96 p3
6 Hakim.C (1995) 'Five Feminist Myths AboutWomen's Employment' p429-455 British Journal of
Sociology 46(3)
7 Hakim.C (1996)'The Sexual Division of Labour and Women's Heterogeneity' pl78-188 British
Journal ofSociology 47 (1) pl78
8
Hakim, The Sexual Division ofLabour and Women's Heterogeneity p 178
9 The publication of a book by Maureen Freely What About Us? An Open Letter To The Mothers That
Feminism Forgot (London: Bloomesbury 1995) produced similar exchanges in relation to the status of
'mothering' in feminism.
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was raised, in another 'the freedom of domesticity' and the fear of speaking these desires
'lest we be seen as traitors to the feminist cause.' 10 The exchanges raised a stumbling block
to agreement as to what 'women really want'. They also posed questions about the issue of
representation in a feminist politics that has to take account of such heterogeneous accounts
of women's experiences.
I have started with these two discursive moments from spheres of everyday media
culture in order to highlight two interests that structure this chapter. The first is a substantive
interest in the way the discourse of 'underclass' is constructed through debates around
parenting, gender roles, welfare and employment change. The second is an interest in the
networks, politics and modes of 'needs/interests' representation that are produced by
particular feminists in everyday media spheres of commentary with regard to the former
issues. Part of this interest is to show how particular aspects of historical and complex
feminist debates are projected by the media into the wider public and political domain. By
making connections between these two interests I will show how the complexities,
contradictions and allegiances of various debates produce contemporary 'underclass'
discourse and feminist discourse in relation to each other through a configuration of classed
and gendered speaking positions. The contemporary configuration of both 'underclass' and
'feminist' discourse so unsettle traditional alignments of Right/Left, feminist/patriarchal,
that only the closest specification of these terms is useful to an analysis of either. It is a
highly class and gender specified analysis that I propose.
The terrain of debates around welfare, employment, and parenting is well traversed
by feminists, in many ways it has been the very ground of feminist politics. In the
contemporary discourse of 'underclass' which is so much constituted by those issues,
prominent feminist commentators are vocally shaping ideas and policy trajectories. Because
traditional issues of feminism are heavily embroiled in this sphere, the current period of
change in the way welfare, parenting and employment are being conceptualised and
practiced, is also a period of change for feminist politics. Questions about what various
groups of women 'need' and whose interpretations of those needs are authoritative are
central to feminist politics and have a particular relevance to the representational politics of
'underclass' discourse. This chapter is therefore partly motivated by an interest in the nature
and adequacy of contemporary feminist discourse as it relates to the politics of 'underclass'
where feminists are not outsiders looking in, or part of self-contained networks, but are an
influentially networked part of the discourse itself. To explore the relation I have
10
Breugel.I (1996) 'Whose Myths Are They Anyway? : A Comment' p 175-177 British Journal of
Sociology 47(1) p 175; 'A Woman's Right To Choose' Letter in The Guardian 2.4.96 p 14
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interviewed six female commentators who are prominent in different fields, occupying
positions of relative power within academia, the media, politics and social policy. Their
feminism can in no way be considered as part of a univocal bloc: they are united only by the
shared terms and networks of the discourse in which they speak and move. Their
publications, appearances and activities converge around particular issues in what is a fast
moving, shifting terrain. There are, however, points of settlement and continuous strands of
debate which mean that they tend to coalesce at important moments of discursive
development. I will briefly outline two areas of debate and policy development that are key
points of coalescence for feminist discourse on 'underclass'. Both points represent attempts
to forward a political language and ways of thinking about contemporary social problems
associated with 'underclass' via analyses that have issues of gender and community as their
focus. They have been developed by academic, political and cultural commentators on the
political Left, although their ideas also range more widely across the political spectrum. In
broad terms both have the aim of promoting the development of communities that have
notions of gender equality and the social good at their core. They are expressed in political
ideas about the need to 'restructure masculinity' and in a 'politics of attachment'.
The Politics of Restructuring Masculinity
The first point of convergence for feminist discourse on 'underclass' is on the
subject of 'families, children and crime'. Discussion of how the contemporary state of each
is both product and cause of community collapse, was the subject of a conference organised
in November 1993 by the Institute of Public Policy Research (IPPR) and The Independent
on Sunday newspaper. This event brought together key figures from political, academic,
think-tank and media fields commentating on social fabric/social values debates when the
idea of an underclass was an emergent theme of British politics." Their papers became the
basis of the IPPR's publication Families, Children and Crime as part of the Institute's Social
Policy programme.12 The book was evidently following in the footsteps of an earlier IPPR
publication The Family Way written by three prominent, politically involved feminists:
Anna Coote, Harriet Harman and Patricia Hewitt.13 That book sought to develop a number
of 'family policy' proposals by examining and developing the way the political Left have
traditionally regarded the family.14 The project was an attempt to reclaim 'the family' from
11
Amongst these figures were David Utting, Anna Coote, Beatrix Campbell, Tony Blair, Angela
Philips, David Willets, and Tony Jefferson.
12 Coote.A (1994) Families, Children and Crime London: IPPR
13
Coote.A, Harman.H, Hewitt.P (1990) The Family Way: A New Approach To Policy Making Social
Policy Paper No. 1, London: IPPR
14 The concept of 'family policy' is variably understood. Generally it is held to refer to a range of
perspectives and policy approaches that intentionally impact on the family through a field of policy
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the Conservative party as the 'party of the family', a claim on which its appeal to women
voters had often been pitched. The book claimed to represent a modern view of what female
and male roles within the family looked like and how they should be politically supported:
'...women and men should be free to combine parenthood and paid employment...
enabling women to do paid work on equal terms with men is more in tune with the
new demands of the labour market.'15
The delineation of a new role for 'men' would be central to this change to ease the labour
market shift to a service-oriented economy which required married women workers:
'Left and Right have different views on men's role in the family: where the Right
stress financial responsibility, authority and discipline, the Left places emphasis on
sharing, parental responsibility, caring for children.'
In the presentation of their policy suggestions, the goal of gender equality within the
family and a buoyant economy would seem to accommodate both particular feminist and
labour market demands. Their argument for legislated family support is an argument for
families as 'central to the interests of society as a whole.'16 Moreover, without such support,
families, communities and societies would be subject to the sort of degeneracy that was the
concern of debates about contemporary 'social values' and the 'social fabric'. This was the
starting point of the IPPR conference in 1993 on 'Families, Children and Crime': the
criminal behaviours of working class groups of young men from unsupported and
fragmented families and communities were a particular kind of manifestation of
contemporary social degeneracy. With its background position on the family, employment
and gender roles outlined in The Family Way, the IPPR addressed itself to issues of family,
crime and community and so became part of the discourse of 'underclass'. Marking a clear
departure from traditional explanations for rising crime on both Left and Right
(unemployment and poverty; moral degeneracy and dysfunctional families) the conference
made its opening theme the gender of crime. Masculinity would be the starting point of an
analysis hitherto characterised by '...a remarkable silence about an incontrovertible fact:
crime is overwhelmingly a male pursuit.'17
Whilst recognising that this was not a new fact or understanding ('delinquent
subcultures' have been analysed in terms of adjustment problems of the male role) the
argument is put that masculinity is a missing dimension of contemporary debates on the
links between parenting, crime and community which tend to focus instead on the role of
mothers, especially single mothers:
practice. A discussion of the complexity of the concept is given in Fox Harding. L (1995) The Quest
For 'Family Policy', Chapter 6, Family, State and Social Policy London: Macmillan
15
Coote, Harman, Hewitt, The Family Way p4
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Coote, Harman, Hewitt, The Family Way p38
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'Instead of demonising and punishing single mothers they might do well to focus on
the fathers.'18
The starting point of this gender analysis is a view of the social and economic landscape
wrought by industrial change which has displaced 'men' from traditional roles and
expectations:
'While women have added the role of wage earner to their traditional role of
homemaker and carer, men have so far simply lost their traditional breadwinning
role.'19
The suggestion is that the loss of traditional male rites of passage through work into
adulthood means that young men are divided from the young women of their communities
who 'can claim adult status by becoming mothers'; who 'have to grow up fast in a way they
would not if they spent their time thieving, joy riding or selling drugs'; and who in not
marrying the fathers of their children are 'making a realistic assessment of the available
options. The boys who get them pregnant may appear to them to have very little else to
offer.'20 In seeking other ways of growing up, these boys who are bound by peer security are
said to practice traditional male virtues of toughness and bravery through crime, emulating
the role models provided by a machoistic popular culture and their own fathers:
'Many will regard their unemployed fathers (if they see them at all) as impotent
failures. Not a few will observe their fathers using violence to defend their fragile
authority at home.'21
This gender analysis seeks to relocate the problem of familial adjustment to social change
from mothers and daughters to fathers and sons, as a problem of gender role adjustment for
previously socially dominant masculinities. Across media and political fields the idea that
the contemporary period of 'underclass' is also a period of gender shift is a main point of
agreement:
'If our current 'family values' controversy could be reduced to one problem then it
would be: men. We do have a men problem. We have juvenile delinquents... we
have large numbers of unmarriageable males, whose economic status has been
removed by industrial change, who father and move on, and according to the
statistics, have quite likely got criminal records by their early thirties.'22
The Dahrendorf Commission on Wealth Creation and Social Cohesion (the Liberal
Democrat version of Labour's Social Justice Commission) whose committee members
included Labour MP Frank Field, Will Hutton and David Marquand, adds to this consensus
18
Coote, Families, Children and Crime p4
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on the gender implications of the end of traditional 'male' full-time employment, in terms of
family cohesion, gender identity and crime:
'More must be done to bring young men into work before they become
unemployable with consequent implications for crime.'
'It looks as if women are more fully employable than men, and it almost looks like
men will have to adopt women's lifestyles. Otherwise they will, with their more
rigid notions of a job career, be unemployed for very long periods.'23
Male unemployment is thus figured in terms of the loss of traditional manufacturing and
heavy industry jobs, and the analysis of 'men's future work styles' is based on forecasts that
job opportunities will be increasingly created as part-time low skilled jobs in the service
sector. Agreement on this 'male' employment issue ('fathers', 'sons' and 'men' are referred
to generically) creates analytic overlaps between differently motivated politics. The
convergence is shown in discussions of inadequate 'fathering', illustrated here in The
Sunday Times newspaper with reference to a speech by Peter Lilley, then Secretary of State
for Social Security:
'
[Peter Lilley] blamed the poor employment prospects of many young men for the
growing number of babies being bom outside marriage... Mr. Lilley is right to see
fathers as part of the problem... Encouraging active fatherhood is one good way of
reintegrating young men into a society which is widely seen to be disintegrating and
forming a new underclass... Looking after children should be seen as an acceptable
alternative to employment in a world in which jobs for women are easier to find
than jobs for unskilled young men.'24
The suggestion that unemployed men could assume the role traditionally performed
by women as the main carer in the family is one that has strong currency in the feminist
orientated publications of the IPPR which address changes in family structure and labour
market restructuring. It adheres to their central goal of encouraging men and women to be
both breadwinners and carers. In these accounts 'fathers' and 'mothers' are not specified in
terms of their class: the goal of promoting social change in which 'workers' and 'carers' are
not gender differentiated seems to suggest a simultaneous cutting across class differences in
those roles. This construction highlights some difficult issues about how we think about the
intersections of class and gender, the alliances and fractures within that dynamic and the
policy implications of pursuing particular feminist analyses. For the sort of socialist and
feminist analysis that I am proposing, these 'difficulties' need to be considered as some of
the most important aspects of 'underclass' discourse. It is the nature of these difficulties that
23
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I have sought to bring out in my interviews with prominent female commentators in this
field.
The Politics of Attachment
The second point of convergence for feminist discourse on 'underclass' is more
recent and less developed than the first but is nevertheless an important discursive
development, marked by the publication of a book called The Politics OfAttachment:
Towards A Secure Society.25 As with Families, Children and Crime it arose out of a
conference of the same name held at the Tavistock Clinic, London in March 1995. In the
book's preface, Patricia Hewitt identifies a task for the post-Thatcher Left to add to and
develop a political language that has the interests of 'social capital' and communities as at
least an equal concern to economic capital and the market. It situates this project within an
exploratory search for the 'Big Idea' on the political Left whose process has created a
convergence of questions about 'the qualities that define good societies and good
relationships within and between them.'26
In the discourses around 'community, belonging, stakeholding, exchange, gifting,
trust', it recognises a foundling coalescence of ideas that 'draw in the political and
psychological together' in which the goal of security is fundamental. It makes the argument
for extrapolating into the social and political realm some of the understandings developed in
the 'attachment theory' of psychologist John Bowlby 50 years ago and now widely accepted
amongst child mental health workers (although remaining deeply contentious amongst some
feminists). Its basic premise is that the formative nurturant bonding between infants and a
small, stable group of carers, is the central precondition for both future personal and wider
social well being. The implications of developing a politics from that understanding are
addressed to the fields of parenting, community and employment policy. In this respect it is
claimed that such a politics is pertinent to contemporary issues of 'deindustrialisation and
the destmction of occupational communities' which are the terrain of 'underclass'
discourse.27 The loss of personal and social security as a central human need is seen as the
underlying problem of extensive social malaise as manifested in anti-social behaviours and
psychological problems of depression and alienation in different parts of society. These
problems are conceptualised in terms of people turning against themselves and others under
conditions which do not support either individual adjustment to social and economic change
or make supportive provisions for the 'more subtle ways in which the individual and society
25 Kraemer.S and Roberts.J (1996) The Politics OfAttachment: Towards A Secure Society London:
Free Association Books
26 Kraemer and Roberts, Politics ofAttachment p3
27 Kraemer and Roberts, Politics ofAttachment p214
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are inextricably bound up with one another' (such as micro-sociological parent-child
relations).28 The recuperation of conditions that would allow personal and social well being
to flourish is seen to lie in communities and networks as generators of social bonding and a
personal sense of worth.
The book's argument for the desirability of 'community' is made with caveats. It
makes clear its intention to distinguish itself from the brand of 'Communitarianism'
introduced into contemporary political discourse through the work of Amitai Etzioni, an
American sociologist popularised by the support of the Demos think-tank. The sense of his
argument has been taken up politically as a discourse of 'rights and responsibilities' as a
29
new social contract between the individual and society for Tony Blair's 'New Britain'.
Rather than a rhetorical nicety, a pre-given collectivity or a means to coercively define terms
and conditions of social inclusion, 'community' is seen in 'the politics of attachment' as a
construct which is created through 'symbolic attachments' and substantive policies.30 It has
material preconditions which need resource commitments and legislative frameworks. The
two areas which are identified as fundamental to the sort of security enhancing relationships
on which good communities are based are employment and the care of children. A 'politics
of attachment' therefore poses questions about relations between different genders, classes
and generations, and about support for relations that lie outside of the market in the realm of
'social capital'. It is part of a political language whose ideas are deployed in different ways
by the commentators I spoke to, and it is a constituent strand of 'underclass' discourse.
The ideas which have come to formulate a 'politics of attachment' and relatedly, a
'politics of restructuring masculinity' in the contemporary period, are the substantive
concern of my interviews with Beatrix Campbell, Ros Coward, Ruth Lister, Ann Spackman,
Ceridwen Roberts and Ruth Lilley - all of whom commentate on those subjects. They are
each concerned to introduce different elements of personal, psychological, generational,
class and gender specified analyses to contemporary debates which link issues of poor
parenting, community breakdown, welfare change and labour market change. I chose these
women as prominent spokeswomen in fields of journalism, lobbying/campaign work, and
social policy commentary as fields which are all centrally involved in producing knowledges
pertaining to 'underclass'. All these women assumed status in the media during the time that
I was gauging the nature and direction of the dominant discourse. Their coincidence, in
debate around particular issues suggested that I could pair them according to three themes:
the nature of 'underclass' masculinities (Campbell and Coward); the state of contemporary
28 Kraemer and Roberts, Politics ofAttachment p2
29 Etzioni.A (1995) The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the Communitarian Agenda
London: Fontana; Blair, New Britain
30 Kraemer and Roberts, The Politics OfAttachment p224
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parenting/families (Roberts and Lilley); and the relations between single mothers , the
labour market and child care (Lister and Spackman). These pairings would allow the
relations between their ideas to be examined as relations which constitute some of the major
areas of consensus, contradiction and conflict within 'underclass' discourse. Far from being
mutually exclusive these themes are absolutely related; I therefore try to avoid too discrete
a separation between them. Any overlap is intended to show how particular ideas are
elaborated, extended, and changed through cultural commentary, rather than being merely
repetitive. Each of the women were broadly asked the same questions, in conversations
which were conducted more as discussions than as interviews.31 For this reason, at particular
points in their presentation on the page, my own comments and questions are included with
those of the women. This was intended to avoid the idea of presenting these women only as
authoritative sources of knowledge. Their ideas and perspectives are presented as
knowledges which need to be fully engaged with, related to others and contested, not just
'received'. Indeed the personal and situated nature of their knowledge production was one of
the main areas that I wanted to explore in relation to their spaces of representation. My own
position in this process was to be clear about where I agreed and disagreed with them, and at
particular points to express some of my feelings of personal connection to the discourse. My
aim in what follows, is to create a sense of a feminist discourse that is multiply constituted
by a network of different speaking positions which at times connect in such a way that ideas
in combination have productive effects. The precise nature of these connections cannot be
definitively ascertained, the workings of discourse cannot be so easily determined. By its
nature it is fluid, amorphous, protean. Nevertheless, it is only by attempting to trace such
connections, by exploring the significance of particular figures, languages, comments, and
texts in relation to others, and by specifying the nature of categories and motivations that are
otherwise taken for granted, that 'effects' can be suggested at all. It is such a close reading
of the feminist discourse of 'underclass' that follows.
31 The questions broadly addressed the following areas: the ways in which their work could be seen as
connected to their personal backgrounds, perspectives and politics; the kinds of representation they
believed themselves to be practising; the networks in which they worked; the implications of their
work for social policy; their estimations of contemporary social policy discourses that relate to
'underclass'.
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Feminist Discourse on 'Underclass' I: 'Underclass' Masculinities
Beatrix Campbell and Ros Coward on: 'Underclass' Masculinities and Socialist
Feminisms
In April 1996 there was an altercation in the pages of The Guardian newspaper
between two prominent feminist commentators, Beatrix Campbell and Ros Coward.32 It was
about the status of contemporary fatherhood and its relation to feminist debates on
'masculinity': subjects that both commentators had been writing around for many years.33 In
the contemporary period this debate has turned on a so-called 'crisis of masculinity' as the
role of 'men' is thrown awry by the effects of employment change, divorce legislation and
feminism as a cultural force. The article by Ros Coward identifies a particular feminist
commentary on these changes in which the role of 'men' is cast as redundant. She names
feminist figures who via their public positions as feminist writers and spokeswomen have
been able to forward ideas about the 'redundancy of fathers': Yvonne Roberts, Beatrix
Campbell, Sue Slipman, Suzanne Moore. She claims that these women have been
defensively reacting to Conservative party pronouncements on single mothers by Peter
Lilley, John Redwood, John Bowis; the emergence of a UK Men's Movement whose
publication 'Maleview' campaigns for father's 'family rights'; and academic
scaremongering about 'Sibling Society' and 'Fatherless Families' which together have
dominated a political discourse of single mother vilification.34 Coward's contention is that
particular feminists have become 'bogged down' in their response to these developments,
caught between a defence of feminism as having positively contributed to the liberation of
families from patriarchal norms whilst also saying that because it is mainly men who leave
women with children they are to blame for single motherhood. She identifies this as a
contradictory area of feminist discourse rooted in a particular feminist disinclination to talk
about the positive role of actual fathers who have evolved new roles, yet continue to be
portrayed as patriarchs, abusers, redundant or absent. She believes this negative discourse
about fathers has left a gap which has been filled by 'pro-family' right-wing misogynists.
32 Coward.R (1996) 'Make The Father Figure' The Guardian 12.4.96 p 17; Campbell.B (1996) 'Good
Riddance To The Patriarch' The Guardian 15.4.96 pi 1
33 Coward.R (1992) Our Treacherous Hearts: Why Women Let Men Get Their Way London: Faber
and Faber; (1984) Female Desire London: Paladin; (1983) Patriarchal Precedents: Sexuality and
Social Relations London: Routledge and Kegan Paul; Campbell.B (1988) Unofficial Secrets: Child
Sex Abuse - The Cleveland Case London: Virago; (1984) Wigan Pier Revisited: Poverty and Politics
in the Eighties London: Virago; Campbell.B and Coote.A (1987) Sweet Freedom: The Struggle For
Women's Liberation Oxford: Basil Blackwell
34 Dennis.N and Erdos.G (1993) Families Without Fatherhood London: IEA; Bly.R (1996) Sibling
Society London: Penguin
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Coward locates the problem in a yet more fundamental one related to a feminist rejection of
gender essentialism. In relation to the family this is shown in a preference to talk about
'parents' rather than 'mothers' and 'fathers' in order to detach family roles from their
gender. It is Coward's intention to raise gender differences in parenting as positive attributes
and not to see 'masculine' fathers as a problem per se. She also wants to raise class
differences between fathers and families as something that particular elements of a feminist
discourse on families find difficult to assimilate to their gender focus on patriarchy and
inadequate father roles. Coward's extended analysis of the construction of 'underclass'
masculinities as 'whipping boys' critiques Beatrix Campbell's book Goliath for its
presentation of 'lawless masculinities' on British council estates as somehow definitive of
poor masculinities in the contemporary period. Here she discerns overlaps with Charles
Murray's uncivilised 'underclass' males.35
Campbell's rejoinder to Coward's Guardian article on contemporary fatherhood
expresses an important dimension of difference between their positions on 'fathering' and
'underclass' masculinities, and between their feminisms. It is Campbell's assertion that
amongst the poor and the prosperous, masculinity comes before co-operation with women.
This has meant that 'fathers-as-breadwinners' are historically positioned in terms of
domination:
'...as the outcome of a bitter struggle by men to purge women from the labour
market and the public domain, and to keep them in a confined space.'36
According to Campbell the historical prevalence of separate public and private gendered
spheres has not passed (women still do more than three-quarters of the domestic work and
child care) but is currently subject to revolutionary change:
'Fathers and masculinities have emerged as new political problems in the nineties
both because of global restructuring and because feminism put them under scmtiny.
We are all participating in a new historic settlement between genders and
generations.'37
A particular kind of 'redundancy' for men is the product of this settlement in traditional
working class communities, one that is made visible by the figure of the single mother:
'To reveal the redundancy of the fathers is the crime of the mothers.'38
Campbell conveys the essence of this change in terms of the labour market participation of
women and the 'choice' of single motherhood:
'The breadwinner is an endangered species because all workers are breadwinners
now. And men are challenged by the discovery that many women would often prefer
35 Coward.R (1994) 'Whipping Boys' The Guardian Weekend 3.9.94 p32-35; Campbell.B (1993)
Goliath London: Metheun
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to parent their children alone and in poverty rather than put up with men who bring
them more pain than pleasure.'39
Although keen to disclaim celebration of these changes, her note is one of progression from
masculinity as an homogeneously sealed domination, which in Goliath has its domain in
poor communities:
'My book Goliath did not celebrate men's redundancy, it reported that in pauperised
places where men have no escape from the space they share with women and
children (the home and the neighbourhood) masculinity is still defended as
difference and domination. This is the legacy that mainstream masculinity has given
to men.'40
In a rhetorical question: 'Who is Ros Coward feeling for? For men? Or for her man?'
Campbell makes explicit the link between the feminist understanding that the personal is
political by suggesting that Coward's argument is specifically rooted in her own subjective
experience. More pointedly the accusation is of right-wing propinquity:
'Mothering is about care. But fathering by Coward's account is the bequest of
masculinity. And here, whether she likes it or not, she finds herself with the
misogynist right.'41
Coward clearly has ideas about the existence of particular feminist orthodoxies
which it is not possible to speak against without incurring angry reactions from particular
feminist quarters whereas Campbell will not admit this view of feminism as representative:
'Her bizarre spectre of a feminist fatwa... doesn't describe the feminisms I know...
feminism is only a conversation, an idea, an argument.'42
This exchange raises two main issues. The first is about the implications of socio¬
economic shifts in the labour market for gender roles in homes, neighbourhoods and
workplaces, particularly those of young men and fathers; the second is about the part of
feminism in articulating and shaping these changes. The position of particular working class
men and the sorts of masculinity associated with them, is a central element of a number of
Centre-Left discourses about gender and employment change.43 These men are identified as
the obstacle to particular visions of change on a number of fronts; they don't fit and are in
need of reconstitution. In Campbell's view some of them embody 'lawless masculinities', in
Coward's they are 'whipping boys'. It is a debate in which the stakes are high for a
39
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discourse that has outcomes for policy, and for configurations of contemporary feminisms.
Both Goliath and Whipping Boys are political representations which are part of the
discourse of 'underclass'. My interviews with Beatrix Campbell and Ros Coward set out to
elicit a self-reflexivity in relation to the ideas, networks and policy trajectories generated
through the discourse of 'underclass' of which they are part. In particular this was intended
to show the ways in which the construction of the spaces and identities of 'underclass'
masculinities is a personal and political production, a representational space.
Personalising Opinions
The ideas that Ros Coward and Beatrix Campbell have about working class
masculinities are partly related to their own backgrounds, which in some respects are very
similar. Both were brought up on new, 'respectable' council estates in the post war period,
their fathers were both teachers and their parents wanted them to do well:
'My father was a teacher so we weren't underclass by any stretch of the imagination
and very aspirant... a family for whom cultural capital was enormously important
and our education was absolutely paramount... we all did very well academically.'
(Coward)44
'They'd do anything to make sure we got what we wanted through the promise of
education but never had contempt for people who'd be regarded as rough - the
people down the street.' (Campbell)
Both identify themselves as having lived in proximity to poor people and although the sort
of poverty associated with 'underclass' (then the 'non-respectable' poor) was not part of
their own experience, they were part of communities in which those distinctions were not
made in terms of absolute difference or through judgements of worth. That is something that
they feel sets them apart from other commentators on 'underclass':
'The school I was at was a new school built on a new estate, high rise... like all the
new estates being built in the '50s and '60s, and my friends lived in the tower
blocks. And all the sorts of debates that are around now, well they were there. I
think that did leave a mark in the sense that unlike some of the commentators, well
you imagine that Tony Blair has never had the sorts of experiences - he's been to a
privileged school, he's been to a private school in Edinburgh, he's been through
Cambridge...' (Coward)
'If you look at the protagonists in the debate that touch on or promote the idea of the
underclass, their personal circumstances are often very revealing... Andrew Neil (as
Editor of The Sunday Times) was an assiduous promoter of Charles Murray and the
idea of the underclass. And here you've got the respectable former working class
boy, goes to grammar school, Oxford or Cambridge, and has a kind of meritocratic
smothering contempt for those other parts of his own class which was part of a kind
of ideological environment in which that class emerged - Thatcherism. So I think his
44 All quotes which follow without footnote are taken from my interviews, with the name of the
'interviewee' following in brackets
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animus against people who are poor obviously partly is to do with his '80s... '90s
New Right politics but partly sustained by his own visceral feelings about the
people at the bottom of the street and a rage that he should be thought to be anything
like them.' (Campbell)
In terms of their own commentaries the significance of their backgrounds and their
present experiences, is seen in terms of a situatedness that is 'anti-othering', connected to
'underclass' both in terms of experience and empathy:
'You sometimes think that people actually don't know as people the people they're
talking about... I can only say that for me some of the kind of people designated as a
problem exist as real people... I can see them as real people so its not been a
problem to separate off from myself... my kids go to a local school in Lambeth and
there's a close contact with a lot of people who actually embody some of the things
that everyone's worrying about so yes I think my personal experience - it's become
something that I feel is important - you know you don't seal yourself off and
commentate from Mount Olympus.' (Coward)
'I'm a working class person, who like Andrew Neil, my niche in the working class
was respectable, upward striving... The culture of my strata of the working class was
very much about active citizenship, in work, and a certain empathy with people
whose respectability was always a bit lacking but who were kind of doing their best,
but who'd be regarded as maybe a bit disgraceful... If you come from the working
class - which after all is the majority class today - you wouldn't think it, you'd think
it was a kind of exiled group of people but it still is the majority experience - part of
that will be about a sort of empathic just bustling along with all the people who
increasingly in the '80s and '90s (which wouldn't be true in my childhood) with
people who are on either side of the law. You can't live in a community say like the
one I'm living in now which is an average, without half of your neighbours are
criminal, the other half struggling respectability.' (Campbell)
From these apparently similar starting points Beatrix Campbell and Ros Coward
have developed a number of very different positions in relation to a range of practical and
intellectual activities and interests. For Campbell these are the interests of investigative
journalism and political activism, primarily focused on working class community politics in
the North of England. Her book Wigan Pier Revisited is in many respects the forerunner of
Goliath. It is a journalistic piece of 'travel writing' through the unemployed communities of
Britain in the 1980s. It is also a self-reflexive exploration of socialism and feminism as she
encounters working class people in places of industrial decline. It reads as a treatise of
values, a record of why she believes the things she does in relation to what she finds. She
starts by saying that she's the sort of feminist who believed 'it's not men, it's the system'
but who came to realise through her journeying that mainstream working class politics were
'stewed in sexual prejudice and privilege' and that both 'individual men and the political
movements men have made within the working class are culpable'.45 Goliath is a similar
political exploration of 'what Britain had become' in the 1990s this time via council estate
4:1
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riots that occurred in disparate parts of the country. It reiterates many of the gender political
understandings found in Wigan Pier Revisited. Campbell identifies her gender politics as
part of a currently diffuse feminist discourse:
'Feminism has so infused the language we all speak, the consciousness of the times,
even though it's a very contested movement, it's a constant reference point... it
seems to me that you're either having an argument that comes from feminism or
you're having an argument with feminism or against feminism.' (Campbell)
Within this diversity she identifies Ros Coward as an 'anti-feminist feminist' as part of a
contingency that expresses itself as a commitment to equal opportunities, and a feminism
that has a problem with extending its gaze to masculinity:
'Ros Coward is not alone, Melanie Philips is another one, Ros Miles is one - she
wrote a terrible book - 'The Children We Deserve', so there's a whole bunch.'
(Campbell)
An 'anti-feminist feminist' means that Coward's feminist position quarrels within feminism,
and it problematises women as much as men, and feminism as much as patriarchy: 'that kind
of feminism is very often furious with other feminists' (Campbell). Coward's starting point
is not 'what's wrong with men or masculinity', but what are the problems of men and
masculinities in relation to the problems of women and femininities. Her standpoint is not
'on the side of women' but on the side of equality.
Campbell differentiates her own political position as socialist feminist but is keen to
separate its constituent parts:
'There are socialist feminisms and socialist feminisms and I don't feel my position
is particularly resolved or any of them are because the thing we're about is so
unresolved. And the attempt to marry socialism and feminism was always a very
unhappy one precisely because socialism had become a politics that was imbued
with a sexist set of priorities. I would never describe myself as a feminist-dash-
socialist or a marxist-dash-feminist but was interested in those two things and
they're not very comfortable with each other.' (Campbell)
The intellectual position and argument of her writings is that gender is inflected by class
rather than class inflected by gender, although she does state the need to see this
prioritisation in context rather than in abstract:
'The argument around what has priority is only an argument that makes any kind of
sense when it's an argument being had with the other.' (Campbell)
In the contemporary period she sees one particular argument as the most important in
relation to ideas of social and economic change associated with 'underclass'. It is that the
cultural shift in gender identities being brought about by the changing world of 'work' and
family relations has to be promoted and supported as a revolutionary opportunity for
changes in power relations between genders. This position is forwarded as the imperative of
our times, and an imperative that she perceives Coward to be detracting from:
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'The problem I have with that is that she is defending masculinity and men at the
very moment in history when the cultural and political history of masculinity is
being tried as never before, is under scrutiny as never before... What I am saying is
that she can't escape and none of us can escape what feels to me like the imperative
of our time - which is to say - 'is masculinity always and forever about difference
and difference as domination?' If it's not and we can imagine other modes of
masculinity and to my mind we have to - that's what the political project is - then
you have to begin to talk about what would it mean for men to be human beings as
against what it would mean for men to be only men.' (Campbell)
In many respects this is an argument to 'seize the day', to 'go with' contemporary changes in
the family and labour market that could lead to the reorganisation of personal and political
economies:
'Masculinity is under scrutiny in a way that in my lifetime is unprecedented.'
(Campbell)
Coward sees these changes from a different perspective, related to the interests that
she has developed through her academic work. She has been less concerned with the
differences between genders within particular community spaces, than with the inextricably
mutual relations between men and women, masculinities and femininities. This has taken
her work in the direction of exploring the psychological relations between masculinities and
femininities from infancy to childhood and adulthood.46 She believes that these mutually
produced elements of gender identity are central to, but usually diminished in the most vocal
of feminist analyses of contemporary gender relations:
'If you're going to look at masculinity you have to look at modes of femininity
around it because this is what's giving it its definition, and actually when men
define themselves aggressively as men you have to look at what it is they're pushing
out of themselves and onto the feminine and vice versa.' (Coward)
This belief has led her towards a critique of those feminist discourses that have mainly
focused on problematising men and the masculine, and of those contemporary political
discourses that have singled out particular sorts of male gender identities as undesirable. The
critique has in many ways affected her personally leading to a re-evaluation of the meanings
of her feminist position:
'I absolutely do not identify with the philosophy and views that I had when
feminism was at its most active and indeed I would be very critical of some of them.
Obviously I fundamentally am still involved in a project about establishing a more
egalitarian society, in which gender has to be one of the most important
considerations because gender is a potent divisive factor in this society around
which certain kinds of things are organised. But in terms of some of the kind of
feminism that was around, I would distance myself now quite a lot.' (Coward)
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Coward does not identify a particular constituency of feminists to whom she is opposed on
these grounds but a number of feminist ideas with which particular figures are more or less
associated:
'Of course feminism is so many different things and no one person is a walking
amalgam of all the kind of wrong thinking. But I'm very critical of the kind of
thinking that designates things as 'problems of masculinity', you know 'crime is a
male problem', 'women do not do this as much as men', 'women are victimised by
this and that.' (Coward)
Coward admits to difficulties in locating her critique in gender political terms for a number
of reasons: because of the diffuseness of feminist discourse; because it cannot usefully work
with categories of feminism (such as 'socialist feminist') whose meanings 'on the ground'
are so often different to those expressed by figures in public positions; and because
adherence to a particular feminist argument is no guarantee of wider political sensibilities as
was more often be the case in the 1970s. Indeed feminism's post-1970s maturation into
some mainstream quarters has made for some unlikely alliances that she finds problematic:
'In a funny sort of way the worst kind of feminism seems to be being upheld by
people who you wouldn't necessarily thought of as feminist - it crops up amongst
the Janet Daleys (a right-wing columnist for The Daily Telegraph)... you know that
middle class women are the salvation of our society. But I think it lurks around quite
a lot. I'm quite suspicious of some of the feminism around Harriet Harman, Patricia
Hewitt, that kind of discourse that's in the Labour Party now.' (Coward)
In particular Coward is critical of the feminist discourse that has developed around
particular working class masculinities, which she sees as uniting parts of Beatrix Campbell's
writing with those mainstream elements of the Labour Party associated with the IPPR and
certain commentaries on the political Right. This accusation was levelled in her article
Whipping Boys, to the ire of those particular feminists concerned:
'Well for example the IPPR, I think there was a very unthought out notion about
masculinity there that had come in from a particular kind of feminist version. And
they were the ones saying things like 'crime is a masculine problem, men are the
problem, we've got this problem with men and marginal men who because they
don't have a natural feel for the community are busting it up'. So that kind of view
was located in particular groups and those were the groups that let me know I'd
stepped out of line...
What I really think is that there's a bit of an embattled rather old fashioned
feminism which isn't actually terribly widespread but it happens to be in one or two
quite powerful positions. But I don't think it's tremendously representative of what
socialist feminists in the broader sense think. It feels it's got its line about male
power and it sticks to that line regardless of social change. And things have been
changing very rapidly over the past 10 years or so and it's not quite the same
situation. It is quite a difficult area to specify really... where that kind of feminism is
located, and I really do think it's quite a small but quite powerful group of people in
Left and Labourey kind of positions who've got a notion of 'we need to think about
gender and what we need to think about gender is that men have power.' (Coward)
The lineaments of this debate are difficult to trace. Issues of representation and
differences in perception loom large ensuring that there can be no definitive version of the
feminist power dynamics at work within this discourse. What is clear is that the different
priorities of Campbell's and Coward's feminist politics are productive of very different
gender analyses of the impoverished communities which are the subject of 'underclass'
discourse. Furthermore, feelings about what can and can't be said, and about what should
and should not be said, are instrumental in shaping the content of the discourse.
Feminist Representations
Within the discourse of 'underclass' Campbell and Coward represent two different
arguments about working class masculinities that are congruent with their particular feminist
and Left-wing politics. In this capacity both have a media presence: as journalists for
Centre-Left broadsheets, in popular/academic journals and through occasional television and
radio appearances. They are published authors whose books are key reference points in
feminist bibliographies, crossing academic and popular discourses of feminism. Both are
active spokeswomen on academic and political events/seminar circuits. They are able to use
their well-established names and distinctive viewpoints to respond to articles that relate to
each other's work through the channels of national journalism. As such they occupy
positions of discursive power that are able to launch issues into particular arenas of public
debate. In this way they are active in bringing elements of feminist theory and practice
together through the strategic possibilities of their speaking positions. The degree to which
they use their positions to bridge different media, political, academic and popular audiences
and seek to influence cultural political debates, reflects both personal ideas about their roles
and the power dynamics of some highly contested debates. These issues of representative
power are differently considered by Coward and Campbell:
'Through the journalism, well you don't want to be a megalomaniac but I think you
do have opportunities and I think I do that. As an example for the 20th anniversary
of the Equal Opportunities Commission, writing a critical piece about what they
were up to and where they were going, that has had the effect of me now being in
contact with the Commission and some of the people in there who are also thinking
a bit critically themselves, who can now come out and make alliances with people.'
(Coward)
'Effectivity' is generated by their networked position rather than being a conscious strategy.
Opportunities are in-built, connections ready-made, while the manner in which they are
practiced gives them shape and makes them exactly what they are:
'Through writing a regular column., you do start getting invited to these think
tankey things., so indirectly you do get the opportunity to influence... I'm not sure
that I do but you get the opportunity to! It's one of those things that creates its own
momentum, you become a spokesperson for something you just happened to have
brought up.' (Coward)
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Networks of allegiance or consensus with a feminist hue are often part of other connections
rather than being separately motivated. They are both work and friendship based, and extend
into a realm of loose political connections shaped by mutual practices and interests of which
feminism is one aspect:
'There'd be support networks, or little groups of people in roughly the same kind of
work who you find supportive and empathetic and whose politics you roughly agree
with. And then there'd be a sort of second tier with people with whom you're
broadly sympathetic for whom there's a kind of mutual trade-off - you know I ring
them for information and they ring me if they want something covered.' (Coward)
Coward regards the representative aspect of her position as a responsibility in which she
thinks about issues of reception and recognises a loose constituency. It has stopped her from
saying particular things that she otherwise would, but it has also been felt as an externally
mediated pressure:
'I sometimes feel conscious of that fact, or I have been made to feel conscious of the
fact that because I am a feminist I should not say this or that or the other, and to
some extent that has stopped me so maybe I do feel there's a kind of constituency
there and some kind of responsibility, because sometimes I do feel much more
critical than I allow myself to say... so I feel , well they've done all these other nice
things and these are good so I won't.' (Coward)
Coward does not conceive her position as either representative of particular issues or
particular people as if she were speaking for them. But she does see her actual arguments as
relatively marginalised within a broadly conceived feminist discourse, even though her
actual position is a privileged one. In this respect she believes her arguments are closer to
those of feminists and socialists 'on the ground' outside of arenas and positions of power.
In a similar but much more obvious way Beatrix Campbell positions herself as
someone whose views are grounded within the communities that she speaks about. She
assumes and draws credibility from more organic connections with 'real' communities. It is
a trademark of her journalistic style in which she constructs herself as an indigenous figure
moving among and between working class communities on bike and foot, talking to people
and finding out about things:
'These pieces of work are always pieces of exploration, I don't know where they're
going to get from when they start.' (Campbell)
Related to this self-styled honesty, Campbell says that her work is not intended to be policy
assimilable:
'Are there things I wouldn't say in order that something could be more successfully
assimilated by policy makers? No.' (Campbell)
Whereas Coward has stepped back from commenting on areas that could marginalise her or
be very divisive, Campbell positions herself as speaking the 'unspeakable' in the process of
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revealing the truth about situations as she finds them. It is not her fault if what she finds is
taken up by differently motivated concerns. So in relation to Goliath she asks:
'Does that lend itself to the enemy because what it's trying to explicate is what
produces villains and conflict within the community in terms of crime and things
like that?' (Campbell)
Her answer is that what is most interesting about the question is the motivation behind it:
'What becomes interesting is who it is who has a stake in saying that my argument
is crap or that it's the same as the Charles Murray argument and that it's bestialising
boys and blaming boys in a way that's unfair?' (Campbell)
She believes this question reveals the gender alliances of her critics of whom Ros Coward
is exemplary:
'For her that's intolerable, to name masculinity, to problematise masculinity for
certain sorts of feminists is intolerable.' (Campbell)
Campbell's own gender alliances are evident here in a way that suggests her self-
presentation as an investigative journalist not knowing what she will find, belies another
agenda. Her feminist politics has as its overriding concern, making connections about
gender interests between men and between women. It is the conditioning theme of both
Wigan Pier Revisited and Goliath in their exploration of working class communities:
'What it (Goliath) was trying to look at is what connects so called bad boys with so
called good boys. What are the culture's legitimate and illegitimate masculinities
that connect both of them... What I was trying to suggest was that if you could
forget the issue 'are they or are they not on the side of the law?' and 'are they or are
they not respectable?', but what these young men share with other kinds of
masculinity, that's what seemed to me to be very interesting.' (Campbell)
This gender determined position was clarified through my question:
I'm trying to think this through in relation to my own socialist feminism and I
find it very problematic. Are you saying that these 'Goliath' masculinities have
more in common with other - even middle class masculinities from different
cultures, than they do with the women in their own communities?
'Yes absolutely. Generally speaking one of the things they share is a determination
to assert difference as difference from the feminine. Now there's a new inflection to
that argument because in the '80s and '90s there's a concern with differentiating
respectable masculinities or fatherly masculinities or middle class masculinities
from those rough, horrible, macho masculinities and again I resist that argument. So
for instance the amount of housework that Tony Blair will ever have done won't be
that different from the man two doors up who's never put a meal on the table in
twenty-five years of marriage. Both of them are very much not like the women in
their communities, but both the women are much more like each other, so the
gendering is profound and determined.' (Campbell)
Campbell's presentation of events which took place on a number of council estates at the
start of the 1990s, and her analysis of the working class masculinities associated with such
disorders (joyriding, burglary, street riot) are often quoted as authoritative accounts and
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connect with some dominant representations of 'underclass' criminality. So for example the
Channel Four documentary series 'Battered Britain' about the 'violent state of British
society' that was broadcast through the summer of 1995 had an accompanying booklet
designed for viewers in which Goliath is described as 'the authoritative account of the
rioting in Summer 1991 on the Meadow Well estate on Tyneside'.47 It goes on to quote a
later piece written by Campbell about Newcastle's Benwell district's 'neighbourhood from
hell',48 invoking the mythologised language of vigilantes, criminal hierarchies, 'the Lads'
and 'the Grass', echoing ongoing tabloid representations of council estate 'neighbours from
hell'. Campbell's analysis of the 'political emptiness' of the riots as 'riots that no-one
wanted to claim or own, that no-one could be proud of, that could not explain themselves',49
has currency with particular representations of the internal degeneracy of council estates. An
article in The Times newspaper which quotes Campbell as its reference, illustrates the use of
that idea:
'They were not kicking at Big Brother but at their own brothers and sisters. Their
violence expressed, not political rage but moral and spiritual bankruptcy, their final
disconnection from civilised values. Unlike the outbursts of the 1980s, their protest
was aimed at nothing and everything, drained of all meaning. They could barely be
bothered.'50
The idea of working class young men losing their civility and identity on losing their
work, and indulging a mindless, meaningless disorder that brings about the destruction of
their own neighbourhood spaces, has been a constant theme of the Conservative leaning
press in recent years:
'This self-loathing, self-destructive tranche of the population [is] far less assimilable
into morally constructive social life than any immigrant group...[whose progress is
barred by] ...the mindless hatred of the indigenous working classes, who loathe them
precisely for their cultural integrity. Long after Britain has become a successful
multi-racial society, it will be plagued by this diminishing (but increasingly
alienated) detritus of the Industrial Revolution.'51
The 'estate' is the domain of these working class lads, in Campbell's account as an
appropriated space that they will not share co-operatively with women once they are
confined there through unemployment and which like the home is not felt to be a naturally
constitutive part of their identities:
'Men's relationship to estates tended to be like their relationship to home - not
exactly a place to live so much as a place to leave, to return, to come and go.'52
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In journalistic accounts the estate 'is a microcosm of everything that can go wrong with a
community.53 The Meadow Well estate on North Tyneside, one of the council estates of
Goliath's riotous record, is held as the exemplar of this condition:
'...a magnet for social scientists trying to discover what's gone wrong with Britain's
Welfare State... a classic sink estate of impoverished women, deprived children,
loutish adolescents and a prevailing nihilism underwritten by the State.'54
Within such estates the 'missing' or 'present but inadequate' father is characteristic of the
'underclass' father as bad role model:
'A man who steals, lies and gets into fights is going to teach his son the same
tricks... there are women and children a plenty and scores of youths. But where have
all the fathers gone? Most of them seemed to have vanished: to the pubs, the betting
shop, prison or points unknown.'55
The 'missing father' is a theme that Campbell pursues in relation to both working
class and middle class men, the latter providing bad role models through the dominance and
exclusivity of their breadwinning roles. She believes that the absence of fathers (actually or
effectively) is rooted in a shared culture of masculinity, which is expressed differently by
working class and middle class men due to their different economic positions. Similarly,
male domination of social space is a feature of a malestream culture which is indulged in by
men of all classes according to their different means. Campbell's complaint is that this
understanding about male dominated spaces is rarely, if at all, extended to middle class men
in the discourse of 'underclass'. Thus Goliath focuses on car crime as the prized male-status
making activity of Meadow Well's criminal fraternities, with the police similarly expressing
their masculinity through high speed car chases of 'the lads'.
The fact that it is the working class young men who end up criminalised or killed in
the chase, may be less about the differential expressions of masculinity than a 'difference'
that is lived as a class inequality. However Campbell suggests that even that class
'difference' bestows masculinist advantages upon these working class lads: 'Doing time in
jail confirms their virility.'56 This idea has been recycled as a thinly veiled contempt for the
perverse morality of male relations within working class families of which Meadow Well
estate fathers are exemplary. The following quote describes a father's defence of his son, at
a press conference in which he denounces the media for describing his son as a joyrider after
being killed in a police car chase:
'The lad was not a joyrider, the father insisted, he was a professional car thief. So is
honour satisfied at Meadow Well. What is unusual about this story is that the boy
had a father at all.'57
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Campbell does not see the production of these ideas around crime, class and gender
in which she is actively involved as part of a strategic feminist project. Indeed she does not
think that such a project exists:
'There is not a thing called feminism there to 'do' anything, it barely exists as a
movement. Part of it, one shard or two shards of its existence take that movement
forward. And in that sense it is a new kind of politics because it has a kind of
mobilising moment and it has a feeling for that.' (Campbell)
In the contemporary period of employment restructuring and gender role changes within the
family Campbell identifies such a mobilising moment: a feminist strength of feeling and of
position that could have its day, as she believes class politics has had its day in the now
disappearing period of industrial employment and the family wage. This is the animus of her
argument. However, in the contemporary period this particular 'shard' of feminism has
taken on the appearance and effectivity of something much more coherent, organised and
policy inflected than an 'idea in conversation'. That is: the problem of 'underclass'
masculinities in need of policy solutions.
'Underclass' Masculinities
Both Coward and Campbell disparage the terminology of 'underclass' because of
what it is meant to imply. For Coward it is 'a concocted term' that expresses a moral
judgement about a predictable type of person:
'...the product of a single mother, broken home, lack of employment opportunity,
education opportunity, criminal behaviour, likely to be violent... so you've got this
kind of profiling of people who would be in this category and it is a moral category
because if someone is a product of a broken home, single parent but has
nevertheless managed to go up the hierarchy and do quite well for themselves, that
person would not be a member of the underclass.' (Coward)
For Campbell it is invoked as an accusation that works as a denial of class belonging:
'...it doesn't give to poor people, the unemployed and to communities, their own
histories, their own powers and their own cultures. It doesn't give them anything.
All it does is confer a sense of their difference, their otherness from the
mainstream.'58
Equally, both believe that the debates around the concept of 'underclass' express something
of the substantive problems that do exist within impoverished communities. For Campbell
the concept is in many respects a distraction from states of economic emergency and the
actual social dynamics of those places. It recasts problems of criminal masculinity and the
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failings of statutory agencies (local authorities and the police) in response, as problems of
single motherhood and of working class communities as a totality:
'It doesn't help us understand what the dynamics are within the neighbourhoods that
have been cast into a state of economic emergency, as well as their relationship to
the powers beyond them.'59
'Why is it that these entire communities are labelled the underclass when actually
their struggle is to survive behaviour by a bunch of boys not OAPs or mothers...You
could go down the West End (Newcastle) where there's a modem housing estate - it
won't be even 20 years old, wrecked, rebuilt at a cost of something like ten million
pounds. A waste of time, a complete waste of time, because there are probably 50
boys orchestrated by really a dozen grown up men who ran around until that
neighbourhood is not liveable for the hundreds of people who actually live there and
the various agencies think re-pointing the roof tops will sort it out.' (Campbell)
Campbell's main objection to the term 'underclass' is the way it lumps together poor
working class men and women, their behaviours and economic circumstances, as an
undifferentiated mass which can be blamed, distanced and disengaged from. She
conceptualises this as a problem of abandonment and violence against the women of these
communities, which simultaneously blames them for their predicament:
'These are the women who failed to manage their man, their lads, their boys. These
are the people to blame for the incubus within. So what happens is that the political
system abandons the neighbourhoods they are supposed to represent and leaves
them to their most dangerous enemy... like the old order in the way that it treated
battered women. It blamed them for their own endangerment.'50
Campbell's exposition of the gendered violence of crime perpetrated against impoverished
communities, conceptualises those activities as analogous to sexual violence:
'I actually think that burglary is akin to a kind of spatial rape, it's like the act of
breaking and entering which is to refuse to recognise the limits of your own bounds
and that you're entitled to go in and mess up somebody else's space. That kind of
crime isn't done by women.' (Campbell)
Similarly Campbell has represented car theft as a metaphor for rampant masculinity where
the car is a feminised object, here speaking at the IPPR conference on 'Families, Children
and Crime':
'Men love the interior of cars... they want to possess them. I imagine car theft is a
surrogate rape fantasy of men's in which they occupy cars and make them their
own.'61
Campbell constructs crime as an activity that partly constitutes the masculinity of these
working class lads, part of which is actual and part symbolic gender violence against
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women. She presents this as continuous with the interests and preoccupations of a
mainstream, masculinist culture which mirrors that of 'their purported enemy - the police'.
In other words as an interest that unifies men and unifies them against women.
At the opposite end of Campbell's construction are the women of these communities
whose responses to poverty are about self-help and constructiveness, the very opposite of
the lads network:
'...typically open, useful, practical, incipiently democratic'62
'...mothers who are as poor as them who are not connected with crime and when
they are it is almost exclusively survival crime - organised shoplifting or benefit
fraud.' (Campbell)
These are the heroines, the 'spinal cord' of communities struggling to survive sieges from
the villains in their midst. Recognition of ambiguity in these relations is secondary to this
basic template of adversarial male relations. Co-operation is rarely yielded by these young
men, who come and go, take and destroy, who dominate rather than share the domestic and
social community space. It is the same complaint that Campbell raises in her piece on
fatherhood - co-operation as the elusive factor of men's relations with women:
'Among both the poor and the prosperous, when men and women share the same
time and space, something is still more important to men than co-operation - their
masculinity.'63
Clearly for Campbell much of the debate about 'underclass', crime and parenting is actually
about the problem of masculinity as domination, difference and non-co-operation. Single
mothers and 'welfare dependency' are diversions motivated by neo-liberalism and
misogyny. This problem manifests itself in specific ways by focusing either too narrowly or
too widely on impoverished communities. The former focus fails to acknowledge the
problem of masculinity as society-wide, extending to middle class male commentators,
politicians and the police who because of their own masculine preoccupations and interests
will not problematise the masculinity of the working class lads. The latter focus fails to see
that the problem of these communities is the behaviour of one particular constituency within
them - that of the men.
For Coward this 'most obvious' aspect of these communities - the maleness of crime
- is a diversion from a more complex analysis of internal dynamics within them, and the
relationship between commentators and the commentated upon. She identifies the
substantive problems within and beyond these communities, concocted in the term
'underclass' as those of social and economic marginality, which particular groups are
subject to:
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'There clearly are groups who are becoming socially marginal, having much more
difficulty sharing in not just the kind of morality but also the kind of benefits of this
kind of society.' (Coward)
Coward does not think this marginality is a straightforward outcome of race, class and
gender victimisation. Within that process there is a dynamic of 'self-marginality':
'The problem of people being very marginal and impoverished and behaving like
it... I think there is a degree of self-marginality or a process really and that's where
the kind of issues like crime do erupt because groups can get into sub criminal
activities which are partly because of their powerlessness and exclusion but also
partly because of what we might call a rather immoral way of trying to get what
everybody else has got.' (Coward)
The effect of 'masculinity' within this process should not be over-determined:
'I think we are in times where the kind of macho masculinity that is actually very
obvious and fashionable, makes it very easy to mistake some of the problems we're
having, with 'masculinity' because very often the people on whom the moral
discourse is focused as the problem - the criminals, the violent criminals, the
abusive fathers seem to come from the group where that kind of machismo attitude
is also very much part and parcel of the structure.' (Coward)
In wholesale accusations against 'masculinity', in which particular groups of working class
men are presented as embodying its worst excesses, the specificity of social and economic
changes are lost. In Coward's view these are about particular groups of working class men
in particular areas of particular regions, caught up in a process of employment change which
affects them most adversely and which offers them the least number of choices and subject
positions to deal with that situation. It then blames those men for their rigidity, inflexibility,
non-co-operation, and blames 'masculinity' as equivalent to those 'bad things':
'I think feminists looking at this might be tempted to think that it is masculinity
itself that is the problem because you get these problems where you get these very
masculine men but I think the problem is much more complicated than that. I think
what we've got at the moment is the kind of situation where machismo has upped
the ante for everybody, in the sense that all boys have to relate to it in one way or
another, it introduces machismo into the whole process of growing up at the
moment. But the kind of things these women are talking about - the signs of lack of
social cohesion, lack of a shared kind of community feeling, violence - those things
are not necessarily products of masculinity.' (Coward)
They are rather the products of a particular sort of economic dislocation, which most
disadvantages working class men:
'The groups who can see nothing in it for them because the employment
opportunities are so limited and unappealing, and the quality of life is so
unappealing, those kind of changes are that much worse. They're at a much more
critical edge of it and kinds of identities have to be found that offer strength and
power and status - you know machismo is a quality that comes free.' (Coward)
Coward's argument about contemporary masculinity insists on two things: that it is classed
and that it is talked about in relation to femininity. With regard to the discourse of
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'underclass' that has two central implications. The first is about the different powers,
identities and opportunities available to differently classed masculinities, and it requires
masculinity to be specified in class terms at every point:
Are middle class men able to develop and benefit from different kinds of
masculinities that are made available to them?
'Absolutely, I think for a middle class male now, they could relate to, in fact are the
body of, the moral discourse because they can see the advantages of shared values,
earning money, having a decent home, having a decent family - there are very big
advantages in it for them. But for those men who don't feel they have any stake in
that, these identities are not terribly meaningful are they? I think the kind ofmoral
discourse around at the moment is just mixing up morality and marginal criminality.
I mean a lot of people involved in marginal crime are not immoral people, they're
people for whom either there are cultural variations or they don't necessarily agree
with the kind of laws that there are.' (Coward)
Coward believes that in contemporary 'underclass' discourse this has meant representations
of particular groups of working class men that are 'actually interested in making that lot
more like us lot'. Where this interest has been spoken by groups of middle class feminists as
well as middle class men, the outcome is most problematic:
'No doubt some of the less pleasant aspects of masculinity should be mocked. But
when this disparagement of all things male gets linked to the poor, in fact to those
who are most disadvantaged in the current economy, the result is much more
problematic.'64
It is a result that Coward believes 'would cause outcry if used to refer to race or women.'65 It
also recalls an historical problem that particular groups of middle class feminists have had
with particular groups of working class men, rooted in the feminism of late nineteenth
century philanthropic movements:
'Women's protests against male dominance have, at times, intersected with or even
reinforced middle class efforts to subdue and civilise the male 'underclass'.... in
need of moral reform by 'womanly' values.'66
Coward's second caveat to contemporary problematisations of masculinity is about
positioning masculinity as separate from femininity which she believes marks a retreat from
the role of actual women in the production of masculinity. An example is an idea that has
currency within particular feminist arguments that single mothers are not the 'real' problem,
criminal young men and missing fathers are. This serves to reduce the complexity of social
relations to gender constructions and it also lessens the importance of looking at the process
whereby 'problems' are actively produced as such by the commentary role. Coward is
interested in the way different masculinities and femininities are constructed and lived in
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relation to each other, and in the context of circumstances that are usually not of their
making. Those constructions are validated because they appear to be bome out by visible
behaviours. Whilst non-co-operation and aggression against different authorities and within
communities have come about, they are not incidental to policies which have actively
impoverished, divided and undermined relations within communities:
'I was thinking about that in relation to things I see a lot around here, which is the
mothers saying - 'if anyone pushes you around, you push 'em back'. I think there is
a dynamic in the culture to protect themselves because they have leamt that they do
have to stick up for themselves... people do fall back on very defensive behaviour
and with women I think it sometimes does lead to pushing the men into a rather
traditional aggressive role as the people who are out there - 'go on stick up for
yourselves, stick up for us'... I think that is the product of the last 18 years really...
it's a bit like the cultural revolution in China - there's been a kind of constant
revolution in institutions which has ended up with those very things that held
together the meaning of community being completely undermined.' (Coward)
The process of 'setting up' particular people and places as problems determines
which masculinities and residential areas are in the frame of discussion in the first place.
Both Campbell and Coward identify motivating factors in the contemporary period of
'underclass' discourse which are about social authoritarianism, middle class angst and
interests. Campbell chooses to highlight the misogyny around the depiction of 'underclass'
families:
'I think these new traditionalists are the new misogynists... what that misogyny
sustains is a sense that the world is falling apart because women have become
unruly, going around having babies all over the place... To promote traditional
family values at a time when that can only mean one thing - the restoration of a
certain domestic arrangement headed by fathers and serviced by women - that
defence of traditional family values requires that you suppress what we know goes
on in family life - half of married women are at some time hit by their husbands, 20-
25% of adults say they were abused by father figures and fathers.' (Campbell)
While Campbell is clearly concerned with the potential gender implications of 'pro-family'
policies incorporating ideas about 'the problematic single mother', Coward's emphasis is
more the broad sweep of the 'underclass' discourse as a particular kind of middle class
fixation with themselves as different from and better than the 'other':
'I think the connections are very deep between the kind of culture that is sneered at
and the kind of culture of the middle classes. All the kind of problems that are being
pointed to, can be paralleled in the middle class lifestyle - that's one of the elements
in the dynamic of externalising, making the problem the other, the kids on the estate,
these awful estates, these awful people, the lout. You externalise it because the
connections run very deep. They are to do with a particular hedonistic,
individualistic, materialistic culture that we praise in the middle class and we
condemn when it manifests in people we think can't afford it... And do we really
think we've got nothing to learn from other groups... we sneer away as if we've got
things to teach them but actually a lot of these people who are sneered at for one
aspect of their lives have very valuable things in the other.' (Coward)
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The different emphases that Coward and Campbell give to the gender and class
dimensions of community spaces and cultures, sustain different views of community
dystopias, both of which are not far from being realised in their views. Campbell's
nightmare is a 'spatial tyranny' against networks of active citizenship sustained by
unsupported and abandoned women, attacked by networks of criminal young men. A male
dominated space characterised by:
'...rigid hierarchies, authoritarian hierarchies, closed systems, almost exclusive
connections to masculinised cultures... a masculinised environment that endangers
everybody else.'67
Coward's nightmare is 'middle class solutions to everything':
'The middle class assumption that their way is best and some of the solutions
around children and gangs on the street is precisely that. This keeping more
vigilance and getting them in off the street and actually I think one of the problems
is not enough of the middle class are out there on the street. I don't think the kind of
lives some of these middle class kids lead is any kind of life at all - they're ferried
hither and thither and they're shoved into nurseries and they're made to do French
when they're three and they're made to do violin when they're four. I remember
Angela Carter used to live round here and I was quite friendly with her and I can
just remember on one occasion we were gossiping about someone and I said ' what
you mean they had the usual privileged middle class childhood?' And she said
'Privileged! - what's privileged about a middle class childhood - bloody oppressed!'
And I thought 'yes, she's absolutely right, and yet we take so for granted that the
solution to problems at the moment is things like after-school clubs - let's get them
in, let's corral them in, let's stimulate them. Actually I think it would be a much
better society if they were all out on the streets from dawn to dusk!... I think the
problem is actually about getting the environment more friendly, to get the cities
redesigned. When they look at cities and spaces the first consideration should be
how can we make it safe for kids to hang about here on their own, not going to their
piano lessons... Kids can't walk to school around here because of the traffic, local
shops have disappeared because of the supermarkets so there aren't people around
on comers, there's no kind of community space... I don't agree with saying that the
middle class shuttling around and us going off to our jobs, and the children shut
away, and being a Blairite is the solution - that's not my idea of life!' (Coward)
This argument recognises that the estate and the street are classed concepts, classed spaces.
With different emphases Campbell and Coward here converge in recognition that
'community' requires a willingness to share space across genders and across classes, to
make community space. That possibility of shared community space also requires policy and
investment. The ability and inclination to 'share' space needs to be valued, facilitated and
resourced.
67
Campbell, Britain's Dangerous Places p5-6
151
Discussion: Dangerous Estates, Dangerous States of Being
The council estate of 'underclass' discourse is constructed as a different sort of
space according to who is talking about it. It is also a space in which people experience their
co-existence in different ways according to gender, race, locality and a whole range of
variable personal experiences. These two aspects are inextricably related because the space
of the estate is a product of power relations within and beyond its real and imagined
boundaries. Its spatiality is made up of power laden social relations; its spatiality is known
and understood through power laden discourses. My interest here is the way in which
differences within estates, and between estates and other living areas are discursively
rendered.
Both Campbell and Coward are part of the process in which the meanings and
experiences of council estate living are being made. Campbell notes the way the terminology
of 'underclass' and 'the estate' together entered a popular vernacular at the end of the 1980s.
A media glut of stories about things going wrong on estates centred on crime and family
disorder, represented these places and the people living there as 'junk'.68
Campbell relates the gender inflection of those representations to an imported
American analysis of the black 'underclass' ghetto (the American equivalent to British
council estates). Since the 1960s it had blamed the matriarchal structure of black
communities for the development of fragmentary family relations because the 'Negro' male
was sidelined as both father and provider.69 Campbell reverses the gender dynamic of that
construction refuting both Moynihan's misogynist critique of the black mother and the
conclusion that it was white racism that created 'ruthless exploitative relationships' reached
by the Kerner Commission set up by the government to study riots in the cities of 1960s
America. Her feminist take on these events is that 'a decade later those cultures would be
called sexism.'70
Campbell applies this same frame of analysis to the causality of the riots in the early
1990s on British council estates in Cardiff, Oxford and Newcastle. They were not rooted in
the dysfunctions of single motherhood, were not simply the expressions of oppression and
poverty, or the pathologies of poor 'ghettoised' people. Campbell gives them another
meaning, an alternative emblematic status, through a particular feminist analysis. These
were estates under siege from within by criminal masculinities and were 'telling us
something bigger than themselves, something about Britain.'71 In short they were telling us
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about a masculinist culture in society which will not support and has abandoned
impoverished communities of women struggling to survive. Campbell's replacement version
of events, is driven by a will and a claim to 'know' these estates better than those who offer
alternative analyses. The underclass theorists 'did not know how to read the estates', and so
'mothers were culpable for the lads culture of predation that tyrannised the places of the
poor.'72
Into this misogynistic agenda and the 'political emptiness' of the events themselves,
Campbell brings the 'real' culprits. Up to this point the 'failing' of the riots seems to have
been an inability to explain themselves: 'riots that no-one wanted to claim or own, that no-
one could be proud of.'73 The events did not yield themselves up to explanation, the council
estate was somehow less 'knowable' after these events than after other riots which had
'revealed' something about 'the estate'. The Brixton and Toxteth riots a decade earlier gave
clearer messages about who or what was to blame, these later riots did not and so were
politically disengaged. In Campbell's view the disengagement was the retreat of male-
interested politicians from facing an unspeakable problem of masculinity: their own,
society's, and that of the working class lads. Goliath presents itself as speaking this problem
of gendered spaces and identities in negative terms: spaces where the girls want to be
'mams' and the boys want to be 'robbers'.74 These council estates are masculine, criminal,
all but doomed social spaces, where female community networks are struggling against
breaking point:
'It is hard to imagine anything in fin de siecle Britain that will change the conditions
of existence among the poor people... their identities as boys and girls are assigned
to the tasks of taking from and taking care. Their futures are already ancient
history...'75
Campbell largely disregards the traditional Left-wing representations of council
estate spaces which ascribe problems of working class criminal masculinities to
unemployment, as masculinist and rather deficient:
'That kind of approach - one that's soppy about class and soppy about men...
involves a kind of sympathy for a fantasy, an homogenised sentimentality, and a
sympathy for masculinity and men.' (Campbell)
It is such a position that she identifies Coward with. Yet in common with Coward's
approach Goliath does partly countenance the existence of more ambivalent relations than
those of ubiquitous confrontation between working class young men and women within the










analysis. Coward does, in a more tentative view of male-female relations inextricably linked
to each other and constructed through social, economic and cultural conditions. In relation to
'male' crime this view emphasises different aspects of Campbell's 'evidence' for different
ends. For example in relation to boys joyriding, the stated disinclination of mothers to turn
their sons over to the police shows working class family allegiances and community wide
allegiances after the riots. Only a handful of statements were gleaned from 600 police
interviews on the Meadow Well estate.76 There was widespread hostility to the police and
media invasion giving the estate a bad name in order to sort out a joyriding 'problem' for
which people had a 'widely held tolerance' and even enjoyment of its entertainment value.77
Estate residents expressed beliefs about the riots as the fault of the police as much as that of
the lads;78 or said that they weren't riots at all, that the estate isn't dangerous but is actually
a 'nice estate'.79 Residents gave justifications for behaviour deemed 'criminal': insurance
covering the lads pleasure of using cars that aren't from their neighbourhoods;80 one father
esteeming his son as a 'professional car thief; parents seeing their children's activities as
morally bound: 'He doesn't rob banks, he doesn't hurt old people and he doesn't do it for
profit'.81 There is also a recognition in Campbell's work that different elements of criminal
activity offer benefits to impoverished communities, that stolen goods in particular are part
of an economy that ensures both survival and a level of participation in a wider culture that
is otherwise denied them.82
Coward does not set out to 'reveal' the council estate as a space that is gendered in
one way or another, but sets up a question about the focus and about the motivation of a
dominant middle class gaze. In relation to the contemporary discourse of 'underclass' such a
question suggests two things. Firstly, it suggests the need to think about a multiplicity of
relations, conflicts, inter-dependencies, loyalties and betrayals between men and other men,
women and other women, and between men and women who live on the estates. Campbell
chooses to highlight the significance of particular episodes of council estate disorder as
symbolic of end of century Britain for particular groups of people in gendered terms. She
chooses to represent a tranche of working class masculinities as lawless, marauding,
incendiary, fraternal and uncooperative, and those council estates with 'criminal'
constituents as male dominated spaces ('less a class culture than a male culture').83 Such


















complexities of identity formation and of the affliction of unemployment. In arguing against
the presentation of 'community' interests as a homogenised community space Campbell
replaces a classed unity of interest with one of gender, and a spatial unity ('the
neighbourhood', 'the estate', 'the manor') with a spatial divide: one network ('criminals')
against another ('mothers'). Her gender focus takes precedence over other power relations
through which council estate identities and spatialities are produced, and that focus is
primarily about division:
'Crime and coercion are sustained by men. Solidarity and self-help are sustained by
women. It is as stark as that.'84
This is a matter of being more interested in focusing on how working class men and women
on estates deal differently with distress, than in how that distress is firstly 'emplaced' on
such estates and is then represented. It is also a matter of setting up 'class unities' as unified
spatialities which need to be broken down, and specifically broken down into gender
divides, rather than recognising a more complex set of relations that do not adhere to
templates of 'unity' or 'division' within neighbourhoods, genders or classes. In other words,
it is a question of emphasis. Amongst the different relations possible between and within
families, streets and estates, the choice of focus is a political one, related to priorities held in
a given period, in a given representational space.
Coward's second question is about the motivation of the gaze on council estates.
The chosen internal focus of disorder and criminality that marks 'underclass' discourse to a
large extent obscures the way those developments are discursively produced, as the product
of a process of material and symbolic degradation. Material conditions and representational
practices over 18 years at least may have rendered people and places divided. However these
divisions are neither gender determined, nor necessarily the omnipresent feature of living on
these council estates. Campbell views the criminal activities of these young men in terms of
power gains and domination over women and space rooted in cultural misogyny. She does
not consider how such cultures are themselves an abuse of young men, or how the gains of
criminal activities may be small change in comparison to the way these groups and places
have been fleeced and rubbished. These sorts of considerations do not negate community
anger at the devastation that crime may cause to women and men in these communities at
particular times, or mean that community crime strategies are not needed. But neither do
they dismiss feelings of empathy, shared experiences, political and class anger at the social
and economic conditions to which estates full of people have been subject. Far from being
'soppy about men and class' such feelings are the product of living in families and streets




This is an argument for the sort of strategic representations of space that bell hooks
argues for in relation to working class black households and black masculinities, questioning
whether certain aspects of black life should be talked about in a non-black context where
those images adhere with white representations of black men as brutal and animalistic.85
This is a matter of political strategy: choosing specific times and specific places to talk
about particular issues. It is about what context issues are best brought up in, whether they
are located in a critical framework, how they will be taken up beyond the immediate space
of representation. It is also an argument for a sort of political responsibility to ensure that
particular issues and identities do not become the evidence for essentialised or generalised
accusations. Those dangers of representation are most important to be aware of where
'evidence' is set up as expressive of a community's authentic or real predicament. It is
sometimes therefore necessary to keep a strategic distance from revealing 'truths' about
particular groups rather than assuming a position of familiarity or equivalence. That is
especially the case when there is a political climate which is set on over-exposing and
scapegoating particular groups of people. This position obviously presents problems for
particular feminist agendas set on revealing 'masculine oppression' wherever it occurs
without sufficient consideration given to class or race based cultural and political
implications:
'Given the popularity of an anti-male reactionary aspect of radical feminism, there is
an audience for works highlighting and exposing male violence. When black women
writers suggest that the most exploitative and oppressive force in the lives of black
females is black men, white society is free from the burden of responsibility.'86
In Goliath that burden of responsibility is shared among masculinist politicians and
statutory agencies, by middle class men as well as the lawless working class masculinities
that are the book's subject. Nevertheless the sort of depictions of council estate street life
and mob rule represented as foreboding drama, are replete with the sorts of wild and
dangerous constructions of a different working class masculinity and spatiality that instil
fear and fascination in particular middle class audiences. This immersion into working class
male 'difference' comes at the expense of a discourse about shared political interests within
classes and a more complex understanding of the dynamics of inter and intra class
disempowerment. Such an understanding sees the possibility of middle class women
empowered by producing discourses that disempower working class men. It is such a power
relation that is highlighted by the Campbell-Coward debate, and which can be seen as a
centrally productive element of 'underclass' discourse in the contemporary period. Working
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class male unemployment is seen to have opened possibilities for discussions about the
reform of men, family and work lifestyles. The policy discourse around 'underclass'
criminality and welfare dependency which seeks to represent particular groups of working
class men in terms of criminality, inflexibility, redundancy and irresponsibility, is settling on
coercive and punitive 'solutions'.
In the discourse of 'underclass' particular feminist ideas about masculinity crises
and gender revolutions meet policy ideas about the reform of criminal justice and welfare.
Coward's and Campbell's prominent spaces of representation partly constitute that meeting,
albeit in different ways, with different intentions. Their debate is embedded by wider
discussions about how a period of prolonged employment change and related changes in
family form and gender dynamics provides the rationale for the restructuring of the welfare
state.87 Part of the reasoning behind arguments for the necessity of change is that criminal
and welfare dependent cultures have developed where traditional working patterns and
related family forms have disappeared. At a number of points the arguments settle on the
figure of the young, working class, unemployed male. The main issue is how his role and
identity as a man is being or needs to be remade. The idea of a crisis in masculinity with
regard to working class masculinities posits links between the loss of traditionally male
working class opportunities for work, and crises in social order (manifested in crime and the
inadequate performance of fatherhood roles). The apparent refusal of these men to
'willingly' take work in part-time, service sector areas of employment growth,88 to adjust
fatherhood roles accordingly, and to avoid resorting to crime is the apparent justification of
socially authoritarian policy discourses in welfare and criminal justice. The construction of
'underclass' masculinities, imbued with an accusatory and reformative zeal, is central to this
discourse. GeoffMulgan and Helen Wilkinson writing for the think-tank Demos, which is
seen to have the ear of the new Labour government, have characterised these young men as
'underwolves', the feral underlings of 'underclass', dispossessed from society and
increasingly a threat to its social order.89
The policy responses to these developments have been strongly inflected by an idea
that young people (especially young men) are in need of moral education, intervention and
control. Proposals from the Commission on Social Justice for a 'Citizen's Service' focused
on encouraging social responsibility and responsible citizenship amongst young people as a
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community version of national service.90 The idea that young people need to be inculcated
with moral values and direction because otherwise they are not socially responsible is
historically continuous.91 In the contemporary period it is inflected with a stated need for a
new moral economy throughout society, and has been couched in the rhetoric of 'back-to-
basics' on the political Right and 'rights-and-responsibilities' on the political Left. Thus
cross party support for proposals on moral education in schools to include instruction on
matters of personal, familial and social responsibility as outlined by the National Forum for
Values in Education and the Community.92 The Commission on Social Justice represents the
liberal end of a spectrum of proposals which include a range of disciplinary measures
directed at the relationship between families, schools, communities and the police. Policy
provisions have been made for home-school contracts, street curfews for young people,
electronic tags for child criminals, and truancy round-up programmes (with boys as their
implicit focus) - all positioning parents in the role of policing their children's behaviour by
being made to take legal responsibility for it.93 Compulsory parenting classes and fines for
parents whose children are seen to be out of control form a plank of 'parental control orders'
that the new Labour government has legislated for in the Crime and Disorder Bill 1997.94
These parental orders are buttressed by 'community safety orders' which allow local
councils to place curfews and eviction orders on particular 'unruly' families, and whose
infringement can lead to imprisonment. They build on the already restrictive conditions set
up with regard to young people's occupation of public space in the 1994 Criminal Justice
and Public Order Act. These policies are paralleled by a new range of punitive
developments within the youth criminal justice system. Under proposals by the Home
Secretary Jack Straw, the 'Doli Incapax' law which prevents criminal prosecution for
children under 14 years old will be abolished so requiring children to take responsibility for
their 'criminal' actions; National Task Forces will be directed at 'young offenders'; and
individually tailored 'Action Plan Orders' will issue directives for 'reparation', to ensure
school attendance and prohibition from certain places.95 These developments in civil and
criminal law mark a stated intention by Jack Straw MP 'to bring welfare and crime
initiatives together', in strategies which deal with social problems by holding young people
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responsible for their actions.96 More than that they represent the imposition of a particular
vision about how, and by whom, public space should be occupied; how families should be
units of disciplinary socialisation; and the State the arbiter and jailer of newly criminalised
children.
At the less punitive end of policy solutions to 'problematic' working class
masculinities, are those solutions posed in terms of changed attitudes to gender and work,
particularly of men's attitude to particular sorts of jobs:
'...they will have to begin to show some of the same flexibility as women if they are
to compete effectively in the jobs market.'97
'...until men learn to be more flexible, to swallow their contempt for such 'soft
jobs', their prospects will remain grim.'98
The need for such attitudinal changes by 'men', is accompanied by the need for policy
changes in which 'women's' needs coincide with those of a competitive economy:
'Women are leaving behind the world of familial domesticity everywhere in the
West. The emerging structure of the economy requires them to do so... (we need)
interventionist policies that change the world to suit women's priorities.'99
It is clear that the economy, driven by the imperatives of employment restructuring requires
different sorts of masculinities and femininities to those associated with the post-war
settlement and differently classed policies to bring about the requisite changes. For young
working class men these include welfare and employment policies to create self-reliance, to
reduce aspirations for full-time, permanent employment status, and to challenge macho
templates of masculinity in favour of parenting and traditionally 'female' jobs. Together
with a number of surveillance and public order controls, the outcome of this policy process
would seem to be a sharing, caring family man with a productive work ethic and strong
sense of social responsibility: the ideal male citizen no less. As desirable as this may seem in
some quarters, it is a vision that is strongly normative and prescriptive: a replacement
normality for the 1950s template of the breadwinner and family waged domestic unit. In this
new vision of family and work flexibility, the goal is the gender-neutral parent-worker. In
the immediate term the most problematic figures for this development are those associated
with 'welfare dependency': working class young men who won't take the sorts of jobs on
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human rights legislation. 'Straw's disorder bill 'will create outcasts and breach human rights' The
Guardian 3.2.98 p8
97 'Flexible Women Take Over The Job Market' Leading Article The Independent 18.12.94 pl6
98 Driscoll.M and Thomas.D (1995) 'Give Boys A Break' The Sunday Times 2.4.95 pi
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Hutton.W (1996) 'Why The Workplace is No Longer A Man's World' The Observer 8.12.96 p26
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offer, and working class women who parent on benefits rather than doing paid work. Their
crime is to put other activities before paid work. They are the central figures of 'underclass':
dwelling on council estates, indulging in crime, fiddling social security, working in the black
economy, having babies on benefits. They are the obstacles to realising the promise of the
'new economic realities' - for society and for their own advancement out of poverty. They
must be made to realise that their real interests (like everyone else's) lie in the redemptive
spaces of the work ethic and the labour market. Such spaces are set up as the antithesis of
the problematic spaces of identity and locality occupied by benefit claimants on council
estates, the material-symbolic spaces of 'underclass'.
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Feminist Discourse on 'Underclass' II: 'Underclass' Femininities
'Underclass' spaces - represented, representational, lived - are shaped by gender.
The counterpart of the young, unemployed and often 'criminal' male on the estate/street is
the benefit claiming single mother and the domestic space of the council estate. She is also
the subject of feminist discourse on welfare change, parenting and employment. My
interviews with four women from those fields of commentary had that figure as a main
concern. I had the same central questions in mind for them as I had for Campbell and
Coward: questions about the personal and the political nature of their representation, how
were they positioned in relation to the subject of their discourse and what were they saying
about her?
Ruth Lilley and Ceridwen Roberts on: 'Parenting Policy' and Feminism
The organisations headed by Ruth Lilley and Ceridwen Roberts both seek to
influence government policies which relate to 'the family' with regard to child care,
community welfare, the tax and benefit system and provisions for parenting. 'Full Time
Mothers' (FTM) and the 'Family Policy Studies Centre' (FPSC) assume positions of family
policy advocacy for society as a whole through the welfare of families. Those positions are
very different in terms of their aims, rationale, and organisational practices, but they both
have commentary positions which occupy prime media space.
The social implications of gender changes in employment patterns, changes in
family life and family forms, and parenting problems are all issues which place 'the family'
at the centre of 'underclass' discourse and which are partly shaped by the commentary of
Lilley and Roberts. Neither Lilley nor Roberts regard 'underclass' as their main concern, but
both are implicated in its production to the extent that they produce ideas about 'the family
in trouble'. My interviews with them sought to make those connections apparent, and to
locate those connections in both the personal politics and organisational speaking positions
of the two women.
Choosing Full-Time Motherhood, Choosing a Career
The starting point of Ruth Lilley's involvement with FTM arose from personal
experience and political opportunity when personal distress coincided with the emergence of
a political organisation that gave vent and shape to her feelings at the time:
'The reason I got involved personally was because I was feeling very lacking in
confidence after my second child was bom, and I think a lot of women go through
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this because all the propaganda says unless they're going back to work they're less
of a person. So I was here sweeping the floor, tidying up toys, doing really mundane
things and from the outside world I wasn't getting any support. And the key thing is,
I thought I was the only one who felt like this and I thought all my friends had got
their act together and were loving what they were doing. So I asked around because
I wanted to know if I was the only one who didn't have the confidence about what I
was doing and a lot of my friends were going through the same and that got me
really angry.' (Lilley)
The FTM organisation had been set up in June 1991 - six months prior to Lilley's
involvement - by a number of mothers who had gone through similar experiences: either
returning to work full-time or feeling that they should be, having had babies or whilst caring
for young children. The founder Kathy Gyngell had been inspired to set up a formal
organisation after writing a piece in the Daily Mail newspaper about her own experience of
motherhood and her felt lack of social, cultural and economic support. The article entitled
'Why Must We Treat Mothers As Second Class Citizens?' received hundreds of replies that
affirmed her feelings. The motivation for starting up the group was a determination to make
the case for mothering as full-time work in need of political support, cultural affirmation and
financial recognition.
Particular understandings about young children's emotional needs are central to the
experiences of the founding members of FTM and the discourse on 'mothering' they want to
promote. Under the slogan 'Full-Time Mothers - A Child's Need, A Mother's Right', they
campaign for changes in the tax and benefits system that would allow women 'a free choice
to be full-time mothers' at least until their children are 3 years old and preferably up to
school age. Beyond that age, mother's work in the paid economy should be supported but
until then their work as mothers should be allowed to be of primary importance, in the
interests of their children, of themselves and of society. The valorisation of mothering-work
would be a requirement of that aim:
'We believe that a woman working in her own home is a member of the working
population. As such, employers for example should be encouraged to perceive
mothering as valid work experience, and provide further training, should a woman
wish to return to paid employment once her children are older.'
(FTM policy document)
The financial infrastructure proposed to allow the choice of full-time motherhood to be
made would alleviate the economic and social pressures to work as soon as possible after the
birth of children. It consists of: transferable tax allowances for married couples, increases in
child benefit, index linking of the married couples allowance, and the reintroduction of child
tax allowances for all children. It is based on a particular set of social and familial values.
The organisation itself is non-denominational and non-political and it does not associate
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itself with any forerunning 'maternalist' tradition. However it does have an obviously
100'maternalist' ethos and disputes a definition of feminism that refuses its own credentials:
'It's interesting because people accuse us of being anti-feminist but I don't actually
think that we are. I mean feminism is huge... I think it's about how feminism is
defined. The things that I would say 'no I'm not interested in' is a strident idea that
all women must be career women and therefore they must have child care because
that is the thing that is holding them back from getting on in the workplace. And that
I don't agree with because I think that is just being a woman on men's terms...
which is not my idea of winning the day.' (Lilley)
Lilley believes that both the public image and most vocal and visible public manifestations
of feminism have not expressed the importance of mothering full-time at particular times in
women's lives. She maintains that her view remains feminist as a claim for power,
legislation and choice for mothers in the contemporary period who are economically and
socially pressured to work:
'If you're talking about feminism in terms of power then it is more powerful to have
it enshrined in law that you can be at home for five years when your children are
little, and then you will be entitled to retraining.' (Lilley)
Lilley's personal beliefs, the influence of her mother ('she was always at home for
us... it was her that gave us the opportunities that we have') and a Christian family
background inflect her own argument for the family as the initial provider of personal
security and values. She is however aware of the associations that their cause has with
religious and Right-wing positions and is keen to distance the organisation from those:
'The issues are strong enough, they stand on their own... you don't have to be a
Christian to be a mother and we're appealing to a wider audience here... There's one
organisation who would love us to join with them, it used to be called the campaign
for the feminine woman - they're against homosexuality, women in the forces, any
job that isn't 'feminine'- they're extreme and I don't agree with what they're saying.
I try to keep a distance from those sorts of groups because otherwise we'd get
lumped together and the media would come along and say 'oh that's that Right-wing
nonsense group.' (Lilley)
Working around the same issues of 'family' representation in relation to public
policy the Family Policy Studies Centre in some ways represents the social scientific version
of FTM's position. In terms of their substantive focus both are interested in promoting the
idea of 'family policy' in which children have some priority. The main difference is FPSC's
insistence on a 'parenting' rather than 'mothering' focus. As Director of the organisation
100 In her review essay 'The New Literature on Gender and the Welfare State' (p 171 -197 Feminist
Studies 22: 1 Spring (1996)) Felicia Kornbluh describes maternalist politics as a relationship of mutual
obligation and respect between mothers and their governments. She distinguishes between different
types of maternalist politics from their complex historical emergence at the turn of the 20th century in
Europe, America and Australia. Not all are necessarily feminist but whatever their specific motivation
all carry a central element of belief that motherhood should be 'a legitimate basis for women's
citizenship, that women as mothers deserve a return from their governments for the work they perform
in child-rearing'. In this way they politicise motherhood through demands for social support.
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over the past decade Ceridwen Roberts is keen to stress their non-aligned, traditional social
scientific research ethos in terms of their 'independent' status. The FPSC was set up in the
late 1970s from a short life organisation called the Study Commission on the Family which
was dominated by general social policy concerns in a way that was often overtly political.
Departing from partisan views their aim was to establish a focus:
'...to contribute to informed public debate about change in families, by looking at
the interchange between public policy and family life.' (Roberts)
A claim to independent knowledge production is promoted in order to carry out their
'information' dissemination role and service to other family organisations. Their funding is
'soft money' from research foundations and charities to produce research reports and papers
around issues of poverty and family resources, crime and the family, and trends in family
forms and lifestyles. They also receive money from the government for the voluntary sector:
in 1995 as part of a Department of Health parenting initiative which together with the OPCS
produced a 'National Study of Parents and Parenting Problems.'101 The organisation's denial
of an overtly value-based discourse is presented as importantly different from the political
and religious affiliations that characterise contemporary debates on the family. Roberts is
keen to draw distinctions between intellectual and personal value-based motivations within
her work. This is partly to do with the nature of the organisation itself in which 'objectivity'
is largely the basis of its claim to authority, and therefore a requirement of the job. Personal
issues therefore echo rather than motivate intellectual ones:
'I think it's impossible not to work in issues like families and look at issues like why
do marriages break down or survive or how do people parent without bringing part
of your personal biography. A lot of what we do here is necessarily linked to what
our own lives are like but the issues we may pick up and examine are not a direct
consequence of our own personal interests.' (Roberts)
For Roberts, feminism is a tradition which has been part of her career path and
which in its contemporary manifestations is distinct from her work. The suggestion is that
feminism for her has been more a matter of utility, profession and career than something that
is part of her and something that she may be part of changing:
'I was someone who was active in the feminist movement in the 1970s and
professionally I've done a lot of work on the position of women in the labour
market. So I've never not thought of myself as someone who has not come out of
that tradition. But I am out of sympathy I think with some of the public
manifestations of feminism so I'm not quite sure what feminism is any longer really.
With regard to my work, I would say most of all I see myself as a social scientist.'
(Roberts)
101
Roberts.C, Cronin.N, Todd.D, Kelly.M (1995) A National Study ofParents and Parenting
Problems London: FPSC/OPCS
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In this respect Lilley's position which is based on a discourse about mothering as a
social relation and lived experience, is more engaged with challenging some of the public
manifestations of feminism. In their campaign, explicit values are a necessary and positive
advantage, but as an organisation FTM do not have the status of FPSC as a professional
body that assumes a mantle of authority and truth. FPSC's work is specifically geared to this
reputation for objectivity:
'[to] debunking the amazing amount of hype and rubbish spoken about the family
that's completely fatuous and wrong precisely because [they are] pursuing their own
personal agendas... We don't have any formal representative role because we don't
have a clear constituency. If we're representative of anything it's rational social
science, contributing to unpicking myth on the basis of theoretically informed
empirical research.' (Roberts)
Representing Mothers (Like Us), Representing Reality (As We See It)
Lilley regards FTM's representative role as the main strength and problem of the
organisation. The latter in terms of the way they are represented by others, the former as she
believes they express the unrepresented and unsupported view of a great mass of mothers
with young children. She quotes comments that are sought in FTM's membership campaign
as evidence of a widespread distress caused mainly by the economic pressure to return to
work, a pressure that even for those not directly effected by it serves to undermines
mothering-work in general. The conviction of her argument comes from her own experience
and shared communications on the subject with other women:
'I've just said what I feel and it actually happens to be representative of the way an
awful lot of mothers think but because full-time mothers are busy people and they're
not organised as such, they haven't got a voice - you know 48% of mothers with
children under four are at home full-time - that's 1.6 million mothers who never get
any representation. And if you add on to that the number of mothers who do work
and work part-time, well that percentage only get a voice for the part of them that
goes to work and that needs extra child care, no-one is addressing the side of them
that is a mother.' (Lilley)
Lilley points to Dr. Catherine Hakim's research as a way to include those mothers who do
work, but would often prefer not to, as 'the unrepresented and subsumed' of the vocal cause
of the 'career woman'. Although she does not wish to negate their choice, she resents the
way it dominates the policy agenda and undermines the masses of actual mothers who
believe (through their own experiences) that what they're doing is very important, difficult
and rewarding:
'I find it very difficult now... if someone has decided not to have children, to say
'well actually you don't know what it's like' but I really feel that until women have
had children they don't know what it's like. They think their own children will be
like their friend's children or their sisters. And if they're not going out to work and
doing this, that and the other then they're not achieving their full potential... and you
know you just cannot compare, there is no comparison to be made with either of
those things.' (Lilley)
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Prior to her involvement with FTM Lilley worked as a journalist and in many
respects continues to use those skills in writing and broadcasts to forward the position of
FTM in the media. The organisation has been the subject of extensive media coverage in
The Daily Mail, The Times, The Evening Standard; in women's magazines like Good
Housekeeping, Living, Family Bulletin, Woman Alive through a mix of letters, interviews
and articles; on 'controversial issue-led' morning television chat shows like 'Kilroy' and
'The Time and The Place'; in two appearances on Newsnight; and in a number of BBC radio
interviews. FTM is news for both populist and more hard-edged contemporary debates on
the state of the family, childcare policy and changing gender roles. Actively seeking a
controversial position as a means of self-promotion they address mothers as a means of
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support, and politicians and decision makers in the hope of influencing them :
'Every time we get mentioned as an organisation, that is support if someone is
sitting there watching the television, feeling alone, it affirms her in what she's
doing.' (Lilley)
FTM appear as a group of well-educated, articulate, white, middle class, married
women. The group are not threatening in their manner or too radical in their aims. Their
target is limited to particular parts of the tax and benefit system, and is practically rather
than ideologically driven. In broad terms they are assimilable to professional, media debates.
They have a limited network of support for their own position which is loosely aligned
through umbrella organisations: the Parenting Education and Support Forum (includes the
NSPCC and National Childbirth Trust) and FEFAF - the European Federation ofWomen
Working in the Home. FTM's preference is to work autonomously within the wider network
of lobbying and campaign groups with whom professional and pragmatic relations are
maintained:
'I get on well with... I had lunch with Lucy Daniels who's the Director of the
Working Mother's Association (now called Parents At Work)- really diametrically
opposed to us. But in a way there are things that organisation does that are fine like
campaign for flexible working hours. And they put people our way and give people
our telephone number and vice versa. So there's a working relationship but we sort
of each know that at the end of the day the big sticking point is this child care
thing.' (Lilley)
Their differences are argued over shared lunches and in Newsnight appearances. There is an
ease and expectation of inclusion to these social and media circles, in the promotion of a
position that is marginal but not extreme in its presentation. Indeed there is a sidelining of
the more radical aspects of FTM's position, their potential cut short by a tendency for the
conservative aims of a 'family values' discourse to be emphasised when used by campaigns
102 This 'cultural' support is in addition to quarterly members newsletters and 16 local groups
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like the Daily Mail newspaper's for a restoration of the 'traditional family';103 or by liberal
feminist efforts to caricature the position of 'stay-at-home mothers' as regressive.104 FTM's
other arguments - about the financial recognition of mothering-work; about the way business
and economic priorities dominate the political agenda for childcare; in opposition to the
time regimes of paid work and the social and economic pressures for parents to work - are
thereby elided. Instead the 'mother in the home' is evoked via the most conservative and
reductive meanings associated with 1950s family-type ideals, by conservatives and liberals
alike. This representation obscures other elements of FTM's maternalist discourse that have
feminist weight and political expression. Their affiliations to international organisations like
UNICA (the World Congress of Housewives), and FEFAF (the European Union forWomen
Working in the Home), express a more radical stance in relation to the politics of mothering
in European and Latin American countries. FTM formed a British contingent at the 1995
first congress of UNICA held in Buenos Aires at which a joint statement was issued to the
United Nations. Their president Tina Leonzi expressed the basis of this as a need for
women's domestic labour to be recognised through financial security in Social Security and
pensions.105 Similarly at the Fourth International Women's Conference in Beijing in 1995
FEFAF's president Brigitte Le Gouis represented demands for social non-remunerated work
to be recognised in social protection programmes in the same way as productive work in the
labour market in order that mothers are not economically marginalised.106 This element of
FTM's position is both less represented in the media and less developed in FTM's own
work, a situation that reflects the tendency for FTM's spokeswomen to stress middle class
and politically conservative ideas, and which has allowed them to be summarily dismissed
for forwarding a regressive argument to get women 'back to the kitchen sink'.107
In its social scientific mode FPSC is freed from the obligations of an explicitly
representative role. The research is held to 'speak for itself via the public domain of the
media. FPSC is powerful enough to adopt a media management role in this process:
'The media is useful to us in two ways: as a way in which the general public can
find out about things, and by spreading the word about our publications and the
work we do, giving legitimacy to it and meeting the policy influencing process.
Politicians are busy people and are more likely to remember things if they've seen it
103 For example The Mail on Sunday newspaper published a feature called 'The Price Of Feminism' in
which the case for 'A woman's place in the home' was exemplified as FTM's position (7.3.93 p7)
104 See Walter.N (1997) 'Work Sweet Work' The Observer 9.11.97 p25; Harman.H (1997) 'Forget the
Fifties, we have a better deal now' The Observer 9.11.97 p27
105 FTM newsletterWinter (1995)
106 FTM newsletter September (1995)
107 Coward.R (1993) 'Women At War' The Guardian Tabloid 22.3.93 plO. The shifting nature of this
critical relationship is illustrated by FTM's support for other commentaries by Ros Coward in which
she expresses anxiety about the messages coming from the government about mothers, childcare and
work. See 'Single mums and double jeopardy' The Guardian 24.11.97 p 17; 'Our children's absolute
right to be bone idle' The Guardian 9.6.97 pl7 and FTM's supportive response: FTM newsletter
Summer 1997
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in the papers and on Newsnight....[the media] are very greedy of our time and
energies and they're very difficult to deal with in the sense that they cut up what you
say so we do have an implicitly or indeed explicitly targeted version that we send to
particular broadsheets or even within broadsheets to named journalists. I decide if
I'm going to give anyone a headstart or I might decide it would be much better to do
it on 'Woman's Hour' so I won't talk to 'Today' because I know both won't do it.'
(Roberts)
FPSC's professional strategies and rhetorics effectively position those who do work
with personal agendas and in a 'partisan' capacity as less than 'true' and as less
authoritative. For FPSC that knowledge hierarchy is a central strategic resource. And yet
within that power position Roberts is personally bound because maintaining the distance
from personal agendas also restricts her speaking position. She is not 'allowed' to be seen in
a lobbying capacity even when she believes strongly in a particular issue or believes
something that relates to family policy to be wrong. Her position, as the position of FPSC, is
only allowed to be stated through research not through independent commentary:
'My board will not allow me to sign up to any sort of public declaration for
example. Just recently I was asked about aligning the Treaty in Europe to say
something about families and children and despite having modified the line and got
the line I wanted, my board wouldn't allow me to be publicly associated with it.
And that's important because at the moment family policy in the European context
is completely dominated by a labour market perspective and it's completely wrong.'
(Roberts)
Similarly, professional networks create restrictions as well as offering connections
for FPSC's public position. Roberts believes that the 'family lobby' exists as a number of
groups characterised by particular strands of thought and policy goals. Some groups are
marginalised within those discussions through not adhering to particular dominant strands.
The International Year of the Family in 1994 revealed the limitations of these organisations
working together because of the restrictions it placed on voicing their different priorities:
'We were trying to come up with something in terms of delivering the International
Year of the Family that was a broad based coalition that managed to cope with
family diversity and stick together. And basically saying something as banal as
families should be on the policy agenda. That was about as much common ground as
it was possible to get.' (Roberts)
She also identifies the way their ability to work together is conditioned by how receptive the
government is at particular times. Opportunities are used then let go of, as circumstances
change. Networks are loose, strategic and time-limited:
'There was a group running from about 1992 called the Family Organisations Group
consisting of 6 to 8 family organisations and we did a lot of work over the period
1992-95 on trying to talk to politicians and move forward. That's on hold because
this is a very difficult political period... we've turned ourselves into a sort of dining
club for a period because the Labour party is all over the place at the moment and
we can't be sure of the government either.' (Roberts)
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Through a broad based cultural discourse about family change generated by media
commentaries and academic research Roberts believes there is increasingly less dependence
on politicians to make research count, indeed in many ways there has been a power shift:
'After years of calling for the needs of families to be taken more seriously, a
perceptible change has taken place. Families have gained more confidence in
demanding that politicians listen to them.'108
Within this 'upturn' of interest in the state of 'the family' FPSC sees itself as well placed to
speak about 'actual' family trends in refutation of media-led panics. Roberts identifies issues
around fatherhood, stressed parenting and child care as main areas of concern around 'the
family' converging in populist and political analyses which are marked by contradictions,
unrealistic proposals, the unsaid and the unsayable. In many respects Robert's position is
close to Lilley's in being dubious about the benefits to women and families of labour market
change; in departing from a particular feminist line that men's inflexibility is to blame for
many of these problems; in questioning the advisability and desirability of extensive
childcare provisioning as a resource priority; and in pointing to the pressures and
contradictory messages given to mothers and fathers about the relative importance of paid
work and parenting work. Like Lilley she poses policy solutions that are geared to family
life patterns through fiscal support and family support centres rather than to labour market
demands. She is also keen to stress that their work is interested in all family life, with
families who are not suffering disadvantage as much as those who are. This is reflected in a
carefully stated but implied preference for particular family forms. Here, backing a similar
comment made by Tony Blair in July 1994:
'We feel that the research evidence is clear that on balance children do better with
two loving parents looking after them.'109
It is also evident in an expressed wish to highlight normalcy, stability and continuity in
family relations in addition to 'difference' and change. In this vein FPSC's latest research
output on contemporary fathers and fatherhood seeks to challenge:
'...some of the wilder ideas about feckless and vanishing dads that we have heard so
much about: 84% of fathers are living with all their children under 18.' (Roberts)110
Where Roberts significantly departs from Lilley's position is in believing that a
particular macro-economic framework should be set up in order to enable the most
favourable outcome of a two parent stable family. She points to the need for wage level
108 Roberts.C (1996) 'Families Are Coming Home' Family Policy Bulletin November 1996 London:
FPSC p2
109 Blair quoted in 'Labour's Stance On Single Mothers 'Slap In Face' The Guardian 26.7.94 p2
110 This is a reference to Burghes.L and Clarke.L (1997) Fathers and Fatherhood in Britain London:
FPSC
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legislation, employment creation, and employment legislation on home-work flexibility and
working hours all as pro-family policies, in order to:
'...at least cover the basic costs of family formation and family life... For too many
young people the lack of jobs not only denies them adult status and income but also
undermines their chances of setting up a home and having their own families in
stable settings... The employment costs of bearing children should be borne more
equally between all employers, parents and society.' (Roberts)
Together with family support and advice centres (for break down prevention, marriage
counselling, parent and toddler groups, parental skills, early intervention) these policies are
the mainframe of the family infrastructure needs identified by FPSC.1"
The Politics Of Contemporary Mothering, and/or Parenting?
The particular applications of FTM's arguments are productive of a limiting class-
interested bias. However, such a bias is not inherent in their arguments per se. This can be
seen in relation to the position of the single mother. FTM's basic argument is actually highly
salient to benefit claiming single mothers who are the primary focus of policies to encourage
labour market entry via institutionalised childcare, and poor mothers who are under the most
social and economic pressure to 'work'. As a couple of letters to FTM's newsletter have
made clear there are different economies at play (in terms of gender, class, and personal
values) in support of full-time motherhood than those often equated with arguments for
'stay-at-home' mothers:"2
'It's quite possible to be a Left-winger, a feminist and a stay-at-home mother.'
'I am extremely unhappy at the use of the term 'feminist' to describe women who
have children and work outside the home. To me the term means women who want
to see women enabled to reach their full potential without artificial obstacles being
put in their way and if that means staying at home with children (as I have for the
past nine years) then fair enough.'
'The problem is that as long as society defines success in terms of an impressive job
title and sizeable bank balance then us full-time mums will remain at the bottom of
the heap. I prefer to define my success in the more durable terms of my children's
development.'
'The strain of lone parenting and the need for economic security tend to drive the
mother out of the home just at the time that the children need more than ever her
security through her presence.'"3
''1
Roberts, Families Are Coming Home p2
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Assumptions that these arguments are regressive/ conservative/part of a backlash against feminism
were demonstrated in the reaction of centre-Left broadsheets to the Conservative government's pre -
1997 election announcement of plans for the re-introduction of a married couple's tax allowance to
allow mothers to stay at home . For example in 'Women Still Left Holding The Baby' Natasha Walters
argues that 'stay at home' wives are an anachronism and part of middle-aged men's wishful thinking
(The Observer 6.4.97 p27)
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Quotes from letters in FTM's newsletter September 1995, Winter 1995, Summer 1996
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Nevertheless, in Lilley's arguments there is a distancing and a narrowing of these member's
opinions through her delineation of which mothers and families FTM is most concerned to
represent: 'I think our arguments most apply to the two parent, one-eamer family'. In terms
of their specific policy recommendations this is clearly seen to be the case. Where other
teenage and single mothers could benefit from the realisation of FTM's aims, it is by default
rather than intention. Although there does remain some affinity with such mothers it is in no
way a central campaign issue:
'It's families that we address but I think the arguments also apply, well I hope they
apply to single parents as well, to all mothers... Transferable tax allowances for
married couples - that wouldn't be relevant for a lone parent because there would be
no partner to transfer their tax to if they're the one who wants to be at home. On the
other hand they've got a tax allowance, maybe they could be paid that in cash to be
full-time mothers. A realistic increase in child benefit - well that applies to all
mothers who ever they are. Index linking of the married couples allowance - we
include that because we think that most stability comes from married couples.'
(Lilley)
However, FTM's position is not specifically anti-single motherhood, and neither is it
exclusionary of other parenting arrangements where the main carer is stable:
'We do recognise in our statement aims that sometimes the traditional role of the
mother is carried out by another family member. John Bowlby talked about a mother
or a permanent mother substitute. As long as the child knows that the person looking
after them is a permanent fixture - that's really where we're coming from.' (Lilley)
Robert's assessment of the problems and needs of contemporary parents does not
seek to be gender-neutral. Both mothers and fathers parent but not in the same way:
'The term 'parenting' recognises it as a process, so in other words you can talk
about parenting and it needn't be the parent that does it. I think that if you're then
going to take it further and say that parenting is a unisex activity and that good
parenting is exactly the same whether it's done by a man or a woman I think that's a
load of nonsense and that that's quite dangerous.' (Roberts)
According to Roberts the reasons for those differences are not intrinsic to a parent's sex but
there are gender differences, many of them positive, which can and should be distinguished
in terms of role performance and for needs provision:
'I think that probably you do need two parents but that the division of labour
between two parents tends to be about society... I think you can see small children
have nurturing needs and that in our society that is predominantly provided by the
mother... I think I would say mothering type behaviour - the activities we
traditionally associate with mothers is very important, I prefer to call it nurturing.'
(Roberts)
Roberts identifies changes in the gender role of parenting, attended by confusion, inadequate
provision and a lack of voice from fathers:
171
'What we need now is a much more serious debate and men must take the lead
about what men's role should be - far too much emphasis has been on stripping
many of them of their main breadwinning role, and then telling them that the only
way to be a father is to be a nurturer and that actually women are better at that...
actually feminists and politicians have got to shut up because men have got to talk.'
(Roberts)
What organisations do you think should be facilitating that talking?
'I think that's got to emerge, I don't think there are any mainstream men's
organisations, I think that's part of the problem.' (Roberts)
In this respect Roberts believes that individual men are caught up in the contradictions and
rigidities of changes that have as yet no legislative or cultural support:
'We've been saying as a society and metropolitan feminists taking the lead in this -
'staying at home is not a very sensible thing to do, that's not the way to be a
worthwhile parent, person'. And we've been saying what you do as a breadwinner
isn't important, the important role as a father is to be a nurturer. Combine that at an
ideological level with a complete collapse of actual financial support for parenting
and also macro-economic change in male and female employment patterns and
you've got a real conundrum.' (Roberts)
These changes are discrepant in the effects they have on differently classed parents,
something that Roberts acknowledges but does not foreground in her drive to address issues
that effect 'all' parents.
Similarly, FTM's professed class neutrality is in practice laden with preferences and
priorities for some family 'types' over others."4 Through a minimal pro-active engagement
with other family forms in its media commentary and specific policy proposals there is a de
facto questioning of their legitimacy. Emphases and connections are not made or sought
across class-based distinctions: FTM is more about families than mothers per se; non-state
dependent middle class mothers rather than benefit claiming working class mothers; and
married mothers rather than single mothers. Lilley deploys a number of justificatory reasons
as to why they are most representative of the middle-class married mothers. 'Family'
support because 'most stability comes from married couples'; mothers because 'mostly it's
mothers who do the job and it's mothers who need affirmation in their role' particularly
when children are very young and 'certainly for breastfeeding.'
The class perspective of Lilley's ideas about 'good' parenting can also be seen in
the way she differentiates between the 'good' father figure as middle class and the 'bad'
father figure as characterised by a lack of official work and stability. His characteristics are
those of a staple figure of 'underclass':
114 The same neutral stance was claimed by the Conservative government with regard to 'family
policy' although the effects of their policy discourse were differentiated according to family type.
Bradshaw.J (1994) 'Family Policy In The UK' Paper for the conference 'Changes in Family Patterns
in Western Countries' Bologna, Italy 6-8 October
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'There's a difference between a floating father who turns up, lives with his
girlfriend, has a kid and moves on. There's a difference between a child
occasionally seeing him and the child who has a father who goes out to work
everyday and spends 12 hours at work. That child may never see her father much
but she knows her father is a permanent fixture... I'm not saying that the middle
class father who's out to work for 12 hours a day is a particular role model, but at
least there's a work role model.' (Lilley)
These class-based distinctions between parents characterise the discourse of
'underclass' as alternative understandings about, and prescriptions for, different parents on
the basis of class, marital and financial status. The 'truths' about contemporary parenting
that Lilley and Roberts seek to establish in their different ways, embed and are embedded by
wider normative understandings about preferable kinds of families.The incoming Labour
government in 1997 signalled their intention to retain Conservative benefit changes for
single parents and to implement a 'family-friendly' tax system in which state help for
families would come through the tax rather than benefit system in order to favour 'working
families'."5 Thus the retained abolition of the One Parent Benefit of £6.30 a week (non-
means tested) and the Lone Parent Premium of £5.20 a week (Income Support) for new
claimants and in April 1996 the freezing of those benefit levels for current claimants."6 A
major pre-election policy proposal of the Conservative government was to re-introduce the
married couple's transferable tax allowance (after 3 consecutive cuts since 1991), as called
for by FTM. This has been rejected by the 1997 incoming Labour government, choosing
instead to install in-work tax and child-care benefits for low waged mothers."7 The logic of
this change is not, however, dissimilar to that brought about by the Child Support Agency
(CSA), established by the Conservatives in 1993 in order to enforce the financial obligations
of separated parents as a means of reducing benefit dependency among lone parents."8 Its
rules were such that mothers would only be significantly better off if they moved from
Income Support to paid work and Family Credit. The Conservative government's
motivation, far from a concern for child welfare, was about encouraging benefit dependent
mothers to work. Child support only represents a direct financial gain without change to
employment or mothering choices for single mothers not on benefit or with an ex-partner in
well-paid regular employment. In other words the CSA intentionally has unequal effects on
differently classed mothers:
'There is a division in the population of lone mothers between those with and
without choices. At the bottom end of the income scale there is no choice about
pursuing child support, except with a considerable benefit penalty, whereas at the
top end some choice still exists. For women on Income Support with little prospect
115 'Tax Plan To Help Jobless' The Guardian 10.5.97 pi
116 'Tax Plan To Help Jobless' The Guardian 10.5.97 pi
117 'Women: Blair's New Deal' The Guardian 26.2.98 pi
118 Millar.J (1996) 'Family Obligations and Social Policy: The Case of Child Support' p 181 -193
Policy Studies Vol. 17 no. 3
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of raising their incomes above Income Support level, whether in or out of work, the
Child Support Act represents an erosion of their (limited) right of citizenship as lone
mothers, in as much as their entitlement to independent Income Support via public
benefit has become conditional on the obligation to be financially dependent on the
father of their children and to co-operate with the State in pursuing him, even when
there is no benefit to herself or her children.'119
It is clear from these most recent policy developments that 'family policy' via the
tax and benefits system is not based on the same construct of gender roles for all 'women'.
Instead there is a strongly class inflected policy discourse in which parenting choices for the
benefit claiming mother are heavily restricted. Indeed the most desirable outcome is that she
should move off benefits into paid work. This outcome is not just intended because of her
'welfare dependency'. It is part of another class-gender construct about the nature and
quality of poor women's mothering itself. Rather than something to be supported -
financially or culturally - it is a realm of intervention to be criticised, pathologised,
undermined, changed.120 This class-gender construct is central to the contemporary
discourse of 'underclass' where judgements - including those of Lilley and Roberts - about
what sorts of family and what sorts of parenting are socially desirable and deserving of
support proliferate. In their fullest expression these judgements are socially eugenic:
demographic trends of reproduction are presented as socially unsustainable because those
least able to financially support families are the most reproductive.121 This kind of
sociobiology draws on an historical mode of representation which has sought to construct
working class mothers as burdenous and dangerous to their children's and society's
development. The accusation that these mothers fail to discipline their children, emasculate
their sons, retard their children's educational achievement and perpetuate cycles of
disadvantage and dependency through bad role modelling is an ongoing theme in social and
'psy' professions around parenting.122 In the contemporary discourse of 'underclass' the
theme is widened from 'bad mothering' to 'bad parenting' covering the wider terrain of
issues associated with 'welfare dependency'. Poor parenting is seen as one of the main
contributors to the sorts of unruliness, delinquency and criminality exhibited by the children
of 'underclass' - in schools, on estates, on the street. The idea that parenting behaviour is
potentially dangerous and burdenous to other people in the 'wider' society, is part of a
strongly regulative policy discourse in favour of legislation around the family and civic
119 Wasoff.F and Morris.S (1994) ' The Child Support Act: A Victory For women?' Paper presented to
the Social Policy Association conference 'Families in Question' University of Liverpool 12-14 July
1994
120 The cultural lineaments of this particular discourse are traced in Walkerdine.V and Lucey.H
(1989) Democracy In The Kitchen: Regulating Motherhood, Socialising Daughters London: Virago
121 'New Breed of Non-Parents Turns Back on Family Way' The Observer 16.4.95 plO
122 See Walkerdine and Lucey, Democracy in the Kitchetr, Hill-Collins.P (1990) 'Black Women and
Motherhood' pi 15-139 Black Feminist Thought London: Unwin Hyman
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order ranging from nursery care to curfews and parental court orders. Launching such
policies in the Labour Party's strategy to improve parenting in Britain Jack Straw indicated
the political rationale of the proposals:
'We have to accept that having a child is not a totally private act, but one that has
significance for the whole community if that child grows up into a pattern of anti¬
social offending behaviour.'123
In the populist political representation of 'parenting problems' the behaviour of
working class children is used to flag issues of child 'behavioural' problems as
manifestations of where parenting has most visibly gone wrong. A prominent example was
the prolific media commentary and programming that surrounded the discipline problems of
the Ridings school in West Yorkshire during October-November 1996. The Ridings was a
'sink school' serving three working class estates in the Halifax area that over a period of
three weeks became the focus of a moral discourse about parenting, discipline and unruly
children. Expelled children became media figures in a discourse of moral outrage that
something 'had to be done', eventually leading to the closure of the school.124 The General
Secretary of the NASUWT teacher's union blamed the parents of the pupils:
'Parenting is getting worse. The problem kids of the 1970s are now producing the
impossible children of the '90s.'125
Academic analyses of parenting problems with childrearing and the anti-social
behaviour of children include issues about the relationship between parenting and paid
work. One of the most prominent writers on this subject - Amitai Etzioni - has addressed the
subject as 'The Parenting Deficit'.126 The devaluing and effective abuse of young children in
123 Straw.J and Anderson.J (1996) Parenting: A Discussion Paper London: The Labour Party
124
'Ridings Closes As Control Is Lost' The Guardian 1.11.96 pi; 'School's Out Forever' The
Observer Review 17.11.96 p6
125 'Schools 22 Month Curriculum of Chaos' The Daily Telegraph 23.10.96 p4
126 Etzioni.A (1993) The Parenting Deficit London: Demos. Etzioni argues for the necessity of a
Communitarian political project in which families are positioned as social goods at the core of 'a web
of interpersonal attachments and a shared set of values'. The relationships between children and
parents, and parents and work are key to this project. They are most strained and most in need of
change via a revalorisation of relations outside the paid economy and a restructuring of the relation
between family and working time that accords priority to parental time with children. In particular he
identifies the early pre-school years of childhood as most in need of support for full-time parenting.
The argument has some political currency with the new Labour government which has engaged with
Communitarian ideas in terms of the need for legislation to ensure balance between family and
working life. Etzioni's analysis is actually a much stronger critique of a cultural value system than that
implied in Labour's project for change in which labour market and economic demands for parents to
work outside the home take precedence. He conceives economic pressure at the lower part of the
income scale and the desire for material success at the middle and upper ends as part of a persistent
culture and economy promoted in the 1980s that undermines civil society. Both the energy and
inclination to invest in this inter-personal and social capital have been dissipated in the push for
parents to prioritise work in the paid economy. In this respect Etzioni's position is strongly aligned to
that of FTM in which community is seen to be undermined by the daily absence of mothers as the
traditional stalwarts of community work. Etzioni is similarly criticised for presenting a veiled agenda
for women to be 'returned' to the home: for example Beatrix Campbell insists that his arguments
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the push for maximal labour market participation by parents is central to both Etzioni's
'Communitarianism' and FTM's 'maternalism'. They prefer to present their positions as a
positive discourse on 'care' rather than a negative discourse on 'paid work'. As a debate it is
marked by controversy over what are often highly personal and emotive issues around the
relationships between childrearing and paid work, resources and parenting. Party political
engagement with these relationships tends to settle on the issue of childcare provision , a
consensus reflected in the recommendations of the All Party Parliamentary Group on
Parenting established in 1993.127 Their starting question was how government could respond
to the changing needs of families and the parenting needs of children, and how policy could
be formed and co-ordinated to assist families. The report presents a striking consensus
between the 47 submissions from family-related organisations. Its concluding proposals
reflect a wide field of representation around 'the family' that reflect available ways of
talking authoritatively about contemporary parenting, its problems, and policy relations. Its
part in the discourse of 'underclass' is shown in the way it settles on particular
recommendations for the problems of poor families to be solved through participation in the
paid labour market:
'Reform the benefit system to remove disincentives to work for people on benefits;
Provide and encourage a range of good quality childcare to help families work their
way out of poverty.'
Those aims are the central policy objectives of the new Labour government's approach to
'underclass'.
The Politics of Child Care
Roberts believes that the answers to complex changes in parenting, 'work' and
gender roles have been too dominated by a labour market perspective as a drive to get
everybody working with childcare provision rather than considering ways to get everybody
parenting with necessary provisions and support:
'We've got a project on families and work and what I suppose we're looking at is
why is there this rush to the labour market, why is everything more important - why
is the public via the market more important than the private and the non-market
relation?' (Roberts)
This question is the crux of contemporary feminist discussions around the parenting-paid
work relation. It necessarily goes beyond childcare as the answer to gender inequalities in
paid work and parenting roles. Indeed Roberts questions the consensual call for extensive
attribute the parenting deficit to women's entry into the labour market (Campbell.B (1995) 'Old
Fogeys and Angry Young Men: A Critique of Communitarianism' p47-65 Soundings 1).
127 The All-Party Parliamentary Group on Parenting (1994) The Report of the All Party Parliamentary
Group on Parenting London: Exploring Parenthood and The International Year of the Family
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childcare provision on a number of counts: in terms of the way it values paid work and
parenting work in relation to each other; the realism of the resource demands it makes;
unspoken issues about the sorts of changes in the worlds of work and care that parents really
want; and unspeakable issues about child welfare:
'I think there's real problems about childcare that no one's willing to talk about. It's
going to be completely out of court to provide a degree of good quality institutional
childcare on a highly subsidised basis for all parents. And then there's the other
issue about whether a) that's actually good for very young children b) whether that's
what the parents of those children really want.'(Roberts)
In government the labour market perspective dominates:
'As far as I can see the powers that be in the Labour party think that everyone
should work'. (Roberts)
The publication of the Conservative's consultation paper on childcare in 1996 ended the
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traditional Conservative tension between family and work priorities in favour of the latter.
It is a position that the FPSC is positioned against:
'This document does not seem to have thought coherently about the long-term
effects of deeper penetration of the labour market into the family. If you take a
family perspective, you would say that people should be able to choose whether to
stay at home to look after children or go out to work.'129
In this dominant political discourse around childcare, discussion about child welfare rather
than their 'educational success' is almost entirely absent, other than with regard to the utility
of early education for future exam 'success'. FPSC seeks a child-centred view of these
issues:
'We should have a national policy based on the social and development needs of
children and the diverse support needs of their parents, rather than starting from the
point of view of the needs of the labour market.'130
The reason for that absence is an unwillingness to deal with a different sort of 'needs'
discourse to that of employers, the economy and the traditional case made for child care in
terms of equality for women. There are conflicts of interest in which the time patterns,
lifestyles and lifecourses of children and parents do not necessarily fit well with current
labour market demands. Rather than question those demands the onus is on parents to be
'flexible' in order to accommodate labour market priorities. In this there is a supposition that
the needs and interests of children, parents, employers, the economy and society can be
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brought in line. FPSC is concerned to delineate the needs and interests of children as the
least powerful players in that complex.
The figure of the benefit dependent single mother highlights the extent to which
those different interests are not aligned, standing as she does at the axis of very different
'needs' discourses. Roberts is keenly aware of the class-based nature of the current political
drive to position these single mothers as workers with the argument for their childcare
'needs' at its core. Indeed the idea of flexible but supportive family-work regimes being
delivered across occupations, across differently classed families, to the equal advantage of
all women obscures class issues. There will be differently classed needs, interests and
outcomes within that regime. At the moment the most vocal interests of a particular group of
women are being made to stand for the interests of all:
'What worries me about the whole family-work debate, in particular the campaigns
organised by groups like 'Parents At Work', 'New Ways Of Working', 'Opportunity
2000' is that they are disproportionately about advantaged, qualified, healthy,
professional, white collar women to advance them in the labour market and to
enable them to combine family life with work. What they are not about is ordinary
people and it's something I can understand under a Tory government but I find it
rather distressing with the Labour party.' (Roberts)
However FPSC stops at outlining anti-poverty policies for those disadvantaged,
unqualified, often exhausted and ill benefit dependent mothers beyond 'getting them back to
work'. Even as she critiques one aspect of this discourse Roberts is caught up in another
about the desirability and acceptability of single parent welfare expenditure. With regard to
the question of whether these mothers should be required to seek work once their children
were at school if other childcare provision were available, Roberts is ambivalent:
'I find that quite difficult. I'm tempted to say yes because why should the state
support them. I do think there's not enough public discussion about the economic
consequences of lone parenthood. And this might well be the solution. But I'm also
aware that sometimes these children need more care.' (Roberts)
Certainly her predecessor as director of FPSC Malcolm Wicks (now a Labour MP) is clear
on that line, insisting on defining independence for single mothers through paid work:
'The emphasis should be on independence. The current entitlement of lone parents
to stay on Income Support until their youngest child is 16 belongs to an earlier era
and should be scrapped.'131
FTM approach the issue of government resourcing for parents by arguing for tax
allowances and child benefit increases as opposed to government funded childcare. Their
central and least contentious demand for a tax system that recognises and rewards married
couples with children, is in the contemporary period agreed upon by both Labour and
131 Wicks.M (1995) 'New Deal For Families' The Guardian 21.6.95 p 16
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Conservative parties. For FTM it is a policy direction which lessens the necessity to pursue
those arguments which relate to wider change for all mothers which would address
questions about the status accorded to different sorts of motherhood. The contradictions of
their position are revealed in relation to childcare.
FTM's strong objection to the current priority given to childcare, is not equalled by
a strength of support for the mothering status of benefit claiming mothers even though they
are targeted as the main users of extended childcare provision as part of Labour's New Deal
for single mothers. Indeed it is the position of benefit claiming mothers that is politically
used to show most clearly why childcare provision is needed and to flag demands for it.
Beyond the simplified idea of childcare as a facilitation of paid work are arguments about
the sort of children and the sort of mothers that childcare would most benefit. The dominant
position is that single parents and their children should be prioritised as beneficiaries for
their own sakes and for the widest benefits to society and the economy.132 Here we are on
the terrain of 'underclass' whose parents are also the most socially problematic and
economically burdenous. Those mothers who will benefit most are those who are currently
'welfare dependent' whose loss of earnings cost themselves and the economy too much.133
Those children who will benefit more from child care provision are those who can be better
parented - better stimulated, educated, disciplined, socialised. This position is advocated by
a number of teaching professionals who question the quality of lone mother's parenting
skills.134 And it is prominently argued for in the media by Polly Toynbee, a prominent
journalist on welfare matters who is a fervent advocate of single mothers working and of the
benefits of childcare socialisation: 'children of non-working lone parents do far worse than
children of single mothers who work'.135 A principal reason for this is that the absence of a
'working' role model inclines children towards becoming:
'...a burden on the state for life... [they] grow up with no work ethic expecting
money to come from the post office giro.'136
Public voices against the total benefits of childcare provision for industry, for the
economy, for better parenting-work relations, better parent-child relations, better gender
132 This position is argued by both Labour and Conservative parties: the former in The Labour Party
(1996)'Getting welfare to work: a new visionfor social security' London: Labour party ; the latter in
Department for Education and Employment (1996) 'Work and Family: Ideas and Options for
Childcare: A Consultation Paper' London: Department for Education and Employment
133 Joshi.H and Davies.H (1995) 'Mothers' Human Capital and Childcare in Britain' Mothers In
Employment volume 3 London: HMSO p507
134 For example see David.M.E (1993) Parents, Gender and Education Reform Cambridge: Polity
Press p3-4
135
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relations and as an effective anti-poverty strategy are very few indeed.137 It is against this
consensus that FTM opposes itself. However, Lilley's stated support for the parenting role
of single mothers, and her objection to their use in childcare campaigns is not developed as a
resource issue via the benefits system for example. She believes that motherhood could be
imbued with status via relatively small financial changes within available and tested means
of family support in tax and child benefit. In this respect FTM's policy proposals are for
much less than the pitch of their argument would otherwise suggest.
Their most vociferous opposition is towards the childcare lobby for having
promoted childcare as the most powerful idea about 'what mothers really want'. Lilley
insists that the development of this consensus is based on an economistic devaluation of
mothering-work and of children, that far from having realised 'what mothers really want'
now forms a grip on what mothers can hope to expect and what they are persuaded to regard
as important:
'Childcare is overridingly considered as an economic good... these people are
coming from two angles. Firstly, helping employers - the 'Employers For Childcare'
thing. Why is it called that? Because they can retain their staff and improve their
profit margins because if they've got to take on new staff and retrain staff then
they're going to be out of pocket. So it's coming from the employment lobby and
secondly it's coming from this sort of feminist career lobby that says most mothers
want to work. It says 'women cannot achieve full equality of opportunity when
they're prevented from taking the job of their choice by a lack of suitable childcare.'
Well where's the child in either of those? We're talking about small, developing
children with feelings - we're not talking about commercial transactions.' (Lilley)
FTM's proposals are for a mother and child centred policy frame not dictated by fiscal and
economic priorities:
'Young mothers are in the workforce as a function of existing fiscal and economic
policy more than as a statement of their real choice. It is a spurious argument to say
'this is', therefore 'must be' and therefore we have to work out childcare policies to
enable this state of affairs to continue.' (Lilley)
Following the research of the child development writer and fellow of the British
Psychological Society Dr. Penelope Leach, FTM identify the 0-3 years of infancy as
crucially in need of full-time one-to-one care, with nursery education and playgroups
thereafter.138 Employment policies should be geared to motherhood as the norm given that
most women will become mothers, rather than as aberrant inconvenience so that mothers
can mother on their own terms once their children are at school:139
137 The consensus that has developed around childcare as an unquestionable good is further traced in:
Morgan.P (1996) Who Needs Parents?: The Effects ofChildcare and Early Education on Children in
Britain and the USA London: Institute of Economic Affairs
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139
Figures suggest that 80% of women are or will become mothers: Boulton.M (1983) On Being A
Mother London: Tavistock Publications pi
180
'Instead of more childcare, more creative employment schemes are needed - flexible
working hours, five year career breaks, longer maternity leave, anti-ageist policies.'
(Lilley)
Where the predominance of the childcare consensus sets motherhood up as something to be
escaped from and improved upon primarily through paid work and often any work, Lilley
believes this feeds into the actual experience of mothering and is productive of the sort of
'self-esteem depression' that is so prevalent amongst mothers as they are pressured into the
workplace and denigrated in their motherhood.
However, the more conservative aspects of FTM's approach - a campaign which
prioritises some mothers over others, sets up classed notions of 'good' parenting and shows
an unwillingness to address issues of how resource distribution effect differently classed
families - means that the discourse of FTM is very limited as a maternalist agenda. This is
necessarily related to the conditions of its emergence culturally and politically where
support for motherhood per se and any sort of benefit dependency is less than
forthcoming.140 Nevertheless it is the only contemporary organisation that brings issues of
mothering-work and the dominance of an economistic approach to the family into prime
media space in a way that has challenged the mantra of 'getting mothers back to work'.141 It
has introduced to the discourse about parenting and paid employment questions about the
value and social support given to mothering. In doing so it partly challenges arguments for
the necessity and desirability of benefit dependent mothers placing their children in
childcare in order to take up paid work, which are central to 'underclass' discourse. FTM
present an alternative, experiential and personally committed voice to a political consensus
around 'getting mothers back to work'. Albeit indirectly, they pose important questions
about the sort of feminist politics that are necessary to challenge particular hegemonic
discourses around the problems, inadequacies and solutions to parenting in poverty.
FTM and FPSC both suggest that there is a dominant consensus about childcare as a
panacea for a number of social, economic and familial problems. The childcare issue is a
strand of 'underclass' discourse which brings together issues of inadequate parenting and
welfare dependency, often posed as the solution to both. Childcare provision represents a
way of facilitating a huge change in the conditions of benefit entitlement for lone parents by
making them 'available for work'. It becomes the condition for releasing mothers from
poverty and 'dependency' on men or the State and to push lone mothers into becoming
140 The limitations of FTM's maternalist agenda, also reflects the historically class-ridden nature of
much 'maternalist' politics when it meets poverty. See Ross.E (1993) Love and Toil: Motherhood In
Outcast London 1870-1918 Oxford: Oxford University Press
141
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workers in the paid labour market. The latter development shows the necessity of updating
long-standing social policy discourses which have identified a lack of childcare as a barrier
to choice over mothers working with regard to contemporary welfare discourses where
labour market participation is the expressed priority and likely to become coercively so for
particular mothers. Through the discourse of 'underclass' childcare provision is being set up
as a means of removing from single mothers the right not to work in the labour market until
they decide. In other words, for these mothers there will be no excuse not to work. This
development raises serious questions for feminists interested not only in the paid-unpaid
work relation, but more widely in assessing the nature of contemporary power relations
between the public and private, the economy and family life.
Discussion: Classed Discourses on Parenting
In contemporary discourses around parenting problems and work-family relations
FPSC and FTM have sought to make high profile issues of the support needs of parent-child
relations within the family. Their organisations deploy different tactics in that process. FTM
have purposefully presented a controversially titled campaign on an experiential basis to
promote motherhood and infancy as distinct and fundamentally important time periods in
the lifecourse. Their argument is for financial and cultural recognition and support for that
period unrelated to labour market participation. FPSC present themselves as a research base
organisation given over to debunking myths about the family through traditional social
scientific research objectives. Central to that work is distinguishing parenting and family
relations from labour market ones, as in need of attention and support in their own right.
Both FPSC and FTM discern that their positions are often against the grain of dominant
political developments, and of particular feminist commentaries in which the centrality of
paid work to economic and gender equal states of well-being is promoted. They are
concerned to question the basis on which policies around the family-work relation are being
made and identify a labour market premise as productive of limiting, devaluing and
increasingly pressurising elements that negatively impact on the status of parenting-work.
Both represent particular middle-class perspectives on these issues. FTM through a
primary concern to promote the interests of two parent families especially married partners
where the husband is working for a good wage and the wife wants to choose full-time
motherhood. FPSC through a disinclination to recognise or support welfare entitlements for
single mothers in poverty over and above the support needs of 'all' families. In this their
personal perspectives and interests are significant: Lilley as a middle-class, full-time mother;
Roberts as a professional, career woman. Both Lilley and Roberts claim particular feminist
connections whilst disputing particular publicly dominant manifestations of feminism.
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Although both are concerned to speak about stressed parenting and the devaluation of
parenting work, they are not concerned to represent people for whom those issues are most
amplified in the contemporary period. 'Underclass' parents are problematic for them
because their apparent characteristics do not fit their preferred template of the family. Both
promote ideas about parenting on benefits as undesirable. These discriminations of class
converge in attitudes to the benefit dependent single mother.
Getting Poor Mothers 'Back To Work': Devaluing Working Class Home Places?
Feminist critiques of Amitai Etzioni's work on 'the parenting deficit' have
identified the re-introduction of a conservative and woman-blaming element to his analysis
of family decline.142 It is seen as a proposition for women to 'get back to the kitchen sink'
and as a moral exhortation against working mothers. The discussion runs parallel with
particular political and media commentaries which support policies for welfare dependent
mothers to 'get back to work'. It seems clear that the idea of women being told to 'get back'
to anywhere is an affront to women and to feminism that should be resisted. But this matter
is unfortunately more complicated because arguments against the idea of paid women
workers 'getting back to the kitchen sink' are being used to provide contemporary welfare
discourses around single mothers with an apparently feminist credited argument for 'getting
mothers back to work'. In other words, the idea that single mothers want to take up paid
work which they were previously denied access to, is now being used to encourage benefit
claiming mothers to be seen primarily as unemployed workers.
Lilley and Roberts both seek to counter the idea that the home can be reduced to the
'kitchen sink' with ideas about the importance of parent-child relations, of family-based
attachments and interdependencies which are increasingly stressed and undermined by
external market pressures. However these arguments are not fully extended to 'underclass'
single mothers whose 'benefit dependency' positions them as 'other' and is an affront on
two counts. Firstly it is an affront to tax paying working mothers and fathers who are
parenting and 'working' for whom benefit mothers are presented as an unemployed tax
burden. Secondly it is as an affront to particular middle class parenting sensibilities. 'Bad'
parenting is inflicting juvenile delinquents and pregnant teenagers on the wider society who
must pay the price.
Both these 'affronts' can be addressed by a socialist feminism that is attuned to the
power dynamics of class and gender which constitute the contemporary period of
'underclass'. The issue of child care is a salient starting point. The relation between
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feminism and childcare is highly contentious because it forces together issues of labour
market gender equality and domestic power relations, with issues about the boundaries of
State-family relations, the status of motherhood and the value of paid work. It also
necessitates questions about resource priorities in relation to paid and unpaid work. The
issue of childcare has in many ways been central to feminist discussions around domestic
and labour market inequalities.141 It is of renewed interest in the contemporary period which
projects high increases in the numbers of mothers entering the labour market.
A demand for '24 hour nurseries' was one of the four original demands of the first
women's liberation conference in 1970, seeking to challenge:
'...women's de facto responsibility for the care of young children... [as] a
fundamentally determining aspect of their social subordination.'144
The radical nature of this demand has been tempered by an acceptance in
mainstream politics of the national economic and demographic necessity for mothers to
enter the labour market.145 The need for childcare has therefore largely become a resource
question rather than an ideological one about the desirability of mothers working. Along
with this development by the late 1970s a feminist literature on motherhood had challenged
many of the negative meanings around motherhood associated with the early feminist
movement in which childcare was conceived of as an escape route from the domestic role.
These new writings on motherhood embraced it as an experience, developed it in terms of a
maternal value system, and used it to reconstitute meanings around the value of paid and
unpaid work.146 Reflecting women's own ambivalent feelings about child care these
theoretical developments within feminist writings mean that there is no one 'feminist
position' on childcare.
However, contemporary political and media commentaries on the subject have
reverted to the language of sexual equality in the labour market and liberation from
'dependency' as a means of gaining support for provision. And in the context of declining
political support for benefit expenditure and the vilification of 'non-working' families, these
original aims have new meanings.
Harriet Harman's book The Century Gap gives a good indication of where
contemporary political ideas on childcare are located.147 As Secretary of State for Social
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Security under the 1997 Labour government and as chairwoman of the cabinet sub¬
committee on women, she is positioned to place childcare as a central plank of a new
welfare regime. The premise of the book is that there is a gap between the lives of men and
women in terms of the distance women have travelled from domesticity into the world of
work. Her thesis is that men have not filled this gap through a parallel journey into
domesticity and in this respect they are a century behind. She outlines the increasing
importance of women's paid work to society and calls for greater female equality and
representation through policies that accommodate women's 'unwillingness' to sacrifice their
'careers' and their relationships with their families. Society needs men to 'catch up' via
moves into domestic roles and for them to recognise the loss they bear by not participating
in the upbringing of their children. This shift can be partly facilitated by childcare provision
to enable both sexes to share work and home responsibilities. The case for childcare is
further made in terms of economic savings and children's social development. Public money
invested in childcare would bring a return when the savings to the Exchequer from tax and
national insurance receipts and benefits savings from additional mothers going out to work
are calculated into the equation. This argument is clearly directed at mothers on benefits for
whom 'work' has the added advantage of breaking 'cycles of welfare dependency'. This is a
major motivation of New Labour's 'welfare to work' strategy which has been promoted by
Frank Field MP as Minister for Welfare Reform, in terms of restoring links between
welfare, human nature and morality which translates into cutting the welfare 'supply routes'
to single parenthood.148 In this regard childcare's role of facilitating economic participation,
is part of a wider role of socialisation. In line with the perspective of the Equal
Opportunities Commission and the much quoted IPPR report Childcare in a Modern
Welfare System, Harman argues that children with pre-school nursery care are more likely to
complete their schooling than those without it. They are also more likely to be employed and
to support themselves, and nursery educated girls are more likely to have jobs and less likely
to be teenage mothers.149 Childcare is therefore an investment to reduce benefit expenditure
and 'dependency', to better socialise working class children and to move towards a gender
neutrality in relations of 'work' and 'care'. To this end an initial £300 million will be made
available for extended childcare provision from April 1998, and 50,000 18-24 year olds will
be trained as childcare assistants as part of the 'welfare to work' New Deal. Two-thirds of
the New Deal recruits are male and it is therefore expected that they will make up a large
number of the new childcare workforce.150
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This pro-childcare discourse is highly prescriptive about what is best for children,
mothers, the economy and society. Where mother's and children's needs happily coincide
with those of the labour market, the values of that prescription are overwhelmingly
economistic and rationalistic. Dissenting voices come from the margins of mainstream
politics. The 'Wages For Housework Campaign' (recently described in The Guardian
newspaper's 'Women' section as a 'cult') contests the too easy equation of working women
with careers and choice.151 Traditionally conservative defenders of the family such as the
'Family and Youth Concern' group here overlap with WFHC:
'Women are now forced to work even if they would like to stay at home. When we
read about working women it always seems to be women judges and professionals.
There's nothing desirable about a career for women who have to stuff frozen
chickens or be chamber maids.'152
This perspective insists on the difference that class makes to 'working women'. Careers,
salaries, self-realisation, and empowerment are not part of the same reality as waged work,
casualisation, low wages, alienation.
Positive understandings about the difference that class makes to the politics of
mothering are exemplified in the black feminist writings of bell hooks and Patricia Hill-
Collins.153 Their work on the way black mothering is represented in negation of the
economic and cultural experiences of black family lives resonates politically with the
contemporary situation of working class, 'welfare dependent' single mothers. Despite the
different cultural histories between these groups many of the same stereotypes are deployed
about families that are inadequately and irresponsibly parented, cause pathological gender
development, are over-reproductive, scrounging and lazy. In this context the meanings of
motherhood and the home are very different to those produced by many of the white, middle
class discourses around parenting and work that constitute politically vocal and powerful
expressions of feminism in party politics, lobbying groups and organisations like the Equal
Opportunities Commission. Hill-Collins talks about interlocking social inequalities in which
particular oppressions are more keenly felt than others. She identifies the discourse of flight
from the 'private' by middle class women seeking personal autonomy via the 'public' sphere
as characteristic of the early Women's Liberation Movement. That discourse in many ways
still constitutes public manifestations and understandings of what 'feminism' is about and
continues not to speak to large numbers of poor and/or non-white women for whom the
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meanings of 'home' and 'family', of 'public' and 'work' are differently experienced. For
these women conflict is often located elsewhere:
'The locus of conflict lies outside the household, as women and their families
engage in collective efforts to create and maintain family life in the face of forces
that undermine family integrity.'154
In terms of the theorising that this understanding produces there are different themes
and priorities around material survival, struggles against the intervention of external
agencies, pro-natalist values, and the affirmation of cultural difference. For the subjects of
'underclass' discourse the realities of poverty, unemployment, imprisonment and children
being taken into 'care', mean that their 'parenting problems' will be differently understood.
These differences often constitute the home as a site of resistance to the incursions of
dominant middle-class family norms and the external oppressions of low waged, degrading
work, hooks talks about the experiences of those mothering in poverty as struggling for
economic survival with poor work or poverty level benefits undermining their ability to
parent; stress and depression taking away their time and energy and importantly 'the right
of children to effective child care by parents and other childrearers.'155
I would argue that it is such conditions that increasingly prevail for working class
single mothers in poor work and on benefits whose parenting abilities and choices have less
than marginal political representation in current welfare discourses. For the benefit
claiming single mother (in degraded alliance with the unemployed young working class
male) the 'public' space increasingly represents a surveillant, coercive and punitive space.
This is a space occupied by unruly children on the streets, criminal young men on public
housing estates and single mothers greedy for public resources. At the same time the 'poor
home', the 'poor private', is presented as a sphere in need of public intervention. It becomes
fixed in a public gaze as the source of dysfunction, and for the poor it often becomes a place
of refuge. The 'underclass' need to be ejected from their sofas and into the workplace. The
'poor' home and its family relations are no longer private because their 'bad' choices are at
a cost to the public purse and to public order. They become public property. The
'underclass' must work and their children placed in public childcare.
Two places where political representations against such developments have
traditionally been located are the welfare lobbying group, the 'National Council For One-
Parent Families'(NCOPF), and in discourses of social justice supported by the Labour Party
and exemplified in their 'Commission on Social Justice'(CSJ) set up in 1992. My last
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interviews were with Ann Spackman NCOPF Chairwoman and Professor Ruth Lister, a
spokeswoman for the CSJ.
Ruth Lister and Ann Spackman on: Welfare Policy for Single Mothers and Feminism
Between 1970-1990 the number of single parents in Britain more than doubled to
over one and a quarter million which is one in five of all families with children. Over 90%
of those were single mothers and two-thirds of that 90% in receipt of Income Support or
Family Credit.156 Since the beginning of the Welfare State, policy discourses around these
benefit dependent single mothers have illustrated ambiguity over whether they should be
regarded as mothers or workers, or how those roles should be balanced.157 In the current
period their increasing numbers has posed the question anew with their 'cost' to the State as
its emphasis. Current policy for benefit dependent single mothers with dependent children
under 16 years of age does not require them to register as unemployed and 'available for
work'. In April 1997 the Conservative Government launched a £20 million 'Parent Plus'
pilot project in 12 areas, in which single mothers attend job centres to discuss work
availability and childcare provision in an attempt to build individualised job and training
packages. This is very similar to the new Labour government's plans for every single mother
with children of school age to attend job centres for 'career interviews' and access to
government funded individual learning accounts which would enable them to purchase
training.158
Differently motivated arguments about single mothers being enabled, encouraged, or
pushed into 'work' make for a highly contentious policy area. The distinctions between
these approaches seem increasingly blurred, raising questions about State support for
women's roles as mothers and workers. The discourse of 'underclass' is centrally
constituted by these discussions with regard to the benefit dependent single mother. At the
nexus of a range of different trends and political causes, it is unsurprising that the single
mother of 'underclass' is a highly contradictory figure: a production of conflicting
motivations, needs, wants and interests. In the contemporary period two powerful players in
that production have been the National Council For One-Parent Families and the
Commission On Social Justice.
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From Welfare To Work
NCOPF was originally established in 1918 as a campaigning organisation and
pressure group called the 'Unmarried Mother and her Child', representing almost the entire
range of welfare organisations for single women and their children at the time. Its stated
objectives were to reform the Bastardy Acts, and to provide accommodation and nurseries to
allow mothers to work, mainly in domestic service. These aims are continued in the
contemporary period through campaigns to change public and political attitudes to single
parenthood and to facilitate single parents' employment.159 Since the mid-1980s under the
direction of Sue Slipman the predominant campaigning and organisational role of NCOPF
has been geared to a national 'Back To Work' strategy as the most realistic means of
producing 'an independent life in the mainstream' for single parents. This strategy is
reflected in the title of its 75th anniversary publication 1918-1993 From the Workhouse to
the Workplace.
The relation of NCOPF to the discourse of 'underclass' works through a powerful
commentary role on issues of benefit 'dependency', parenting and family form. Perhaps the
most significant moment in media and political attention to the single motherhood-
'underclass' relation in the contemporary period was the transmission of the BBC Panorama
'Babies On Benefit' in September 1993. Watched by 5 million viewers, the programme
generated an enormous media response, public reaction through newspaper letter pages and
a year long legal dispute between the BBC, the Broadcasting Complaints Commission
(BCC) and NCOPF. The programme hit the nerve of a debate which had started in July of
the same year after comments by John Redwood, then Secretary of State for Wales, who had
used a visit to the St. Mellons estate in Cardiff to evidence the notion that young women
were choosing single parenthood as a means of guaranteeing entitlement to State benefits
and housing. That idea had been an ongoing Conservative theme of populist conference
speeches and tabloid media attention from the 1980s through to the 1990s. Panorama set out
to 'investigate' this trend in response to Redwood's comments and presented evidence from
the mouths of single mothers on the estate which seemed to confirm them. It then revealed
how benefit capping in the American state of New Jersey had been able to stymie such
developments: reducing the number of babies conceived by 50% in the first month of
becoming law. The programme started with an interview with Michelle Ellis aged 22, a
never-married mother of four children expecting her fifth child. The commentary
extrapolated her situation:
159 Reform of the 'Bastardy Act' came in the 1987 Family Law Reform Act. Slipman regards her part
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'There are nearly half a million women in Britain like Michelle. She's single, she
lives alone with her children and she relies on the taxpayers to provide for them.'
The programme's conclusion, in relation to the New Jersey 'success story' was:
'Those behind the reforms claim this is proof that people's behaviour can be
changed by removing free handouts from the State.'
NCOPF's refutation of the programme was largely based on the typicality of the
cases presented in terms of numbers and the attitudes of the women represented. They also
challenged the programme's examination of the policy options to reduce 'welfare
dependency' in particular the dismissal of childcare out of hand as 'too expensive' while
American style benefit reductions were presented as a tested solution. NCOPF's complaint
was supported by the Chartered Institute of Housing whose Policy Director said the idea of
single parents jumping the housing queue needed to be laid to rest.160 The Broadcasting
Complaints Commission finally ruled in favour of NCOPF, and in response the BBC, for the
first time in its history rejected the BCC finding and took the case to judicial review. It won
on the issue of NCOPF's right to have brought the case in the first place.
The debacle was a central part of what Ann Spackman calls 'the year of the single
mother'. As the Chairwoman of NCOPF, a journalist and a barrister who represented
NCOPF's case against the BBC at judicial review, Ann Spackman has been centrally
involved in the development of this central part of the discourse around 'feckless' single
mothers.
The Commission on Social Justice was set up by the Labour Party under the
auspices of the IPPR in 1992: the 50th anniversary of the Beveridge Report. It was intended
to reconfigure welfare policy on the political Left via a wide-ranging debate of ideas and
policy between a number of independent, prominent experts. To that end it took written and
oral evidence from a large number of organisations and individuals including FPSC, Frank
Field MP, NCOPF and the Wages For Housework Campaign. As a contemporary Left-wing
statement on social justice it assumed a powerful and much quoted position with regard to
the future of welfare. Many of its ideas are now part of the policy debate that surrounds
'underclass' on the political Left in ideas about social exclusion and the necessary
constitution of a modem welfare state. It has been given party political and feminist
affirmation:
'Its report will inform Labour's policy making and provide the basis for a vital
national debate about the future of work and welfare.'161
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'The Labour party is certainly more tuned in than it has been to the issues and
problems that confront women, as evidenced in... the impressively 'feminised'
understanding of the contemporary labour market that underpins the report of the
Commission on Social Justice.'162
Its policy proposals for transforming the welfare state, for education and training,
and for community regeneration all relate to the policy discourse around 'underclass'. Its
discussions on the contemporary position of women in society generally, are central to the
sorts of policies that it proposes for the problems of benefit claiming single mothers in
particular. Those problems are primarily figured in terms of exclusion from the labour
market, marginalisation in a social and economic revolution conceived as a gender
revolution:
'...a revolution of women's life chances, of family structure and of demography.'163
The first proposal for its vision of social justice as a 'fair and efficient distribution of
unemployment and employment', is directly targeted at lone mothers as part of the
unemployed:
'We propose a new Jobs, Education and Training strategy (JET) to get the long-term
unemployed and lone mothers back to work.'164
This is envisaged as being part of a wider re-organisation of work and family life in which
there should be no difference between women's and men's work - paid or unpaid. It requires
women and men to change stereotyped notions of what sorts of work they do so that:
'...women are able to share financial responsibility for their children and men to
share the emotional and practical responsibilities of parenthood.'165
There is an acceptance that because growth in the economy is in part-time, service sector
work (traditionally occupied by women), men will have to lower expectations which
otherwise act as barriers to gender equality:
'Concern about male unemployment should not lead to romantic notions about the
re-creation of the male breadwinner earning a family wage. The old jobs which
offered a reasonable wage to men without a good education will not return.'166
Social justice in these terms is primarily about enabling participation in the labour market,
whilst the nature of available work is secondary and amenable to positive change via a
minimum wage and signing up to the European Social Chapter. With regard to benefits
provision, social justice comes from an 'intelligent welfare state' that 'works with rather
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than against the grain of change.'167 That grain of change is primarily labour market driven
necessitating 'welfare to work' benefits that are a 'hand up' rather than a 'hand out'.168
The Commission's Report does engage with the issue of 'social capital' produced
by caring work outside of the market relation but for those parenting in poverty the central
emphasis is on routes out of poverty via paid work rather than higher benefit levels as an
investment in social capital. Indeed social capital is not viable on its own, only in relation to
economic capital via labour market participation:
'Labour market and family policy go together; the social revolution in women's life
chances demands a reappraisal of the role of men as workers and fathers as well as
that of women as employees and mothers.'169
As a Commission member, Professor Ruth Lister was responsible for some of the
report's recommendations and allied to most of them. Since the report's publication she has
assumed a commentary role on its proposals in which she occupies a powerful interpretative
position. As such she has been able to develop its discourse with caveats, clarifications and
her own priorities.
Representing Pragmatism
Both Lister and Spackman identify themselves as feminist and believe that the work
of the CSJ and NCOPF respectively contain strong elements of a feminist agenda. For Lister
that is a positive choice related to her personal politics and to her direct involvement with
the emergence of the Women's Liberation Movement in the 1970s. Her active feminist
politics emerged in relation to her work as Director of The Child Poverty Action Group
whose campaigning made direct links between women and poverty. Lister worked on issues
such as sex discrimination in the Social Security system:
'I'd definitely describe myself as a feminist... it has to be said these days. I came to
it in a sense through my work, obviously I think I was sympathetic but I hadn't
become involved. When I was working at CPAG, I'd written a pamphlet about co¬
habitation rules and a group of women contacted me. They were organising a
conference - kind of launching the fifth demand of the Women's Movement - a
campaign for financial independence. Then I joined the group, became very active
in it and it broadened from that.' (Lister)
Lister now regards feminism as an intrinsic element of her work and as something that is
part of her personal identity. This merging of the personal and political is something that has
implications for the sort of feminism which is represented through her work and speaks to a
range of concerns in social policy. Because her 'personal' happens to be located in a
relatively powerful social position, it partly acts as a public manifestation of what feminism
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'is'. Moreover, as a middle class, professorial academic and political spokeswoman her
authority to speak inheres in her social position, something of which she is reflexively
aware:
'In a way I suppose many of those things I fight for both politically and
academically are for me, well the things I have... I think my very strong emphasis
going back through my work in the fifth demand group on women's economic
independence -1 think reflects my own terror of being economically dependent on a
man. That is very much for me where the personal and political fit together... But I
think to say you can only write about things you've experienced then it becomes
completely reductive. I mean you don't know that what you're arguing for is
necessarily the things that the people you're arguing for want but I think if you're in
that kind of position you can't agonise over that too much. I think you have to try
and find a way. Partly writing in the third person is a kind of recognition that I can't
speak for all women.' (Lister)
The 'representation' problematic is central to NCOPF's position on 'feminism'.
Spackman is careful to specify the sort of gender politics they are aligned to, in order that
they can maintain a reputation of being 'representative'. Unlike the work of the CSJ,
NCOPF has a particular constituency which it claims to represent and which it represents
itself to. Spackman regards feminist politics as inherent in the nature of the work of NCOPF
but something that is also implicit rather than being an official line. How feminism might
relate to single parenthood is a pragmatic question rather than an a priori position. Indeed
some of their stances are opposed to the sort of feminist position NCOPF are often assumed
to take:
'I think you could assume that most of the people who sit on the Committee are
feminists in the broad modern sense of the word and many of us would feel very
supportive of other parts of a feminist agenda. Having said that we don't in any
sense see ourselves as part of a campaign to say that lone parenthood is a good
thing, to promote lone parenthood, to say that women have rights to have children
whatever their circumstances. In fact we have quite consciously taken a negative
stance with some of those positions that could be described as radical feminist. We
don't support those and the reason we don't as a principle is because we think
they're actually alienating to the vast majority of people, because they don't actually
accurately reflect their problems.' (Spackman)
NCOPF are not about supporting single parenthood as a lifestyle choice or as a family form
that is anti the 'patriarchal' or nuclear family. Their representative pitch is that they are a
mainstream organisation for a mainstream group of parents who have particular problems
often related to discrimination. This involves 'mainstreaming', normalising single parent
families and even distancing themselves from those lone parents who are atypical, 'bad
examples' of single parents. The Michelle Ellis figure on the 'Babies on Benefits' Panorama
was one such atypical bad example, on whom Spackman comments in a newspaper article:
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'No-one would consider her to be anything other than feckless and irresponsible.'170 Most
single parents are not so by choice and for them:
'...hope springs eternal... most continue to want to find a good man as opposed to
the one who left them or they left and felt let down by.' (Spackman)
It is these women who are most representative of single mothers and whom NCOPF is most
keen to represent:
'We have spent most of our time trying to say to people: 'lone parenthood is your
sister who's divorced', you know - 'it's someone I know', that lone parenthood is a
part of society, it's not some odd person who's made some odd decision. It's sort of
mainstreaming it. And in a sense lone parents have got a bad reputation through the
very people who do choose to have children on their own which is something that a
lot of people are very hostile to. The vast majority of lone parents are not happy to
be in this position and they never thought they would be either. If we were to spend
our time and other people's money campaigning on things like that it would make us
very unpopular.' (Spackman)
The note of pragmatism is clear. NCOPF are involved in a very managed sort of
representation, that is as much about themselves as representatives as it is 'what single
mothers are saying'. This style was instituted under the ten year directorship of Sue Slipman
(who left in 1995):
'She essentially decided we were in a very strong period of Conservative
government and there was no political mileage to be gained at the time campaigning
for increased benefits - which is actually the way directly you'd make lone parents
better off, because nobody had that on the political agenda. That was our position
when there was mileage in that, there was a party committed to that - to increasing
benefits - and there was a party opposed to it. In the early '80s that political ground
started to shift and shift quite fast.' (Spackman)
The result was a shift of focus for NCOPF to make support for single mothers entering the
labour market their main campaigning issue. Benefits became something to escape from
rather than something to be defended or increased. Through that change, the position of
NCOPF was itself politically mainstreamed. It was taken seriously by all political parties as
the 'pay-off' because its line could be politically accommodated. It could nevertheless claim
to have set the agenda:
'Basically Sue Slipman has set the agenda and now there's not a political party
that's not signed up to that. So it has not become a political position because the
Conservatives took it up, because the Labour party has also taken it up....We have
become a group that is reasonably well respected within the family lobby, we have
sensible ideas, we carry projects through, we do a lot of service provision, so we're
involved in a lot of things they can sign up to. And also we represent a group that
they all find now politically very difficult. The reason we're talked to is not because
we're their mates, we're not. The reason we're talked to by both parties is that they
think we've got something sensible to say and if we don't have that we're nothing.'
(Spackman)
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The sense of all this is that NCOPF have been able to gain a power to influence some parts
of policy through adopting a 'realistic' position seen as the only position-with-power
available at the time. Having something 'sensible' to say is the condition of the power
relation. One of its outcomes is that the content of what they are saying is derived from a
highly political accommodation: the politics of their representative position are constitutive
of its substance. This discourse on the needs of single mothers is therefore a product of what
is 'sensible' for the times, and the process of its production ensures a power position for
NCOPF. The needs of single mothers are generated through that power play, and they are
seen to be met when provisions are made. NCOPF can thus be affirmed as a success, as an
organisation which meets the needs of single mothers. In the contemporary period those
needs are defined in terms of escape from benefit dependency via the labour market. It is a
position which suits a number of political objectives, where the allegiance of NCOPF as a
potentially oppositional force is clearly desirable. It means that conflict can be subsumed:
NCOPF has facilitated the understanding that the needs of the single mother, are the same as
the needs of the labour market, are the same as those of the economy, of society, of 'public
opinion'.
In this respect the idea of NCOPF as a pro-active lobbying organisation is
undermined to the extent that their 'success' is shown to fit a particular political agenda.
Spackman's comments make it clear that they are essentially reactive:
'We haven't tended to be proactive because lone parenthood has been such a hot
political issue.' (Spackman)
They work with other big power players:
'On welfare to work we set the agenda and we've been proactive in a business way -
in business partnerships with people like Northern Foods. We want to be in there
with business, business institutes - the CBI and TECs, persuading them, working
with them.' (Spackman)
They are interested in maintaining a professional identity:
'We don't put our resources into lobbying. Most of the people here are involved in
producing high class information, or setting up options, getting people back to
work.' (Spackman)
They are not aligned with traditional anti-poverty political organisations who they believe
represent different gender interests, and different ideas about the material interests of single
mothers:
'We have found some of the TUC links to Labour quite difficult because in a sense
what do they want with us getting more lone parents to work when they're trying to
get their male members back to work. So that other aspect of Labour is quite
antithetical to the things we want to do.'
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'We departed from the Welfare State, 'increase benefits' line, parting ranks with a
lot of charities and voluntary organisations and we haven't been forgiven for that
even now.' (Spackman)
The trade-in for 'disconnection' on these fronts is being well-connected and resourced on
others:
'We run option fairs where we have government money, private sector money to
actually help lone parents get back to work.' (Spackman)
With the media they have developed a parallel track as providers of 'factual' information
and pragmatic positions rather than polemic and campaigning:
'Generally we have a very favourable position with broadcasters and all broadsheets
who come to us for matters of fact, although we're still not status quo because lone
parents are such a political hot potato.' (Spackman)
Spackman regards the Babies On Benefit/BBC debacle as a very separate and anomalous
case. Generally they are seen to have reaped the media reward of 'modernising' themselves:
'We're highly regarded because we changed in a way lots of other organisations
didn't in the late 1970s/ early 1980s with political infighting and internal
differences. We were purposefully not agit-prop and we were credited for it. We
wouldn't fight battles we knew we couldn't win.' (Spackman)
This same note of pragmatism is sounded, but much more resignedly and
ambivalently by Ruth Lister in relation to both her academic position and the work of the
CSJ. Her academic work is strongly policy related because of its disciplinary nature in the
field of Social Policy but in order to establish a political audience it still requires active
promotion. It is a process in which she is advantageously positioned as a well-established
policy commentator:
'A lot of the stuff I'm asked to do is a semi-accommodation of the academic and
political. On the book I've just written on citizenship people have said 'ooh it'll be
out just after the election' but I don't think it's the sort of book politicians would
read - it's too theoretical. I hope it's accessible but politicians aren't very interested
in theory although there are policy implications there. Ideally what I'll do is pull
them out and try and get more publicity around that side of it.' (Lister)
These academic-political links can be thwarted, as well as actively promoted. Either way
they are dependent on the complexion and dynamics of wider political discourse. The
apparent shift brought about by the Labour party's 'modernising' project has changed the
influence that her work might have had. Her political line to the Labour front bench has
become 'less and less' so that she is now more likely to be represented to them through the
media and regarded as a critic:
'As an ex-member of the Commission on Social Justice I have a position that the
media will use as someone who is critical of where Labour is going and not many
people are willing to stand up and say that. So they quite like someone who is linked
to politics but not of politics that they can turn to.' (Lister)
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The development of a party political terrain that is less easily defined along a
traditional Right-Left axis means that Lister no longer sees herself as part of a particular
lobby but as occupying different positions in a shifting network of alliances:
'There's so many shades of positioning now, I suppose it depends on which way
you're facing - if you're facing towards the Conservatives then I still identify with
the poverty lobby. If I'm facing towards the Labour party I feel quite uneasy
because I do feel it difficult to pigeon hole myself there politically. So I find myself
getting involved with things like Red Pepper to try for strategic intervention, but
then I also get involved with this Nexus thing which is much more Blairite because I
still feel I ought to try to use my relative insider position in some ways. So I sort of
straddle.' (Lister)
This 'straddler' position includes work with the Right-wing think-tank the Institute for
Economic Affairs:
'I've actually just written an introduction to the IEA books by Charles Murray -
they're doing a sort of omnibus version and they asked me if I'd edit it. That I did
have to think very hard about, thinking 'well who's using who here?', thinking 'well
do I want to write for the IEA?' But the term 'underclass' and the way it's used is
something I feel very strongly about, so I thought 'well actually this is a way of
actually getting my views across in a different forum than I normally would.'
(Lister)
However Lister maintains that there are definite limits to these sorts of 'unlikely' relations
which are political attempts to broaden particular discourses:
'They're very odd at the IEA - it's the Health and Welfare Unit. A few years ago
they had these consensus conferences where they invited kind of Centre-Left
academics to meet with Right-wingers to discuss some of these issues and I think
they had this sort of naive idea that all sensible thinking people will come to the
same conclusions in a very civilised way. I mean a lot of this Norman Dennis stuff
originated from that.'171 (Lister)
One result of this shifting political terrain is a shift in what is considered to be a 'realistic'
argument for party politics, a consequent marginalisation of what were previously
mainstream Left-wing positions and a realignment in which people are more strategic than
principled in their politics:
'I think there has been a shift in where the centre ground is, so everything's shifted
to the Right. So yes I think I probably have shifted to the Right from where I was in
the 70s - it's this whole thing about what's realistic in this situation we're in... The
kind of people now who are writing things in this area -1 suppose trying to influence
Labour front bench, they're the kind of people that 20 years ago would have been
writing rather different things and they'd say of course it's different times. There is
a sense that you're made to feel old-fashioned if you're saying the same thing... I
think for some it's a genuine change, for others a kind of negative decision - 'do you
want to marginalise yourself?' (Lister)
171 This is a reference to the Norman Dennis publications by the Institute of Economic Affairs: The
Invention OfPermanent Poverty (1997) and Families Without Fatherhood (1993) which set out an
'ethical socialist' position against traditional Left-wing analyses of poverty.
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There are some issues however, on which Lister believes principled positions need to be
maintained and the use of the concept 'underclass' is one such issue:
'When Frank Field published Losing Out I think he got publicity because it was
actually about 'the underclass' rather than the poor, you know because it's
newsworthy and it's very media-friendly - the fear and danger stuff.172 So some
people argue that therefore we should use it. I just think it's counterproductive, that
alright it might get more publicity but if you're creating an image of fear - 'they're
different from us', it's not going to make people open to policies that will actually
do something about it. It'll be Law and Order and just keep away from them really...
we should not use the term except when critiquing it.' (Lister)
Lister distinguishes the level of pragmatism associated with the work of the CSJ,
originally set up as Labour's welfare modernising project, as mild in comparison to the way
it has been used by the Labour party:
'The Labour party policy documents which came out, bits of which were heavily
influenced by the CSJ, had no mention of the CSJ. It was like they felt they had to
distance themselves because already they were positioning the CSJ as almost Old
Labour.' (Lister)
There are clearly strong elements of a pragmatist agenda in place in the report of the CSJ, in
particular their 'welfare to work' approach to benefits provision and positioning of single
mothers in terms of their 'unemployment'. There was also not an absolute consensus about
all aspects of the final report but an overall agreement that strategic unity was needed. Since
its publication Lister has made moves to specify and emphasise different aspects:
'Most of us made compromises a bit and went along with some things that we
weren't as happy about as others. We were all very keen not to write a minority
report or anything like that and there were no huge splits. When I'm out speaking
about the report I'll emphasise some proposals and not others.' (Lister)
'Underclass' Femininities
NCOPF's perceived need to maintain a particular sort of representative role requires
adherence to a management strategy. Spackman acknowledges that NCOPF's position on
'unrepresentative' single mothers (rather than the 70% majority) is problematic in this
regard:
'We have been defending the 70% more than the others and are now more aware of
how this might be seen - as somehow going along with the idea of the 'feckless
poor'. And we are keen to be seen as representing all single mothers really. So we're
not supporting the trends but them as human beings in difficult circumstances,
especially now this is a growing group - the 20-24 year olds are about 36% and the
other group of widowed, separated and divorced single mothers are shrinking to 60-
65%.' (Spackman)
172 This is a reference to Field.F (1989) Losing Out: The Emergence ofBritain's Underclass London:
Basil Blackwell
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These mothers need to be carefully managed. The terms of their support are therefore still
very much conditioned by the limitations of their preferred and predominant image of older,
once married, responsible single mothers. As 'human beings in difficult circumstances'
these 'other' single mothers are in need of social support of a particular kind. NCOPF is
keen to promote 'parenting and family initiatives' for these mothers:
'...supporting schemes like grandparent mentoring to give advice on parenting non-
judgmentally - rather than arguments for big welfare change.' (Spackman)
NCOPF is also targeting these groups for education programmes which will show
cohabitation to be even more insecure than marriage:
'They need to know what the risks and trends of particular sorts of relationships
are.' (Spackman)
The emphasis of support is for education against particular relationship choices and
parenting behaviours. Moreover, their problems are defined in terms that position NCOPF as
providers of solutions. Other problems such as poverty level benefits are not prioritised
because NCOPF do not deem them to be realistic. The way NCOPF speaks for this
represented constituency is therefore highly selective and rather 'matrician' as a 'we know
best' and 'don't mess it up with your out-of-favour atypicality' approach. This matter is
something that was a major point of contention in the 'Babies On Benefit' furore. NCOPF
were accused of trying to dictate which single mothers should appear on television, saying
that the programme makers should have used different single mothers who were not
'breeding like rabbits on the taxpayer'.173 By attacking the programme through the
Broadcasting Complaints Commission which is meant for individual complaints of
unfairness NCOPF was accused of bringing a case that was more about defending its own
reputation than those of the single mothers concerned. Indeed NCOPF described these
mothers as - 'feckless and irresponsible' and 'at the worrying end of the scale of parental
and human competence'.174 Panorama's editor took particular objection on that front:
'So the BCC finds itself ruling against the individual's right to say what she likes
and believes just because it goes against the lobby group's party line. What right
does anyone have to say that other people cannot speak for themselves?'175
This complaint brokers the issue of the representative power of pressure groups. NCOPF's
response to the programme was clearly set on issuing a replacement 'truth' about single
mothers: one that was basically more palatable and more representative. Michelle Ellis,
according to Slipman was 'a statistical freak' because:
173 These are the words used in the NCOPF complaint, quoted by the Panorama Editor Glenwyn
Benson in her newspaper defence of the 'Babies On Benefit' programme in 'Feckless Or Not? The
One-Parent Panorama' The Independent 13.9.94 p23
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Benson, Feckless Or Not? p23
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Benson, Feckless Or Not? p23
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'...only 3% of the 1.3 million lone parent families in Britain have four or more
children and the vast majority of those are divorcees and widows.'176
NCOPF's defence of their reasons for having brought their case in many ways confirms the
problems with the nature of their representation by highlighting the extent of their own
power and resources in comparison to that of single mothers who were given some voice at
least in the Panorama. Spackman gave the following justification:
'Yes we were speaking for the single mothers in the programme because they
haven't got the resources or competencies in terms of being articulate. They
couldn't have defended themselves by pursuing a complaint... Michelle didn't even
have a phone.' (Spackman)
Presumably however Michelle's defence would not have been that she was a 'statistical
freak' and therefore should not have been represented in the first place. In many respects she
was used by NCOPF to defend the reputation of other single mothers by highlighting her
'atypicality'. The difficulty of NCOPF's stance and style of representation when it comes to
young, working class unmarried mothers is historically continuous. Their position
historically was one of speaking for mothers regarded as generally lacking: whether in
competencies, resources, articulacy or responsibility. Such mothers originally made up the
majority of NCOPF's represented cases when discourses about the immorality of these
mothers were rife and the Council was not immune to them. Indeed it was partly constitutive
of them in its insistence that their efforts would produce a decline in illegitimacy rates and
afforded 'the best hope of [the mother's] moral regeneration'.177 Its motivation was 'to save
the child, to restore the mother to good citizenship and make effective the role of the
father.'178
The guiding principles through which NCOPF's historical practices were accounted
for, were those of 'realism and humanity',179 qualities which remain the rationale of their
contemporary positions and are therefore strongly implicated in the way figures like
Michelle are spoken for by the Council. It could be described as 'matronising': an attitude of
class-based superiority dispensed as help and advice, in this case by middle class women to
particular working class mothers. It is also in evidence in NCOPF's attitude to fathers who
are 'irresponsibly' missing from the lives of single mothers. Historically 'the shadowy figure
in the background' such men were to be brought to light by the Council's attempts to
support mothers in pursuing child maintenance - then called 'affiliation orders' - through
court:
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Slipman.S (1994) 'The Babies On Benefit Battleground' The Guardian 13.9.94 p20
177 NCOPF (1993) '1918 - 1993 From the Workhouse to the Workplace' London: NCOPF plO
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'The Council maintained an almost missionary zeal in pursuing affiliation orders,
seeing it as both a way out of poverty and a way of making the father face up to his
responsibilities.'180
In the contemporary period NCOPF's broad support for the 1991 Child Support Act was
driven by those same motivations and not unproblematically so. For both single mothers and
fathers who are already economically disadvantaged, the apparent feminist credentials of the
Act are of no positive benefit.181 NCOPF's support fits with a particular attitude to the
feckless fathers of 'underclass'. So whilst not disputing the existence of an 'underclass'
NCOPF wants its referents specified so as not to include single mothers. This position
emanated from Slipman's directorship:
'Yes she would say that most of these men in single parent's lives are pretty useless
and she would say the same of middle class men too - there just hasn't been the
same agenda requiring that... Much of what's being said is necessarily class-based
because the problems are. But we don't want to talk about the underclass in relation
to single parents because it suggests a class below and we're keen to show they're
your neighbour, sisters, aunt, part of society. Slipman and Murray debated this and
she wanted it specified - not to include single mothers.' (Spackman)
Slipman has identified the young men of 'underclass' as useless because they lack the skills
that make them employable and do not 'care', while women have become breadwinners and
carers:
'If a young man can no longer bring home the bacon and plays no role in caring for
children, why should young women put up with them? This is recognised by the
Institute for Economic Affairs pamphlet 'Fatherless Families' which depicts gangs
of young men roaming the streets causing trouble because they are no longer
civilised within the family. What the pamphlet does not explain is why any woman
in her right mind should want to take one of these things home with her and why its
authors think it would be in the interests of children for her to do so.'182
This note of class contempt for poor working class young men as fathers also comes at the
cost of derogating the woman who does have such a man as part of her life - as not in 'her
right mind'. For 'humanity's sake' and the sake of NCOPF's representative claims such
women are nevertheless included within particular programmes for action, the conditions of
their inclusion revealed in terms of behavioural and vocational guidance.183 The choice
offered to these women invariably leads to reproductive control and the labour market.
The labour market is also set up as the main solution to the poverty of benefit
dependent single mothers in the pragmatic stance of the CSJ. In their proposals choice does
not operate through necessity as in the NCOPF route-out-of-poverty scenario, instead it is
replaced by an element of compulsion to work. Lister maintains its feminist credentials:
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'This is the first report that has put women reasonably in the centre rather than
tacking them on the end and that just wasn't being recognised in a lot of the
criticisms made, I do feel a lot of men just didn't recognise the importance of that.'
(Lister)
However criticisms of the report cannot be equated with a 'male' perspective. Instead
criticism has been made with regard to its classed perspective on gender:
What do you think of other feminist criticisms of the report for forwarding a
particular sort of labour market feminism or middle class career orientated
feminism as suggested by some Women Sections of the Labour Party?184
'I don't think that it was a 'feminist' document but I do think there were strong
feminist influences on it - there were enough feminists on the Commission to ensure
that there was a feminist perspective on a number of the issues and that it wasn't
marginalised. It's true that there is a tension between on the one hand a strong
labour market orientation, not just in relation to women but generally, and also the
emphasis we placed on care and that being valued. And we were very conscious of it
-1 mean it's a big dilemma - how do you square those two things? I accept that the
actual recommendations are more orientated towards the labour market than the care
side but I don't think it was just middle class - because of the importance we
attached to part-time workers, bringing women into social insurance, the minimum
wage - which for middle-class women is not such a problem.' (Lister)
Was the specific proposal for single mothers on benefits with children over five
to be 'available for work' if there was nursery provision available something
you were happy with as an economic perspective rather than one which
forwards a feminist perspective on 'care'?
'Yes I supported it, in fact I proposed it. And it's something I've talked about quite a
lot in feminist academic circles. I've sounded it out. That's not to say I wasn't
conscious of the problems but I do feel very strongly that in a sense to leave lone
parents to rot on income support 'til their youngest child is 16 is not in their long
term interests. I do find it difficult to see... well once the children are either at
school age or say possibly teenagers... well you know why should a woman be at
home all day when her children are at school and they've reached a certain age?'
(Lister)
Do you think that element of compulsion to work is necessary? I mean why
would a woman choose to stay at home on such low benefits if there were real
alternative choices available to her. How do you square that element of
compulsion with the availability of real choices where she could make that
decision on her own rather than according to somebody else's definition of her
'best interests'?
'I suppose on the basis that it's a kind of signal we're putting out, that compulsion
would be subject to a lot of safeguards. But I'm not convinced a government would
do all that if there wasn't a presumption that lone parents are part of the labour
market. I'm not really sure what the age would be and five may well be too young
but I think if you look at other countries we're very unusual and lone parents don't
184 This is a reference to the Labour Women's Action Committee, a group affiliated to the Trade
Union's Congress that maintains arguments for full employment and against welfare retrenchment. See
Pettifor.A and Kane.A (1995)'Hijacking Feminism' Tribune 23.6.95 p6; Pettifor.A and Kane.A (1995)
'Women Demand Social Justice' Socialist Campaign Group News May 1995
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exactly do well in this country compared to other countries. I think you may have a
better chance arguing for good support while the children are young to enable them
to stay at home and then very good infrastructure as support to enable them to enter
the labour market. Now I know also that I'm sure if I were arguing from the other
side, that's terribly naive because the safeguards are never met and they'll still
impose it and that's the danger of course. But it is something I've thought a lot
about and discussed quite a lot in feminist, particularly academic circles and I've
been surprised by the number of people who've said 'Well no actually I don't think
it's helpful to assume that lone parents will stay at home that long'. When our group
proposed it, we said 'Look we could get a lot of flak for this so you have to be clear
what you're signing up to' and everyone was happy to sign up to it. And I certainly
would oppose it if all the conditions weren't provided for.' (Lister)
This sort of proposal for elements of compulsion for benefit claiming single mothers to work
when their children reach a dictated age, being built into the benefit system seems highly
dubious as a feminist position. In many respects it is an authoritarian move to make 'them'
(poor mothers) become more like 'us' (paid workers) at points decided by us in our
definition of their 'best interests'. It accords with a dominant political position that is
espoused on feminist grounds, with regard to labour market restructuring:
Do you agree with the sort of gender analysis that's put forward in Harriet
Harman's book 'The Century Gap' with regard to the 'feminisation' of work
as part of women's 'long march into public space'?
'I suppose 'yes, but' would be my position. Yes but I have been grappling with how
do you combine that with policies and practices that do value care. For me it links in
with one of the issues I've been grappling with ever since the Fifth Demand times as
to how you place a value on care without locking women who are doing the caring
into the home, because at the end of the day I personally don't think that's in the
woman's interests in the long term. I suppose in a sense, as someone who's always
worked full-time, that is where my own perceptions are influencing, partly
influencing, my feminist position. I see the need for full-time work as something
that is crucial.' (Lister)
This exchange goes to the heart of feminist debates about gender equality and difference,
public and private spheres, paid and unpaid work, and the ethics and politics of
representation. In the contemporary period of socio-economic change, cultural debate and
policy making, those traditionally feminist issues are part of 'underclass' discourse. The
nature of this engagement has strong policy implications. With regard to policy discourses
around welfare reform, for benefit claiming single mothers the right not to work is being
seriously undermined. The political motivations of this agenda are clear. Harriet Harman has
promoted it as a feminist agenda to do with balancing work and family life. Yet routes out of
'welfare dependency' are openly discussed in terms of cutting welfare expenditure by
restricting benefit entitlement via 'availability for work' legislation.
For those feminists who have long argued for women's 'right to work' to be
facilitated, often using the language of equality and choice, these policy soundings should
203
have been highly problematic. Yet in the contemporary configuration of feminist voices
around this subject there is a telling silence on benefit claiming mothers having a right not to
work. Part of that silence can be accounted for by ambivalencies, indeterminacies and
alternative awarenesses that are both unresolved and in the making. Organisations such as
NCOPF have been working through some of the dilemmas and contradictions of this policy
discourse where 'underclass' meets the parenting-paid work relation. Recent political
developments are now causing a re-evaluation of their own policies and priorities which
seem less appropriate than they did at the time of their inception in the mid to late 1980s:
'It's a real dilemma for us at the moment especially given the turn of events with the
Job Seeker's Allowance. We don't want coercion to work but maintain that the
chance to work is still the best chance out of poverty. But we really don't want to
minimise the parental role through an over-emphasis on work especially for one-
parents when they are the only fall back for a child in ill health or general need. One
thing single parents have in common is that 99% of them want what's best for their
children and many of them are torn between physical environment provision -
material stuff, and being there personally for their children, for listening and
security. So NCOPF is refocusing at the moment on parenting. NCOPF don't agree
with the SJC proposals because there are all sorts of complicating reasons why that
wouldn't be possible or desirable for lone parents whose children may be sick,
handicapped, in emotional need. Although we don't have a broad based membership
we don't believe this would be reflective of single mother's views. Work must be
about choice.' (Spackman)
As part of this most recent of shifts which has not yet crystallised in NCOPF policy,
Spackman suggests there are crucial differences between single mothers as mainly poor
mothers and other mothers. Parenting issues are different for them because their mothering
is often the only available source of security for their children, whose needs are often greater
than those of other children:
'The health of single mothers and their children is an issue already. These children
often need more care and attention because lone parenthood is often a traumatic
time for them. They need the support of the one remaining parent and if the other
one has left they feel abandoned enough already especially at young ages. Going
into nursery means they have no idea whether that parent is ever coming back, and
for all intents and purposes that child feels abandoned.' (Spackman)
This sort of understanding is very close to that promoted by Ruth Lilley of FTM. Although
not yet part of NCOPF's public position it is a significant crack in their 10 year long pro-
labour market front. Spackman sees the introduction of compulsion to 'welfare to work'
discourses as the crucial change:
'Compulsion to work is not appropriate - you know work at any price. And 'in work'
good, 'out of work' bad is no longer the case, work and poverty are going together.'
(Spackman)
There remains a question over NCOPF's responsibility in the process of single
mothers being coercively reconfigured as paid workers having allowed politicians to claim
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NCOPF for credibility and support at a critical time of welfare retrenchment. The line: 'we
didn't know it would end here' may well be too late now that a broad based political
consensus has been reached in which single mothers are likely to be denied choices around
their parenting role.
Spackman's ending comment was on the relationship between working class male
unemployment and single motherhood. In facing the controversial question of whether some
of the answer to single mother's poverty is increased employment for working class men,
she departs from the idea that the answer to those problems associated with single
motherhood is necessarily their own employment:
'Yes working class male unemployment is very much part of the single motherhood
trends. It's part of the problem because they're not a good prospect for the women.
It's a very difficult perhaps ineluctable problem because we can't force women
'back to the kitchen sink' either. But yes, better employment for men would help the
women - these women have always had children - the difference is that they were
married and had working husbands. The prospects aren't any better for these women
now there are jobs they can do and it'll actually be much worse if compulsion is
introduced.' (Spackman)
This analysis refocuses on the effects of male unemployment on gender roles, relations, and
communities where 'change' has not been for the better just because it has unsettled
'traditional' gender relations. The enormous strains that unemployment, low benefits and
poverty level wages have placed and continue to place on personal, family and community
relations have very often not been positively revolutionary as some elements of feminist
commentary seem to suggest. To make the case for better prospects and forms of
employment for working class men does not have to be an argument for the return of a
'patriarchal family wage' and the nuclear family as the only viable family form. It
nevertheless recognises that in most respects poor wages and no wages has in many ways
been no improvement on 'the family wage'. Furthermore, as Spackman has argued single
motherhood is not usually made as a lifestyle choice and trends of increasing numbers of
young single mothers are not unrelated to the social and economic upheavals of
deindustrialisation. Those areas with highest unemployment rates are also the areas with the
highest rates of single mothers.185 In this respect far from the idea of employment trends
having opened up positive opportunities for 'women', for particular women those trends
towards a 'flexible' restructured labour market have brought about a constriction of choices
around parenting and paid work roles. The trajectory of welfare reform associated with these
'new economic realities' is set to exacerbate this situation.
185 A good example of how the links between single motherhood and male unemployment may be
played out is provided by David Adamson in his sociological study of the deindustrialisation of the
South Wales valleys: Adamson.D (1996) Living on the Edge: Poverty and Exclusion in Wales
Llandysul: Gower Press Changing Wales Series
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Discussion: Welfare Policy For Single Mothers: Making Space For Choice?
The National Council For One-Parent Families and the Commission on Social
Justice have been central players in the emergence of welfare policy discourses around
single mothers in the 1990s. Their aims have been to effect social change by making links
between their own research and debate, and government policy in the 'best interests' of
single mothers as a group. Although both are informed by normative and political ideas
about feminism and social justice, their approach has been pragmatic, geared to achievable
results rather than principled but marginalised campaigning. With regard to benefit
dependent single mothers this has meant an emphasis on labour market participation and
childcare provision, rather than increased welfare benefit provision. Both have reaped the
reward of party political inclusion through this pragmatism: NCOPF in cross party political
support for their 'welfare to work' strategies, CSJ in the 'welfare to work' proposals of the
new Labour government's modernising project. More widely both have contributed towards
a broad based consensus about the gender dimensions of a restructured economy in which
employment opportunities for 'women' are said to have been positively extended and need
further extension, provision and protection. In this process they have presented a range of
'truths' about the lives, needs and interests of single mothers. In particular the need for poor
mothers to become economically productive and contributive, is presented as in the best
interests of their children, themselves, the economy and society. The idea that prolonged
absence from the paid economy is bad for them because it leads to 'depreciation of whatever
human capital they have' is part of an argument stated in overridingly economistic terms.186
The argument is given validation by the reiterated statistic that 90% of single mothers want
to work but are unable to because of a lack of childcare provision.187 The research on which
that figure is based actually states: 90% in 'due course', often after children are older, 63%
liking to work 'later', and for single mothers with children under 5, 40% said they would
want to work mainly part-time.188 Moreover, such statistics take no account of the way
expressed wishes relate to social and economic pressures to work, the availability of and
provision for other sorts of choices and the value placed on motherhood itself. Instead there
is a widespread consensus that the economic necessity to work should dictate policy and
resource provision towards encouraging labour market participation for all mothers but
especially those who are claiming benefit. This requires that benefit dependent mothers are
seen as 'unemployed' as opposed to working as full-time childrearers. If the issue was
186 Joshi.H and Davies.H (1995) Mothers In Employment, Evidence to Employment Committee, House
of Commons London: HMSO p499
187 The Equal Opportunities Commission (1995) Mothers In Employment, Evidence to Employment
Committee, House of Commons London: HMSO p64
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instead presented in terms of childrearing in poverty, the 'solution' would not necessarily be
labour market participation. 'Welfare to work' solutions come as one possible interpretation
of the problems of single motherhood - namely 'absence of work'. Yet 'absence ofwork'
does not accurately describe the position of mothering in poverty. Furthermore for many
working class women, labour market participation will not equate with the alleviation of
poverty. There are more fundamental issues to be addressed here, namely: class-based
educational and occupational disadvantage regardless of marital status; the unpaid-paid
work relation; and unequal choices around parenting for benefit dependent and other
mothers. If this discourse was really about choice for these mothers rather than welfare
reform and labour market demands, they would be allowed to have a childcare allowance to
do with as they wished. Instead childrearing on benefits is made to equate with poverty, poor
living standards, stress and depression with feedback effects on child welfare.
Feminists have written prolifically about the gendering of citizenship as an
historical construct that to a greater or lesser extent excludes women on the basis of their
reproductive difference.189 Within those discussions there is variation between arguments
for a conception of citizenship that is gender-neutral and one that is gender-differentiated
reflecting the 'equality versus difference' debates within feminism.190 Lister summarises the
big question as this:
'Is the aim to change the nature of social citizenship rights so that earning is no
longer privileged over caring in the allocation of those rights or is it to improve
women's access to the labour market so that they can compete on equal terms with
men and can gain the same employment-linked social citizenship rights?'191
Lister admits that her own position on the question remains unresolved, but says that
broadly it hinges on changes in public-private divides, work-family roles, and male-female
relations towards gender role similitude. The details and balances of such changes are a
matter for government policy which eventually stabilises and subsumes the disagreements,
different priorities and shifting positions which characterise the discourse as a whole. This
process is illustrated historically by changes in welfare policy and cultural attitudes towards
mothering in general, single mothering in particular. It has meant that the status and
experience of different mothers has been 'transformed in contradictory non-linear processes
with gains and losses.'192
189 Coote.A (1992) The Welfare OfCitizens: Developing New Social Rights London: IPPR; Lister.R
(1990) 'Women, Economic Dependency and Citizenship' p445-67 Journal ofSocial Policy vol. 19 no.
4; Pateman.C (199 ) The Disorder Of Women Cambridge: Polity/Basil Blackwell
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192 Bortolaia Silva.E (1996) 'Introduction' Good Enough Mothering?: Feminist Perspectives On Lone
Mothering London: Routledge
What has remained a constant is the play of normative expectations around different
mothers in which working class unmarried mothers are most disruptive of 'norms'. Indeed in
the contemporary period it is specifically the classed nature of single motherhood status that
is most problematic for the representational practices of NCOPF and CSJ. The personal and
organisational stances of Spackman and Lister express the problem through their attachment
to a particular set of classed meanings about being on benefits, being at home and being at
work. I would argue that the strength of such attachments is most clearly demonstrated as a
reluctance to talk about increased resource commitments to the value of full-time parenting
work for those on benefits. Amongst the six commentators that I spoke to there was some
divergence on the question of welfare support for parenting per se. They all backed away
from the idea of parenting-based citizen's allowances or wages whether time-limited,
universal or means-tested:
'No but a child benefit increase' (Campbell)
'That's sort of like wages for housework - not really but probably for quite
complicated reasons' (Coward)
'Not if it was pay, maybe a tax allowance for those working and pay for those who
aren't' (Lilley)
'I don't see that as any different to child benefit, so no an increase in child benefit'
(Roberts)
'That's pie in the sky' (Spackman)
'I think only if it was paid to those in work as well as those out of work, but I'd
rather do it through a decent parental leave scheme' (Lister)
The sense here is of a variety of different personal and political motivations leading to the
same reluctance to support the idea of parenting per se being financially supported as a
resource priority. And yet such support would be most likely to balance the value of the
work-family relation, change the value and experience of motherhood, and negate the idea
of mothers on benefits as dependent and scrounging rather than productive and
autonomous.193 Economic arguments against such a development as 'too expensive' do not
hold when compared to the costs of demands for a national strategy for high quality,
affordable childcare which are presented as manageable and necessary. In 1992 the lobbying
organisation 'Working For Childcare' estimated a 25 place workplace nursery would cost
£4,920 minimum per child/per year in running costs, while places in local authority are an
1931 prefer the notion of 'autonomy' to 'independence' because it expresses the idea of personal and
social status and a level of self-determination without necessarily having economic means of self-
support. In hegemonic welfare discourses 'independence' has become overly associated with economic
means. This issue is further developed in the conclusion to the thesis.
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average of £7,228 for England.194 Sally Holtermann's childcare proposals for the National
Children's Bureau envisages a total national expenditure of £8 billion a year,195 recent
calculations put the figure for comprehensive provision nearer £10 billion.196 Clearly the
case against financial recognition of parenting-work is about the political priorities of an
agenda to encourage mothers (and coerce if benefit dependent) towards labour market
participation. The particular version of feminism that is being used to support this agenda
fits the contemporary period of welfare reform and capitalist restructuring very well. As
such it is negatively implicated in the discourse of 'underclass'.
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Working For Childcare (1992) A Practical Guide To Contracting For Quality Childcare London:
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195 Holtermann.S (1992) Investing In Young Children: Costing An Education And Daycare Service
London: National Children's Bureau
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Conclusion: The Talk of 'Feminism', the Talk of 'Underclass'
'The gaps, silences and ambiguities of discourses provide the possibility for
resistance, for a questioning of the dominant discourse, its revision, or mutation.
Within these silences and gaps new discourses can be formulated that challenge the
dominant discourse. This theory of discourses and their mutability provides an
accurate understanding of the talk of feminism.'197
'We used to say gladly: I am a feminist. Then: I am a feminist but... Then: it
depends what you mean by feminism. Then: what is feminism anyway? Some
people label this gradual crumbling away of certainties the backlash, but most
recognise it, less conspiratorially as a deep and authentic confusion about how
198
feminism - once a coherent and backboned theory - can fit the scattered nineties.'
These two quotes point to different understandings about what feminism 'is' and
through those understandings two different versions of its contemporary state. The
difference is in some ways generic: Hekman's is largely an academic and theoretical
position while Gerrard's is more of an impressionistic reading of a cultural feminism. It
would be wrong to present those understandings as absolutely split given that both are
informed by each other in a process of cultural and political dialogue and exchange.
Nevertheless the quotes are revealing in their presentation on the one hand of a multiply
positioned ongoing conversation between different feminist discourses and on the other a
crisis in what has publicly come to be known as 'feminism'. In my interview with Beatrix
Campbell she pointed to the difficulty of 'socialist' positions that try to dissociate
themselves from 'actually existing socialism', arguing that: 'that's not just practice as
opposed to ideology - you can't separate the two - that's what it is'. This was in reference to
difficulties she had with socialism as 'masculinised and sexist'. The same argument can be
applied to the state of contemporary feminism. The sense of feminism as multiply positioned
and shifting discourses, should also recognise that a particular version of feminism can
dominate particular times and spaces. To the extent that it is perceived as doing that it
constitutes 'actually existing feminism'. In the contemporary period of 'underclass'
discourse I would argue that there is a dominant version of feminism that forwards a vision
of the labour market as the solution to a number of social and economic changes, as the
condition of welfare entitlement, and of social inclusion. The perspective is located in
particular middle class and professional positionalities. It is manifest in particular policy
related organisations, think-tank, party political publications and in broadsheet journalistic
197 Hekman.S (1990) Gender and Knowledge: Elements OfA Postmodern Feminism Cambridge:
Polity Press pi89
198 Gerrard.N (1997) 'The New Feminism: Whatever Happened To Sisterhood?' The Observer Review
27.4.97 p5
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commentary, as partly conveyed in the interviews and texts that I have presented. Those
interviews do illustrate the sorts of discursive 'mutability' that Hekman calls the talk of
feminism, but are simultaneously part of a dominant discourse in relation to 'underclass' -
however internally contradictory and changeable it may be. It is dominant in terms of the
access it has to culturally well-mediated spaces; it has power to disseminate ideas and
inform party political positions; it has established not one monolithic idea but a number of
strands of thought and ways of talking about the issues that constitute 'underclass'
discourse.
My interest in presenting the preceding interviews as I have has been twofold.
Firstly to show the relations, contradictions and complexities of different feminist positions
in relation to 'underclass'. There is no one feminist position on 'underclass' and these
commentators do not themselves hold polarised, unified or unchanging positions. I have
suggested where the most significant faultlines of this discourse lie in discussions about
working class masculinity and community; parenthood, motherhood and fatherhood;
childcare; the value of paid work and the value of care; restructured labour markets and
welfare reform. It has been my intention to show this discourse as part of a process of
knowledge production by particular commentators whose perspectives are located in their
own experiences, values and interests but are often hidden in their public representations.
The spaces that they represent: the estate, the home, the workplace; and the groups that they
speak for and about: working class men, fathers, 'working' women, single mothers, full-time
mothers, are all discursively constructed. That construction is partly a dynamic of their own
classed and gendered positionalities.199 It is therefore strongly classed and gendered in terms
of the emphases it gives to particular men and women, the nature of its focus on them, the
languages it deploys, the values it harnesses and the policies it implicates. It is the classed
nature of this feminist discourse on 'underclass' that relates to my second interest in
presenting the interviews the way that I have. This is to show that a dominant story
continues to emerge, not at every moment in every represented space, but to a sufficient
degree to have powerfully informed particular policy trajectories. Different points of
connection between these commentators that could be made and promoted to quite different
effect, have not been. This may well be a characteristic of a feminism which positively
admits 'difference'; it may also signal a disengagement from necessary conflicts which bear
a material cost to other women. In this respect the spaces between different feminisms can
1991 do not want to suggest too reductive a view of these 'personal positionalities' based on class and
gender positions. Rather, I am talking about how these women have personalised (or not personalised)
different aspects of their work in my interviews with them. I have broadly conceived of their class and
gender positions as discursive positions in networks of power rather than as detailed positionalities. I
am not suggesting anything about deep subjectivities, which might only be gleaned from detailed
biographies
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be remote and disconnected spaces in which regard for the way other women, other people,
may be affected by 'your' discourse is lost. Many of the gaps, silences and ambiguities that
are found in the feminist discourse of 'underclass' are not without consequence. They
convey classed meanings and agendas into the policy realm, they are about power
inequalities in the representational politics of 'underclass'. Amongst the commentators I
spoke to there were different levels of reluctance to be self-reflexive, forward thinking and
strategic with regard to how the representations they make will be taken up, used by the
media and politicians, or will impact on different groups of people. In particular I would
argue that this reluctance showed itself most acutely when considerations about how
discussions and policies might relate to working class groups were being made: whether
young working class 'criminals' and 'bad' fathers (Campbell, Spackman, Lilley), 'welfare
dependent' or irresponsible poor mothers (Lilley, Roberts, Lister, Spackman), less than
preferable-family-form single mothers (Lilley, Coward, Roberts), inexpedient working class
children (Spackman, Lister). 'Class' if freely mentioned at all, does not emerge as
analytically central. Working class based perspectives are not systematically considered or
consistently used to qualify arguments. The dominant story is not about the strictures of the
JSA, the humiliations of the medical benefits agency, economic pressures and regulations to
take up low paid/status work, harassment from the Child Support Agency, or unliveable
benefit levels. This story of welfare which is a working class story, has been subsumed by a
middle class story about 'welfare dependency' and the redemptive public space of the labour
market. In the course of telling that story 'feminism' has not been 'hijacked' for ulterior
motives (as if it were an agreed position), rather there are particular kinds of feminism that
happen to fit well with a particular sort of capitalism.200 For socialist feminisms this shows
the central importance of a class analysis of the fit between a dominant strand of liberal
feminism and the contemporary labour market. Such an analysis leads to very different
understandings than those conveyed in particular arguments for labour market solutions to
benefit dependent single mothering and for the 'demasculinisation' of working class men's
attitudes to life. What those understandings may be is suggested in essays by two feminist
writers which allow different interpretations of the contemporary nature of the labour
market and 'welfare dependency'.
In an essay entitled 'Does Capitalism Really Need Patriarchy?' Carol Johnson
argues the necessity of reassessing the relationship between feminism and capitalism in the
contemporary period:
00 This is the unstated premise of Harriet Harman's The Century Gap and Patricia Hewitt's 'About
Time - The Revolution In Work And Family Life' (1993 London: IPPR/Rivers Oram)
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'The question remains of whether the existence of class relations necessitates the
continuing subordination of women... a question that often gets lost in the attempts
to escape from privileging either class or gender.'201
This is an important question in relation to those feminist analyses of 'underclass' which
seek to privilege gender issues over those of class (working class male crime, male
'unemployability' and 'unmarriageability', 'feckless fathers') and to interpret social
economic changes primarily in gender terms (the 'feminisation' of work, the 'crisis in
masculinity', the 'genderquake', 'the working mother' as prototype worker). The discourse
of 'underclass' is partly made up by arguments which suggest that particular trends are
being driven by women, are necessary, desirable and require policy provision. At particular
points those same arguments crystallise as classist representations of other people's realities.
This is exemplified in arguments for the catch-all benefit of labour market participation and
childcare provision. In the contemporary labour market, low wages are paid across genders
for those working class people who make up the bottom end of the growing service sector.
The supply of workers has needed to be as cheap and politically atomised as possible, and
the workers that most fitted that requirement were working class women. Johnson argues
that the labour market changes that have been developing through the 1980s and 1990s are
therefore about 'a redistribution between wage earners... not from capital to labour'. These
changes are less to do with notions of gender equality than they are an equal sharing out of
class inequality between particular groups of working class men and women:
'The market is no great respector of sexual distinction when it comes to employment
practices: there has been no wringing of hands over the decline of male employment
in the old bases of manufacturing industry and the simultaneous increase in female
employment; the market has not stepped in to restore masculine pride. But while we
may well rely on the forces of free competition to equalise participation rates
between women and men we cannot rely on these forces to reshape the hours and
conditions of work.'202
This understanding of labour market trends as being about competitive advantage,
suggests that a working poor will be part of that advantage, both economically and
politically when welfare reform is on the agenda. Johnson believes that although the
outcomes of these employment changes are still unclear the prognosis is not good. For those
in poor families contemporary developments have already led to a modernised version of
historical pre-family-wage labour markets and may well be leading to pre-welfare state
conditions in which mothers and children in the poor working class had to work. In the face
201 Johnson.C (1996) 'Does Capitalism Really Need Patriarchy?' p93-202 Women's Studies
International Forum vol. 19 no. 3 p 194
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of such developments particular feminist arguments that these changes represent
opportunities to bring about gender neutrality at work and in the home, are shown to be
seriously wanting in their neglect of class. Indeed in a period of decline in the traditional
industrial and manufacturing trade unions a particular version of capitalist-feminism could
replace the capitalist-patriarchy mode of social organisation. A sense of the desirability of
that direction can be traced in those particular elements of 'underclass' discourse that argue
for the necessity of particular working class job expectations to be 'de-masculinised' and for
poor mothers to become gender-neutral 'workers'.
Such changes have a rationale of welfare reform that relies on a particular
understanding of the concepts of welfare and dependency. The sort of 'dependency' which
is said to characterise benefit claiming mothers is exemplified in the idea that they can be
freed from 'welfare' by the labour market. This rationale deploys certain feminist ideas
about 'work' as freedom from the home and economic dependency. The idea of such
'dependence' as something always to be escaped from is highly problematic for another
feminist analysis that has a notion of citizenship and autonomy beyond labour market
participation. Such an analysis is presented by Iris Marion Young in relation to
motherhood.203 She departs from those liberal feminist positions which seek equality rights
in the public sphere as an extension of male citizenship rights to women:
'Promoting equal citizenship requires abandoning the idea that those who are not
self-sufficient are of lesser worth. On the contrary, public policy should provide
social support to promote the autonomy of people who need help from others. Only
such an abandonment of the norm of independence understood as self-sufficiency
can grant equal citizenship to at-home carers.'204
For her, this understanding must be at the core of any concept of equality. Without it
'dependence' becomes a coercive taunt that is used to undermine work which is differently
productive such as care work. She traces the notion of 'independence' as the 'citizen virtue
of the male head of household and property owner' ,205 It is the underlying basis of the
distinction between ideas about public and private spheres around which much social
organisation still rests. The disparagement of dependency rests on the 'private' being seen as
lesser than the public. It devalues motherhood and all forms of care and it makes citizenship
a male domain to which women can aspire and escape:
'Privileging independence as a citizen virtue thus amounts to defining dependency
workers as second class citizens.'206
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However, Young does not settle on an 'ethics of care' as the basis of a gender
reformed notion of citizenship.207 She broadens the idea of a 'sexually-differentiated' view
of citizenship to a 'group-interests' view in order to take on board other exclusions that are
maintained by the construction of 'public' and 'private' divides.208 She points to the way
that the construction of the 'public' in terms of homogeneity and universality discriminates
against particular people who do not have equality in the public realm because of their class,
age or ethnicity for example. Those sort of marginalisations are the hallmark of 'underclass'
discourse in which 'dependence' as long term dependence on subsistence level benefits is
used to devalue poor people of different ages, genders and ethnicities. It works to induce
abject dependence because it does not accord the sort of social support that only 'citizens'
could expect. Particular forms of dependence that are not inherently problematic thus
become problematic as 'dependants' are denied the possibility of civic and political
participation. Dependence then becomes something that it is rational to escape from. For
example those mothers who take up paid work can then be used to increase the stigma that is
attached to the dependency of other mothers.
The benefit claiming single mother who does not want to take 'available work' and
may even continue to have more children is most stigmatised of all. She is the archetypal
dependant. She needs to be restricted in her choices, made to 'work'. The discourse by
which that end is brought about has to be careful in the language it uses: being freed from
welfare dependency sounds much better than being effectively coerced into work. Coercion
into independence is the paradoxical result of such a discourse: 'dependants' being pushed
into self-sufficiency, attended by judgements about their 'best interests'. Their own choices,
judgements and values are negated. While the status of their private care is undermined,
public care as childcare is lauded as valuable 'work' and as a 'feminist' gain for 'women'.
Choices about bearing and rearing children are thus limited to women who have the means
to support themselves or be supported, while mothering on benefits is delegitimised and
made less and less possible. Political representation for the choices and autonomy of poor
mothers has in the contemporary period passed over to a classed colonisation of their 'best
interests'. Reproductive freedom as the freedom of poor women to have children and be able
to look after them, defended as a democratic right by the 1974 Finer Committee on One-
207 An 'ethics of care' is used by Carol Gilligan to describe a feminised, maternalist philosophy in
opposition to the masculinist and liberal 'ethics of justice' that underpin dominant notions of
'citizenship' rights: Gilligan.C (199.) Maternal Thinking: Towards A Politics ofPeace New York:
Ballantine
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Parent Families, is losing out to sanctions against childrearing according to people's ability
to pay.209
This chapter has examined feminist discourse on 'underclass' through the representational
spaces of some key commentators. These spaces are constituted in books, pamphlets,
newspaper columns and interviews (including the interview sites of this thesis), and they
relate to lived spaces of 'underclass' by setting up policy-related understandings around the
'needs' and 'interests' of poor people and places. The formal and often institutionalised
nature of this feminist discourse ensures a strong vocality and visibility for its
representations. Although discursive 'effectivity' can only be partially and suggestively
traced, connections to a policy trajectory are at certain points readily apparent. Thus whilst
some ideas in this process of translation become qualitatively different or are lost from the
dominant discourse altogether, others retain the core of their meaning and are easily co-
opted. Similarly, it is true that the originators of ideas also change their positions over time,
that their status shifts accordingly, and that new networks emerge. But however temporal
discursive positions are, they are not without consequence. The flexibility of one
commentator being able to shift her position does not equally exist as a choice for another
less powerful woman not to be 'affected' by her discourse. Thus whilst the discourse of
commentators may shift, their power positions often do not: they remain in place to start
new productions of knowledge. In the next chapter I will look to an alternative discourse on
'underclass' which is not part of any formal or organisational political representation. It
does not talk directly in terms of the 'needs' and 'interests' of particular social groups, but
constitutes different claims, and power relations. It is found in popular cultures of film and
music, its representational spaces are poetically political and constitute a form of cultural
empowerment.
209 Finer.M (1974) Report of the Committee on One-Parent Families London: HMSO
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CHAPTER FOUR
TELLING EXPERIENCES OF CLASS AND POVERTY: PERSONAL AND
POPULAR DISCOURSE ON 'UNDERCLASS'
In the dominant discourse of 'underclass', poor working class identities and places
emerge through an aggregation of statistics and characteristics about family, crime
and work, inferentially linked to group attitudes and behaviours. This chapter seeks to
contest the reductive characterisations and typologies of identity and place which
dominate this discourse. It is not, however, interested in issuing replacement 'truths'
about particular sorts of people and places. Instead it presents a case for refusing such
a quest for 'truths' about poor working class identities and places, and argues for an
epistemology based on personal and popular discourses of experience and feeling that
are both 'real' and 'imagined'. My personal readings of the films Hate and Ladybird
Ladybird are presented as two such narratives. By representing relations between
classed ways of living and their social regulation as a battleground, these filmic spaces
constitute a political battleground of ideas within the wider discourse of 'underclass'.
My readings of the films, represent the outcome of that battle as a temporal victory for
more complex and strategic knowledges of poor working class subjectivities and the
spaces through which they are constituted.
Introduction: Realising a Research View
This chapter is about experiences of being working class and poor represented
through stories, views and voices that are all very different to those which make up the
dominant discourse of 'underclass'. The narrative is popular, the view is changing and the
voice is personal. This representation is different in terms of both the particular aspects of
class and poverty that will be raised and the ways in which they will be talked about.
I am using two films which offer a political representation of working class poverty
that is primarily experiential, highly subjective and deliberately partisan. They are Mathieu
Kassovitz's Hate (1995) and Ken Loach's Ladybird Ladybird (1994). These films are not a
source of 'authentic experience' nor a discovery of hitherto 'unknown worlds'. I am
presenting them as a representation of experience that crosses a divide between material
reality and symbolic fiction. Through them I am choosing to represent particular experiences
of contemporary working class lives lived in poverty. This is an explicitly personal
endeavour in three respects: the reasons for my choice of the films, my interpretation of
them, and my relation of the experiences shown in the films to aspects of my own. My own
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experiences are not held as a test of the veracity of the films or something in which to
authentically locate them. They are part of a situated view of the films, represented through
some personal reflections. The films and the written words of this chapter are spaces
constituted through both material existence and imagination. They are spaces of refusal and
anger; recognition and pride.
Originally I planned for this chapter to be based on recorded interviews with people
who are the subject of 'underclass' discourse. After much consideration, this idea changed
to recording conversations about experiences of poverty, with family and friends that I had
grown up with. By the time of the summer in which I went home to carry those out I had
decided to use the personal responses of family and friends to two contemporary films about
class and poverty. When I came back I was using the films themselves, interpreted through
personal experiences of my own, to talk about representations and experiences of poverty
and the research process. This chapter has two parts reflecting this change. The first is about
the genesis of the change itself. I think that it is important to explain what brought me to this
point and why my original ideas for this chapter became antithetical to my research ethic
and thesis. This is an argument for my use of the films as the very best way ofmaking some
points about particular over and under represented experiences of working class poverty.
Part of this argument is necessarily a comment on other kinds of research processes that
directly and obliquely refer to such experiences. It is also a strategy of choosing things to
tell a particular audience whilst refusing to name, categorise, parade or reveal 'unknown'
others according to social scientific norms. It is a choice of representation which chooses
voices of political resistance in preference to some hegemonic voices talking about
'underclass'. The second part of the chapter presents the films as part of a realm of
experience and knowledge about the way particular working class lives are lived and felt. In
this way they redistribute some ideas about the lives of people and the nature of places
described in terms of 'underclass' - specifically single mothers on benefits and young,
unemployed working class males, living on council estates - to partly challenge a gross
inequality of representation.
The possibility of being able to talk about 'working class experience' from a
subjective and personal standpoint in academic work, and rejecting some traditional
academic tenets in doing so, has partly come from the realms of academe itself, in particular
from the challenges of feminist and cultural studies.1 The sorts of issues which have
structured these challenges address what it means to be working class; how the fabric of
1 See for example Walkerdine.V (1995) Subject To Change Without Notice: Psychology,
postmodernity and the popular p309-332 Mapping The Subject Pile.S and Thrift.N (eds.) London:
Routledge
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everyday life is productive of cultural meaning and value; how popular discourse is a lived
and creative realm that is politically meaningful and can be productive of oppositional
insights about the way societies work. The idea of working class based perspectives on
classed experiences as political discourse, is a central proposition of this chapter. This is not
to suggest that there is an authentic, indigenous working class political discourse or that
such politics are necessarily resistant in particular ways. It is rather a suggestion that accords
with feminist valorisations of 'experience' as a political situatedness and a situatedness
which in particular circumstances can exist as a political knowledge and orientation for
change.2 In this formulation discourse is seen as a realm of experience in which material
ways of life become meaningful, and where part of that meaning is political. I am
forwarding the notion of a politically critical discourse on working class poverty where there
are possibilities of making and remaking working class subjectivities and class relations in
affirming ways. I am exemplifying such possibilities with the use of two films which offer
politically subversive understandings of poor working class lives insofar as they make being
working class a site of positive identity and political anger.
Political feeling is not however the only positive value of popular discourse and
there is no suggestion that all forms and practices have an inherently emancipatory or
subversive value, or that those that do have intrinsically more 'worth' than those that do not.
Valerie Walkerdine writes about her experience of watching films as an 'ordinary girl' of
the 1950s as a direct criticism of that strand of cultural studies theorising which serves to
inferiorise those elements of discourse which are about pleasure, desire and fantasy.3 She
attempts to give value to a feminised realm of discourse that does not address political
'reality' and political change but that is personally meaningful and tells a story about the
psychological relations of class. In her case this was a relation about envy, desire, the wish
to escape, and dreams and longings that find no expression in the sorts of class experiences
described by the men who first forged the 1950's Cultural Studies tradition.4 She contends
that these working class grammar school boys constructed a romanticised view of working
class culture and community and were followed by a cultural studies discipline full of
'redemptive readings of what the masses make with the popular'.5 Walkerdine talks about
the difference that her undemanding view of popular discourse makes to the sort of cultural
studies research that is conducted around working class people. In relation to research based
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on audience reception of films - 'trying so hard to understand what people see [in them]'6 -
she rejects the attempt of middle class voyeurs to intellectualise people's pleasure in order
to either romanticise or feel disappointed with the resistant or passive working class subject.
I wholly agree with Walkerdine's rejection of the will to 'know' the working class driven by
impulses to observe and classify working class habits and behaviours, especially by middle
class social scientists. However this does not mean that all attempts to read representations
politically are doomed to produce a fiction of working class heroism or failure. I do not
recognise myself in her story of culture, class and gender, her will to escape through fantasy,
through education towards a (middle class) dreamland as all that is on offer to her longing
for something else. The films that I have chosen to talk about are stories of working class
heroism that stand out from 'ordinary films' for exactly that reason. When I first saw them I
thought they were extra-ordinary, powerfully political, highly resonant and deeply affective.
They talk to me about my class and my gender in a way that unites pleasure and politics.
They are not about 'escape' to things better (as things 'middle class') and in some ways they
could be seen as rather bleak and hopeless stories. The pleasure comes from the affirmation
of experience and feeling that they offer.
Just as Walkerdine's own family background is part of her experience of watching
particular sorts of films in the 1950s, and of finding particular meaning and affirmation in
them, so my own family background relates to the pleasure I find in particular discursive
forms. This means that the mythologies of class that are part of my subjectivity are quite
different to those she talks about as hers. My Left-wing politics and feminism were not
something discovered through a University education but were part of me long before I got
anywhere near University. They were the class politics and feminism ofmy home, of
growing up, things that my mum had talked about, of the films and music we liked as a
family. They were not about dreams of 'escape', which does not mean I thought our
economic situation was good enough - it wasn't - but neither was it attended by 'upward'
aspirations. I think this was probably because of the political understandings I had of our
poverty from quite an early age which meant that I carried a sense of pride, anger, and even
a kind of ethical superiority in relation to middle class people. And yet, these positive
feelings of class pride were not the whole story: they were also a defence, against pain and
against attack. In some ways they represent a way of mythologising my experiences of being
working class, a way of imagining as a way of dealing with aspects of who I am, in what
seems the best way possible. This personal take, is the starting point to this chapter's
exploration of the relation between the 'myths' and 'realities' of poor working class living.
6
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Being named, being classed
'Writers generalise from personal experience, but they also need to mythologise that
experience in order to give it meaning. This mythologisation is one of the ways of
justifying both existential necessity and existential choice.'7
'Who's your dad? Oh I forgot, you're a bastard aren't you.'
Those words said to me by an older boy on the school bus when I was thirteen or so, came
back to me when I read The Name of the Mother. The above is a quote from that book by
Marie Maclean, which is an attempt to 'write her illegitimacy' not as a negative experience
but as a positive one, not as a disabling context but as an enabling one. She acknowledges
the mythologising tendency that writing personal experience sometimes produces, but
revalorises its worth against those public mythologies which work to suppress that which is
constructed as private, lived, felt. Here, I take a similar tack: my experiences are part of me,
and my myth is in my writing.
That boy on the school bus was wrong, I wasn't a 'bastard' but my dad had died
when me, my brother and sisters were much younger and we hadn't known him. I didn't
really care about that boy, I thought he was stupid then: a big, spotty adolescent male whose
name I forget. I remember him now and the feeling of being upset and embarrassed even
though wrongly labelled. We had our father's name but no father and this was a source of
some embarrassment, insecurity and difference among school friends - especially being
poor, on Social Security, getting free school meals and living on a council estate. School
friends at secondary school didn't know much of this to start with, and when they found out
said things like 'you'd never know', as if that was a compliment or something. Our mum had
done a 'good job', she was a widow, the 'deserving poor'. She wrote poems about it. When I
read them now, I have more than pride in who we are. Even then I was not ashamed of who
we were, only occasionally upset by what other people said. But our poverty, in itself was
distressing. So I have a strangely ambivalent relation to that environment which partly made
me who I am - in thinking and writing against the poverty which is part of my identity, but
not against myself.
As I got older I dealt with the feelings associated with our poverty and its treatment
by being political, embarrassment gave way to anger which could be expressed not just in
personal terms but in wider political understandings: our situation was not due to our
failings but due to the government and its political constituencies. That government had
been Labour until I was nine, then in 1979 the Conservatives came to power. I experienced
what went on in school, in the family, in the benefit office, not as one of Thatcher's children
but often among and against them. I knew that I was as good as they were, and often better.
7 Maclean.M (1994) The Name of the Mother London: Routledge ix
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However I don't think that I would have felt this if all the coded messages and the ways
other people related to me - some 'friends' and teachers especially - had given me my sense
of self. It was my family, especially my mother, who made sure that I could deal with all
that, between ourselves and on my own. So my sense of pride in who I am and where I'm
from, has not just come from formal political engagement or education in a leamt or
rationalised way, it has come from the knowledge of experience.
My mother was (and still is) a working class single parent - resourceful, intelligent
and strong, as are the other single mothers on our estate, and I am one of the children of
those women. So when speeches and benefit policies against single parents and their
children emerge from government, and even a long-awaited Labour government identifies
single mothers as problematic in their 'welfare dependency', and when certain feminist
spokeswomen argue for nurseries and 'liberation' to the workplace for single mothers, I
know that these arguments are a negation of other knowledges, experiences and values. I do
not recognise myself, my mother, or those I grew up with in these representations and have
looked elsewhere for cultural affirmation of who I am. I have often found such affirmation
in music, in particular in music which lyrically resonates experiences of difference: in
anger, pain , humour and celebration. There is a particular song which encapsulates some of
my strongest feelings on the meanings of working class difference, how middle class others
often deal with it, and how it can simultaneously exist as both a positive and negative
identity. It is Pulp's 'Common People'. As part of the generic category of 'Britpop' it has
been accused of being part of a distinctly white, working class, and yobbish cultural
renaissance. To me this accusation best expresses class contempt for the unfashionably non-
exotic. I think it's worth quoting some of it because in many ways it is the beginning of my
discussion on class difference and class inequality. It is a starting point that is an attitude of
class anger and pride, about encountering some middle class people as working class
wannabes. It is based on a personal experience of the singer, a working class bloke starting
college and meeting a middle class girl who tells him she wants to live like 'common
people', he replies:
'Are you sure you want to live like common people, you want to see whatever
common people see, you want to sleep with common people, you want to sleep with
common people like me ?'
But she didn't understand, she just smiled and held my hand.
Rent a flat above a shop, cut your hair and get a job, smoke some fags and play
some pool, pretend you never went to school. But still you'll never get it right, 'cos
when you're laid in bed at night watching roaches climb the wall if you called your
dad he could stop it all. You'll never live like common people, you'll never do what
common people do, you'll never fail like common people, you'll never watch your
life slide out of view, and dance and drink and screw because there's nothing else to
do. Sing along with the common people, sing along and it might just get you
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through, laugh along with the common people, laugh along even though they're
laughing at you and the stupid things that you do because you think that poor is
cool. Like a dog lying in the comer they will bite you and never warn you, look out
they'll tear your insides out. 'Cos everyone hates a tourist especially one who thinks
it's all such a laugh and the chip stains and grease will come out in the bath. You
will never understand how it feels to live your life with no meaning or control and
with nowhere left to go. You are amazed that they exist and they bum so bright
whilst you can only wonder why.'
This song could be seen as a resistant narrative of 'underclass'. It juxtaposes the meaning of
'common' as ordinary, and 'common' as an insult to make a point about class 'difference' as
class inequality. It is about class tourism, middle class envy, intrigue and voyeurism, a
notion of 'workingclassness' that is divested of poverty. It is about working class
knowledge, experience and a way of being that cannot be bought into or acted out by middle
class people. It is about class difference that is sometimes amazing and bright, class
inequality that is sometimes desperate and squalid. And it is about a middle class preference
to dabble in difference in the same way that so much talk of 'underclass' prefers to focus on
behaviours, habits and personalities, rather than on the denial of basic needs. 'Common
People' makes a different sort of position available to those who are normally positioned as
envious. It reverses the psychological impetus of 'embourgeoisement' as the working class
wanting to become middle class, desiring middle class lives. Instead the middle class girl of
the song wants to be 'working class' or rather she wants a bit of 'workingclassness' - that bit
which she thinks is 'cool'. However, whilst rejecting the notion of poor as cool, the song
does not negate the idea that there is something positive in being working class that cannot
be acquired as a fashion. There is no suggestion that the poor want to be like those who may
glorify or commodify them. Middle class envy and appropriation are met with a working
class based resilience and pride in survival that confounds the middle class voyeur: 'You are
amazed that they exist and they burn so bright whilst you can only wonder why'.
My understanding of 'Common People' is of course a personal one, but the lyrics do
make particular meanings apparent and promote some interpretations over others. The
middle class girl in the song 'who had a thirst for knowledge' may not recognise herself in
this and have a different song to sing. Amongst a number of interpretative possibilities, I
hear a defiant answer back to the attack on working class poverty, pride and self esteem; a
refusal of the idea of class as style based difference; and of the imagined working class
preference for 'embourgeoisement'. It is a voice that is not often heard by those who are
routinely denied discursive affirmation. I do not include it here as part of a search for
resistant narratives of 'working classness'. However given the dearth of resonant and
positive representations of 'working classness' from a working class perspective I feel that
representations like these should be talked about and made important in a way that they
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rarely are. Similarly I want to register the films I have chosen as better than other
representations for and about the working class poor on a number of counts. In particular
their stories, aesthetic styles, and political meanings make them different from other
representations in ways that I want to promote.
In Outlaw Culture bell hooks talks about representations which limit the
possibilities of what it may mean to be poor and she puts forward the idea of an alternative
regime of representation around poverty which would work as a refusal of worthlessness, of
shame, of the primary valorisation of material status and the idea of perpetual aspiration.
To me this sort of representation is one that makes you feel 'at last', somebody else knows.
It is a sort of discursive collectivism that explicitly and directly validates your class position
in a number of ways and connects it to others. When everything else around you tries to
individualise that position so that 'it's just you that's not coping, that's angry, that's failing',
then to hear or see something that says 'it's all of us and we're not the problem' is
empowering. Lack of self-esteem is not an inherent part of poverty but a possible product of
a regime of meaning that is created around poverty, hooks notes the uncomfortableness of
linking poverty to a meaningful life which exists beyond material deprivation lest it suggest
that nothing should be done to improve poor people's lives. And yet, those material
improvements are in a large part dependent on changes in perception about poverty because
representation is intrinsic to politics and economics, to the policies that effect change.
Moreover, discursive affirmation is not about 'being positive' all the time, rather it is about
a fuller picture that speaks to people about their lives, not as walking problems but as people
in relationships, in families, with opinions, emotions, talents. A discourse that is
predominantly negative will work to psychologically beat down the poor:
'When intellectuals, journalists or politicians speak about nihilism and the despair
of the underclass they do not link those states to representations of poverty in the
mass media... To change the face of poverty so that it becomes once again, a site for
the formation of values, of dignity and integrity, as any other class positionality in
this society, we would need to intervene in existing systems of representation.'9
Here, hooks is remembering back to her own childhood poverty when she feels nihilism and
despair were not promoted by a mass media. One of the powerful themes of the two
European films that I have chosen to explore, is about poor people carrying on, looking,
trying and hoping for the best even if fearing the worst. This understanding is more resonant
to me than that of the nihilism and despair hooks describes. In this respect the films may be
part of both representational and economic differences between the welfare regimes of
Europe and America. The films that I have chosen reflect and create a site of values, dignity
8 hooks.b (1994) Outlaw Culture: Resisting Representations London: Routledge
9
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and integrity and they act to affirm working class lives even though they show things near
their worst in terms of material circumstances. As such they are an oppositional part of
'underclass' discourse, proudly working class. They are films that speak to and about my
class in a way that does not grate or jar.
Researching Class Through Film
The place of film within research on cultural representation is well established.
Over the past 20 years film research has emerged as a legitimate and important part of a
human and cultural geography that is interested in looking at the construction of space and
time, place and meaning.10 However the study of relationships between class, culture and
film has been most developed within Cultural Studies as an interest in the classed realities
produced in films and the class nature of their consumption. Questions like 'how is the
working class represented?' 'how do those representations relate to working class histories
and experiences?' and 'how do working class people understand these films?' predominate.
The empirical nature of such work involves working closely with text, its meaning making
devices and filmic languages, and with the audience through various kinds of 'audience
research' to draw out socio-cultural meanings." Walkerdine sees those traditions of
audience research in particular as quests for evidential knowledge of working class lives and
minds, often in order to better regulate them, and she recoils from such quests in a call for:
'a more complex blending of fact and fiction, of materiality and fantasy.'12 It is such a
blending that I intend.
My approach is interested in the mythologies of filmic narrative in relation to the
realities of working class lives. My readings do not maintain a purity of distinction between
reality and myth in the films or in the lives they represent: realities and mythologies of class
blend in both. The stories of class told in the films are refracted through my own readings of
them in which I suggest that the films make possible class based identifications, recognitions
and resonances that are part of a collective story. In this respect, mine is a personal reading
of a collective story. I reject the idea that it is only through 'audience research' that a film
can be given significance beyond the formalities of its text, to a wider culture. That idea
persists as a belief in evidence:
10 See for example Aitken.S.C and Zonn.L.E (1993) (eds.) Place, Power, Situation and Spectacle: A
Geography ofFilm London: Rowman and Littlefield p3-26; Clarke.D.B (1997) (ed.) The Cinematic
City London: Routledge; Kennedy.C and Lukinbeal.C (1997) Towards A Holistic Approach To
Geographic Research On Films p33-50 Progress In Human Geography 21: 1
11 Variation within these approaches is considerable. The text/audience relation has opened up to a
much wider range of speculative, experiential, theoretical readings through developments in
postmodernism. See Crawford.P and Turton.D (1992) (eds.) Film As Ethnography Manchester:
Manchester University Press
12
Walkerdine.V (1991) Fantasy and Regulation: (From 'The Mass Psychology of Thatcherism' talk at
the ICA) Schoolgirl Fictions p209
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'Audience research is... the accumulation of evidence about the meaning of things...
13Where's the evidence? Without evidence, everything is merely speculation.'
Such prioritisation of evidence in the study of discursive meaning is rigidly tied to
categorical notions of text and context, viewer and viewed. It holds the idea that with
enough of the right sort of evidence then the meaning, status and effect of representations
can be 'known'. Rather the rhetoric of evidence can only be a claim to knowledge, an idea
of meaning which works to hierarchise particular sorts of meaning as more or less
significant (where the subjective, personal, individual are less). The idea that the personal
reading is less, carries a particular notion of individualism in which the individual is less
social, less public, less trustworthy. That notion ignores both the social aspects of
subjectivity and of the interpretative process itself. This argument is made by Elizabeth
Long specifically in relation to the reading of books, an activity that because widely held to
be private relegates the individual reader to an inconsequential position within 'macro'
socio-cultural processes measured in aggregate.14 The refusal of a public-private value
hierarchisation in social life, and the association of the individual with the private, the
collective with the public, has implications for discourse analytic research. It rejects the
'trickle-down' model of culture which constructs 'linear processes of cultural dissemination'
where the individual reader is at the very bottom of the 'significance' range.151 am claiming
my readings to be part of overlapping social communities of experience and understanding,
as a claim to social significance. How convincing such claims are is a matter of judgement
not fact. It so happens that the films I have chosen are also part of a historical tradition in
film making in which they explicitly make the claim of social significance for themselves.
Both Hate and Ladybird Ladybird are explicitly about contemporary social issues
and their directors have articulated commitments to the political representation of working
class experiences. This commitment is no mark of quality, authenticity, or depth of
understanding. To point it out is rather an acknowledgement of the special nature of these
films in terms of the motivation of the stories they tell. Such films are not new to cinematic
history but part of a tradition variously termed 'social realism', 'naturalism', 'working class
realism'. The tradition is associated with a period of British film making at the end of the
1950s, although Loach prefers to locate his influences in the Czech cinema of the 1960s and
Kassovitz claims more recent cinematic influences from Martin Scorsese to Spike Lee.16
13 Lewis.J (1994) 'The Meaning of Things' pl9-32 Viewing, Reading, Listening: Audiences and
Cultural Reception Cruz.J and Lewis.J (eds.) Oxford: Westview Press p20
14
Long.E (1994) Textual Interpretation As Collective Action p 181-211 Viewing, Reading, Listening:
Audiences and Cultural Reception
15
Long, Textual Interpretation As Collective Action p207
16 Simon Hattenstone interviewing Ken Loach The Guardian G2 29.9.94 plO; Sheila Johnston
interviewing Mathieu Kassovitz The Independent 19.10.95 p8
Since the majority of the British films of the realist tradition have been strongly criticised
for their political conservativeness and reductive characterisations I should make clear that I
am not talking about Hate and Ladybird Ladybird as the bearers of a long and great
tradition. I believe them to be both positively different and positively similar. John Hill's
analysis of British Cinema from 1956-63, the period during which films specifically focused
on working class lives and contemporary social issues first emerged, suggests that the
political quality of the films was a double-edged sword:
'The views of the world which they promoted, may well have obscured as much as
they enlightened, and obstructed as much as they initiated the potential for social
change and reconstruction.'17
Hill levels this criticism of political ambivalence at both the 'social problem' films that had
an observational and unsophisticated approach to characterisation and such narrative themes
as youth delinquency and immigration, and at the 'new wave' films of social realism -
kitchen-sink dramas - which were widely credited as aesthetically and politically
progressive. At the end of the 1950s the latter films represented a landmark change in
cinema direction, rejecting conventions of character and place for location shooting and
unknown regional actors as part of an ethos that was about giving value to the ordinary. The
direction of Kassovitz and Loach can be seen as fitting the template of that style. Hate is
black and white verite, with wide angled location shooting producing shots full of detail.
Ordinary characters are shown with rough edges, in their daily lives. Kassovitz's camera
work is also authored with a few stylistic shots conveying entrapment, circularity and
downward spirals. The effect is to show the ordinary as extraordinary, as lyrical and
extreme. Loach prefers 'naturalism' to 'realism' as a description of his style. Ladybird
Ladybird is in colour and there are no overtly stylistic shots, the feel is more documentary.
Part of Loach's method of direction is to use the gut reaction of characters who do not know
what will happen next, some lines and movements are unscripted. He mixes professional
with non-professional actors and will not cast against class.18 The ethos of both directors
echoes that of Lindsey Anderson, a prominent director of the 1950s period who is quoted by
Hill as exemplary of changes in 1950s cinema:
'I want to make people - ordinary people - not just top people - feel their dignity and
their importance.'19
Yet despite their good intentions, Hill contends that the vast majority of the 1956-63 films
produced an outsider's view of the working class, a middle class idea of working class
17 Hill.J (1986) Sex, Class and Realism: British Cinema 1956 -1963 London: British Film Institute
p2-3
18 'Rock Steady' The Guardian G2 29.9.94 plO
19
Hill, Sex Class and Realism p 128
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squalor and sexuality, and a patronising if not contemptuous view of a working class
degraded by the newly emergent culture of mass consumerism. The disdain for working
class women was particularly strong with female figures serving as appendages to the
narrative and psychological development of male characters; and as the easy targets of
consumer frivolity.
It would seem that the very fact that these films dealt with social issues which had
not been broached before, through lives which had never before been made filmically
interesting or important, was enough to mask their reductionism and conservatism. On
political grounds Hill identifies their give away failings as a preponderance of individual
over collective situations; interpersonal over socially structured conflicts; cultural attitudes
over political-economic relationships; anger with no direction; a tone of nostalgia and
pessimism. These are 'failings' which are not apparent in Hate or Ladybird Ladybird but not
because they meet Hill's political checklist where their predecessors did not. Indeed Hate
and Ladybird Ladybird are very much inscribed with individual situations, interpersonal
relationships and cultural attitudes. The difference is that they are shown to be absolutely
part of collective situations, social conflicts, political and economic relationships. The
individual, interpersonal and cultural are not inherently conservative although they can be
constructed as such. That changed construction is perhaps the main difference between these
old and new stories of working class lives. The issues and characters are in many ways the
same and in that there is shown to be a continuity of working class historical time, but the
perspective has changed from a relation of exteriority to one of interiority. In Hate and
Ladybird Ladybird the perspective is very much that of their working class protagonists. If
something has changed in the interim years of the 1950s and 1990s perhaps it is the
intervention of feminism, a catching on that the personal is political and that insider
perspectives can make for better stories of class. Their filmic space merges the personal and
political, the real and imagined. It is the antithesis of an observed space of 'difference' and
of 'truth'. It is a space of possibility, of recognitions and resonances, of real and imagined
identifications with identities and places. In this respect their filmic space produces a
particular kind of cultural cartography.
Hate and Ladybird Ladybird map identities and places of working class poverty.
The spaces they produce are antithetical to the observed spaces that are the view of
traditional ethnographic research. If ethnography is understood as the traditional social
scientific fieldwork method based on the empirical observation of 'people in culture' then
any sort of fiction is decidedly non-ethnographic. On the other hand, if ethnography is
understood as a reflexive, power laden method of creatively constructing reality, as it is in
postmodern templates of ethnography, then there are some radical methodological
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implications for ethnographic form. Writers inclined to pursue these implications have
conceived of a 'poetics and politics of ethnography' opening up a whole new terrain of
possibilities in which intertextual, plurivocal and interpretative forms and methods of
practice take over from the authorial voice of scientific, empirical endeavour.20 Indeed
particular 'non-traditional' ethnographic forms would seem to be well suited to express the
'happening-all-at-once' quality that constitutes social life. Forms which can represent such
simultaneity become ideal for the study of social life. Ethnographic poetics, novels and films
are all therefore possible alternatives to traditional ethnographic accounts which 'have failed
to convey cultural differences in terms of full-bodied experience'.21 The potential of using
filmed ways of life ethnographically already has a history in the sub-discipline of 'visual
anthropology'. Historically the use of such ethnographic films has been strongly tied to the
making of films specifically for the purpose of anthropological research in a strongly
evidential mode.22 The use of drama documentaries and fiction films therefore makes
possible modes of enquiry that go beyond the evidential surface, to fully realise the potential
of film's semantic richness. That fullness of meaning creates complexity, possibility, and
ambiguity which refuses both the viewer and the director absolute control over the subject's
story. Claims of intellectual authority are immediately out of place. The difference that a
filmic ethnography makes to the lives it represents lies in both the detail and the openness of
meaning it allows. These are meanings made in the conjunction of multiple events and non-
events; conversations and interactions; looks and movements. Such meanings do not exist in
language and therefore cannot be conveyed in forms such as the research interview. They
cannot be repeated in speech, are unspoken and possibly unspeakable.
The films I have chosen are myriads of temporal and spatial complexity from which
'reality' is constructed from the intersection of outward appearance and inner depth, the
transient moment and enduring lives, marginal spaces and encompassing landscapes. For my
purposes the central strength of this filmic space is the sort of visibility it creates. The way
visibility is achieved has consequences for those whose lives are deemed to require
surveillance and intervention. These films defend and complicate what they show, they do
not leave their subjects exposed or revealed. They also give voice in a way that is not part of
an injunction to tell, that is not recorded as evidence. 'Not telling' in a culture of 'telling'
that falls most heavily on the poor - to welfare professionals, to the DSS, to the police, in
media confessionals, to researchers - is in many ways a defence. Both these understandings
20 Clifford and Marcus, Writing Culture
21 Marcus.G and Fischer.M (1986) Anthropology As Cultural Critique: An Experimental Moment in
The Human Sciences Chicago: Chicago university Press p73
22 See Kuehnast.K (1992) 'Visual Imperialism and the export of prejudice: an exploration of
ethnographic film' p 183-195 Film As Ethnography Crawford.P and Turton.D (eds.) Manchester:
Manchester University Press
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about voice and visibility developed as part of a research process that took me home to
reflect on the place of 'experience' and 'affect' in the discourse of 'underclass' through
conversations with friends and family. When I came back, the films had become part of a
meaning making process in which their stories, were part of my own stories. My re-telling of
them is not about trying to reproduce the filmic space or my home space, they are told
specifically with the purpose of refuting some dominant meanings of 'underclass'. That
motivation is at the centre of my interpretations, partly creating the reality it describes.
Going Home
My idea of going home was to put onto the page in 'conversations' something of
what it is like being working class and poor amongst the contemporary glut of
interpretations and prescriptions for your life. I also wanted to express something of the
meaning of being home which did not fit either a specimen style sociology of 'people in
council houses' or an alienated narrative of 'people in council houses who go to University'.
I could have been spending that summer in 'participant observation' of a working class
family and their friends who had lived in the same street for most of their lives. It just
happened that the street, family and friends were my own and that they were a continuous
part of me. At first I thought that situation would be enough to be able to make a point about
closeness and distance in research; to convey the difference that proximity, immersion, and
continuity make to the research view; and to produce something experiential in which the
idea of 'the other' would be rendered obsolete because there was no yawning gap between
researcher and researched. Yet the evocation of 'difference' was somehow inherent in even
this idea as the explication of something 'unknown'. I would be making these people
'unknown' in order to then make them 'known' to another audience, when really we were
entirely familiar with each other. In my University office I had not anticipated the distaste I
would feel at trying to recreate this experiential realm. Once I was part of things again at
home, the idea was out of place. This was very much a personal feeling, a gut feeling that
the idea was all wrong. I decided that it was important and that my disinclination was
probably part of the very reason that I had chosen a discourse analysis in the first place. Part
of this reason was a desire to 'turn the tables' on those who are not usually talked about but
do the talking about 'others'. Part was a huge misgiving about the sort of information that is
obtainable in 'interviews', the idea of the spoken word as a route, albeit a winding one, to
self-identity. The nature of this misgiving is expressed in one of the 43 episodes of
Edinburgh 'underclass' living found in Irvine Welsh's novel Trainspotting,23 One of the
main characters - Renton - is forced to discuss his identity with a counsellor. He reverses the
23 Welsh.I (1993) Trainspotting London: Minerva
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relationship between the knowing 'interviewer' and the 'subject' of the interview as a
refusal of the injunction to tell (the 'truth') and to be accountable:
'Sometimes ah telt the truth, sometimes ah lied. When ah lied, ah sometimes said
the things that ah thought he'd like tae hear, n sometimes said something which ah
thought would wind him up, or confuse him.'24
Renton's refusal, or rather the confusion it produces, ends up with him being sent for more
counselling, an outcome that makes him think his mate got the easy option in going to jail.
Nevertheless he maintains a protective distance, a refusal to be convinced of the necessity to
'tell it the way it is' in order to be better 'known':
'Once ye accept that they huv that right, ye'11 join them in the search fir this holy
grail, this thing that makes ye tick. Ye'll then defer tae them, allowin yersel tae be
conned intae believin any biscuit-ersed theory ay behaviour they choose tae attach
tae ye. Then yir theirs, no yir ain.'25
I was not a counsellor but I was about to ask people about their subjectivities, and to ask
them to repeat things I already knew about. These were people who knew my politics and
motivations, had known me all my life, there was no great distance. It was the 'ideal' which
I thought I had wanted. In that closeness I realised that my approach to this experience based
chapter needed to be a defence, a strategic refusal of the injunction to tell, the revelatory
end. In the end some family and friends watched the films on video, as films we might watch
anyway and I said I was probably going to talk about them in my Ph.D. Everyone responded
to the films much like I had when I first saw them and I knew that I had made the right
decision not to make either their lives or their viewings of the films the subject of the
chapter. I decided that that these were the sort of films that we might choose to represent
something we know about, something of who we are or could be, or imagine ourselves to
be:
'We're amazing aren't we' (Ladybird, Ladybird)
'Oh it's not subtitles is it....
(and later)
... I wouldn't mind seeing that again' {Hate)
'Fucking brilliant' {Hate)
'Pam has got to see this' {Ladybird, Ladybird)
'It's like a French 'Made In Britain', nearly as good, 'Made In France'!' {Hate)






These reactions are those of people familiar with negative representations about
who they are, their class, their poverty, their 'problematic' nature. Such representations were
part of experiences of growing up, being children and teenagers or being parents through the
seventies, eighties and the nineties: living through prolonged periods of impoverishment, as
others were living through periods of consumption and materialism. For a large part of that
time poverty was accompanied by a degradation of poor working class people, a cultural
contempt expressed about people who wore 'shell suits', 'Sharons and Trades', 'losers',
'yob culture', 'low life', 'scroungers'. At the same time there was a total degradation of both
the idea and provision of welfare which was the most important aspect of lives lived on
benefits, moving in and out of low paid work, being unwell, living in council housing. We
were the groups that were associated with crime, yobbery, social security fraud, welfare
dependency. During the eighties especially we were the most marginal and most despised,
perverse in our failure to 'succeed', dragging our feet over change, wanting the old jobs
back, still having babies instead of careers, stuck in outdated class and gender moulds. I
include myself in this story because going to University at the beginning of the nineties did
not extract me from the meaning of all this as part of my emotional and material relation to
class. My class is about a felt connectedness to experientially similar others and a political
connectedness in terms of welfare interests. That connectedness is shown in Hate and
Ladybird Ladybird as a relation of the personal to the cultural and economic. Those
connections are made in a myriad of ways between people of the same class, they are not
fixed and cannot be determinedly stated. You recognise them when you see some of yourself
in others; and you feel their pull emotionally, intellectually, politically at different times, in
different places. Representations which affirm those connections feel like winning a prize,
wresting something valuable from those who don't want you to have it. This is about class
as much more than material inequality: class as stories, values, feelings, as something
positive. It is an expansive notion of class: stories which do not need to be identical to my
own in order to affirm me. They can be about the North of England; they don't even have to
be British; they can be set in the past; they can have black male protagonists. In common
they produce a feeling and a recognition that this is somehow about me. In Hate and
Ladybird Ladybird the positive nature of the feeling comes from the recognition that things
are not alright and the reasons for things being as they are is to do with other social groups,
their authority, their privilege, their values. Thus a central part of the positive feeling is
being justified in feeling angry about the way things are and directing that anger towards
those who set things up and carry them out that way. In large part that involves antipathy
towards 'things middle class' in feelings that are a psychic defence built from experience,
maintained for protection. This class feeling is about positive affirmation and expression of
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conflict. The films are pleasurable in being part of an insistence that parts of middle class
society should be accountable, are problematic, should not be allowed to be comfortable in
their privilege, power and class. The feeling is personal because I take contemporary debates
about cultures of benefit dependency and criminality personally as part of my affective
relationship to 'workingclassness'. The films offer a particular sort of affective relation to
material deprivation and social identity. They express something of the feel of being
working class which cannot be reduced to a description of a political ideology such as
socialism or a social scientific analysis of class relations. That feeling necessarily goes
beyond external perceptions of what being working class should be, described here by
Annette Kuhn:
'Class is not just about the way you talk, or dress or furnish your home... Class is
something beneath your clothes, under your skin, in your reflexes, in your psyche, at
the very core of your being.'26
Raymond Williams describes the 'feel' of a social group as a 'structure of feeling:
'[the] specifically affective elements of consciousness and relationships'.27 The notion
works as a mediating category between social, experiential and representational practices.
Hate and Ladybird Ladybird similarly work to mediate some of the social, experiential and
representational practices and meanings of being working class and poor. In this respect they
can be located as part of a structure of class feeling that is made up of a myriad of material
circumstances, emotional responses, psychological defences, personal and political
meanings. I have tried to structure some of that feeling in three themes, which I use to
explore the films. They are: Oppression-Resistance, Time-Space, Subjectivity-Collectivity.
Oppression-Resistance is about the social relations of class and poverty; Time-Space is
about the way those relations are lived on a daily basis according to situation; and
Subjectivity-Collectivity is about their politics as matters of difference and belonging.
My discussion of the films through the themes will not be using a traditional
academic voice. I feel that the things they are about will be communicated best in a language
that is not totally alien to the lives and experiences being talked about; a language that does
not need references to authoritative others because it is a claim to an experiential and
subjugated knowledge of its own; and a language that is not too heavily structured by the
formalities of academic writing, as a classed form of writing. While that writing has use and
purpose elsewhere, it is not part of the space of knowledge and understanding which I want
to create here.
I will briefly set the stories of these films in relation to contemporary hegemonic
stories of the breakdown in law and order in working class young men and council estates,
26
Kuhn.A (1995) Family Secrets: Acts OfMemory and Imagination London: Verso p98
27 Williams.R (1977) Marxism and Literature Oxford: Oxford University Press pl32
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and the breakdown in family and reproductive norms of working class single motherhood.
Both films confront the spectre of these contemporary political issues.
The Films
'There were 28 recorded violent disturbances or riots between 1991-93 and about a
hundred lesser disorders as the police clashed with groups of young men on
residential streets. The riots took a different course in different parts of the country,
and varied in intensity, but they shared many features. Twelve of the thirteen riots in
1991 and 1992 took place on council estates - most of them large, and all outside
London... The vast majority of rioters were white, British bom boys and young men,
aged between 10 and 30... The riots always happened in low-income areas with
long-standing social problems and poor reputations - most of them built to re-house
slum clearance families in the 1930s, '40s, and '50s. Unemployment levels were far
above the national average, three times as high for the local authority areas as a
whole and more than twice as high as in other areas of social housing... The
concentrations of young people in these areas were much higher than in the country
as a whole. In some more than half the residents were under 24... In some cases the
police were criticised for inaction before the riots. More frequently, serious violence
28followed an unusual level of police intervention.'
'A woman was put under pressure to have an abortion and sterilisation by
Lancashire social workers... Cathleen McCullagh was pressured into aborting twins
by social workers who told her that if they were bom, they would try to have them
taken into care. Two doctors refused to give their permission for the termination
because there were no medical grounds for it. Mrs. McCullagh was never accused of
abuse, but social workers argued that she was an 'unfit' mother because they said
29she had a low IQ and they claimed she was prone to aggressive mood swings.'
'Now, more than 60 families have formed an action group, Mothers In Action, each
with a story to tell of overt interference by social workers... The Children Act which
came into force in October 1991, was supposed to control many of the abuses of
power by social workers... Many of the cases examined in Lancashire, however,
indicate that the law is being used to separate families and children are being placed
with adopters before any reasonable attempts have been made at reunification.'30
These are reports of 'real' events in contemporary Britain. Hate and Ladybird
Ladybird are the stories of individuals involved in such news, both films being inspired by
such 'real-life' events. Ladybird Ladybird is 'based on a tme story'; Hate refers to riotous
occurrences on public housing estates in France and was seen to have been instrumental in
their re-occurrence. Both films have been met with criticism and censure: Loach for having
'blurred fact and fiction' and Kassovitz for 'fostering confrontation'.31 In different ways
28 Power.A and Tunstall.R (1997) 'Estates Of Siege' The Guardian G2 25.6.97 p9, taken from
Power.A and Tunstall.R (1997) Dangerous Disorder: Riots and Violent Disturbances in Thirteen
Areas ofBritain 1991-1992 York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation
29 'Social Workers 'Pressured Mother To Abort Twins" The Independent 12.12.94 pi
30 'What Are Social Workers For?' The Independent 13.12.94 p 18
31 'Milk Bars? Marxist Theory? Wake Up and Smell the Cappuccino, Ken' The Observer Review
19.6.97 p4; 'Concrete Jungle, Where Life Imitates Art In The Concrete Jungle' The Independent On
Sunday 11.6.95 p 15
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both were seen to be reckless: Loach with the 'truth', Kassovitz with social consequences.
Both films have also been followed by official reactions to their 'real' content to bring about
positive changes and compensations. Part of the French government's response after Prime
Minister Juppe screened Hate for the education of his cabinet, was to propose a £2 billion
'Marshall Plan for the estates'.32 There are injunctions against the case of the woman
represented as 'Maggie' being talked about in the media, and the Broadcasting Standards
Authority have up held a complaint that because of the film's violence and bad language
Channel Four overstepped acceptable boundaries in screening it on television. However it is
only since the film has been made that 'Maggie', after being refused a Social Work enquiry,
has been able to find some recognition that what happened to her was wrong via the criminal
justice system. A case of assault against her is being pursued through the courts.33 Both
films have broken bounds of representation in their subject matter and response, making a
purity of distinction between fact and fiction unsustainable.
Hate chronicles 24 hours in the lives of three working class friends from an outer
Parisian housing estate in the aftermath of a riot. They are Hubert, Said, and Vince - who
has found a gun lost by the police the night before. The riots had been started after Abdel - a
16 year old from their estate - was beaten into a coma after being taken into police custody.
Vince announces to his friends that if Abdel dies, he'll use the gun to kill a policeman. They
wander the terrain of the night before, recalling its events, making small time deals, avoiding
the police and the television cameras, drifting and talking. They travel a few miles away to
Paris, are picked up by the police and abused. In Paris they are like strangers in a foreign
country. Much of the tension and dialogue centre on whether or not Vince will use the gun
as a tension between survival and getting revenge. The talk is street slang laced with
violence, bravado, friendship, humour and reflectivity. Music systems blare gangsta rap and
hip-hop, the television brings post-riot news. The 24 hours are shown ticking by, a mixture
of boredom and immanence, ordinariness and extremity.
Ladybird Ladybird is the story of Maggie Conlon, a single mother with four young
children. She has left a violent husband and council flat to enter a women's refuge with her
children. On the one evening she decides to go out to a pub karaoke, the children are caught
in a fire at the refuge. Social Services remove all four children from her, and she is fighting
to get them back. This we learn in flashback as Maggie tells some of her story to Jorge, a
Paraguayan asylum seeker, who she meets in the pub on a night out with her sister. Meeting
Jorge is the start of a new life for Maggie. They fight together to get her children back but
without success. They go on to have two children who are also removed by Social Services
32 'The Angry Sound of the Suburbs' The Independent 26.10.95 p2-3
33 'For Once Ladybird's in the Right' The Observer 10.8.97 p24
because Maggie's past and her personality are used to mark her as an unfit mother. The
narrative and dialogue centre on her relationship with various welfare authorities, her
relationship with Jorge and with her children. As she is continually denied the relationship
with her children, her grief, anger and despair come to define her way of being, coping and
not coping. The 'truth' represented is Maggie's truth, defended by Loach in these terms:
'It isn't whether the film is true but what is the truth in the film? The material events
happened.'34
I have divided some of the 'truth' that is found in the stories of Hate and Ladybird Ladybird
into three themed areas. The first is Oppression-Resistance.
34
Quoted in 'Still Worried About Maggie's Children' The Observer Review 4.9.94 p2
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1: OPPRESSION-RESISTANCE
Getting by when you're working class and poor often means presenting a front to those
authority figures who have direct power over your life. The things you say, the way you look
and act, the tidiness of your home or state of your garden, are all things which can be used
against you. They can have consequences that mean you have to be vigilant and that mean
you have an investment in making things look 'good' and non-problematic. This is not to say
that things always do look good, just that you are aware that outward presentation is often
made to count against you. The front that is put up is in many ways a denial of who you are,
what you're going through, how you feel. If you look 'normal', look as if you're getting on
fine, coping and abiding by the law, then you are less likely to have your life subjected to
external intervention whether by Social Services or the police. Yet this means that things
can look as if they really are alright: you can manage on that amount ofmoney, you are
going along with the way things are. Very often that is not the case. You're not coping,
you're ill, you're angry, you don't feel part of things and you don't agree with 'the way
things are'. Even when everything may look fine, the cost of that look is an immense
physical and psychological struggle that brings you down. A sense of what that struggle
might be is often only guessed at when things go wrong. When the investment in keeping
things looking 'normal' does not seem worth it or is not possible to make, some of the
'truth' spills over in the way you look, the way you behave, the things you say. Relations
with authority and middle class society generally are therefore a mix of conformity, good
impressions, politeness, and resistance, defiance, anger. Either way it is a struggle against
what are very often oppressive social relations, manifest in a wide range of behaviours,
outcomes, interactions. Hate and Ladybird Ladybird convey a great deal of what the
struggle, material and psychological, is like.
Both films are stories of class-based oppression, inflected with race in the former,
gender in the latter. In Ladybird Ladybird the primary channel of Maggie's oppression is her
local Social Services department. Social workers are not presented as an homogenous
monolith. Maggie sees a good selection of different workers who are variously well-
meaning, patronising and sanctimonious individuals, but the role they fulfil, and the social
behaviours and conditions they police, tend to work in one direction. They work to define
Maggie's situation on their terms and the bottom line when their terms are not adhered to is
coercive intervention. Maggie is subjected to surveillance, coercion and violence as she
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struggles to keep her children and to get them back once they are removed from her. Her
contact with social workers ranges from the intrusive to the brutal. Backed by police officers
they forcibly snatch one baby from her at home and wait outside the hospital delivery room
to remove another as soon as she has given birth.
These overtly violent events are part of an aggregated officialdom made up of a
phalanx of agencies presenting a united and inflexible front, backing each other. Their
intimidation and lack of understanding are not shown as personally or departmentally
motivated, but as institutionalised. Actions are backed by the legality and procedure of the
'case conference', the 'at risk register', the 'place of safety order'. Maggie is told: 'The Law
says if you don't co-operate we will have to take all your children from you'. The front of
their practices is the language of her 'best interests' and their justification is made out to be
her individually motivated behaviour. In combination, her reproductive choices, her choice
of partners, and her intellectual and emotional responses to her situation, are defined as the
problem. Before Maggie goes to her first court hearing to try to get her son back, her social
worker tries to load responsibility for the outcome onto Maggie's sexual behaviour: 'Now
there are no men in your life are there Maggie?' She is continually told that she has the
power to change things, that negative outcomes are her fault: 'If you would help yourself
Maggie, we're here to help you'. As she tries to escape with her children, a social worker
shouts after her: 'If you go now you'll lose the kids forever, I'm trying to help you Maggie'.
Finally the family court judge uses her behaviour as the reason that he has to act to remove
her children from her: 'Her choice of partner is in her control... she seems likely to continue
her pattern of abusive relationships.' Thus Maggie's treatment is permanently attended by a
rhetoric that attempts to reverse the causality of events, to position her as the master of her
own destiny. Under the guise of 'help' and the proffering of 'advice' is accusation and
threat, both geared towards individualising her predicament as a matter of behavioural
choice. In her actual experiences Maggie permanently faces the lie of their rhetoric, the
meaning of their formal niceties and sanitised legalities. She is told by her social workers
that if she does not swear, behaves with decorum, wears a suit to court, does not get
involved with other men, then it will be alright, she will be able to have her children back.
Maggie knows that it won't. This is the lesson that she has continually learnt and that she is
expected to continually forget. She is expected to forget her own knowledge, intelligence
and experience, indeed to see her use of them as against her better interests. She knows how
she is seen in their eyes, according to her records, and the evidence of her 'bad language'
and 'aggressive behaviour'. She knows that on their terms she will always fail. In the interim
she will be subjected to social work practices of surveillance and monitoring, and placement
in a residential 'family centre' to treat those problem elements that are deemed capable of
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'reform'. The permanent removal of her children to more suitable socialising contexts of
State 'care' and foster homes is the ever present threat that conditions all her relations to
authority.
Maggie's own ability to assess and direct her situation (struggling but coping), the
value of her own priorities (love and emotional security for her children), and the value of
what she has already achieved in raising four children, are all rendered worthless. The
physical, emotional and psychological work of her child rearing in circumstances of poverty
and domestic violence are made to count for nothing. The violence of these judgements
against Maggie's autonomy and intelligence is hidden in the polite, quietly spoken, middle
class voices of proper statutory channels. Their meanings are realised in actions against her:
police officers hold her down and hold her back as she seeks to keep hold of her children;
hospital staff sedate her with an injection, attended by police and security staff.
Maggie's social and economic position - subject to poverty, homelessness and
violence - is marginalised by the authorities assessments. Social Services can do nothing to
significantly improve those circumstances so they must act as if the problem is with Maggie
herself. To admit those economic and environmental injustices as primary, and moreover
that there is nothing they can do about them, would be to negate their role. Their way of
dealing with this impasse, is to judge as inadequate the very thing that Maggie is most
capable of providing for her children and to deny the central significance of her material
hardship. Thus the family court judge tells her that she cannot have her children back
because: 'Children need more than love, they need support and stability'. She later sees a
picture of her eldest son Sean up for adoption in the classified adverts of the local
newspaper, under his photograph it reads: 'I've never had much love, can you give me some
now?' The nature of this oppression is emotionally and psychologically exhausting, Maggie
is traumatised as blame is added to brutality: 'They won't be happy 'til I'm dead'.
In Hate such a feeling is symbolically justified when Vince and Hubert are finally
shot by police authorities which have hounded and abused them over 24 hours. The
shootings are carried out by psyched up officers, the first happening when a gun goes off
accidentally. However, the shootings themselves are not the main measure of the oppression
to which the three friends are subjected. They happen in the very last minute of their story;
they are preceded by a day and night of provocation and harassment by riot police,
community-based police, city police, security guards, and television cameras.
12.43 p.m. As Vince, Hubert and Said hang around a dilapidated playground , a media
truck pulls up on a raised road that borders the estate. A woman hangs out the window with
a microphone while the camera films from its roof. They peer down as if into a pit: 'Hi
we're from the TV, did you bum anything, break cars....?' The friends react angrily: 'What
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d'you think we look like?' 'Stirring up shit for a juicy scoop?' 'No camera! Stop snooping
fuckface. Stop taping!' 'Get outta the car, this ain't Thoiry' (a drive through safari park). As
they throw stones and shout, the film frame becomes the view from the media camera lens
and we see them as they'll be presented for the news: aggressive, shouting, throwing stones,
as evidence.
The scene ends with Hubert saying to the others: 'This ain't no zoo', but for the
media it is exactly that. They are presented as a dangerous social species in their natural
habitat, the concrete jungle of the estate. The oppressive presentation of their reality, and the
intrusion into their lives will be hidden in the camera view which positions 'society' as
justifiably anxious and aggrieved by their problematic behaviour. The scene shows
representational violence wearing a cloak of objectivity in a quest for the 'truth' of the riots.
20.17 p.m. Hubert and Said have been pulled into a Parisian police cell from the city streets
having been identified as being from the estates and found to be carrying small amounts of
cannabis. The police officers taunt them for their appearance, their clothes, their accents,
and their attitude, in a tirade of sick abuse, humiliations, sadistic cruelty and violence:
'They'll be out in two hours, let's make the most of it'. A younger officer is unwillingly
initiated into these practices, his sensibilities brutalised as he is forced to watch, and into
silent acquiescence. The event horrific as it is, is not anomalous, it is perhaps an extreme
example of what they are subjected to on a daily basis. The sense is that such oppression is a
central part of their experience, part of the fabric of their lives which they have learnt to
expect. They stagger out, do not talk about it, or breakdown, they do not refer to it when
they meet up with Vince, do not report it or tell their parents. They just carry on. The
'normality' of such violence is part of the condition of their lives. It is a casual brutality
backed by legality so that everything looks and sounds alright on the surface. The police
officers are clean and smart with Parisian accents, the forms will be filled in - 'drug users
from the estates'. They are the problem, their oppression does not register.
6.01 am Emerging from the events of the night in Paris the three friends return to their
estate. They seem to have survived all the provocations, frustrations, degradation, abuse and
violence that has been loaded upon them, and without retaliating with the police gun that has
been in their possession. Their incredible restraint, psychological defences, discussions,
reflections and finally their choice of survival over confrontation, have all brought them
back. Hubert's role as the older and more experienced of the three has been central as a
pragmatic philosopher reiterating that survival is what counts most: 'hate breeds hate', they
may be falling but 'so far so good'. They have made it home, so far so good. Vince hands
the gun over to Hubert as if to acknowledge that Hubert was right, and walks off with Said
still joking after everything they have been through. Hubert watches them as a police car
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pulls up by their side and three local police officers jump out. One of them starts to push
Vince about, taunting him: 'You were the two on the roof earlier weren't you, think you're
tough?' Hubert walks over and as he does the police officer shoots Vince in the head as the
gun accidentally goes off in his hand. Vince slumps to the ground dead. Hubert holds the
gun that Vince had just given him to the police officer's head, the officer holds his to
Hubert's, and they shoot each other. The significance of Hubert being the one to finally use
the gun, having argued the futility of violence and revenge all day, is to show that Vince's
argument against turning the other cheek ('they'll kill you anyway') is just as valid. Hubert
finally unleashes his hate from pragmatism, in full knowledge of what he is doing. This
outcome, far from extreme, is entirely in keeping with the preceding 24 hours as the ongoing
possibility and looming bottom line of a violent and oppressive reality. The ending is a
refusal of hope when everything points in the other direction. A realisation of the aphorism:
'if they don't get you one way they'll get you another'. Yet it is the struggle against that
realisation that makes up most of their life, most of the time.
Hate and Ladybird Ladybird both show that the struggle in the lives of those who
are oppressed by external agencies, produces relations other than oppression. Part of those
relations are about acts of balancing the just about manageable with the threateningly
catastrophic: things are bad but they could be worse. The films show that certainly whatever
motivates social compliance and conformity, is missing, even when it seems not to be.
Identification is replaced by compliance that is based on pragmatism and fear. In Ladybird
Ladybird Maggie's fear of losing her children means that she will go along with the social
workers for part of the way; in Hate it is the fear of arrest, abuse and imprisonment that
makes the young men as tolerant of things as they are. A central part of both films is the way
their protagonists are working around the contradiction of 'compliance and resistance'. They
are trying to resolve the question of how they should deal with their predicament, which is
to say how they should deal with the oppression in their lives. Should they be defiant and
make conflict explicit, or should they put survival before pride, self-control before free
expression, and do they have a choice?
In both films defiant ways of being teeter on the edge of outright conflict, but most
of the time are held in check. Maggie struggles with this constantly, knowing that to reveal
the truth of her feelings jeopardises getting her children back and being allowed to keep
them, yet the enormous strain and emotional trauma she is going through makes self-
restraint near impossible. She is too stressed and too angry to 'pretend', to play with
appearances, to be polite when inside she is screaming. She forces into the open the nature
of the power relation between herself and the social workers, the health visitors and the
foster parents: it is a conflict of interests. Maggie refuses an amnesiac approach to the things
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she has learnt from experience, and states things as she sees them: 'Social workers is what's
got my kids... they like to keep busy', 'They've done nothing for us whatsoever', 'You said
I'd get my kids back'. To the Social Service's 'offer' of a place in a family centre to 'help'
her 'rehabilitate and cope', and for them to be able to assess her situation, she replies: 'I'm
not going to a detention centre, if you want to help me get me a flat'. To the social worker's
polite enquiry as to why she's got a black eye, which Maggie knows is not motivated by
concern, but by a necessity to gather 'evidence' of the unsuitability of her home
environment for children, she replies: 'Ooh you've got fucking x-ray eyes today, well I hit in
on this cupboard if you must know'. She tells the 'respectable', privately and securely
housed foster mother that she has come round to see her son not to indulge in chit chat as if
they were friends, the woman has her child: 'I haven't come here to drink your fucking
coffee'. When the social workers talk about her relationship with Jorge as a means to assess
its suitability they continually try to see problems and are looking for evidence. One tries to
use the idea of language barriers as a fault in the relationship: 'Do you find it difficult to
communicate?' Maggie immediately reveals the motivation and implication of the question:
'How do you think we communicate by tom-tom drams? I can't stand his guts is that what
you want to hear?' However, the high stakes of letting such feelings through have to be
constantly taken into account, she is constantly having to explain and excuse herself: 'Me
mouth works before me brain... I'm mouthy it's just me, I can't help it'. While Jorge
counsels restraint so that the social workers and judges can see her gentle side and cannot
find the excuses to act against her, Maggie cannot easily transplant her feelings in this way
and will not allow their calm tones to disallow her anger. This is at least partly because she
knows deeply, in a perfectly rational way that they are not to be trusted. She is permanently
vigilant of their language and intentions, she is quick to translate questions like 'How are
you Maggie?', and the jargon of 'family centres', local authority and foster 'care', at 'risk'
registers, place of 'safety' orders. The display of her feelings make explicit the truth of how
things are for her: 'How can I be nice when they've got five of my kids?' She knows her
enemy well, knows to expect the worst, and produces a defensive strategy as part of a siege
mentality: don't let them near you; don't let them get hold of the children in the first place;
once you're in the system they've got you; they'll try to push you to say things and act in
ways that confirm their perspective and justify their actions; get as far away as possible; try
to be anonymous; it's not going to be different next time.
When things have reached their lowest point and all six children have been taken
away from her, the relationship between her and Jorge is taken to breaking point under the
stress. At the point that Jorge becomes as angry and grief stricken as she has been all along,
she shouts: 'What's wrong, got to you have they?' The meaning is that they got to her long
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ago. Throughout the unfolding events Maggie carries a terrible expectation that things will
not turn out well, as a knowledge and experience of oppression. But she also has a
knowledge of survival. She knows that they can do terrible things to you and you have to
carry on. Indeed it is that struggle to carry on that partly defies the odds against her. Part of
the struggle is therefore a resistance to the ideas and effects of oppression. It is about
maintaining a sense of integrity, of your own values, and a sense of what is really going on.
Maggie's mothering role is a defining part of her identity and a site of her
resistance. Before Social Services get hold of her children, she struggles to look after them
well in conditions of poverty. She knows and loves them as individuals and has developed
warm, close relations with them. She is fussy about what they eat and wants the best for
them. Different qualities of child rearing and home environment are one of the reasons she
won't go into the 'family centre' and dislikes the foster parent. She pitches her own values
against those of the social workers definition of 'good' families as generationally distinct,
autonomous and individualising, stable and comfortable. Maggie tries to deal with the
pressures put on her ability to mother with a resilient, protective and nurturing orientation to
her family. It is in stark contrast to the alienation, violence and oppression that defines her
relationship to the authorities.
After the removal ofMaggie's first four children, her determination to have more
children acts as a resistance to the determination of official authorities to control her
mothering: 'We're going to have a family if it takes the rest of our lives'. Her refusal to give
up wanting and trying to have a family shows not only the importance of maintaining hope
as a spirit of resistance but specifically shows a highly positive value attached to children
and the family as the reason for carrying on, the best thing life offers her. Motherhood and
child rearing in these circumstances of poverty, stress, scrutiny and sustained efforts to
prevent them are a site of positive value. They are also a site of resistance to the control of
her reproduction by professionals and wider middle class social norms. This is all
powerfully symbolised when Maggie is in labour with her fifth child and she refuses to push
along with her contractions. She does not want to release the child from the safety of being
inside her to be taken over by the professionals and norms of an outside world that are alien
to her. The nature of this resistance, which is central to Maggie's story, is rarely understood
by the professionalised classism that tries to pathologise reproductive behaviour that is not
their own. Thus, some of the reviews of Ladybird Ladybird seemed to miss this meaning of
Maggie's reproductive struggle:
'The only permanently worrying aspect in this searing film is the assumption that
Maggie is right to have one child after another. Has no-one heard of over-population
or condoms?'35
35 The Times, Film Review 22.2.94 p39
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'...the chronic inability of his heroine Maggie, to practice birth control, seems to run
counter to his usual left-wing tolerance.'36
Maggie's resistance to a sanctioned reproductive role is not about conscious protest, but is
part of her everyday life as a struggle to maintain a positive identity against externally
imposed values and interests. She refuses their attempts to negate the meanings that she
attaches to her own life: 'I'll tell you what's best for my kids, it's to be at home with me';
'My interest is to have my son back, my kids interest is to have their brother back'. This is a
struggle against taking on board their estimation of her, a struggle against feeling worthless.
It is made so difficult that it is not always possible to sustain, she tells Jorge: 'I see trouble
and I go to bed with it, me' 'Love's for fucking fairytales... I'm not worth it anyway'. But
most of the time she is able to maintain distinctions between herself and those who seek to
define her as a way to maintain self-esteem. Her resilience to their ways of thinking, talking,
and acting are part of her defence against their attack on her difference.
Maggie's personal relationships with Jorge and her children focus the nature of her
struggle as a struggle for optimism, hope and the future. Her relation to them is the positive
meaning of her life, part of an emotional and psychological defence against unrelieved
bleakness and defeat. The strength of her values, feelings and relationships are resilient
ways of being poor and oppressed. On Maggie's first meeting with Jorge it is her humour,
sensitivity and positive nature that are most apparent. These are underlain by the sadness
and grief expressed in the poignant song she is singing for the pub Karaoke, but her spirit of
survival in dealing with them is what comes through to Jorge. The pub is a place that
Maggie can try to escape from her sadness and anger by trying to have a good time, singing,
chatting, smoking, drinking. When she first meets Jorge she tells her sister: 'Eh I've copped
off with Julio Iglesias!', and refuses to wallow in her sadness after telling Jorge something
of her situation: '...but we've all got worries haven't we?' Much of this positive attitude is
fragile and temporary. Once out of the pub her pain re-emerges: 'You don't realise how
much sound goes round in your head 'til it's not there do you?' It's then, in the quiet that she
breaks down and starts to tell Jorge her story.
In Hate, Vince, Hubert and Said are also involved in a struggle to find the best way
of dealing with their immediate predicament and ongoing oppression. It is a struggle to
achieve a balance between defiance and compliance which allows them some dignity but
without jeopardising survival. Like Maggie's it is a struggle for positive identity and feeling
in order that they are not totally consumed by hate and the oppression in their lives.
36 The Sunday Times, Film Review 30.10.94 plO
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The everyday lives of Vince, Hubert and Said express a variable but ubiquitous anti-
authoritarianism that is related to exclusion from, and their rejection of, identification with
wider society. It is not organised protest but is manifest in their social practice as a number
of different ways of dealing with negative authority. They are expected to accept their
economic powerlessness, their isolation on estates, their lack of choice, mobility, and status,
and to be deferential to various forms of authority. The riots which start their story are a
moment of spontaneous refusal to go along with this set up but their refusal is also shown in
more diffuse ways of giving meaning to their lives which make up a cultural identity. They
have ways of temporarily reversing the authority of situations, making something out of the
nothing of boredom and desolate space: in the jokes and stories they tell each other, in their
bravado and street style, in the way they face up to the police and answer back.
Vince's possession of a police gun provides the impetus for assessing their relation
to authority, for thinking and talking about the possibility of taking it in different directions.
The central narrative is their struggle with the understanding that there are no easy answers
to the question of 'what to do' about their predicament. Through the events and reflections
of the day and Hubert's rationalising, Vince comes to realise that having the gun changes
nothing, that the gun in the hands of the police is an expression of power but that in his
hands those power relations are not changed. It offers a momentary means of revenge, an
illusion of power. However it is also a means of creating a fantasy of power, an imaginative
resistance. Vince wants to keep hold of that idea of a dramatic resistance for as long as
possible. As the story goes on we can see why.
A riot has taken place and their friend has been beaten into a coma, all their
interaction with external authority figures is fraught with abuse and immanent conflict.
Vince, in particular, is unwilling to keep up a consensual front. He wants to maintain the
honesty of actual confrontation as an expression of how he is feeling and as a principled
stance. The three friends try to visit Abdel in hospital but are refused access. Angry that they
should be refused while the media is allowed in, they will not leave. A scuffle with security
breaks out and while the media cameras snap the news of 'continuing trouble' Said is
arrested. He is quickly released after the intervention of a community liaison police officer.
These community police men are seen by the boys as buffers, explaining, defusing tension,
keeping things ticking over. They facilitate the management of tensions, the management of
the boys on a daily, ground level basis. However, they also try to position themselves as
neutral mediators: 'We're only doing our job', and are more or less tolerated, providing a
'safe' outlet for defiant jibes and attitudes about the police. On his release Said insists that
he's not looking for police favours but will still shake the officer's hand, Vince refuses the
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compromise hand shake as a phoney consensus, maintaining integrity through distance:
'You don't shake a pig's hand.'
For most of the time Vince and Hubert seem to represent opposing views on the
question of balance between defiance and compliance, action and emotion versus reflection
and rationality. Vince is emotional, ready to fight, puts principles first, saying of Hubert:
'The jerk thinks too much'. Hubert rationalises keeping out of trouble, is pragmatic, puts
survival first, saying to Vince: 'You're headed for big shit.' Their sparring is really an
attempt to resolve their predicament, a working through of two possibilities. As friends and
as positions they are inextricably part of each other. The turn around ending as a reversal of
positions - Vince having given the gun to Hubert is shot, Hubert uses the gun to shoot a
policeman - shows just how inextricable their positions finally are. Neither positions were
'right' because the outcome was out of their control, there was no 'right' answer that they
had failed to reach. The outcome recalls the story that Hubert has told earlier in the night as
a metaphor of their lives: a man is falling 50 storeys, reassuring himself on the way down -
'so far so good, so far so good' - 'Like us on the estates, so far so good, it's not how you fall
but how you land'. Its meaning conveys a mix of the arbitrary, the hopeful and unbearably
predictable as characteristic of their own experiences. They cannot make plans, can only get
by for the moment, trying not to think about the nature of their future as inevitable. It means
that for most of the time they walk a knife's edge of risk between defiance and compliance.
The price of defiance can be high: Hubert has done time in prison and refuses to glorify it,
telling Vince that he's got to change his attitude before it is too late. His position is backed
up by the failed attempt of Abdel's brother to shoot a policeman on the estate. The drive-by
shooting is witnessed as a disaster when the car they're in won't re-start and they are quickly
ambushed by waiting riot squads. The incident shows that guns and attitude are not enough,
that permanent endangerment is the overriding aspect of violent confrontation with
authority. Later in the day the friends focus their arguments:
Hubert - 'Wanting to kill a cop is jack shit'
Vince - 'I didn't say that, I said if Abdel dies, not for the hell of it.'
Hubert - 'Do you expect us to bring you gifts in prison?'
Vince - 'I expect nothing from someone who kisses cops arse. I'm fucking sick of
all this. We live like shit in rat holes, you want to do fuck all to change things,
you're my friends so I'm telling you if Abdel dies I'll kill a cop, so they'll know we
don't turn the other cheek now.'
Said - 'Wow what a speech, half Moses, half Mickey Mouse.'
Hubert - 'Forget it, it's out of your league, if a cop dies do all cops go away? You
can't blow them all away.'
Vince - 'You know what's right and wrong, why d'you take sides with them?'
Hubert - 'In school didn't we learn that hate breeds hate?'
Vince - 'I didn't go to school, I'm from the street and you know what it taught me?
Turn the other cheek and you're a dead arsehole.'
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These understandings about the stakes of confrontation and non-confrontation show that the
absence of organised resistance or individual spontaneous action cannot be held to show a
lack of knowledge or feeling about oppressive experience. The friends know the issues
involved, the difficulty is deciding what to do about them in the knowledge that there may
be nothing they can do. The conversation is a mixture of frustration, anger, idealism and
realism that expresses a no-win situation. For most of the time their way of dealing with it is
to try to counter on a daily basis those aspects of their oppression that work to deny them a
positive identity, self and group esteem.
Positive expressions of who they are, are necessarily caught up with the negative
meanings associated with them and where they live, and with dominant cultural values about
what is desirable. The means through which they are able to articulate different meanings
about who they are and where they live and to find value and worth in them, are partly taken
from what is available to them economically and culturally from mainstream society. They
improvise, make the best of what they've got, are inventive and resourceful. They do small
time deals in cannabis and in stolen goods, not as an exclusive criminal fraternity but as part
of an everyday way of getting by on their estate. Hubert leaves his drugs money for his mum
to pay the gas bill, she asks him if his friend who is a fence for stolen goods in one of the
other blocks has got hold of her new sewing machine yet and whether he can get hold of any
text books for his brother who is taking his exams in the detention centre. Their ways of
getting by are not empty of values and morals but have their own standards, situated within
the lives they lead. None of the friends are living with their fathers, family authority is
negotiated between siblings, and its outcomes respected among friends. Said is told to go
home by his brother when trouble looks immanent; Said tells his younger sister she can't
hang around particular areas or talk to Vince; Vince tells Said not to insult his sister; older
groups have some authority over younger ones on the estate. Sticking together and looking
out for each other are part of their code of living. It creates some safety, security and group
identity when most other things work to create insecurity, danger and isolation.
A large part of the struggle of Vince, Hubert and Said to maintain pride in
themselves and group esteem is about appearance: resisting the idea that they are unstylish
and unsophisticated just because they're poor. In this they are very much part of wider social
and cultural estimations about what has credibility. Their own fashions and music styles mix
with mass trends. The influence of American culture is strong: they play American gangsta
rap; wear American sports labels; their conversations are full of references to American
films. Their ability to be part of fashions that are denied them because of their economic
status is an achievement and a stand against a cultural exclusion that is at least partly forced
upon them. They still look like they are 'from the estates' when they venture into Paris, but
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among themselves they have enough of the right sort of style to maintain esteem within their
groups. The disaster of Said's haircut - carried out by Vince with an electric shaver - is
therefore a terrible thing in the style stakes. Said believes that it has ruined his chance of
attracting women and has to wear a hat to hide the damage. The humour found in this
incident is another aspect of their struggle to maintain a positive outlook and some
happiness against the odds. Indeed the humour expressed in the 24 hours, in spite of some of
the terrible things that are taking place, is a central part of the resilience that means they can
carry on. Humour arises as a natural part of the way they relate to each other, from the
situations they find themselves in, as an everyday way of being that often tries to find the
best in the worst. Their botched attempt to hot-wire a car to try and get home, sets off alarms
and wipers, attracts an advice giving drunkard, and is carried out with a running commentary
of insults, jokes and laughter: 'it's the night of the living car'. It is a moment of madness and
hilarity, just hours after Hubert and Said have been abused in the police cell. It is a way of
coping, being young, making their own entertainment, being happy, when so much of their
experience is about attempts to deny them those things.
The struggle to carry on and to resist in small measure, is shown in both Hate and Ladybird
Ladybird to be a struggle ofmany parts. The word 'struggle' carries a baggage of
associations that are about working class/political/revolutionary struggle, often as the only
struggle that is good enough to talk about. I have used it in the sense of a phrase that I have
often heard - 'It's a struggle isn't it' - as a recognition that when you're working class and
poor it is a struggle to just carry on. In these films it is shown to be a struggle against a daily
oppression that is more extreme at particular times, but that commonly exists as a casual
brutality. The capacities of these people to deal with this oppression in the best way they
can, manifests itself in a myriad of ways from the defiance of authority figures to the
sustenance of personal relationships. Both films give recognition to those who struggle in
this way, they are shown as heroes and heroines doing something amazing.
2: TIME-SPACE
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There is a line in the film 'In the Heat of the Night' where Sidney Poitier is trying to warn a
black woman against ending up in prison : 'We all know there's black time and there's
white time'. This is about the difference that being black makes to what might appear to be
the same time passing, in this case prison time. It is also my starting point. What does class
do to time? Not just time spent in prison, but everyday time. Both Hate and Ladybird
Ladybird are about working class time, poor time, and poor time-space. They are about the
difference that class makes to living in what appears to be the same time-space dimension as
everyone else.
In both films 'time' is not employed time, as the time that is traditionally associated
with the working class. When work is removed from working class men and women, and
child rearing is not seen as 'work' for either, then the meaning of 'working class' would
seem to be ambiguous. In these circumstances it has different meanings but also historically
continuous meanings. In the stories of Hate and Ladybird Ladybird being working class is
about more than working and more than work as traditionally defined. These are stories
about working class time on benefits: time that is made up of everyday extremes and
everyday ordinariness. The temporalities of the films are apparently different: Hate is a
chronological 24 hours, Ladybird, Ladybird is made up of flashbacks into the past, elapsing
time, and epilogue. However I am talking about a parallel time to the time of clocks that
cannot be so easily measured and classified. Classed time is not just about minutes and
months passing, the rhythms of life, although they are part of it, it is about the working class
poor living time in a different way to the mainstream, living time differently though the time
passing is the same.
In both stories, time has an unstructured character. It is unplanned, unknowable, out
of the control of the protagonists who are driven and buffeted along by the schedules, plans
and intentions of others. They deal with events as they happen, arrangements are not
possible. Carrying on, getting on with it, getting through the day are ways of everyday
living. In a very real way these are lives that feel like they have no future, the future is so
much out of their control: it exists mainly as an imaginative time swinging between hopeful
and hopeless anticipation.
The everyday ofMaggie's time is about her children, the struggle of bringing them
up, staying together, and when they are taken from her, visiting them, thinking about them,
fighting to get them back. Time passing is marked by her nine month pregnancies, going
from court hearing to court hearing, being visited by social worker after social worker. The
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outcome of these activities is always unknown: they represent time taken up, consumed,
invested in but with no security or guarantees attached to it. In this way Maggie's time is
devalued, it is not viewed as something that entitles her to anything, it is something she must
give without expectation or reward. This derogation of her time is the hallmark of external
intervention in her life. She must perform, please, appease, be accountable, be ever-prepared
for check up visits by health visitors and social workers and ever wary of just answering the
door once intervention has become an intention to remove her children permanently. The
sheer time consuming nature of this intervention is represented through a sequence in which
one plate of biscuits after another is offered to different social workers on a seemingly
endless merry-go-round of visits in which Maggie must impress, appear to be deserving,
respectable, amenable, continually taking into account their perceptions and feelings. The
time that she has invested in her six children, in pregnancy and child rearing can be written
off at a stroke by the report of a social worker, in the decision of a judge. Such time has no
monetary value: it is seen as freely and naturally given and therefore can be dismissed
without compunction, or compensation. Through the actions and judgements of Social
Services Maggie's time spent with her first four children is rendered disposable, a waste of
time. The personal relationships, interdependencies and ties of understanding between her
and her children are discounted and severed. The decisions represent an assault on Maggie's
worth: she has given everything she can give and it is not good enough. Yet Maggie has
shown nothing but the highest regard for her children's well being in the circumstances that
she is in. In the refuge she tries to keep them away from the other children - 'the little sods'-
who are running around; she tells the foster mother she doesn't want Sean eating 'muck'
like Tomato ketchup all over his food; she leaves the family centre when she hears the
shouting and sees the older children hanging around. She knows the personalities of her
children and sings their praises, telling Jorge about her second son Mickey: 'For someone
who's got nothing and wants to be everything, that's brilliant'. Maggie's efforts to do the
best for her children are therefore shown most of all in the time she spends with them, talks
and thinks about them, and puts into getting them back.
This sort of time cannot be accounted, it is 'inside' as part of her own and her
children's psyches. It is (dis)missed by the superficial, transient regard of the Social
Services and family courts. They see material poverty, bleakness, a record of violent
partners, her angry outbursts. They do not see the fullness of Maggie's time: the details of
her everyday that carry so much of the truth of who and how she is. They cannot credit her
ability to be different in other circumstance: in her everyday life she is changing and
spontaneous while their snapshots are static and reductive. The social workers see the fire at
the refuge and her burnt son, her karaoke singing in the pub, her black eye, the shabby flat,
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her fleeing from them with the man who has beaten her. But they don't see the life that these
things are embedded in which gives them their meaning as part of her life. Instead their
estimation of particular snapshots of her life, come to assume the definitive 'truth' of its
totality. They pass through seeing what they need to see as evidence to justify their intrusion
and protect their careers. In the family court, five quietly spoken sentences of carefully
selected professional judgements wipe out the purpose of half of Maggie's life. In less than
an hour her own understandings of her identity as a mother, her children's best interests, her
life of time-invested struggle, are made to count as nothing by professional judgement of
their worth. Their meanings construct her past and that of her children, and reset their future.
'Everyday life' is meant to imply 'the ordinary' as that which usually goes
unremarked upon. The idea that the everyday is worthy of attention, that it is about more
than an expanse of time where nothing much happens has academic status within
geography's cultural turn.37 Ladybird Ladybird is about everyday life where for a lot of the
time, the ordinary is extra-ordinary, the normal is extreme. Maggie's story shows the
difference that working class poverty and oppressive relations with various authorities can
make to the 'everyday' as conventionally understood as the unremarkable. It requires that in
this case the meaning of 'everyday life' is seen as strongly classed and gendered. A large
part of 'working class time' is lived in extremities of poverty, stress and violence, with little
if any financial security or collateral of any means to extract yourself from desperate
situations. This creates precariousness and vulnerability in which time is not in your control
and is not your own. Maggie's time is spent in anticipation, preparation, presentation,
vigilance. She is in a state of siege that is mentally and physically exhausting. The fragility
of holding things together is shown by a total susceptibility to trigger events. Such events
are apparently ordinary, routinely happening, or temporary fixes: locking the door of her
room in the refuge from the outside; starting a new relationship; an argument with a social
worker; oversleeping the morning she plans to escape with her children; a swear word in
court; a visiting relative unthinkingly opening the door, to the police. For Maggie their
consequences are huge and uncontainable. She cannot afford risks and is not allowed to
make mistakes, when things go wrong for her she is accused and punished.
Where events and decisions gather negative momentum, and Maggie's time is
ruptured by traumatic interventions, the significance of 'starting again' in personal
relationships and through pregnancies is considerable. It marks a refusal to be beaten, to
have your future controlled by what others have made of your past. When they have labelled
37 Connections with earlier geographical work on the 'everyday' should be noted here (see Ley.D
(1977) Social Geography and the taken-for-granted-world p498-512 Transactions of the Institute of
British Geography) as well as the influence of traditionally non-geographical writers on the subject
(De Certeau.M (1984) The Practice ofEveryday Life (Trans. Rendall.S.F) London: University of
California Press; Lefebvre.H (1991) Critique ofEveryday Life London: Verso)
and pathologised her, taken away all six children, undermined her relationship with Jorge to
the point that she turns on him, Maggie's ability to 'start again' is her greatest resistance. It
is an attempt to take control of her time, by refusing to have it ordered by a system of
sanctions and of values that are nothing to do with her life. For Maggie 'reproductive
control' is not about planned pregnancies when her life is got through on a daily basis, or
being able to 'afford' children when she can't afford anything much, or limited numbers of
children by the same father when fathers disappear or turn violent. It is about being allowed
to make decisions about having children without intervention, choosing to go on having
children even though she is poor. Her struggle to have this family takes time, she keeps on
trying with time at last on her side. The epilogue tells us that Maggie and Jorge go on to
have three more children who are not removed by the Social Services.
Hate starts with news footage of clashes between riot police and groups of young
men on a public housing estate. We see the riot as the opening credits roll. The riot is not the
story, it is what is shown to the country: a prime time image of these people and places.
What follows is another story that starts as 10.38 flicks onto the screen, the beginning of 24
hours of working class time. The 24 hours is that which is normally unseen, not
conventionally measurable, known only by those who live it. In Hate it is the everyday time
of Hubert, Vince and Said passing in the aftermath of a riot, seen entirely from their
perspective. Unlike the momentary media snapshot, it is a changing view, a developing
narrative of passing time. The activities of small time drugs dealing, police chases, stealing
cars, shoplifting, when situated in the fullness of their time, as part of 24 hours of
experience, are normalised and naturalised. Everything fits together on the same level of
experience, things happen and follow on from each other. They do not exist in hierarchies
and categories of the 'criminal' or 'petty' as opposed to the 'normal', but are all of a piece
and make sense in relation to each other. Their meaning is intrinsically part of the day and
the lives in which they occur. The choice of the 24 hours is therefore not about that number
of hours per se, primarily it expresses the difference that being-a-part-ness and the bigger
picture, make to understanding and meaning. It is that quality which is so lacking from so
many representations of working class lives, abstracted from their bearing in working class
time.
Most of the time Vince, Hubert and Said are not involved in the sort of extreme or
'criminal' events which are used to define the totality of their lives This is not to say that
events which may be commonly understood as extreme - such as police abuse - are
experienced as anomalous rather than continuous with the rest of their lives. It is to situate
their meaning in the myriad of other happenings that make their time a way of being. The
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friends sit around talking and not talking in bedrooms, in playgrounds, on roofs; they hang
around with other young people on the estate, sharing food, joking, bragging, recounting
stories to each other, watching each other break dance; they sit and talk with their family, do
shopping for family food, try to help out with homework, they cut each other's hair, listen to
music, watch the television. The minutiae of the day - from the price of a milkshake in town,
the new cut of a hairstyle, to their perception of the advertising billboards which line their
journey to and around Paris - all has significance, and no less significance than the riot
itself. It defines their relation to each other, to the place they live in, to their families, to the
world off the estate. It is a multi-layered complex relation through which they know
themselves and their place in the world. It is through this spent time that their lives find
meaning, through which experience and identity become classed. Their time is classed
because it is actively made so, by everything that they go through and the meaning that is
attached to it by themselves and by others. Even the most apparently insignificant parts of
the day go to make up that meaning. At 14.12 p.m. Vince, Hubert and Said are sitting on
blocks in a playground, 'doing nothing', no-one is saying anything, they look at a graffiti
covered wall behind them, Hubert kicks a syringe needle that's lying at his feet. This is
apparently unremarkable time, but it produces particular sorts of understandings for those
living it, they know what this means in their lives and it is no less significant than the riot
itself.
For Said, Vince and Hubert, time passes unstructured by plans or expectations. It is
fluid and precarious, events are often unpredictable and seemingly arbitrary. Their lives are
not made up of pre-meditated actions, individual decisions or choices about the lives they
want to lead, wilfully carried out. The overriding feeling about their time is that it is
haphazardly directed by the will of others, things happen and they react, not in pre-
determinable ways but clearly not in unpredictable ways either. As Hubert says of the gym
that took him two years to get a grant for: 'I knew it'd go up in smoke one day'. Like
Maggie they are susceptible to trigger events: situations escalate in unforeseen ways, actions
of others on the estate embroil everyone, their lives are wholly connected and consequences
shared. Thus the attempt of Abdel's brother to shoot a policeman on the estate leads to his
ambush by riot police, the onlooking crowd's attempt to defend him leads to the police
turning on the crowd, a desperate escape to avoid arrest leads to Vince pulling the gun on a
policeman and only being prevented from shooting it by a last minute intervention of Hubert
knocking the policeman out instead. These moments reveal how precarious their lives are,
poised to collapse in breakdowns or explode in conflict. The arrest and abuse of Hubert and
Said in Paris leads to them missing the last train back to the estate so that they arrive back
the next morning to encounter the policemen who taunt them and 'accidentally' shoot Vince.
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Clearly this apparent arbitrariness is part of a bigger picture, a pattern of endangerment.
Both the actions and reactions of those living on the estate and of the police are part of a
continuous social relation, manifest in apparently arbitrary ways but with outcomes tending
in one direction. These are not isolated events that can be explained individually in terms of
the behaviour of a few, whether a 'criminal hard-core' or a 'bad policeman'. They cannot be
guarded against or prevented from happening again by a change in behaviour. They are part
of particular circumstances, social relations and power inequalities that do not change much
through time. This is powerfully symbolised when one of the young men on the estate turns
the speakers of his music system outwards onto the courtyard where people have gathered
the morning after the riot. Using his mixing turn tables he creates his own music: a powerful
mix of NWA's (Niggers With Attitude) gangsta rap 'Fuck the police', and Edith Piaf's 'Je
ne regrette rien'. The message is that they don't regret the riots and are still defiant. The
NWA/Piaf mix expresses the continuity between two cultures of class through time: the old
and the new, across generations, voices from the 1940s 'slums' to the 1990s estate 'ghettos'.
The places where poor, working class people live have historically been used to
make judgements about the sort of people who live there. Working class places and working
class people are put together in a degraded alliance: both problematic, unsightly and
unsavoury. Outside of their own areas such people are 'out of place', liable to contaminate
other people and places with their problems. Burglaries, vandalism, and violence attend their
presence. In the contemporary period people from council estates, especially young men are
set up as the prime culprits of such disorder, roaming and permanently overstepping the
boundaries of other people's space. Hate and Ladybird Ladybird choose to invest 'poor
space' and poor subjectivities with different meanings, meanings about working class space,
its contours and its boundaries.
Both Hate and Ladybird Ladybird have issues of public housing at their core. This
is shown by the meaning it is given as a marker of identity; its social relation to other spaces
such as middle class residential areas and the city; and its material centrality to the lives of
the working class poor in terms of its quality, availability and physical location. In Ladybird
Ladybird it is a lack of availability of council housing that drives Maggie and her children
into dangerous and untenable situations and accommodation. It means that on leaving her
own council flat to escape her violent partner Maggie must go into a refuge that is itself
unsafe due to faulty wiring and damp. A resultant fire sets off the train of events leading to
the removal of her children. After the fire, it is the lack of availability of a council flat which
means she has to return with her children to her old flat where her violent partner still lives,
in order to keep a roof over their heads. Both moves are seen by social workers as evidence
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ofMaggie's inability to provide a safe home for her children. The foster home in which her
eldest son Sean is placed, in a middle class residential street, is deemed to be such a home.
Its stripped pine dressers and unshared bedrooms are in stark contrast to the home that
Maggie can provide. The visible, material nature of this home is made to represent what a
'good' home is like: 'evidence' on the basis of which social workers and judges differentiate
the good and the bad, suitable and unsuitable. Early on Maggie provides her own definition
of her needs and interests in terms of basic needs provision: '...if you really want to help me
get me a flat'. In doing this she reveals the nature of a system of resource distribution in
which social workers are paid to manage her as a substitute for the material help that would
alleviate her problematic circumstances. The fact that Maggie is denied a home at crucial
points in her life is the catalyst of disaster for her. It represents her powerlessness as a total
lack of material resources, and the failure of a Social Services system that her material
poverty is so used in judgement against her, conflated with estimations of her parental
abilities. It is easier for them to remove her children than to secure the provision of a council
house.
After the removal of her children into 'care' and foster homes Jorge and Maggie,
pregnant with her fifth child, manage to get hold of a small flat on another estate. It is damp
but still 'lovely' because it represents space of their own which makes possible the having of
a family. However, Maggie's home space does not have the same meanings of 'property,
privacy and ownership' that define other sorts of housing in middle class areas. The
meanings that define Maggie's housing are strongly related to those which define her
identity. Their basis is a relation to public resources through which public management is
sanctioned: Maggie's council flat is public property, and her reproductive behaviour and
choice of partners are also public property. She can be commented upon, judged, subjected
to intervention, treatment and punishment. External agencies trample on personal space
which is deemed to belong to everyone but Maggie herself. She is never granted the
expectation or right to be housed, safe and left alone. The flat which Maggie secures with
Jorge, is a casing that provides no defence. Indeed it is part of her relation with the State that
makes her easy to find. Social workers peer and shout through the letter box; they survey the
flat for evidence of her ability to provide a good home; home visits by social workers and
health visitors check up on her mothering; social workers and police ambush the flat,
pushing past her sister who opens the door to seize her new baby. After the birth of her sixth
child Maggie is not even allowed to take her from the public space of the hospital, the child
is removed by social workers and police officers hours after being born. It is the final
violation of any autonomous space that she thought she had. It marks her struggle as a
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struggle for different kinds of space - for public housing, and for domestic and personal
autonomy - against public interventions to deny her them.
For Maggie public space is where judgements are delivered and sanctions enforced.
In it she can find no safety or defence. This is powerfully represented by the court space
where professionals sit in judgement and pronounce upon her life. Within that space
Maggie's future is cast. The evidence is static, the judgement fixed. Her life is
circumscribed within the boundaries of their perspective: '[she has shown] a refusal to avail
herself of efforts by Social Services to help her'; '[she is] beyond help... a woman of low
intellect and little self control'. To Maggie it is a cold, hard, inhumane space, impenetrable,
unnegotiable. The contrast between her reaction of emotional trauma, and the business-like
delivery of legal judgement is extreme. Hers is entirely out of place, the sort of reaction that
is too personal and emotional for the court space. It symbolises the total collapse of
boundaries that has been brought about between Maggie's personal space and the public
realm so that by the end of the film her entire life has been taken over as public space. Her
final attempt to refuse that colonisation is shown in her efforts to fight her labour
contractions to keep her child within, knowing that her womb is a space they cannot get to.
In Ladybird Ladybird working class space is materially and figuratively a bound
space. Maggie is trapped in her first flat, she cannot take her children and escape to
alternative housing; her children are locked into the refuge while it bums; she is trapped into
returning to her violent partner in order to keep a roof over her head; she is trapped as she
sits through home visits of officials one after the other. She is boxed in by external
perceptions and judgements: her identity fixed, her future considered to be a foregone
conclusion, her life circumscribed. For Maggie, Jorge and her children this bound space has
no defences, is never safe. Their insecurity and lack of control over their lives is shown by
the total lack of boundaries to the spaces they occupy. Whatever space they are in is taken
over by events that are driven by others. The pub as a place of escape and pleasure; the
hospital as a place to bring her child into the world; the home as a place of safety and
retreat. All have their meanings changed by a permeating violence and oppression. Within
their home Jorge must hide from social workers in cupboards; they cannot freely answer the
door of their flat; they must hide and pretend to be other people by using other names. There
is no space that Maggie settles in, she is almost continuously in transit between flats, the
refuge, the family centre. She is running as fast as she can back from the pub to the burning
refuge; running away with her children from the social workers who chase after her; running
away from her violent partner. She cannot control the access that others have to her because
she cannot afford to buy safety, privacy or distance. Far from a middle class idea of mobility
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as travel and freedom from boundaries Maggie's mobility is about being unsafe, uprooted,
trying to escape, being pushed, being on the run.
Maggie's paradoxical occupation of space - bound yet unprotected, going nowhere
yet transient - is about her social position. She has overstepped the mark of particular
middle class norms and behaviour and the reason that she cannot get away with it is because
she is poor. Transferred to a middle class space as a 'lifestyle', her family form would
perhaps be considered bohemian, her personality tempestuous, her residential instability
choosy; her choice of partners unlucky and then adventurous. In working class space they
are the mark of an unfit mother. As a consequence she is allowed no boundaries, no
defences, no autonomy, security or freedom. She is made to feel that her occupation of any
space at all is illegitimate: 'They won't be happy 'til I'm dead'.
The feelings of Vince, Hubert and Said about the estate they live on are highly
ambivalent. They express a complex way of relating to a place of virtual confinement. The
estate is part of who they are because most of their time is spent there. They have grown up
with and grown familiar with both the people and the space of the estate and they identify
with it. It is also a place that is negatively implicated in the way they are perceived and
treated by outsiders. It is somewhere that has hardly any amenities, is cut off from the rest of
the city and often feels boring when they have no money, and no choice about being there or
not. The standard of the housing is poor: cramped, noisy and too hot in the summer. 'The
estate' is not really theirs because it is occupied not owned, allocated to them not chosen by
them, but still it's all they've got. This ambivalence is pronounced in the aftermath of the
riot in a mixture of horror, amazement and satisfaction at the destruction that has taken
place. On the one hand they have turned against all they had - burnt out their gym, cars and
community buildings; on the other, it was not much anyway, their anger has been registered,
they have shown that they have to be contended with. They do not blame each other and
there is no interest in finding out who destroyed what or who 'started' it. Hubert and Said
were not part of the riot and the extent of Vince's involvement is deliberately unclear: the
point being that it does not really matter who did what. They all share the space, the
disaffection and the consequences.
Nevertheless, for Hubert the riot is a sign that things are getting worse and could
spiral out of control at any time. He feels the need to extricate himself before it happens,
expressing his sense of foreboding to his mum after Vince has shown him the gun: 'I'm fed
up with the estate, I want to get out'. His mum replies: 'Well bring me a lettuce back', in
recognition of what remains a fantasy of escape. This day is to be his last, escape routes if
they ever existed, are now too late. Importantly, the escape he wants is not about aspiration
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and self-betterment, but survival. He tries to make his friends see things in the same way
that he does, he does not want to leave them behind physically or in terms of ideas. As they
travel into Paris on the train he is acutely aware of their shared confinement and the lie of a
wider culture as they pass advertising hoardings of travel companies offering unlimited
possibilities of choice, travel and escape: 'The World Is Yours'. He knows they are going
nowhere and own nothing. Said graffitis over the same advert later in the day so that it reads
'The World Is Ours', indicating that it is the travel companies not theirs. Their travel, shown
in the trip to Paris, is not about escape or choice. Who they are travels with them, making
their passage endangered by the perceptions and actions of others. Ultimately they must
return to where they come from because escape - like the promise of en masse upward
mobility - is mostly fantasy.
Of the three friends, Vince is most enthused by the collective meaning of the riot
and defiantly proud of the estate as part of his identity. At one point he shouts at the others:
'I know who I am and where I'm from', as a criticism of what he sees as half-heartedness in
their feelings about the riot. He is also the one most angry about their living conditions: 'We
live like shit in rat holes'. He straggles to combine pride in who he and where he is from
with anger about what it is like to live there. As he wanders through the estate he
hallucinates a cow, symbolising his heightened subconscious awareness of the incongruity
of these concrete expanses in the middle of nowhere, built on green-field sites and given
bucolic names - theirs is 'Chanteloupe-les-vignes'- recalling the woods and fields that were
once there. These 'suburbs' like many British council estates were conceived as improved
housing for urban slum dwellers, they are sprawling and crowded at the same time and most
of all they are isolated. The camera frames this isolation through distant shots in which
space is used to convey separation and alienation. In French, suburbs ('les banlieues')
literally means place of exile. For Vince, Hubert and Said its meaning is manifest in their
daily feeling of displacement from the mainstream, felt most acutely when they travel off the
estate into Paris. The Parisian police who pick them up tell them: 'You're far from the slums
now', as a threatening taunt that they are not on home ground. Missing the last train back
leaves them stranded in Paris over night, their apparent mobility replaced by a sense of
isolation, vulnerability, stasis.
Distance from the metropolis as socio-spatial marginalisation, exists with the sorts
of global cultural connections and inequalities which mean that the experiences of Vince,
Hubert and Said are almost instantly recognisable. Their housing is the product of the same
ideology of slum clearance and modernisation that gripped much of the Western world, its
problems are not unique; their unemployment is the product of the same processes of
deindustrialisation and employment restructuring that have adversely affected a generation
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of young working class men in the West; their poverty is the product of the same monetarist
ideology that has undermined the ethos of welfare provision in America and Europe wide;
their cultural dissonance in relation to these developments has global-local expression in
hybrid forms of music and fashion which includes mass consumption of American films,
sports fashions and street slang. These global connections mean that in a number of ways
Vince, Hubert and Said have more in common with the sort of harassment that young black
men on the streets of London are subject to, with the isolation of Edinburgh's outer council
estates and with the poverty of young people on benefits in Liverpool than with the uptown
economies and cultures of Parisian society. This is humorously shown in a scene in which
the three friends enter the elite space of a Parisian art gallery that has free entry: 'What can
we lose?' They help themselves to food and wine, hardly able to contain their amusement
and disbelief that it is freely available. They treat the exhibition with a mixture of
fascination and irreverence. The gallery goers look over at them suspiciously, and they
jokingly reprimand themselves: 'Behave arseholes'. Said persuades Hubert to approach two
attractive young women and to chat up 'the sister' for him. Hubert approaches deftly and
tells them that Said - romantic, shy and a poet - would like to talk to her. Said follows him
over and almost instantly offends the women with direct chat up lines. Vince and Hubert
stand by laughing as the women get more and more irate: 'You're so aggressive, how can we
respect you?' The situation quickly degenerates into a noisy exchange of insults to which
the quietly spoken, liberal exhibition manager tries to intervene. His pleas for them to calm
down go unheeded and the friends are ejected back onto the street, laughing, shouting and
swearing at the crowd as they go: 'Have fun... You're all ugly... Fuck you all'. Once they are
out, the manager turns as if to explain, shrugging his shoulders: 'Off the estates... troubled
youth'. The scene is about them being out of place, alien in a middle class space that is not
about them, despite its open access. It is about a liberal arts crowd who might well have
been gathered to see a photo exhibition of 'troubled youth off the estate'. It is a crowd who
would know about the problems of 'troubled youth' but only in abstract. In the flesh, in
proximity, they exceed the fantasy, cause offence and have to be expelled. The black 'sister'
turns out not to be like the black sisters Said is used to. She expects a particular sort of
social interaction with young men of her own class and is outraged when Said does not act
according to those norms. Their social distance in terms of class cannot be brokered by
physical proximity. The situation is fraught as soon as Hubert's construction of Said as a
shy, romantic poet is not in evidence. As soon as they stop pretending to be something that
they are not, 'difference' becomes conflict. The expectation that they should adjust their
behaviour because they are the ones who do not fit, reveals the classed nature of the space.
The scene shows a recklessness on their part as they recognise that they have no investment
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in this space: 'What can we lose?' In relation to the two hours of police cell abuse that
Hubert and Said have just walked away from, they have nothing to lose, it is just a laugh.
The scene shows how some differences can deny others expression because of power
relations (here manifest in the gallery space), and how conflict is produced when differences
refuse to be denied. The gallery scene is a head on collision of working class 'difference' in
middle class space.
The gallery is not the only space in which the friends are deemed to be 'out of
place'. Through the 24 hours their occupation of public space both on and off the estate is
deemed problematic. There is nowhere 'safe', nowhere they can be left alone. Cameras pry
when they are just sitting around outside; they are ejected from the hospital on trying to visit
Abdel; they are cleared from the roofs where they hang out, for the mayor's visit; on the
streets of Paris they are arrested; they are ejected from the public gallery; they return to their
own streets to be harassed and then shot. Indeed it is only in the domestic space of their
homes that they can escape from the danger and constant vigilance that is required outside.
They all have domestic lives as well as street lives, and in many ways their homes are a
refuge from outside. Here they do not have to permanently show bravado, instead practising
in the mirror styles and attitudes to be performed outside. In their family relations there is
inter-generational dependency, financial help, affection, tolerance. It is mainly through these
domestic scenes - Said's botched haircut; Vince's morning routine with his family; Vince
and Said practising street styles in the mirror scenes; Hubert confiding in his mum and
retreating to his bedroom - that we see the underbelly of some of their aggressive stances
outside. The main difference is that outside they have to occupy a space in which they are
subject to disparagement and danger as part of their everyday experiences. Throughout the
24 hours they are continually reminded that public space is not theirs: they are out of place,
illegitimate, inappropriate or unwanted. They occupy it under hostile conditions, and create
behavioural and psychological defences in order to survive it.
In Ladybird Ladybird Maggie produces her own behavioural and psychological defences in
order to cope with the exigencies of her life. As with Vince, Hubert and Said that struggle to
cope involves a defence against oppressive parts of the public realm as the spaces regulated
by police officers, social workers, judges, council officers, and health visitors. Such
defences are a way of occupying 'unsafe' space. At the beginning of Maggie's story that is
the domestic space of the flat she shares with a brutal partner. From there, there is nowhere
she can go to be safe. With the arrival of Jorge she struggles to have a home space that is
free from external intervention, while he struggles to remain anonymous in public space as a
refugee without papers. Like Maggie he must be permanently vigilant, escaping the
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surveillance that regards him as an alien who has crossed the borders of national space. The
nature ofMaggie's domestic space changes through time. For her, the processual nature of
time and space is the possibility of change and the hope that things will one day be better.
Similarly in Hate the space the friends occupy at home, on the estate and in the metropolis
of Paris, is not 'one thing'. 'The estate' is both part of their displacement and confinement,
and part of their social awareness, anger and pride in their identities. In both stories change
and complexity does not detract from the notion of classed time and space. For Maggie,
Vince, Hubert and Said their class remains intrinsic to who they are, shaping and being
shaped by their experiences, its meaning made through the nature of those experiences.
Their experiences of subjection and oppression happen because of their class; they are lived
through modalities of gender and race; and they are felt in personal ways. Both stories show
the detail of that class experience, as situated in the space of the home, the city, the estate,
through the passing of time. In common is a feeling for the meaning of working class time




The idea of 'class consciousness' is so associated with the history of Marxism in theory and
practice that it sounds outdated and awkward in use. In those traditional formulations
associated with the proletariat and revolution, 'class consciousness' is a collective
understanding of a shared social position and an awareness of how that can be politically
changed. Yet the phrase itself only means an awareness of class and in that respect can also
be used to convey personal feelings and understandings about yourself as part of society.
This does not mean that subjective feelings about different parts of yourself and how they fit
into society will necessarily register in terms of 'class'. Class is a personal and potentially
divergent notion, so its use as a means to express shared social positions and possibly
understandings which are about more than economic location, is potentially problematic. To
use it in that respect is therefore to engage with a mythology of class, or a strategic notion of
class, and to recognise that these ideas of class are an important part of its meaning. This
last themed section addresses the nature of class subjectivities in the films in those terms:
class is not explicitly referred to but is played out as an intrinsic relation between
subjectivities and collectivities, and between 'ideas' and 'realities' of classed social
positions. These are relations between the personal, the shared, and the different: the 'I', the
'we' and the 'they'; and between the apparent, the imagined, and the possible of classed
ways of being and becoming.
Both Hate and Ladybird Ladybird tell stories about subjective experiences of
poverty, oppression and class. They do not show what those things are but what they mean
to those who are living them. The story is their story, in all its complexity, from their point
of view. We are not shown things that they cannot see. Maggie's sense of the
impenetrability of decisions made against her, and her horror about what is happening to her
is the sense and horror of the film's perspective. It is hardly possible to anticipate what is
going to happen next: 'surely they can't take this child too', 'how can this be happening?'
The camera view is part of this subjective mode, inside what is going on, never apart from it.
Despite this relation of interiority, the film does not individualise Maggie. Similarly, what is
going on in Hate is not about the protagonists per se: they are socially embedded, relations
are thoroughly socialised. Through this 'socialisation' of the subjective, a sense of the
collective emerges. We are looking at social outcomes, institutions and professional
practices that involve groups of people. The perspective is one-sided and angry, creating a
political edge that forges subjective-collective meanings. Those meanings are not
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necessarily articulated by the characters and they are not 'one thing'. They are lived in
myriad ways, negotiated as matters of difference and belonging.
In Hate both difference and belonging are partly lived through the play of
appearance and fantasy. They are partly about the images that Vince, Hubert and Said want
and need to project to others, how they imagine and describe themselves, in relation to
meanings that others read from those appearances and project onto them. This relation
between visibility and meaning is at the core of both films. Outsider views of Maggie and
Jorge, Vince, Hubert and Said are based on their appearance via the perspectives of middle
class professionals in media, law and welfare agencies. That perspective - extrinsic,
superficial, evidential - is above all a denial of the selfhood of those it views.
The start of Hate is the media view of the riot: lads throwing missiles, running,
setting fire to cars, fronting the police. A while later we see Vince waking up in his
bedroom, looking the epitome of the sort of youth that would be associated with riots,
typically 'thuggish' with his skinhead haircut and knuckle-duster jewellery. Then follows
the first of two mirror scenes, the second being Said's, which show the two of them getting
ready to go out onto the street where style and attitude are a way of being and getting by
with some respect. In the mirror they perform as hard men like the contenders they see in
American films. Vince, like Robert de Niro in 'Taxi Driver', acts out an adversarial street
encounter - the look, the stance, the attitude - 'You talkin' to me?' Later, Said does the
same, mimicking aggressive taunts: 'You wanna fuck me? I'm going to screw you all, you,
him, her..' The scenes are about the importance of style as cultural capital; about defences
that are cultivated against violence and rejection; they are about the sort of masculinities and
role models that are made available and the heavy influence of American film culture; they
are about highly mediatised, fictive and performative aspects of subjectivities produced in
particular circumstances.
The identities of the young men from the estate are not seen in those terms by
outsiders, they are seen as the direct expression of their aggressive, violent and machoistic
natures. Such views are devoid of understandings about the exigencies of their lives, its
psychological and performative defences, where status and credibility are something that
they must create for themselves with the economic and cultural resources that are made
available to them. This is about recognising the genesis and meaning of particular
behaviours which in the case of Vince and Said are about desiring appearances which offer
them positive degrees of engagement with a wider culture. Such appearances do not
represent the totality of their lives: the mirror scenes themselves are partly comical, Vince
and Said are playing with identities as fantasies not moulding themselves into macho strait-
jackets. Furthermore those masculinities also intimidate them, they struggle to make the
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grade as part of a struggle with drugs, with violence, with boredom, with who they are. They
are not aficionados: Said's haircut goes wrong and Vince humorously riles him about it - 'Is
this the fashion in New York?'; Vince does not become a gun-touting-hard man, he cannot
sustain the attitude, is ill at ease, uncertain, improvising and ultimately he is unprotected by
it. These images, partly achieved, give them a very limited sort of power. The police still
abuse them, the media make monkeys of them, but within that they are able to cultivate
some personal and peer group esteem. Appearance is therefore a central part of the way they
deal with a class identity and predicament that mostly renders them powerless in relation to
societal ways of dealing with them.
Of the three friends, Vince most plays with his identity as the realm of the possible,
a fantasy realm which the others partly deflate ('You dreamt it more like') and partly foster
as a source of excitement and entertainment. Vince's retelling of the riot scenes is a story of
the rioters' heroism, the police's fear, a spectacle of riot and rebellion. This is not about self-
aggrandising exaggeration, it is part of the way that he has experienced the events. Fantasy
as reality, reality as fantasy, are collapsed as opposites, merged in 'the way that it was'. He
replays the confrontation like a film or drama in which power relations are reversed and the
rioters have control: 'I kicked a pig right in the head'; 'They stepped aside to make a path for
nj'. This is partly an expression of what he would like to do to the police, the truth of his
feeling located within actual events, given meaning through his emotional, psychological
and physical experience. Part of that is about a realised desire to be part of the action on
their terms when usually they are denied a role as their lives are mediatised and made into
entertainment and news for others. Said and Hubert dispute the terms of that participation,
while Vince insists that the riots combined authentic entertainment and empowerment:
Said - 'Tear gas, two nights with the police, all the fists you can eat, hell at home,
sorry mate but I ain't buying it'
Vince - 'Gimme a break! It was war against the pigs live and in colour'
The point made is that the riots were both these things: a battle with the police with small
victories for the rioters, but a battle with a price. Good and bad, fantasy and reality. That
fluid meaning allows different stories to emerge, and is part of a particular way of being in
the world that is an imaginative engagement with an otherwise often depressing existence.
This is further shown in the talk of groups of young men hanging around the day after the
riot, apparently doing nothing but creating exciting realities for themselves through sex talk,
gun talk, film talk. These episodes show them collectively forging classed masculinities,
testing the boundaries of individual identities in relation to the group, moulding collective
identities as understandings, attitudes, and values. They all recognise the fantastic elements
of each other's stories and there are limits to the imaginative license they grant each other.
When Vince admits he cannot drive as they try to hot-wire a car in Paris, his story of having
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driven a beautiful girl around the Israeli desert in a Mercedes, is hurled back at him. The
accusation of 'fraudulence' is humorous rather than serious: they never wholly believed him
anyway, their willing belief was part of the fantasy. Mostly there is an openness to personal
and symbolic meaning that transcends distinctions between what is 'real' and what is not,
that credits and shares imaginative resources.
The nature of their relation to the media has a similar fluidity, its value depending
on the terms of engagement. They are angry at the intrusive media cameras trying for 'a
juicy scoop' the day after the riots; they are transfixed by the news coverage of the riot
itself, scrambling to get a better reception, Vince looking for himself, riled when he doesn't
appear: 'It's David, how'd he get on TV, I was over there - they missed me!' These
apparently contradictory reactions are about an inability to resolve the relation between the
exploitative aspect of their representation with the value that is accorded to 'being on TV' as
part of the glamour and pull of media culture. The integral part of that culture to their lives
makes it difficult for them to draw lines and boundaries to maintain protection and integrity.
They try to select media images that they can positively engage with. The media is part of
their living fantasies in which they see themselves as part of the action, often as a substitute
for action elsewhere. The riot gives this fantastic element of their subjectivities ultimate
expression. In it they feel part of a film style drama and it is recounted in those terms; it is
televised, real and fantastic; they have been part of it, they watch themselves being part of it.
Later they learn about Abdel's death on the giant indoor television screen of the mall like
metro station, on their own in the early hours of the morning. The moment is surreal, the
screen is made up of tens of smaller screens, the image of Abdel is fragmented and illusory.
Abdel's death has been distanced, removed from them, its meaning has changed. Vince's
earlier anger is displaced, he disappears from the others and imagines himself shooting a
traffic warden. The sense is of lives and subjectivities being made through a relation to the
media. The event of Abdel's death is a media event, and Vince's reaction is an imaginary
revenge conditioned by the circumstances in which he hears about it. There is no implication
that Vince's feelings are less authentic because he does not carry through his threat, instead
he expresses them through fantasy as part of the fantastic circumstances in which he hears
about the death. It is part of a changing subjectivity that is part of situations, where feelings
find different sorts of expression and change with time and place. It is therefore not only the
immediate circumstances which condition Vince's reaction but everything else he has been
through in the course of the day.
Each of the three friends change through the 24 hours, assuming different roles in
relation to each other, showing different elements of their personalities, responding to
circumstances as they arise. These are not fixed or easily categorisable identities, they are
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fluid and changing. Vince is emotional and impulsive but he is also self-controlled and
ultimately not willing, or perhaps able, to kill. Said is hyperactive and comedic but carries
out a calming role of negotiation and compromise between Hubert and Vince. Hubert is
thoughtful and pragmatic but in the end he is the one who 'kills the cop' as a mix of impulse
and principle once Vince has been shot. These are not the behaviours of one-dimensional
'no-hopers', dangerous or macho 'yobs' that are the standard characterisation of
'underclass' masculinity, they are part of young men with distinct personalities whose
behaviours are enmeshed in social conditions and contingent situations.38 They are both
angry and funny, hateful and vulnerable, reflective and impulsive.
Neither are the friends without self-understanding or insight into their lives. At 2.57
in the morning, still in Paris, Vince, Hubert and Said are sitting on the roof of an old
building looking over the Paris skyline. The city lights illuminate the sky and at the centre of
their view are the bright lights of the Eiffel Tower. They are silent, just sitting there, getting
stoned. Then Hubert starts talking, reflecting on their predicament: 'Sometimes you feel so
fucking small'. The others listen as he carries on, then join in:
Said - 'Got any more bullshit wisdom?'
Hubert - 'The early bird catches the worm... a stitch in time saves nine... haste
makes waste.'
Vince - 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity -1 save that one for special occasions.'
Hubert goes on to tell the story of the man falling 50 storeys reassuring himself 'So far so
good... Like us in the projects but how will we land?' As they leave Said tells the others to
watch as he switches off the lights of the Eiffel Tower, but they walk on, Hubert replying:
'That only works in the movies'. The scene expresses something of their feelings about how
they fit into society. Their disbelief in the idea that they can change their lives by adhering
to the sort of common sense self-help implied in the simplicities of adages. Their disillusion
with the myth of 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity' - the values for which the French Revolution
was fought - having any relevance to their lives. Their knowledge that things are not going
to change, miracles do not happen, magical endings only happen in the movies. They are
falling and things are only going to get worse. It is in the silence, away from the television,
off the streets and having to just carry on coping with things on a treadmill basis, that they
reach some perspective on their lives. On the roof they have a view of the city and a view of
38 It is worth comparing this understanding with that promoted by the commentator Charles Murray,
and those who produce related characterisations of 'the underclass male': 'Male teenage behaviour is
often a caricature of the barbarian male: retaliate against anyone who shows you the slightest
disrespect. Sleep with and impregnate as many girls as possible. Regard violence as a sign of strength.
To worry about tomorrow is weakness. To die young is glorious. What makes these attitudes so
disturbing is not just that they describe behaviour but that inner city boys articulate them as principles.
They are explicitly the code they live by.' Murray.C (1994) The New Victorians and the New Rabble
p 12 The Sunday Times 29.5.94 p 12
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how those on the estates fit into this bigger picture. They know about their social position,
the difference between what is sometimes shown (in the movies) and what happens. They
also know that there is nothing much they can do about it, that they are falling, and that the
only way they can deal with it is on a daily basis, carrying on and keeping up hope. If that is
partly an illusion, a fantasy, it is also all that is available to them - 'So far so good, so far so
good' - a psychological defence against admitting that one way or another they're not going
to make it.
In Ladybird Ladybird Maggie keeps up a similar defence, hoping and coping,
knowing that there is no alternative. As for the protagonists in Hate it is not the positive
nature of that struggle and resilience that is seen by professional outsiders, but a caricature
of disorder. In Maggie's case that professional view is summed up in the Social Work
magazine 'Community Care'. In the childcare practice section a principal social worker
complains:
'The film rarely rises above Maggie's portrayal of the social work role... Maggie is
every professional's nightmare - an abused child grown into a feckless mother
whose addictions are violent partners, violent language, and a fondness for karaoke
pub culture.'39
Newspaper reviews show a similar understanding of Maggie's appearance:
'...an ambiguous portrait of a passionate, angry, none-too-bright, impossible
woman... a Mother Courage whose all-devouring maternal love can turn dangerous
and destructive.'40
Such views are in close agreement with the judge in the film who characterises Maggie as a
woman of 'low intellect and little self control'. It is this reduction of the complexity of her
subjectivity and life that is Maggie's main burden. She cannot escape the professional image
of her, recorded in her files and 'evidenced' in their ongoing interpretations of her
behaviour. She is fixed as a damaged person who will reproduce damage in her children.
She selects bad partners, avoids and lies to officials, tries to run off with her children and
refuses to practice birth control. Their inability to recognise everything that is going on
behind these 'choices' and in addition to them, is a failure to credit Maggie with a life and
being beyond that which they can perceive. It is not that Maggie is 'not really like that', her
behaviour is an intrinsic part of her subjectivity and what she is going through materially,
emotionally and psychologically. There is an emotional rawness to her behaviour which
makes professionals uncomfortable and unable to deal with her on an interpersonal level.
But their awkwardness becomes part of their professional judgement of her as a difficult,
39 'Loss and Belonging' Community Care 13-19th October 1994 p8
40 The Independent, Film Review 30.9.94 p25
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problematic person. What we see is the clashing of classed cultures translated into
pathologisation and class contempt.
Maggie's subjectivity is complex and changing. We see her behaviour change
according to who she is with. In the presence of officialdom she feels threatened, angry and
judged and responds by being angry and uncooperative. As situations and external pressures
change so Maggie shows different parts of herself: she is warm, funny and tolerant. With her
children she is eminently caring and capable; with Jorge she is understanding and
communicative; with her sister and friends from the refuge she is sociable and good
company. These are parts of Maggie's subjectivity that find expression when she feels
happy, secure and confident. They flourish when she is allowed to be herself, free from
reproach. As 'the accused' she is an unwilling participant in the system and makes the
professional's work more difficult. The distrust that is generated may be mutual but it is the
inflexibility of the view of the authorities which conditions situations and drives events. Her
stridency actually bespeaks powerlessness while their quiet tones articulate social and
institutional power. They have no need to shout. The power of their right of intrusion and
judgement actually creates the forms of behaviour which are used to further indict Maggie.
Her life becomes embroiled in a system that is productive of situations which justify its
purpose, generating 'evidence' as it goes.
Maggie's behaviour means that she cannot be cast as a straightforward 'heroine' and
in many ways that is the point: she is not there to 'please' an audience of social workers or
film goers (some reviewers turned on her 'unlikeable' or 'unwatchable' nature).41 Her
ambivalence about her history of partners and her reluctance to let Jorge get too close to her
are part of her psychological defences. She projects an image of being able to handle herself
as a means of protection from external intervention and from being let down by partners.
She admits to having loved her violent partner so is ambiguous as a 'victim'. The ambiguity
of her desires make her question her own worth: 'If I loved him, what did that make me eh?'
Maggie's swearing, heavy smoking and refusal to use contraception make her an affront to a
wide range of middle class norms on 'good mothering', she makes their exponents feel
uncomfortable. It is the perceived nature of her maternal femininity that is the focus of
decisions made about her, specifically her sexual and reproductive choices. Her choice of
partner: multiple, bad and violent; her choice of having four children by four different
fathers in poverty; and her refusal to stop reproducing even when her entitlement to mother
has been officially withdrawn, are the unacceptable face of her motherhood. She embodies a
refutation of powerful norms that are made to symbolise unfit mothering. That symbolism
subsumes Maggie as a person who is complex, ambiguous and changing like any other.
41 See for example 'Rock Steady' The Guardian G2 29.9.94 plO
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Instead she is a 'case'; a list of disasters waiting to happen; a file of evidence; a failure of
criteria; a risk. The 'objectivity' of these 'facts' is ultimately a denial of her subjectivity.
Both Hate and Ladybird Ladybird are stories about the denial of subjectivity in
terms of complexity and difference within individual lives. In both cases the denial is of
poor working class subjects by state authorities: police officers, judges, social workers,
health visitors, council officers. The practices of these authorities are manifest in the casual
and systematic brutality of individual professionals in the daily lives of people who are
largely unable to defend themselves, individually or as part of a group. The focus and
justification of intervention are behavioural activities: 'criminal', reproductive and sexual.
These behaviours are made to represent the totality of individual lives, as problem and
threat. Maggie, Vince, Hubert, and Said have in common this external mode of
identification and the sorts of interventions that attend them. Central elements of their
experiences are the same. Their stories are about common experiences in as much as they
share a social relation of impoverishment, brutality and disempowerment. They share
particular aspects of experiential commonality which are similar enough to suggest that
they have shared interests in particular areas. In this respect to conceive of 'collective'
relations, is to imply a specifically political commonality, which does not have to be
articulated in a conventional, well-recognised language in order that it can be said to exist.
Distinction between groups of working class people is the key tenet of the
hegemonic discourse of 'underclass': the working class and the 'underclass', the deserving
and the undeserving, the married and the single parent, the male and the female, the younger
and the older, the black and the white. To talk of the collective in this context is therefore a
political refusal of the use of differences as divides. Given the divisive nature of the
hegemonic discourse of 'underclass', the idea of keeping hold of a notion of the collective
would seem to be an important strategic resource. Race and gender specification is in no
way antithetical to that notion, indeed it is part of it in recognition that the working class is
not white and male, it's female and male, black and white. I am not suggesting that politics
and strategy are the only justification for the use of ideas about the collective in relation to
the working class poor. Solidarity, sociality, altruism and mutual aid are also important
parts of lives lived in conditions of poverty and oppression. Both Hate and Ladybird
Ladybird show how complex solidarities and interdependencies are lived as part of everyday
experiences, where 'collectivities' are about strong interconnections rather than absolute
sameness.
Vince, Hubert and Said find togetherness in being hated and hating back. Vince is
Jewish, Said an Arab and Hubert is black; they are all working class and poor living on an
outer city housing estate. Theirs is an outcast solidarity. They exchange racial jibes, stripped
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of racist meaning, which are all about each other's lack of racial 'authenticity': 'You bogus
kike', 'You're both frauds', 'You phoney Arab'. Their collective experience through 24
hours does not mean they are an all-forgiving, all-accepting fraternity, but the differences
between them are both less meaningful to themselves and to outsiders who perceive them
than what they have in common as working class young men from the estates.
The everyday, experiential, as opposed to organised nature of that collectivity is
clear in the post-riot scenes. There had been no battle plan and there is no reconnaissance. It
was a spontaneous event, an upsurge of shared feeling. The next day there are nods of
friendship and recognition between different groups of friends as they all mill around the
estate. Common meanings are evident as part of their shared lives, their understandings are
implicit rather than articulated. Some of the details of those meanings are talked about by
Vince, Hubert and Said as a group of friends. The riot, the gun and how to deal with their
predicament are the subject of the argument that runs the course of the 24 hours. It is an
argument within their group, with shared terms of reference, with no question as to who
their adversaries are. The significance of this argument is central to the story because it
shows how difference is expressed and negotiated within their group without detracting
from their commonality which is based on the fall they share, on lives that are part of each
other's, and as Hubert's decision to kill and be killed for Vince shows, on inextricable
feelings for each other. Thus, while the subjective-collective dynamic in this 24 hours is no
one thing - they argue about personal survival versus collective retaliation - as far as daily
living and daily outcomes are concerned they are in it together. This is also the case in
relation to their families and other groups on the estate. Differences, inter-relations and
mutualities are multiple. Their shared interest is in sustaining the positive elements of those
relations, from the ties of the black economy, to responsibilities for each other within
families, to stepping in to defend each other from police arrest and violence. These positive
connections based around shared class positions extend beyond the estate. An old man in the
public toilets in Paris tries to give them the benefit of his own knowledge and experience of
oppression in a strange fable; a drunk man on the street advises them on which wires need to
be joined to successfully hot-wire the car they are trying to steal and then jumps onto the
bonnet of the approaching police car to stop them being chased. These scenes are about
connections between people who recognise each other beyond being personal strangers and
they are not afraid. Both men are concerned and want to help, they come to the fore at
critical moments. Similarly there is recognition of class difference amongst strangers and
conflict in place of aid. In the early morning metro Hubert watches a business man on the
escalators as he looks away from him, and accuses him: 'Look at these sheep... they ride
escalators carried by the system... they can't move without escalators'. Hubert's perception
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is of difference as oppression, of people who are prepared to benefit from the way things
are, to be carried along at the expense of others. He registers his hate.
Importantly, all these relations of shared experience, recognition, of aid and of
hatred, are not the product of positions that are 'held'. We see positions develop as
expressions of what is happening in their lives - through events, through interactions,
through relations. Those developments, or outcomes, are then met by the authorities with the
type of approach which says 'you can't help some people' as a way of naturalising and
justifying the way things turn out. Said is pleasantly shocked when the first policeman he
meets in Paris and asks for directions, politely calls him 'Sir', he thanks him in turn. The
point is that such behaviour is unusual, even anomalous. If there is a stability of positions
and predictability of events, it is because of the ongoingness of particular relations. It is this
continuity that in Hate is shown as things hurtling in one direction, hate breeding hate,
palpable distrust, seemingly inevitable disaster. It is clear that the impetus of this motion is
not those who have the least power within it. The hate of Vince, Hubert and Said is about
their powerlessness in relation to the hateful power that is exerted against them.
The story of Ladybird Ladybird is less clearly expressed in collective terms.
Maggie's isolation is at times stark. Her position as a single parent with no money, on the
move, is one without many ties of support. Yet it is also clear that Maggie will not be the
only one experiencing such treatment and feeling the way that she does. The ease with
which the system works against her is about family courts, Social Work departments and ties
with the police, ticking over on a daily basis, channels set up, ready and waiting. Maggie's is
one story about how that system can work.
When Jorge enters her life she is able to express her feelings and share her
experiences in a way that gives them shared meaning and validation. Her relationship with
Jorge is forged on a recognition and understanding of what they have both been through
before they met, and go through once they are together. Jorge is a political exile from
Paraguay who has had to leave the country. He tells Maggie of how he worked with
homeless orphan children whose parents had been killed by the government for their land.
He tried to set up safe homes for them and to publish writings about their dispossession. For
these activities he was seen as a danger to the country, forcing him to seek asylum in Britain.
When he first sees Maggie singing in a London pub, the poignancy and sadness of her song
communicates her own feelings of pain and loss, and speak to his. He recognises someone
like himself and once they talk about their experiences the commonalties are apparent. They
relate to each other in a myriad of different ways which cross language barriers and the
barrier of language itself, expressing the meaning of the sorts of experiences they have had
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without having to speak about them directly. At one point a social worker tries to suggest
that there must be a communication barrier between Maggie and Jorge as a means to
undermine the suitability of their relationship. Maggie replies that: 'It's not only words you
use to communicate'. The deeper meaning of her reply is lost on the social worker caught
up in the evidential realm of the visible and the articulated. Maggie and Jorge share a
language of class, experience and knowledge that is not dependent on the structures of
language. It is based on a deep feeling for who they both are and for most of the time it
sustains their relationship through the pressures against it. Rather than a divide, Jorge's
ethnicity and experiences in a different country and culture are something that is both an
attraction and basis of understanding between them. Two of Maggie's first four children are
black and the issue of ethnic difference is problematic only for the authorities who see Jorge
as another choice of 'violent' partner because of his status as a political refugee.
The violence in Maggie's life is primarily about her powerlessness, firstly in
relationships with men and then with social workers and police as her violent past is used to
justify enacting a different kind of violence against her. A central part of both Maggie's and
Jorge's subjectivity is therefore tied up in experiences of class-based violence, expressed in
different ways. Most of the time Maggie externalises it emotionally in bursts of grief and
anger, while Jorge tries to deal with it quietly and reflectively. Their feelings and
understandings are shared even if they are not exactly the same. This is the antithesis of the
way various authorities relate to Maggie where nothing is understood outside of visible and
spoken 'evidence'. Maggie and Jorge also share a political understanding of their situation
which crosses cultural, ethnic and gender differences. They are both people on the run,
denied basic rights, intimidated and poor, and they have both been terrified by a state of
siege. Jorge tries to describe the reason for their experiences based on what he knows in
Paraguay, which is that fear prevents change: 'It's dangerous to alleviate suffering, suffering
has a job to do for the government'. It is the only directly political line in the story, making
connections between different kinds of oppression carried out against the working class
poor, in the name of government, for the good of the country.
In both Hate and Ladybird Ladybird matters of class conflict, hatred and incommensurable
difference are addressed as central to their protagonist's experiences. They are not expressed
polemically with characters as political mouth pieces and their stories are not illustrations of
any certain, monolithic political truth. They are shown as part of everyday, lived experiences
for poor working class people on the receiving end of oppressive practices. Those
experiences are shown to be often extreme, desperate and painful, and ways of coping with
them are multiple, from the comedic to the anarchic. What the characters do with their class
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and where they are from is different from character to character, and within individual
characters at different times and places. Class subjectivity is ambivalent and changing.
Complexity, ambivalence and change are therefore part of relations of class conflict, hate
and incommensurable difference. Neither film shies away from or tries to resolve those
relations, they keep things moving and do not give us happy or conclusive endings. That
openness is related to the perspectival integrity of their representation: these are stories
consistently told from the perspectives of those whose experiences are shown for whom
there are no easy resolutions. The films are not about 'problem solving' according to
mainstream definitions or seeking 'inclusion' for the characters. We are asked to engage at
their level, on their terms. Our ability and willingness to share the view rather than to be
made uncomfortable by it, is the political challenge of the films. It is a challenge to
collective dialogue about matters of material and representational violence against others.
The filmic space is therefore the possibility of a different space of understanding about the
working class poor. It does not seek to position the characters as 'deserving', aesthetically
pleasing, or 'not like that really'. Instead it gives them dignity by showing the fullness of
their stories, its meanings and complexities.
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Conclusion: Filmic Discourse as Social and Political Becoming
My main argument in this chapter has not been about the positive value of Hate and
Ladybird Ladybird in terms of their ideological or practical effectivity, although a case
could be made for both films on those grounds as noted earlier. Rather it is about their
epistemological value: that is their value as a means of representing subjugated knowledges
and experiences that are so often reduced to journalistic snapshots or evidential social
scientific truths. Such abstract truths when seen embedded within lives, as stories, have
wholly different meanings. This is really an argument about the best way of approximating a
representation of 'the whole'. For my purposes this is about trying to produce
understandings of subjectivities that are situated, complex, changing, especially where such
expression is usually denied as with 'underclass'. It is a refusal to make an issue of one or a
few particular things, usually the most visible (the riot, the children by different fathers) and
to abstract it from everything else (everyday exigencies, humour, relations) in order to draw
conclusive meanings (about class, masculinity, estates). The refusal is not about replacing
such representations with a more authentic subjective experience but recognising that 'what
we are like' individually and as people from the same class or gender, cannot be known
through static reproductions. This is why films which constantly move, showing lives in
myriad, have such potential to avoid fixing on the 'most obvious' aspect of lives and
reducing them to formulation.
This is necessarily an argument about the nature of social being itself, as a process
of constant subjectification. A central element in that process is the relation between the
material and symbolic through which meaning about our selves, our lives and those of
others, is produced. Hate and Ladybird Ladybird can be seen as part of this meaning making
process. Rather than suggesting what the 'outcome' of the meaning making process has
been, for me personally or for others who watch the films (given that it is largely
indeterminable anyway) my choice has been to say something about the experiences they
represent. Like my own, these experiences include representations with which they can
identify. It is in this meaning making realm that subjectivities are formed in relations
between the real and the imagined, material and symbolic. It is also in this realm that
connections between subjectivities and collectivities are productive of political meaning.
The realm can be called 'discourse': a diffuse and untraceable process of social and political
becoming. The stories of Hate and Ladybird, Ladybird as part of the discourse of
'underclass' provide a cultural and political representation of and for the working class poor.
They offer bold, alternative meanings about lives, people and places that have been
274
rubbished by dominant cultural and political representations of them. The films will not
necessarily create strong sources of positive identification for poor working class young men
and single mothers on council estates.42 Neither will they necessarily change the attitudes of
audiences with intransigent views of their own. Luckily the same can be said about those
dominant representations of 'underclass' discourse whose 'effects' are also indeterminable,
although it needs to be said that such spaces of representation are more culturally and
institutionally powerful and well connected. In place of such audience research, I have
interpreted the feelings and experiences represented in the films through my own, as a claim
to partial knowledge. My hope and feeling is that their stories of class and poverty are likely
to ring true, for different audiences in different ways, and that for many this truth will echo
the commonly expressed sentiment of those queuing from the French estates to see Hate:
'This is about us, this is our film'.41
42 The question of how many people will even see these films, is not addressed here. It is worth noting
however that they have both been broadcast on the television since their cinema showings, so have
probably been more widely viewed than might otherwise be assumed




WELFARE UNIVERSALS AND CLASS DIFFERENCES : TACTICAL
CONCLUSIONS ON THE DISCOURSE OF 'UNDERCLASS'
This chapter starts by summarizing the different ways of knowing and kinds of
knowledge that characterise the sites of the preceding chapters. Each site has been
presented as a realm of knowledge and practice through which 'underclass' is
produced. The productivity of these sites is derived from their place in a network of
power relations which partly works to formulate social policy around poor people and
places. This concluding chapter proceeds by disputing the key terms of reference of
these policy formulations as they have developed in the contemporary period. In
prevailing notions of social exclusion/inclusion expressed by vocal elements of the
contemporary new Labour government among others, I argue that a particular kind of
middle class value system has tried to institute the primary citizen value of 'public'
participation via the labour market. In contestation of the productionist ethic of
'underclass' discourse I suggest the value of discourses made up of positive collective
representations of working class difference, as well as economic representations for
unconditional welfare entitlements and for unpaid labour.
The starting point of this thesis was a question about the nature of the relationship
between welfare and modernity. My starting premise was that the relationship is non-
determined: neither exist as a set of discrete principles and practices with inevitable
outcomes, both are made through the discursive practices of particular periods. With regard
to the contemporary period of 'underclass' discourse, the nature of the relationship between
welfare and modernity cannot be absolutely stated or concluded upon. I have presented a
discourse analysis whose politics, motivations and values are explicit, and whose
conclusions must therefore be argued and tactical. My approach has engaged with the
contemporary discourse of 'underclass' to draw out some of its coherences and its
contradictions as produced through an extensive network of power/knowledge relations. It
has presented this network as a shifting and changing configuration in which the particular
meanings of 'underclass' are contested even as they are entrenched. Contestation does not
therefore prevent the entrenchment of some of the most powerful meanings of 'underclass'
in policy making fields but it does represent the unsettled potential of things being different.
In the contemporary period, as policies pertaining to 'underclass' are pushed through by a
new Labour government, there is widespread dissent (differently motivated and expressed)
from those quarters of media, politics and academia that have also been part of producing
'underclass' as a regime of meaning and policy practice. 'Underclass' discourse cannot
therefore be represented in terms of contestation/dissent versus promotion/agreement, but
should be seen in terms of the production of a multiply positioned and changing regime of
ideas, feelings, meanings and policies. In this conclusion, discussion of the policy related
aspects of this regime will be given precedence over and above other possible endings. This
decision accords with the political emphasis of the thesis as a whole - seen in both its
substantive focus and in the underpinnings of its analyses. I shall briefly summarize the
main points made in each chapter before pulling them together in order to draw some policy
related conclusions about the contemporary discourse of 'underclass'. These conclusions
develop an argument about the relations between welfare universals and class differences.
They bring together modernist political principles and postmodern epistemologies to argue
for the strategic visibility and voice of the people and places of 'underclass' through a
socialist feminist analysis of welfare equality and cultural representation.
This thesis as a whole works with a notion of 'underclass' discourse as symbolic
and material practice, where practices both produce and are the products of different people
and different kinds of spaces. These productive processes are conceived as working through
networks of power relations. The particular configurations of these networks allow and
condition the circulation of ideas, the meeting of people and ofminds, the effectivity of
policy making, the making of careers and the momentum of social change. They also allow
the isolation of other ideas, the containment of disputes, the forging of common oppositional
understandings, the stasis and the worsening of social conditions for particular groups. The
different and changing nature of those configurations mean that power relations, through
social practice, create and shore up particular social outcomes, put down and hold back
others.
In Chapter Two the nature of networked relations between a policy conference on
Stakeholding and DSS waiting rooms in the South of England is argued to produce largely
negative social outcomes for the benefit claiming poor. The different knowledges partly
produced through these spaces - about Social Security, about the imperatives of a modern
Welfare State and about the 'best interests' of claimants and society - are shown to be
unequally placed within those power formations affecting policy developments around
'underclass'. The absence of poor people from a discourse of which they are the subject, in
those networks which are made to matter, works to enthrone particular ideas, people and
spaces as authoritative, whilst denoting others as less worthy and important. Conferences,
policy events, academic texts and think-tank reports are all forms and forums in which the
poor are overwhelmingly situated according to the professional expertise of others. They are
targeted and interpreted, spoken for and about by the political Left and the political Right.
Their absence is not an incidental matter of organisational failure but an expression of the
success of predominantly class-based power relations working to effect discursive
dominance. This is more than a practical issue of facilitation and involvement - such
practical arrangements are merely part of a discourse of Knowledge that has developed
historically to ensure different public voices and visibilities for different groups.1 In
Chapter Two that discourse is expressed in the differences between the staged visibility of
extensive expert commentary at the Stakeholder policy conference and the surveilled
silences and contained comments of claimants in the DSS waiting rooms. The relation
between daily practices of subsistence benefit administration and receipt, and the one-off
event to locate those practices in Stakeholding's political imaginary may seem remote but
their practices are intrinsically related. The gap of understanding and contact between them
is yawning, even as they are tightly bound by power relations. This is shown to be the case
even when their relation is stated as being close in terms of advocacy, indeed when
representations for social change and anti-poverty goals are part of the reason for staging the
conference. This disjuncture is less the product of practical decision-making on ways of
generating and disseminating the kinds of knowledges that are made to count, than of a
class-based division between those who are deemed knowledgeable in the right ways and
those who are not. The discourse through which authoritative knowledge is acquired by
institutional sanction and which claims the mantle of objectivity, works to occlude
differently classed knowledges on the basis of their not fitting standards of rigor and
rectitude. It is through that dominant discourse that other forums, publications and
knowledges, though existing, can be assured a lesser kind of existence than their
authoritative counterparts. That different kinds of welfare knowledge exist does not in itself
create a plural realm of knowledge on the subject. In order to have effectivity in policy
realms it is necessary for those knowledges to be approved, valued and connected to the
right kind of people and spaces: such features are designations of power. 'Poor' welfare
knowledges are networked in different ways and through the designations of power those
differences are produced as inequalities. As the referents, statistics, and evidence for a better
class of discourse, the knowledges of the people of 'underclass' are unequal to the
knowledges about them produced by authoritative others. In these knowledges the poor are
1 The welfare reform 'roadshows' being undertaken by the Prime Minister and other key Ministers of
the new Labour government from the early months of 1998 illustrate a similar kind of exclusionary
effect. Although billed as 'consultation' exercises with 'the public', in practice they have worked as
sessions in which Labour Party members have the opportunity to hear ministerial justifications for
initiatives that are perceived to be unpopular and likely to provoke grass-root dissent. Although such
dissent has been allowed expression in question sessions, it is not part of a policy making process, the
policies have already been made. 'Blair's Mission To Reassure' The Guardian 16.1.98 p2
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rendered in the languages, views and understandings of others: the terms of their production
are largely those of outsiders. The productive nature of this relationship between different
kinds of authoritative discourse and their 'underclass' referent is analysed in Chapter Three.
The networks of 'underclass' discourse are made up ofmore than exclusionary or
occlusive representational practices, and their focus extends beyond socio-economic
conditions of Social Security to an extensive field of commentary. Through such
commentary 'underclass' is constituted as a condition of particular family forms, criminal
behaviours, parenting, gender and community relations. The positions of the commentators
interviewed in Chapter Three are configured in broadcasting, academic and campaign
networks. Together they are seen to constitute a feminist discourse on 'underclass' through
which their own personal and professional identities are partly produced, as well as
'underclass' masculinities, femininities and the material living spaces that are directly and
indirectly their referent. Through the representational practices of these women there
emerges a range of needs, wants and interests around the young unemployed working class
male and the benefit claiming single mother, that are power-fully related to dominant policy
formulations around those figures. Notions of dangerous and redundant masculinities; of
disordered council estates and non-functioning communities; of welfare dependent single
mothers who would 'work' if only childcare were available; and of family crises in need of
tax and benefit policy solutions, are variously mooted as issues necessitating government
action. The policy trajectories that have developed around these notions in the contemporary
period show how different ideas can be harnessed to work within dominant schemas as they
are selectively interpreted, translated, creatively combined and unfettered from the caveats
of 'but only ifs...', and apparent good intentions. In this way some diverse feminist ideas
have been incorporated into socially authoritarian policies around the conditions and levels
of benefit provision for the 'non-working' poor and the council estates on which they live.
Many of these ideas are translated from strains of feminist thought which have become
instrumental in arguments to support policies of welfare 'restructuring', labour market
'flexibility' and 'zero-tolerance' crime management. The kinds of visibilities of poor people
and places created in these 'feminised' discourses have become central to the policy
lineaments of 'underclass' discourse.2 In this process the classed and gendered complexities
of the lives they claim to know about and/or to represent have been reduced and
circumscribed by a burden of meaning. That these meanings are conceived as expressing the
2
My use of the term 'feminised' reflects the way that many contemporary changes within the family,
labour market and gender relations have been positively conceived, indeed heralded, as the
'feminisation' of society. Will Hutton, The Observer editor, has been prominent in advocating this
position. See 'The new sex war: Will Hutton versus Melanie Phillips (he's the feminist) The Observer
22.3.98 p 13
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'best interests', 'needs' and 'wants' of 'underclass' groups - the ever quoted 9 out of 10
single mothers who 'want' to work, and the 'communities' who do not want 'criminal young
men' and 'neighbours from hell' amongst them, for example - shows the complexly classed
and gendered nature of the politics of needs interpretation that characterise the discourse.
The extent to which these 'needs' and 'wants' may be expressed by groups so stigmatised,
lambasted and bombarded with images and arguments about their material conditions and
best interests that they seem to demand the policy frame set up around them, shows the
power of discourse to work through the subjects that it names. Equally the nature of
discourse as a non-determined process means that its constitutive parts are neither
monolithic nor guaranteed in their 'effects'. The culturally creative and politically dynamic
nature of contemporary 'underclass' discourse is the subject of Chapter Four.
In the forms, practices and relations of popular discourse there are knowledges,
feelings and understandings which refuse and accuse dominant forms, practices and
relations of knowledge production around 'underclass'. In the films Hate (1995) and
Ladybird Ladybird (1994) are the kinds of discursive resources which allow personal and
collective meanings around poverty and oppression to be created in contestation of
dominant and politically formal representations. That creativity works through resonances,
identifications and feelings that go beyond relations of formal representation about or on
behalf of 'them' as 'others'. It works through imaginative, affective and subjective modes
of knowing in relation to more authoritative discursive modes and it opens up an
interpretative process. The non-determined nature of the interpretative process does not
mean that personal certainties and convictions are precluded by the filmic view. The films
present a space for such understandings to develop by engaging antecedent judgments and
knowledges and making possible collective recognitions and identifications in the process.
Loach's Ladybird Ladybird deals directly with the social welfare issues around State
intervention by welfare professionals into the parenting practices of poor, single mothers,
while Kassovitz's Hate deals with criminal justice issues of State intervention by the police
into the lives of unemployed young men on 'problematic' public housing estates. Both films
set up strong narrative identifications with their protagonists and credit their
characterisations with the kind of value, dignity and complexity that is so often denied in
dominant representations of these most problematic excrescences of 'underclass'. Their
characters' predicaments are shown to be socially embedded and part of oppressive relations
and institutional practices that extend beyond the plight of the individual. In this way they
collectivise social problems and make available collective reactions to them: indeed I argue
that the films are a kind of collective oppositional representation in which voices and
visibilities of the poor have been strategically honed rather than evidentially revealed. A
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particular strength of the kind of cultural and political representation they offer is that they
show working class understandings of social conditions and struggles to be already 'out
there', as part of experiential knowledges and everyday practices. These people are not
waiting to have their consciousness raised or their false consciousness de-mystified, they are
conscious experts of their own lives. In this respect the films should perhaps be partly
regarded as strategic: offering positive representations that are partly suggestive of an
everyday class consciousness as well as being reflective of it. In other words the films
themselves act as arenas for the expression and creation of political understandings and as
such are part of a cultural politics through which poor groups can garner self and group
esteem and political anger, whilst other groups are opened to non-reductive understandings
of those people and places normally cast as 'other'.
While the films promote representations that refuse the dominant knowledges of
'underclass' discourse, the significance of their refusal is partly contained by their status as
'popular culture', and therefore as less knowledgeable and consequential than more formal
representational politics. This is not just a feature of contemporary 'underclass' discourse
but is part of a wider hierarchisation of the social in which some forms of discourse are cast
as superficial and extrinsic to 'realistic' economic, political and social commentary. A
network view of social space allows for films to be seen as discursive forms and arenas that
are no less socially relevant than other kinds of representation but which are habitually
constructed and hierarchised as such in order to ensure the workings of dominant power
configurations. It is such a hierarchisation that discourse analysis eschews: knowledges of
'underclass' exist in all kinds of forms and arenas, their mainstream status and effectivity
strongly conditioned by the way they are networked to each other and other discursive forms
and arenas, not by the intrinsic value of their knowledge or its proper location on a
particular social 'level'. It would therefore be a mistake to assume that oppositional
knowledges to dominant ideas of 'underclass' need to be created and represented by
different politicians and commentators. The point is that they already exist in other forms
and types of understanding but that power relations network them in such a way that they
are marginal to the 'real' business of social policy as practised through well-connected,
authoritative forms and institutions of knowledge production and dissemination.
This is not to say that issues pertaining to 'underclass' that are expressed in terms of
political economy for example, should have less status within the discourse when they are
already marginal. An understanding of the production of 'underclass' in relation to
deflationary economic policies, labour market 'flexibility' and 'welfare to work'
programmes is not excluded by a discourse analytic approach. Indeed such political-
economic knowledges would be crucial to an analysis of 'underclass' as a neo-liberal
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economic discourse (this has not been my main focus). It is not, however, enough to say that
the production of 'underclass' can be solely understood via a political economy of welfare
restructuring, and it would be blinkered to say that political economy is its driving or causal
power. Crucially, 'underclass' has been produced through a dominant discourse whose
spaces of production range across (and intermesh) contemporary feminist, popular, and
political knowledges. It is only through reading those spaces that the complex constitution of
'underclass' discourse can be traced. Moreover, that tracing may include issues of political
economy because those issues do not 'naturally' reside in particular theoretical or statistical
forms. Political economy can be in a poem, or can be in a film at the level of meaning.
The discourse analysis of this thesis has aimed to show how a wide range of
different kinds of spaces are differentially imbricated in policy formulations around the
people and places of 'underclass'. Fundamental to powerful discursive spaces are
stubbornly dualistic constructions of the social in which notions of same and 'other',
inclusion and exclusion, public and private, work and care, have been used to construct
reductive analyses of, and solutions for, the social and economic problems associated with
'underclass'. Chapters Two and Three show that those analyses and solutions do not only
hail from the political Right and tabloid press but that many of their ideas have emerged
from, or at least in relation to, individuals and organisations which claim Left-wing and
feminist credentials and which have been selectively taken up by an incoming Labour
Government (1997). The idea of ready-made political-economic alliances along the lines of
Left-Right, Feminist-Patriarchal, has proved all but redundant in relation to many of the
ideas that have assumed status within the dominant political discourse of 'underclass'.
There are few certainties about what such political categories represent when their most
prominent manifestations are so problematic: tied to claims of radicalism and reliability
from the first Labour government for 18 years and the strongly classed expressions of
feminism associated with it. The welfare visions derived from these networks are built
around notions of good citizenship as public and inclusive. Respectable and respected voices
and visibilities are rewards of social inclusion equated with the public realm of labour
market participation. The realm of full-time familial or non-'work' based activities by those
claiming subsistent level benefits is socially excluded, spoken for, exposed as aberrant in
'normal' society. In other words the political exclusion of that 'non-working' realm as
legitimate or viable is pivotal in bringing about the social exclusion of which it speaks. In
these circumstances even the identification of unemployment as undesirable becomes
problematic, necessitating questions about its definition, why it is undesirable, to whom and
how it will be righted.
Inclusion/Exclusion: Whose Terms?
The notion of social exclusion/social inclusion is the central axis of new Labour
policy solutions around 'underclass'.3 In August 1997 the Labour MinisterWithout
Portfolio, Peter Mandelson MP, announced at the annual Fabian Society Lecture that a
special Social Exclusion Unit headed by the Prime Minister, would be set up to tackle 'the
greatest social crisis of our times'.4 Amongst the targeted groups to be re-integrated into
society are the 5 million in 'workless homes', 3 million on 1,300 council estates, single
parents and those with disabilities, and those children not attending school, at risk of teenage
pregnancy, criminality and drug taking. These groups are deemed to be the socially
excluded, the product of the previous Conservative government's failure - 'an underclass
shut out from society'. The task of the Social Exclusion Unit is to bring them back into the
mainstream, a task whose success will go beyond economic inclusion:
'This is about more than poverty and unemployment. It is about being cut off from
what the rest of us regard as normal life.'5 (my emphasis)
Here the key referent of 'social exclusion' is 'underclass', where exclusion is partly about
poverty but importantly also goes beyond an economic predicament. Inclusion to 'normal'
society is also cultural: it is inclusion to the values, aspirations and ways of living 'of the
rest of us'. This construction goes to the very core of 'underclass' discourse, raising an
important question about the relation between economic inequality and class differences:
should discussion of class differences be part of deciding policy formulations for the
alleviation of poverty? The question forces consideration of how relations between margins
and centres are about more than economic inequality. If 'inclusion' to the economic well-
being of the centre has conditional terms that demand changes in the values, attitudes and
behaviours of the margins then is it necessarily desirable? Does rejection of those terms
mean acceptance of economic inequality? Are there poor, working class discourses which
are different and valuable, that should not be characterised as entirely negative? Such
questions point to the notion of poverty being part of working class subjectivities and
collectivities that are not problematic. The danger of promoting such a notion is of playing
into the hands of those who suggest that poverty itself is a product of cultural difference.
Nevertheless in a political climate where poor people themselves are the target of change,
then it becomes necessary to question the terms of 'help' and to consider arguments about
cultural resistance as well as economic equality. The promise made by Harriet Harman, as
3 The theme of 'social exclusion/inclusion' is also central to The Economic and Social Research
Council's current funding structures, allowing a cross-referencing of understandings between political
and academic networks on the basis of that shared terminology.
4 Mandelson.P (1997) Fabian Society Lecture 'Labour's Next Steps: tackling social exclusion'
London: Fabian Society p9
5
Mandelson, Labour's Next Steps pi
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Secretary of State for Social Security, to help new single mothers by removing previous
income entitlements makes the questioning of terms of 'inclusion' highly necessary on both
cultural and economic grounds.
I want to argue the desirability of two related approaches to this inclusion/exclusion
problematic. They can be regarded as subjugated knowledges within the dominant
formulations of 'underclass' discourse. The first contests the continuing potency of dualisms
of public and private, work and care, as they are currently entrenched in policies which
herald the superiority of public participation and paid work in relation to domestic
participation and unpaid work. Part of that contestation is about the way in which particular
arguments have been justified in the name of feminist progress as argued in Chapter Three.
The second approach contests the idea that the concept of inclusion is preferable to that of
equality. The Centre-Left think-tank the Institute of Public Policy Research (IPPR), has
chosen to promote the idea that 'inclusion' might be the successor of 'equality' for a radical
Centre-Left politics that accommodates difference and diversity.6 In this telling, equality is
an anachronistic notion which carries with it a heavy baggage of sameness and homogeneity.
The next two sections address these approaches in turn, the first by problematising the
notion of 'public' participation as an inherent good, the second by discussing a notion of
equality and universality as preferable to the politically predominant notion of social
inclusion in terms of both principle and policy.
'Public' Participation
Nancy Fraser identifies the 'public sphere' as the realm in which democratic debate
and deliberation occurs, allowing distinctions to be made between 'state apparatuses,
economic markets and democratic associations'.7 The association of the public with politics,
democracy, citizenship and debate seems to assure its status as a good to which everybody
should have access. However there is a need for caveats to this warm embrace of the
'public' in a critical approach that allows ideas of inclusion to the 'public sphere' to be
examined and specified rather than assumed to be necessarily good. Central to Fraser's
approach is the conception of modern society as characterised by a 'multiplicity of public
spaces' with conflicts between and within them. This multiplicity fits with the idea of social
networks configured through many different kinds of spaces and through power relations
that produce their knowledges as more or less authoritative in relation to each other. In
Fraser's conception of multiplicity, the public/private divide - being a classic spatial
6 See Franklin.J (1997) (ed.) Equality London: IPPR
7 Fraser.N (1995) Politics, Culture and the Public Sphere: Towards a Postmodern conception
Nicholson.L and Seidman.S (eds.) Social Postmodernism: Beyond Identity Politics Cambridge
University Press p287
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hierarchy among other things - is replaced by relations between different kinds of publics
and privates. With regard to the discourse analysis of 'underclass' presented in this thesis,
the goal of equality in such configurations cannot be achieved by compulsions to enter the
'public space', or by granting 'inclusion' into it. Instead the task must be to democratise the
power relations of networks in order that those informal voices and spaces already spoken
and practiced elsewhere can be heard and seen without necessarily having to join formal,
dominant voices or re-locate to their spaces. In this way movement from a 'bad' thing to a
'good' thing as implied in the notion of inclusion is seen to be both unnecessary and
undesirable. There can be no conflating 'entry' or participation in the 'public' with social
equality.
Fraser's approach to the 'public' therefore starts with the idea that it is multiply
constituted by different kinds of publics and its embrace necessitates caveats. Firstly, public
participation is no guarantee of political inclusion: the public is where different inequalities
may meet and groups be seen to be unequal but 'being there' is not enough to overcome
those inequalities.8 Herding Social Security claimants into policy conferences and
compelling the unemployed into workplaces is therefore no panacea for unequal power
relations that define the nature of their existence most of the time wherever they are and
which attaches value to some kinds of spaces - spaces made in the image of the powerful - as
opposed to others. Secondly, 'the public' can only fulfil its positive democratic potential if
different kinds of publics are openly admitted and actively encouraged to develop as
autonomous and inter-dependent spaces. In this regard 'the public' should not be about
transcendental consensus - a space where everybody has to have the same values and
aspirations - but about discursive contestation.9 The goal of social inclusion to 'normal'
society, definitive of contemporary policy formulations around 'underclass' can therefore be
seen as undemocratic in its drive to create the common good as a citizenry working in the
paid economy. Thirdly, notions of the 'public' need to be detached from prima facie
meanings especially those of 'common good' and from assumptions about 'the private'.
Such meanings are all contestable and should be temporally defined through different
experiences, not read off from anachronistic political constructs.10 This means that the
construction of public and private in gender terms, a dualism whose meanings commonly
favour the 'benefits' of 'the public' cannot be sustained. It is that simplification that I have
shown to be so useful to prevailing arguments for labour market participation as the route
out of poverty and out of the home - arguments which often serve to naturalise the relation
between the home and poverty (especially female poverty).
8
Fraser, Politics, Culture and the Public Sphere p289
9
Fraser, Politics, Culture and the Public Sphere p292
10
Fraser, Politics, Culture and the Public Sphere p294
285
With regard to 'underclass', these understandings about the 'public' as less than
favourably inclusive, go beyond issues of compulsion to work in the labour market, to the
wider issue of 'publicity'. Clearly 'underclass' has extensive publicity in broadcast and
print journalism, serving as highlights of crime-based light entertainment, of 'real-life'
documentary footage, and of current affairs and news reportage. Images and commentaries
proliferate but the nature of that public presence is predominantly reductive because of its
primarily classed view that seeks exposure, evidence, censure or justification for policy
action. For the people and places of 'underclass' the issue of publicity is as much about the
right to silence, to invisibility and the right to be left alone as it is the right to participation,
voice, visibility. Such rights are currently non-existent where the media and police can agree
contacts for joint police-camera raids on unsuspecting households in poor areas. Tenants on
some of Middlesborough's poorest estates are currently suing the media over intrusions into
people's homes set up to provide public relation exercises for the police and 'real-life' cheap
footage for the media.1'
For the people of 'underclass', strategic invisibility, silence and the right to
withdraw from particular kinds of spaces at particular times is less and less of an option.
The problem is acute when a real need for communication about matters of poverty from
those who are experiencing it is met with a surfeit of representations in which their voice
and presence is forced, surveilled or made into voyeuristic entertainment. As with effective
compulsion to work in the public sphere, the terms of their 'public' presence are not their
own: the 'public' becomes a space of over-exposure, generalised harassment and
degradation. In the contemporary period there are a number of kinds of inclusion where the
need and right to decline the 'offer' of inclusion should be apparent, namely: inclusion to
the values of the dominant discourse of 'underclass' - where every child is a 'wanted' child
who will be brought up to respect the authority of the law and the value of the work ethic;
where needs, interests and wants constructed in powerful representational modes will
always happily coincide with those that are 'self-defined' by poor people and places; and
where any work that ensures labour market inclusion is better than no work. In this regard it
may be necessary to counter that dominant discourse of 'underclass' with discourses which
resist the idea that poor groups have no subjective or collective value and need to be
'included' via a process of middle class subjectification/acculturation. This may require the
defence of subjectivities and collectivities that are partly premised on social inequality, not
in order to represent inequality as a 'difference' but rather to admit the contradictions and
ambivalences of needing to speak against poverty without speaking against yourself and
your kind. Such a move is only likely to work when it is those people who are subject to
11
'Here Comes Mallon's Law' The Guardian 2nd December 1997 p 17
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poverty doing a central part of the talking, defining the parts of their shared lives that they
value, criticising those that they do not. The outcome of such discussions being colonised by
those who have never known poverty is exemplified in the dominant discourse of
'underclass' where poor working class lives are cast in wholly problematic terms, or where
an expressed concern for material inequality dare not mention class difference lest that be
turned against the poor.
The idea of a positive poor working class discourse is expressed uneasily, it seems
to be a contradiction in terms. How can material disadvantage ever be a positive thing? Its
'loss' will always be perceived as a gain. Yet as I have argued in Chapter Four class is more
than a material relation, feelings of class belonging can remain when material relations have
thoroughly changed. In this respect the notion of class-based (rather than poverty-based)
subjectivities and collectivities can be used to positively express different values, behaviours
and desires to those that the 'rest of us' regard as 'normal'. Indeed their expression may be
needed in order to resist cultural negation. This idea does not require a notion of the poor
working class having a univocal discourse or identical subjectivities, nor does it imagine
that such voices are self-identical: instead it recognises the advantages of discursively
engaging in politically strategic or other purposive ways which may include the deployment
of positive narratives of poor, working class life. The suggestion is not that such narratives
should displace issues of material inequality but that they should not be relegated to a lesser
significance or seen as diversionary just because the dominant discourse of 'underclass' has
cast cultural aspects of life in such reductive ways and traditional approaches to challenging
poverty have shied away from offensives on that front. The kind of discourses that perhaps
need to be promoted with regard to single mothers on benefits for example, are those which
relate to their feelings and understandings about the value of motherhood itself rather than
just concentrating on the economic predicament of their poverty. A recent study by Edwards
and Duncan based on extensive interviews with single mothers suggests that a predominant
reason for non-participation in the labour market is the value they attach to mothering time
itself. 12 These values are represented as 'gendered moral rationalities' which oppose
dominant norms of prioritising paid work and marginalising mothering time as 'quality
time'.
Ideas of 'cultural difference' are intrinsic to the dominant discourse of 'underclass'.
However, such a 'difference based' discourse is not inherently problematic. The particular
nature of its production and use in the contemporary period has made it so for those poor
working class people and places made to carry the burden of its meaning. It is tempting in
12 Edwards.R and Duncan.S (1998) Supporting the Family: lone mothers, paid work and the underclass
debate p29-49 Critical Social Policy 53 vol. 17
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these circumstances to recoil from a discourse of class difference altogether. Indeed some
have succumbed to that temptation by making strong arguments for the prioritisation of
issues of material inequality over those of cultural difference, often for strategic purposes.
For example, a recent exchange in the New Left Review between Nancy Fraser, Iris Marion
Young and Anne Phillips has once more pitted issues of 'culture' and economy against
each other. In this case Fraser argues that issues of cultural identity, difference, domination
and recognition have supplanted a socialist imaginary concerned with 'exploitation as the
fundamental injustice'.13 She points to the problems of combining a 'cultural politics of
difference' with a 'social politics of inequality' and argues that it is through the faultlines of
that ill-fitting combination that a radical Left politics has fallen. Primarily this is cast as a
problem of deconstructing socially constructed identities whilst imagining that substantive
political programmes of social change can be simultaneously constructed around them. She
argues that not only has this failed to happen but the injustices to which materially deprived
groups are subject have been thoroughly marginalised if not pushed off the political agenda
by struggles for cultural recognition.
In contemporary America - the context in which Fraser writes - welfare politics have
passed through a period of terrible decline culminating in the 1996 Welfare Act installed by
a Democrat government led by President Clinton. His 1992 campaign comment that 'the
best welfare programme is a job' was followed by the imposition of a two year limit on the
amount of time welfare benefits could be paid, and the passing over of responsibility for the
administration of welfare from Federal to State government thus ending the principle of
welfare parity established in President Roosevelt's 'New Deal'.14 The states ofWisconsin
and New Jersey have led the way in implementing workfare programmes for single mothers
previously on welfare. That this has happened whilst a discourse of multiculturalism has
assumed a powerful political role is not necessarily causally related. Indeed a very similar
political trajectory with regard to welfare reform has developed in Britain with the election
of a Centre-Left government after an extended period of New Right governance, and here
there have been no major 'diversions' by multiculturalist political lobbying. This thesis has
tried to show how symbolic and material representations and distributions are inextricably
intertwined. The idea of separating and prioritising economic inequality over issues of
cultural representation is patently inappropriate to an analysis of 'underclass' where those
elements are intrinsically of a piece.
Moreover, it is not necessary to separate discourse analyses of class difference from
economic analyses in order to argue that issues of distributive justice have been politically
13 Fraser.N (1995) From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a Post-Socialist Age
p68-93 New Left Review 212 p68
14 Cockburn.A (1996) 'From New Deal to great betrayal' The Observer 4.8.96 p27
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marginalised in the contemporary period. Indeed central to that process has been a
widespread discursive degradation of the lifestyles and values of those poor groups for
whom such issues are so important. The marginalisation of issues of distributive justice has
been achieved through a discourse about poverty as much more than the outcome of an
economic predicament. Moreover, the discourse itself is produced through practices that are
culturally embedded. The classed and gendered views about work, family and crime
expressed in the dominant discourse of 'underclass' are power-fully derived from the social
positions of those who articulate them and their discourse of Knowledge. The arguments of
Stakeholding, Third Ways, 'Feminisation', Welfare to Work, Social Inclusion/Exclusion and
Rights and Responsibilities, represent a pointed avoidance of articulating notions of class,
whilst continuing to express strongly classed notions. To the extent that they depart from the
modernist goal of achieving equalities of outcome for different class groupings with regard
to the distribution of social and economic goods and benefits they can also be seen as part of
a post-socialist discourse of welfare. It is to the policy related part of this discourse that I
now turn.
Academic arguments about a postmodern welfare state have directly linked post-
1970s changes in culture and economic organisation to the kinds of welfare discourse that
predominate in the contemporary period.15 The questions they have been interested in asking
concern the nature of relations between modernist welfare universals and postmodern
conceptualisations of social difference, and between Keynesian economics and Post-Fordist
economic change. Disputes about universalist discourses of welfare needs are at their core.
In particular, modern ways of conceptualising welfare are seen to have constructed 'needs'
in rigid and homogenising ways in order to fit with the requirements of bureaucracies for
rationalisation and large scale provision. However, while large scale bureaucratic forms of
policy making and administration would seem to be conducive to the characteristically
postmodern changes of informal, decentralised, flexible practices, in practice class
differences, among other differences, may be used to justify differential treatment based on
the discretion of welfare administrators. This possibility was highlighted by Frank Field MP,
as Minister for Welfare Reform, in his suggestion that individual DSS benefit offices be
given control of their own budgets. This idea breaks with the 1966 Social Security Act
which established clear national entitlements in order to wipe out local and regional
15 See Leonard.P (1997) Postmodern Welfare London: Sage; Lipietz.A (1995) 'The Third Sector:
Resolving the crisis of the welfare state' pl41-144 City 1/2; Burrow.R and Loader.B (eds.) (1994)
Towards A Post-Fordist Welfare State ? London: Routledge; Thompson.S and Hoggett.P (1996)
'Universalism, Selectivism, and Particularism: Towards a Postmodern Social Policy' p21-43 Critical
Social Policy vol. 16 (1); Mann.K (1996) One Step Beyond: Is There Still a Critical Social Policy in
'Post-Modern' Britain? Paper for Social Policy Association conference, Postmodernity and the
Fragmentation of Welfare: A Social Policy for New Times? University of Teeside September 9th and
10th 1996
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variations due to administrative bias and prejudice.16 Significantly such organisational
changes are largely premised on a post-Fordist business prototype, and are strongly related
to arguments about the 'imperatives' of new global economic realities where investment,
production and consumption are supposed to be characterised by flexibility and rapid
change.
The extent to which such economic developments inhere the kind of imperatives for
welfare reform that are presently underway is arguable. Clearly the idea of defending a
system which is in many ways failing is not acceptable; sustained critiques of welfare
failures by single parents, disability groups and claimant unions among others are already
well advanced.17 They do not however represent a wholesale rejection of the principles of
the Welfare State. Indeed the kind of welfare reform likely to worsen an already inadequate
system of basic needs provision is antithetical to such critiques.
Much of the current debate centres on the relation between universal contributory
benefits and means-tested subsistence level benefits, reflecting the classic welfare division
between the middle class and the working class poor, the 'working' and the 'non-working'.
The question of whether the principle of universality should be maintained is central to the
welfare reforms of the new Labour government. However, given that it is subsistence level
income supplements and benefit conditions that have been 'reformed' first (lone parent
premium cuts, Welfare to Work) while the stringencies of the JSA have been maintained,
the question of reforming the principle of universality should seem less momentous - in
many ways the worst has happened first. It may be no longer possible to argue for
'universality' as a means of protecting the benefits of the poorest, ensuring a non-
ghettoised/stigmatised Welfare State, by using the idea that middle class welfare
beneficiaries maintain the dignity and right to those benefits for everyone. As it is, the
contributory benefits of the Welfare State have been defended while means-tested benefits
have been the first to be cut. Indeed, Tony Blair has voiced his concern that middle class
people have been needlessly agitated about the prospect of 'affluence tests' - as the middle
class counterpart of means-tests - when no policies have been formulated in that regard.18
Rather than making a defence of the principle of universality as the corner stone of a
socially inclusive, non-stigmatised Welfare State, it would therefore seem necessary to
16 Field.F (1997) 'Give Them The Tools' The Guardian 12.8.97 pl3
17 See Ginsburg.N (1992) (ed.) Divisions of Welfare London: Sage; Williams.F (1993) 'Gender, race
and class in British Welfare Policy' in Cochrane.A and Clarke.J (eds.) Comparing Welfare States:
Britain in International Context London: Sage; Lewis.J (1992) 'Gender and the development of
welfare regimes' p7-32 Journal ofEuropean Social Policy 2
18 'Middle Classes to be hit by 'affluence test" The Observer 11.1.98 pi. It should, however, be noted
that the strong possibility of taxing child benefit for higher earners, mooted by Chancellor Gordon
Brown in his March 1998 Budget, would represent a move to end the principle of Universal benefits
for the middle classes
290
highlight the way universalism has become part of a classed rhetoric through which
contributory benefits are less touchable than subsistence level benefits which are
permanently open to 'reform'. It is perhaps necessary to introduce a different kind of
vocabulary in which the ostensible reason for protecting universalism - namely the
achievement of fairness and social equality - is presented as foremost to its defence. In
particular, a discourse of basic needs and of interdependence could orientate discussions of
welfare reform around the kind of concepts that locate principles of social justice at the
centre of the Welfare State, rather than having the primary value of labour market
participation penetrate its core meanings. The lineaments of such a discourse are addressed
in the next section.
'Real universality is actual interdependency'19
An argument for welfare reform in which the concept of interdependence is central
can maintain traditional socialist welfare principles associated with social modernism, in
particular the idea of social improvement through redistributive policies and basic needs
provision. Here basic needs are held to be the requirements for a degree of material well-
being that enables individuals to participate in society, rather than just 'subsist', and so if
20
necessary enables them to engage in political discourses of needs interpretation.
A concept of interdependence can also offer a way of accommodating modern and
principled postmodern critiques of welfare as practiced in the contemporary period. It can
express the positive, even intrinsic, relation between concepts of social solidarity and social
difference, that is the connectedness of individuals in society but also their inbetween-ness
in social positions that are multiply constituted and changing. In Balibar's conception of real
universality as actual interdependency, this idea is expressed in his contention that:
'[No] discussion about universality... can usefully proceed with a 'univocal' concept
of 'The Universal' [but] has to take into account the concept's insurmountable
equivocity.'21
This view is extended by Iris Marion Young in her idea of a heterogeneous public:
19 Balibar.E (1995) Ambiguous Universality p48-74 Differences: A Journal ofFeminist Cultural
Studies 7 (1) p51
20 This definition is based on Doyal and Gough's 'Theory of Human Need' ((1991) A Theory of
Human Need Basingstoke: Macmillan). It is purposefully a limited statement which does not engage
with the 'Theory' part of Doyal and Gough's formulation. In this respect I am following Iris Marion
Young's suggestion that a rational discourse of justice that holds ideals and principles, does not
require a 'Theory of Justice' (here I am substituting justice with 'need'). Young posits that 'Theory'
suggests a Universal normative system and so militates against the idea of 'situated political dialogue'
that is culturally specific. Young.I.M (1990) Justice and the Politics ofDifference Chichester, West
Sussex: Princeton University Press p5
21
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'...in a heterogeneous public, differences are publicly recognised and acknowledged
as irreducible, by which I mean that persons from one perspective or history can
never completely understand and adopt the point of view of those with other group-
based perspectives and histories.'22
This position leads Young to reject a notion of Universal citizenship, preferring to conceive
of citizenship as a perpetual process, a dialogue between often irreducible differences, but
which maintains a sense of belonging through universal dialogue. Similarly, acknowledging
difference and diversity within and between groups of welfare beneficiaries - including
middle class recipients of fiscal, contributory and occupational benefits23 - does not require
the abandonment of the principle of welfare universalism expressed through a democratic
and situated policy process and politics of needs interpretation, which keeps social
equalities of outcome as ideal and principle. Indeed the commonality of basic welfare needs
must be one of the strongest illustrations of how unity exists within difference and why
those differences should not be erected as divides. The welfare principle of universalism
should not therefore be regarded as an expression of absolute sameness but of
interdependence.
The strategic importance of a concept of basic needs is that 'needs' work as a basic
justification for claims to State welfare provision. The political importance of the concept is
found in Marx's still resonant dictum - 'from each according to his ability to each according
to his need', locating the concept in a principle of redistributive justice which remains
central to socialist beliefs. It is not my intention here to test the concept in relation to
specific policy proposals, nor to engage with debates about the relationship between needs
and rights (suffice to say that the identification of basic needs would suggest certain rights
of needs satisfaction). Rather my focus here is the value of the concept of interdependence
where provision for interdependence involves both basic needs provision and redistribution.
The notion of interdependence expresses the nature of social between-ness that I
have been arguing for, in contestation of the dualistic constructions that are foundational to
the dominant discourse of 'underclass'. Here there are clear links to be made between
critical theory and social policy. An understanding of the social as thoroughly
interdependent - contesting processes that seek to construct it through division and polarity -
provides the background to the kind of 'ethic of solidarity' necessary to sustain support for
22
Young.I.M (1989) 'Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship'
p250-74 Ethics 99 p258
23 For a discussion of how these tend to be excluded from conceptions of public welfare See Sinfield.A
(1989) Social security and its social division: a challenge for sociological analysis Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press
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a strong Welfare State.24 The notion of interdependence can be used to expresses the nature
of social relations beyond ideas of absolute sameness and absolute difference. It does not
suggest homogeneity but can be marshalled to the cause of equality, and in this respect it is
central to a non-reductive politics of social justice. Within this conception welfare
universalism does not imply an homogeneous population, or an homogeneity of claimant
groups. Moreover the aim of equality expressed in welfare universals does not imply
sameness of treatment. Indeed its starting point must be the recognition of the differences
and inequalities that do exist and which mean that policies intended to achieve social and
economic equality cannot deploy blanket approaches. It is such a basic understanding that I
have shown to be so amiss from current policy drives to achieve equality in the labour
market and Social Security system by legislating for the social desirability of 'the worker' as
a labour market participant undifferentiated by gender among other things. According to that
logic the worker mould is to be equally cast around the single mother and the married
mother; the parent with one teenage child and the parent with four young children; the
parent with a sick or disabled child and the parent with a healthy, able-bodied child; the
disabled or incapacitated unemployed man and the healthy unemployed man; the parent who
wants to be a full-time carer at home and the parent who wants to work in the labour market.
Difference is thus quashed in the name of equality, indeed partly in the name of feminism
and anti-discriminatory practice. This policy trajectory places labour market participation as
a condition of enhanced social provision: for those individuals and families who have no
part in the formal labour market, social benefits and provisions will be withdrawn, or at best
maintained at poverty levels rather than improved. This logic unites a host of current and
emergent welfare policies. Family Credit, Child Maintenance support, Childcare provision,
New Deal packages and Tax Credits all support the principle that more will be given to
those who participate in the labour market.25 In this respect the logic is not about making
'cuts' per se but redistributing spending towards encouragement, facilitation and
increasingly compulsion into paid work for those who refuse to see what is in their 'best
interests'. The drive of the logic is to make the 'welfare dependant' into the 'independent
worker'.
Clearly the construction of dependence and independence in these terms is ethically
lacking. In the notion of the interdependent subject is the refusal of that dualism, the refusal
of the construction of the modern individual as an independent unit and the insistence that
interdependence is intrinsic to the different ways of being a person in society. Recognition
24 The idea of an 'ethic of solidarity' is forwarded by Iris Marion Young as being critical to the
combination of social justice with a politics of difference. Young, Justice and the Politics of
Difference
25 See thesis postscript on March 1998 Budget
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of such interdependence grants rather than denies autonomy.26 This conception opens up the
possibility of notions of the universal being used to express difference as constitutive of the
whole, creating solidarity as opposed to fragmentation between parents and children, the
young and the old, men and women, the disabled and able-bodied, the community worker
and the office worker, the sick and the well and in-between all those groups.
The practicalities of this ethical understanding of social relations are of course
potentially problematic, implementing an ethic through policy will always be more difficult
and subject to constraints than the statement of the ethic itself. That discourses of 'need'
replete with ethical justification are so easily used to homogenise and oppress particular
groups either for 'their own good' or for 'the greater good' is the permanent risk of social
modernism. Benign outcomes can never be guaranteed. The risk-laden predicament of
modernist drives for social change points to the critical contribution of those postmodern
approaches to society that have heightened sensitivities to the power relations of cultural
and political representations of the way 'things are' and should be. In particular it points to
the need for ongoing discourse analyses of the languages, spaces and practices through
which notions of the Social Good get defined. It is such an analysis that this thesis has
developed with regard to the contemporary discourse of 'underclass'. Central parts of the
socially reformative element of 'underclass' discourse have been shown to be thoroughly
imbricated in the languages and practices of conventionalised, power-vested knowledges.
The discourse analytic approach of this thesis does not represent a denial of the
existence of serious troubles that are part of many poor people's lives and the places in
which they live. Nor does it attempt a glorification of 'communities' under stress battling
against material and symbolic degradation. Poverty often exists without positive meanings
and practices of working class subjectivities and collectivities. It can be brutal and
destructive, turning those who are subject to it against each other and the places in which
they live. Such predicaments need neither demonisation nor glorification but an analysis that
recognises the way people living through poverty have understandings that can be very
different to those assumed by 'objective' knowledges about them. Such an analysis should
be able to recognise strengths and survival strategies where they exist whilst trying to
understand the heavy burdens placed upon people which sometimes result in their being
unable to cope. My analysis has looked at the way different kinds of social distress are
produced and experienced through different kinds of knowledge about them. It has mainly
26 The notion of autonomy as opposed to self-sufficiency as an ideal citizen value, and moral value, is
explained by Iris Marion Young as the basis of egalitarian citizenship. It is created via a recognition
that some people may require more social support than others and that such support should never be
used to detract from personal autonomy through judgments - 'about where they will live, how they will
live, how they will spend money, what they will do with their time' - which make them into second
class citizens. Young, Mothers, Citizenship and Independence p550
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analysed the producer end of that process: the way that different 'truths' are installed around
those who require social welfare support as 'truths' about what society can and cannot
afford, 'truths' about entitlement to subsistence level benefits and 'truths' about different
kinds of people and places. Through the workings of discourse such 'truths' about
communities in crisis and a lack of 'public' willingness to support them culturally or
financially, are at least partly realised. Within this regime of meaning and practice around
'underclass' struggles for material survival are also struggles for measures of autonomy,
dignity and empathy. Meaning and power are symbolic and material resources that are
wrested, granted, or denied.
The matter of proposing 'solutions' for the alleviation of poverty tends to direct
attention to the material conditions of the poor and thereby often elides understandings
about the nature of poverty's production and the role of the non-poor in that process. It also
tends to suggest a locus of action in a way that fails to take account of the way the
production of poverty is thoroughly embedded in, and extended through the practices of
society, especially in the practices of the non-poor. Moreover, the notion of policy
prescription can itself seem reductive at the end of an analysis that has insisted on the nature
of the social space as configured through shifting networks and multiple axes of some
temporal and spatial complexity. Nevertheless in my presentation of this complex network
ontology I have also insisted on the centrality of a normative, political analysis of it. In
particular, in this concluding chapter I have indicated the kinds of political understandings
of social justice and equality - with interdependence and basic needs as central concepts -
that have informed my analysis. Below I will briefly outline those policy ideas that emerge
from the kinds of political understandings that I have forwarded. They come with the caveat
that a discourse of social justice needs to be seen as produced within a specific time-space
and specific policy ideas are part of that contingency. Following my analyses of the
networks, spaces and power relations that configure the contemporary discourse of
'underclass', some policies can be tentatively suggested. They do not represent a 'new'
political project but are drawn from ideas that are at least partly, already constituted in the
oppositional and subjugated spaces that I have presented. They do not represent a plan to be
imposed on a failing system but are part of a process that is already working as new welfare
forms, ideas and campaigns emerge from the crises, successes and contradictions of the
'historical present'. In such developments it is possible to identify three broad areas of
policy ideas that could together work towards the alleviation of the problems associated with
'underclass'.
The first is a politics of parenting and child welfare which could express the right
of parents to look after children as full-time carers should they so wish and to be given
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financial support for that work at a level that accords cultural value and ensures material
well-being for their children and for themselves. The provision of welfare entitlements for
babies and children could form part of a child welfare programme which recognises
children's emotional and psychological needs for attachment as well as their needs for basic
material security. Such a programme would recognise conflicts of interest between children
and a society dominated by paid work and it would adjudicate on the side of children as the
least powerful group in society rather than seeing them as deviations from an adult norm. It
would not assume that the best way to alleviate problems of parenting in poverty is for the
State or commercial interests to take over the parenting role, enabling more 'productive'
work to be done. This kind of politics would need to be instituted in relation to a positive
discourse on the family as a realm of life that should not be predominantly defined in
relation to, and penetrated by the demands and values of the labour market. Avoidance of
the conservative aspects with which this idea has become associated could support an idea
of the home as an important place of identification, education and politicisation, as
potentially as radical and progressive as any workplace.27
The second policy area that could achieve the alleviation of poverty amongst long-
term 'benefit dependent' groups is a politics of basic or minimum income. This would
involve the introduction of a universal form of basic or citizen's income as a social dividend
in recognition of social interdependence beyond the taxpayer-claimant divide. The income
would replace the social insurance principle of the Welfare State which regressively links
social support to labour market advantage, and would serve to integrate the tax and benefit
system in favour of the principle of redistribution. A basic income could be used to confer
symbolic and material value upon unpaid work in the family and community.
The third policy area that I have identified as central to a refusal of the politics of
'underclass' is a politics of representation. This could establish a Commission of the Low
Incomed managed by staff who have extensive experience of poverty, including community
project workers. The Commission would have a lobbying role and a proactive consultancy
role within the policy making process and within the media. Such a Commission would be a
policy priority, and have a central role in formulating the politics of parenting, child welfare
and basic income suggested above.
These three policy areas are not meant to be comprehensive: policies for the creation and
better regulation of employment in particular, and investment in education, housing and
27 For a discussion of a progressive reformulation of the meanings of the private see Squires.J (1994)
Private Lives, Secluded Places: Privacy as Political Possibility p387-401 Environment and Planning
D: Society and Space 12. Also hooks, 'Homeplace: a site of resistance' p41-51 Yearning: race, gender
and cultural politics
health are of equal importance in addressing the kinds of social issues associated with
poverty. The above are presented as three areas that are given very little serious
consideration in policy terms even though their ideas relate to central points of reference in
the discourse of 'underclass'. Moreover all three areas could have extensive theoretical
support from the kinds of feminist and critical theories that have been used in this thesis. As
it is the implications of such theories are rarely developed in terms of contemporary
relations between poor children and society, working lives outside of the labour market, and
the politics of subjugated experiential knowledges of poverty. In this regard there is room
for greater academic advocacy in these areas.28
The presentation of these policies is not meant to suggest that the failings and
contradictions of current welfare practice (and relatedly of society) are fully resolvable.
Rather they are part of a discursive process in which concepts of collectivity, solidarity and
interdependence are given analytical and political priority. The tension between those
priorities and the values of diversity and difference both in principle and in practice may
well be a constitutive dynamic of contemporary society. Acceptance of this tension should
not however suggest that social outcomes are contingent upon the arbitrary working of the
dynamic: power relations can be more equally configured. Cultural and political discourses
are an integral part of those configurations and can work towards ensuring that the risks and
dangers of modern society's quest for social improvement are more equally borne. In this
thesis my own representations are part of an academic practice and network that is
personally and politically committed to reconfiguring knowledges about those people who
unequally bear the burden of such risks.
28 Such advocacy around issues of child welfare, basic income and political representation specifically
is presented elsewhere without reference to Social Theory. See Leach, Children First; Meade.J.E
(1995) Full Employment Regained? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Holman.B (1993) A
New Deal For Social Welfare? London: Lion Publishing
POSTSCRIPT
'The's' word was not used, but this Budget was a first step in creating a stakeholding
economy and society.'
(Hutton.W (1997) 'The Budget' The Observer 6.7.97 p22)
'...the Chancellor has pulled off the magic trick. He has done what he most wanted to do
about the growing underclass. He has changed the future for hundreds and thousands of
women and children (and Harriet Harman here deserves the credit for making him
understand the importance of childcare).'
(Toynbee.P (1998) 'Wooing Women' The Guardian 18.3.98 p22)
'I say this to those who can work: this is our New Deal. Your responsibility is to seek work.
My guarantee is that if you work, work will pay...
Because in the future work will pay, those with an offer of work can have no excuse for
staying at home on benefits.'
('Extracts from Chancellor's Speech' The Guardian 18.3.98 pl9)
Developing the 'welfare to work' theme of their interim budget (July 1997), the first full
Budget of the new Labour government marks a powerful symbolic moment in the discourse
of 'underclass'. It also sets an economic framework for the material existence of large
groups of poor working class people. Its cultural and economic significance is considerable:
the meanings of Welfare and Labour ('work' and the political party) have been cast in new
moulds with a view to long-term social change. This is not a budget on-the-hoof but part of a
programmatic vision whose genesis has been at least as long as 18 years in government
opposition. This thesis has traced part of the development of that vision, through the
discourse of 'underclass': through knowledges, practices, and relations that have chartered a
route of 'social becoming' for poor groups and places in 1990s Britain. Though neither
univocal nor linear in nature, this discourse has been able to achieve a momentous stability,
of which the Budget is now part.
Welfare reform, as one of the Budget's key themes (the others are Stability and Enterprise)
is based on a distribution of benefits to the poor conditionally tied to paid work and
childcare. The Working Family Tax Credit and the Childcare Tax Credit are its centrepiece.
Both are directed at low-income families as a means to create a minimum, work-based
income. The value of the childcare credit is £100 a week for a first child, £150 for two or
more children. The child premium for families on full Income Support has been increased by
£2.50 a week per child, in addition to a £2.50 increase in Child Benefit for all families. Cuts
to lone parent premiums have been maintained.
The disjuncture between the in-work monetary value of childcare and the at-home value of
child care is clear. Also clear, is the intention to regard single parent poor families as
requiring the same level of social support as two parent poor families by not granting any
single parent benefit premiums. In this formulation, two parent working families are
instituted as the ideal. Welfare benefits will deliver most to those who conform to that ideal.
These benefits, however, are not to be regarded as dependency-inducing benefits. By
administering them through the pay packet, the Inland Revenue rather than the DSS, the
cultural and psychological value of 'independence through 'work" is apparently assured.
Subjectivities, psychologies and economies are being re-made through that regime of
meaning, a regime of power/knowledge for new times.
